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Foreword
This is the initial volume in the International Series on Applied Systems Analysis,
sponsored by the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (nASA).
The series has been established by nASA to facilitate the development of systems
analysis and encourage its application to problems of international importance. It
is intended to serve, like the Institute itself, as a means for the international ex-
change of information on and experience with systems analysis and as a vehicle
for collaboration among scientists and scientific institutions addressing common
problems in different countries.
This volume is a particularly appropriate beginning for the series since it addresses
a problem on the methodological frontier of systems analysis, which at the same
time is of considerable practical importance. Furthermore, it reports work by
scientists from more than a dozen nations who were brought together at nASA
for a workshop during October 1975. Finally, it has been edited by the organizers
of the workshop, three nASA staff members, who are now alumni, to provide a
broad representation of the state of the art.
Almost all of the issues that decision makers face in actuality involve multiple
objectives that conflict in some measure with each other. In such issues, decisions
that serve some objectives well will generally satisfy other objectives less well than
alternative decisions, which, however, would not be so satisfactory for the first
group. The decision maker then must select from among the possible decisions
the one that somehow establishes the best mix of outcomes for his multiple con-
flicting objectives.
The analytical tools developed to aid decision makers facing complex problems
originally addressed only single-objective problems. More recently, the artificiality
and restrictiveness of that approach for most real problems has led to the develop·
ment of various methods for handling multiple-objective problems. The purpose
of this volume, and of the workshop from which it was derived, is to bring together
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and report on these various methods and on their application. As the editors suggest
in their preface, better understanding of the processes of decision making with
multiple objectives will enable those who must make such decisions to do so more
intelligently and thus will enhance the likelihood of good decisions.
The contributors are leading scientists and analysts from government, industry,
and the academic world, and their papers (and the informal discussions that follow
many of them) should be of interest and use to researchers, analysts, managers,
and decision makers throughout the world. The editors have prepared an intro-
ductory chapter that provides a background to the papers and places them in
context.
We are especially pleased that the first volume in this series is edited by three
IIASA alumni - David Bell was with the Institute from 1973 to 1975 and Ralph
Keeney from 1974 to 1976; Howard Raiffa was its first director, serving from the
founding in 1972 until 1975. We believe that this book makes a distinct contri-
bution to the literature of systems analysis, and we are gratified that IIASA has
been able to contribute to its preparation.
JERMEN GVISHIANI
Chairman of the Council
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ROGER LEVIEN
Director
Preface
A workshop on Decision Making with Multiple Conflicting Objectives was held at
the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (lIASA), Laxenburg,
Austria, on October 20-24, 1975. Approximately 30 scientists from 15 countries
participated. The purposes of the workshop were, among other things,
To review, contrast, and appraise the several basic approaches to decision making
in problems with multiple conflicting objectives
To discuss applications involving multiple objectives taken from lIASA projects
To learn of applications involving multiple objectives that have been conducted
elsewhere, but that fall within the domain of IIASA projects
This volume contains an edited version of some of the papers presented at the
workshop and the discussion that took place.
Why is IlASA interested in the "multiple-objective problem"? The reason is
simple. IIASA's charge is to conduct systematic analyses of problems common to
industrialized societies in both the East and the West. Such problems include the
use of energy resources, the management of the environment, the development of
water resources, and the expansion of regional development. Problems of this type
invariably involve multiple conflicting objectives: the decision maker or decision
makers must make the vexing value tradeoffs required in such contexts in order
to reach a decision. Let us be a bit more concrete.
The energy systems and ecology projects at IlASA are examining the impact
of different fuel mixes (e.g., coal, oil, gas, nuclear, solar) on populations of up to
approximately 300 million. Different mixes have very different implications for
the environmental quality, for human health and safety, for the socioeconomic
impact on groups of people, and for the overall system costs. It is important to try
to balance these impacts in some way and to come up with the best energy mix, or
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at least a good one. Of course, the problem is complicated because the impacts of
specific decisions will be felt for many years to come. This implies that another
balancing - immediate and short-term impacts versus long-term impacts (perhaps
over generations) - must take place.
Our water resources project has been concerned with further development of
the Tisza River Basin in Hungary. Each of the distinct alternatives has a constel-
lation of implied impacts related to water availability, floods, recreational potential,
employment opportunities, and agriculture, as well as intangible factors such as
aesthetics and degree of international cooperation required to make a specific
plan feasible. As with similar problems, at the time the decisions must be made, it
is impossible to forecast all the possible impacts. Natural factors, such as rainfall,
and the complex sociological processes, such as future interest in particular re-
creational opportunities, contribute greatly to these uncertainties. Yet a decision
must be made - now.
An earlier ecology project at IIASA investigated the implications of various
strategies for controlling the spruce budworm (a forest pest) in New Brunswick,
Canada. Because the lumber industry is very important in this area, serious out-
breaks of this pest can be devastating to the economy as well as to the environment.
After several iterations, three major objectives were identified. These concerned the
recreational value of the forests, the area employment, and the lumber company
profits. Simulation models indicated the impact of various strategies on each of
these objectives over time, and a multiple-objective time preference model (see
Chapter 18 of this volume) was used to evaluate the strategies.
The papers in this volume do cover a variety of approaches to multiple-objective
problems. However, the coverage is not at all balanced; there is certainly a concen-
tration of papers in the area of decision analysis. This is due mainly to the fact that
our research is in decision analysis, and consequently, we were much more familiar
with work, especially with previously unpublished applications, in this area than in
others. The coverage is in no way meant to suggest that decision analysis is the
"best" approach to all or even most multiple-objective problems or that it is more
widely used than other approaches.
Three individuals played major roles in bringing this volume about. Dr. Eva
Matt did a marvelous job in making and carrying out all the workshop arrangements.
Even though the proverbial phrase says you can't do it, she seemed to have all the
workshop participants pleased all of the time. Ms. Edith Gruber was responsible
for typing large segments of the manuscript. It was terrible to read some of that
edited material, let alone to type it. After the editing for content, Jeannette lindsay
edited the volume for grammar and consistency, handled design and production,
and supervised all the fmal details necessary to make such a volume a reality. The
efforts and contributions of these three individuals are greatly appreciated.
DAVID E. BELL
RALPH L. KEENEY
HOWARD RAIFFA
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Introduction and Overview
PERSPECTIVES
It is the task of the editors to set the stage and to establish some perspectives.
How does the subject matter of this conference on multiple objectives fit into the
broader context of applied systems analysis? The simplest explanation of what we
mean by applied systems analysis can be obtained by a mere rearrangement of the
words: the systematic analysis of applied (problems). Such analysis, it is to be
hoped, will result in better decisions.
CAN ANALYTICAL THINKING HELP?
Not all problems can benefit from deep, reflective analysis. However, it is the
feeling of many practitioners and investigators that the body of material that is
now being developed, by many contributors in many fields, under the heading
of "multiple objectives," will become an integral part of the know-how of systems
analysts and that this increment of knowledge will help make an even wider class
of problems amenable to systematic analysis.
Should formal analysis of a problem be done? Although it may seem plati-
tudinous, it is nevertheless important to say that it depends on the problem, on the
analyst - on his personality as well as his skills - on the decision maker(s), and on
the sociology of their interaction. It is true that the mere introduction of an analyst
and the decision to analyze may already have a biasing effect on the outcome
- we could consider whether analysis should be done to do an analysis, and so on.
Certainly empirical evidence is important, but many critical issues still defy scienti-
fic analysis now and probably will continue to do so.
2PREANALYSIS
Preanalysis usually begins when the existence of a problem or a constellation of
interrelated problems is recognized. Since the world is complicated and almost
everything interacts with everything else, there is a natural desire to include every-
thing in the domain of the problem. In many cases, however, the more extensive
a study becomes, the more superficial it becomes; there is a need for an artful
compromise between depth of coverage and making the problem easy enough to
analyze.
After the decision maker(s) and analyst(s) become aware of the problem and
bound its extent, it is important to understand the sociology of the decision prob-
lem. Who is the decision maker? Who will be impacted? When? How? Should
those affected have a voice in the decision? One must also worry about the decision-
making process itself. Which decisions should be made centrally? Which decent rally?
Now let's suppose that we, acting as the decision-making entity, have properly
identified our problem, have bounded it, and have examined the sociological
structure of the decision environment. Next we must be imaginative, but realistic,
about our options. What are our alternatives? What must be decided now, and
what can be deferred without loss? What later actions can be made conditional on
the outcomes of what intervening events? One must recall that doing nothing
is often, in an action sense, doing something. And doing some particular thing
tomorrow may be different from doing that same thing today. The creative gen-
eration of alternative actions is critically important, and one can find empirical
documentation of two strikingly different conclusions: (a) formal analysis often
impedes imagination; and (b) formal analysis can help trigger imagination. Of
course, we aspire to make the latter conclusion more prevalent. By examining the
deficiencies of various action proposals, the analyst can often help tailor-make
alternative proposals that will eliminate these deficiencies. Ideally, there should be
vigorous interaction between the analysis of proposals and the design of proposals
to be analyzed.
MODELING THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACTIONS
Next, the analyst must begin to understand the implications of various courses of
action. Not only must he predict the obvious immediate consequences, but he
must understand how secondary and tertiary effects reverberate in a dynamic way
through a highly interdependent system. This may entail building various models
of the system. But before the analyst goes very far in this modeling effort, he
must decide what he should be worrying about. What are the outputs? What are
the attributes of concern? It is this phase of the problem with which we shaH be
primarily concerned in this volume. But before describing these concerns, let us
round out the picture.
Assume the analyst has now identified and bounded his problem, has examined
the sociology of the decision-making setting, has generated alternative options
3to be examined and evaluated, has listed the attributes and objectives of concern,
has modeled the dynamics of interacting forces at play, and has validated the
model with empirical observations; now, at last, the decision maker must decide
what best action to adopt. We again come to a phase of the problem of primary
interest in this volume - how should the decision maker balance the set of multiple
conflicting objectives, especially when those objectives range over such diverse
realms as economics, the environment, and health. This is the problem at issue here.
MULTIPLE ATTRIBUTES: THE BASIC PROBLEM
Let us consider a simple abstraction to establish a framework that can then be
further embellished. A decision has to be made. The action options are AI, ... ,
Ai, ... ,Am. There are a set of attributes of concern Xl, ... ,Xj , ••• ,Xn , and
each option can be evaluated on each of these attributes. To retain simplicity,
let the evaluation of Ai on attribute Xj be given by the single number Xii for
i = I, ... , m and j = I, ... , n. Thus, act Ai can be identified with a vector con-
sequence Xi = (Xii, ... , Xii, ... , Xin), and a comparison between two acts involves
comparisons between two n-tuples. Now we are ready to look more systematically
at some facets of the problem.
Generation of relevent attributes. These are not given a priori but must be
generated by the analytical team. One desires the attributes to be relevant, in-
clusive, nonoverlapping, and operational. Furthermore, the set of attributes will
not, in general, be unique, and the selection of an attribute set cannot be separated
from what is to be done with that attribute set in the ensuing course of analysis.
Incommensurable units. To understand the problem fully, one must always keep
in mind that we are dealing with incommensurable quantities. The units of one
attribute may be dollars (or schillings or rubles) and those of another may be
lives, or levels of pollu tion.
Intangibles. Some attributes might reflect psychological aspects such as aesthetic
considerations, pain and suffering, anxiety, and other intangible qualities. The
evaluation of actions on such attributes involves delicate problems of psychological
scaling. To ignore such attributes might seriously distort an analysis.
Time. In dynamic models, consequences unfold over time. It is common to look
at monetary flows over time and to realize that a monetary unit t years hence
should not be treated like the same monetary unit today. We must deal not only
with monetary flows over time but with other flows as well. Should we discount
lives or ecological indices? If one is concerned with really long-range planning (e.g.,
nuclear energy options) one might be compelled to think about intergenerational
as well as other temporal (but intragenerational) trade-offs.
4Uncertainties. In most applied problems one is uncertain about many things.
In particular, the evaluation of act Ai on attribute Xi> called Xii> may be an un-
certain quantity. If these uncertainties are acknowledged and probabilities are
introduced, then the outcome of an act Ai is a multivariate probability distribution
in the n-dimensional attribute space. If time is also included, then the evaluation
is in terms of a multivariate stochastic process.
The group welfare problem. Some decisions will benefit some groups and hurt
other groups. Hence in any meticulous accounting of consequences, one must
consider the distributional impact of decisions. Who is to be advantaged and who
disadvantaged? In comparing alternative decisions, one is forced to consider prob·
lems of equity. A decision maker whose actions will affect the lives of others must
pay attention to the feelings of those others, and he may be forced to make painful,
vexing interpersonal and intergroup trade-offs.
This is what the multiple-objective problem is all about: the making of vexing
value trade-offs. There is no magic formula for making these value trade-offs.
The decision maker would, of course, like to do the best he can in each attribute,
but it is not possible to maximize several things at once. If we reduce unemploy-
ment, it may be at the expense of increasing inflation; if we cut costs, we usually
cut benefits as well; if we control one type of error, it is often at the expense of
increasing another type of error.
These problems are pervasive and are at the heart of many public policy con-
troversies. In capitalist countries many of these value trade-offs are made by market
mechanisms - sometimes efficiently, sometimes inefficiently. Many public policy
problems involve externalities that cannot be internalized by a pricing system.
There are other cases in which market imperfections lead to socially undesirable
solutions. In socialist economies, which depend less on market mechanisms, these
problems are handled by planning agencies. Someone must decide what is in the
best interest of society as a whole, and value trade-offs are crucial in such decisions.
VARIOUS APPROACHES
Although the literature on decisions with multiple objectives has shown exponential
growth in recent years, it has a long tradition, especially if one considers special
aspects of the problem, such as the group (or social) welfare problem or the time
problem. In this section we discuss various approaches to the problem of multiple
objectives from the vantage point of different disciplines. This should assist the
reader in placing specific papers in this volume in a broader perspective.
5THE MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS APPROACH
The literature is vast (e.g., Allen, 1961; Henderson and Quandt, 1958; and
Lancaster, 1968), but because of limited space, only two of the most important
problems of mathematical economics that bear directly on our subject of concern
are discussed.
The Individual as a Rational Maximizer
In the theory of consumer behavior, an idealized economic man is confronted
with a choice between bundles of goods and commodities. A commodity bundle
can be identified with a vector x = (XI, ... ,xi, ... ,xn ), where Xi might be the
number of apples to be consumed and Xj the number of oranges. It is usually
assumed that idealized economic man has a transitive preference ordering over
bundles and that this is consistent with a (real-valued) utility I function u, where
u(x) denotes the utility (desirability) of bundle x. Pareto and others have shown
that the essential ingredient of the logical superstructure of economics is not the
utility function but rather the structure of the n-dimensional isopreference curves.
Relatively little attention in economics has been given to practical studies that
either try to ascertain isopreference structures or try to determine appropriate
utility functions (Debreu, 1960). Utility ideas are used primarily as a theoretical
construct to describe idealized behavior rather than as aids to guide behavior.
The theory is designed primarily to permit qualitative conclusions about the
descriptive behavior of consumers as a group and to use these insights in the theory
of the firm or in general equilibrium theory (e.g., what happens to supply and
demand if certain taxes or regulations are imposed).
Very little has been done to enlarge the scope of the problem to include un-
certainties except, of course, to observe that if probabilistic choice is involved,
then the utility function must be further constrained to be cardinal (as opposed
to ordinal) and the von Neumann-Morgenstern (or Ramsey) theory must apply
(Arrow, 1965; von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1947; Ramsey, 1931).
The Social Welfare Function
If X is a commodity bundle shared by n members of the society, then one often
posits the assumption that the ith individual i = 1,2, ... ,n has a preference
function Ui(X) and the group utility function (or social welfare function) is of the
form
u*(X) = f[UI(X), U2(X), ... , Un (x)],
which is often taken to be additive:
I This utility function is more precisely called an ordinal utility function. Its only strategic
purpose is to yield ordinal rankings between x-bundles.
6n
u*(x) = I Aj ulx).
j=1
There is a rich literature on this problem that quickly becomes embroiled in
questions of in terpersonal comparisons of utilities. For the most part this literature
concentrates on the certainty domain. Some of the literature (Nash, 1950; Harsanyi,
1956; Luce and Raiffa, 1957) extends these ideas to probabilistic choice situations,
but once again the literature theorizes about idealized behavior and little attempt
has been made to assess actual utility functions and to use these to guide behavior.
THE PSYCHOMETRIC APPROACH
Psychometricians have long been fascinated with the problem of multidimensional
scaling. Their orientation is to find some simple, psychologically appealing, latent
(genotypic) model that can account for the manifest (phenotypic) behavior of
individuals. Factor analysis and multidimensional scaling models are examples of
such models. A tie between this tradition and the tradition of the mathematical
economist can be found in the work of Luce and Tukey (1964) on conjoint
measurement. Once again, the orientation and motivation is to explain, rationalize,
understand, and predict behavior - not to guide it.
There is a vast literature on behavioral decision theory [see the review article
by Hogarth (1975)] that examines individual behavior under conditions of cer-
tainty, risk, and uncertainty. Most of the researchers are mathematical psychologists
and psychometricians, and their orientation is to try to understand behavior better
in order to be in a better position to (a) predict (descriptive) behavior and (b) guide
(prescriptive) behavior. The empirical research of the psychological school of behav-
ioral decision theorists includes laboratory experiments and observations of natural
behavior.
THE MATIIEMATICAL OPTIMIZATION APPROACH
The Standard Problem
The basic problem of mathematical programming or control theory can be ab-
stracted in the following terms: Let Z be a set of control or decision variables with
generic element z [for example, in linear or nonlinear programming z may be an
n-tuple, but more generally z may be a function over some (infmite dimensional)
space]. The set of permissible or feasible z's is restricted by a set of constraints
(e.g., by a set of linear or nonlinear inequalities). Let the set of feasible z's that
satisfy these constraints be denoted Zoo In the classical formulation of the pro-
gramming problem one assumes the existence of a single objective function that
associates to each feasible z in Zo a numerically scaled evaluation X(z); in linear
programming where z is an n-tuple, X(z) is a linear function ~j CjZj. The problem
is now formulated: find ZO in Zo to maximize (or minimize) X(z). Constraints are
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FIGURE I Set of attainable evaluations.
used as a way of eliminating alternatives that are known in advance to be non-
optimal, and in this way a simple objective function may be a close enough repre-
sentation of the "true" multiple objective trade-offs in the feasible domain.
The Multiobjective Generalization
Instead of a single objective function, let us now consider n objective functions
XI,' .. ,Xn . For each feasible z in 2 0 we now associate a vector evaluation
X(z) = [XI (z), ... ,Xi(z), ... ,Xn(z)].
We cannot generally choose z to maximize Xi(z) for all i.
Several problems have received attention in this literature:
Problem A (characterization o/multidimensional opportunities). Let R be the
set of points in n-space of the form X(z) for all z in the feasible domain 2 0 (Figure
1). One asks: Is the set R convex? How can one characterize the efficient (Pareto)
frontier of nonstrictly dominated points?
Problem B (setting 0/aspiration levels: goal programming). For each evaluator
Xi, a goal value bi is tentatively proposed, and the analyst investigates the possibility
of finding a z in Zo that simultaneously satisfies the extra n inequalities
8i = 1,2, ... , n.
The goal vector b may then be successively changed through informal, interactive
exchanges among analyst, programmer, and decision maker (Dyer, 1972; Kornbluth,
1973).
Problem C (interactive exploration of the efficiency frontier). We can intro-
duce an auxiliary problem: find z in Zo that maximizes ~iAiXi(Z) for a set of ex-
ternally suggested weights Ai ~ 0 (i = I, ... , n) and ~iAi = I. The resulting optimal
z (which depends on A) will yield a point on the efficient frontier together with
marginal substitution rates for this frontier point. The decision maker can now
decide which way to move (if at all) on this frontier. This is often done informally,
and there is an active interchange between probing the decision maker's preferences
and the attainability of evaluation outcomes. Usually, no attempt is made to
investigate the basic structure of the decision maker's preferences. This is left
unformalized.
Problem D (introduction of an ad hoc aggregation [unction). An illustration
will help to explain what is done here. Let x; == maxz E z [Xi(z)]; that is, x; is theo
best that could be done if Xi were the only objective function. Let x* = (xr , ... ,
x~); we can think of x* as the unattainable aspiration point. Introduce a norm
II x - x* II that measures the distance from x to x* , and now the problem is for-
mulated: choose z in Zo to minimize IIX(z) -x* II; Le., choose a feasible z whose
vector evaluation comes closest to the unattainable x* .
This procedure, although mathematically satisfying, is not operational until one
decides on the norm to be used. In illustrative problems, one often introduces the
mathematically convenient norm, [~iAi(Xi -xD2]1I2; but one must then grapple
with the all-important Aweights.
In all these problems, uncertainty is not handled except perhaps by deterministic
sensitivity studies.
THE COST-EFFECTIVENESS AND COST-BENEFIT APPROACH
In cost-effectiveness analyses, distinct from cost-benefit analyses, a proposal
q is usually evaluated in terms of several cost indices Cl(q), ... , c.(q) and several
benefit indices b1(q), ... , br(q). Although a monetary unit to one government
agency is not the same as to another agency or to a private company, and although
a monetary cost today is different from the same cost in t years, these costs
Cl(q), ... , c.(q) are in sufficiently commensurable units that one usually collapses
the costs into an overall single cost, say c*(q).
Collapsing the benefit side is more difficult and therefore more controversial
(Mishan, 1972; Peskin and Seskin, 1973). In cost-effectiveness analysis, the dif-
ferent types of benefits are kept separate. One classical problem is to set aspiration
9levels br, ... ,b: and to find the program qO that satisfies these aspirations - viz,
bj(qO);;;. hi, all i-and that minimizes c*(q). An analytical staff might prepare
for policy consideration several sets of target levels (br, ... ,bn each with its
associated minimum cost figure.
In cost-benefit analysis - or, as some might prefer to say, in benefit-cost
analysis - there is an attempt to collapse the r benefits b 1(q), ... ,blq) associated
with proposal q into an overall benefit index b*(q). Now if an agency has many
proposals and an overall budget constraint C, proposal q should be ranked alongside
other projects by its benefit-cost ratio b*(q)/c*(q), and projects should be ac-
cepted from the top of the list until the total budget C is exhausted. This can be
shown to be optimal, except for indivisibility effects, which in many circumstances
are minor.
The weakest link in this development is the collapsing of the benefits b1(q), ... ,
blq) into a single composite benefit b*(q). How can this be done? In most appli-
cations of these techniques in market economies, one allows market mechanisms
to help make these trade-offs. There are objections, however:
There may be imperfections in the market mechanisms.
There is a tendency not to include benefits that cannot be "priced out" by a
market mechanism.
Cost-benefit analysis as well as cost-effectiveness analysis usually ignores
uncertainties. Since this is intolerable in some applied contexts (such as studies
involving natural hazards), cost-benefit-risk analysis should be employed.
The major departure of cost-benefit-risk analysis from the traditional cost-
benefit analysis is the explicit introduction of uncertainties. Probabilities (or
risks) of various possible events are specified. However, in the overall evaluation
process, the impacts of these possible events are usually collapsed by using an
expected impact on each attribute. The decision criterion often used is to maximize
the benefit-cost ratio with the restriction that the risk should not exceed an
acceptable level. Of course, identifying this acceptable level requires someone to
make some difficult value judgments.
Most cost-benefit analyses of any type leave out one crucial matter: the ability
to adapt or adjust a strategy to account for information acquired along the way.
The dynamics of uncertainty analysis (Le., how assessments of uncertainties might
evolve over time) are especially important in problems with long time horizons.
THE DECISION ANALYSIS APPROACH
The aim of decision analysis is to decompose a problem into two parts: one to
indicate the probabilities of different possible consequences of each alternative and
the other to evaluate the desirability of those possible consequences.
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The consequences are evaluated using a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility
function u that assigns a utility u(Xj) to consequence Xi' The key property of this
function is that it is appropriate to evaluate alternatives using their expected
utilities; better alternatives have higher expected utilities.
The probabilities Pj(x;) associating the likelihood of an actual consequence Xj
given an alternative A j may be assessed objectively (if possible) or subjectively by
the decision maker or some other more qualified expert.
The assessment of the utility function by questioning the decision maker is
intended to involve much less complex trade-offs than the real problem does. The
spirit of recent theoretical work in decision analysis has been to find ways of
identifying simple underlying preference structures that enable the analyst to break
down the assessment of a multidimensional function into that of several one-
dimensional functions (Fishburn, 1970;and Keeney and Raiffa, 1976).
ORGANIZATION OF THE VOLUME
We have chosen to place the papers in this volume in two categories, those con-
cerned mainly with methodological aspects of multiple-objective problems and
those concerned mainly with applications. Papers that focus on procedures for
using methodological tools are included under the heading of methodology. At the
end of the book, there is a condensation of some of the general discussion that
took place at the workshop.
METHODOLOGY
Each of the first four papers is concerned with models that attempt to examine the
alternatives and specify either the best one, or a set of "good" ones, or a ranking.
Hence, both the consequences of each alternative and an indication of the decision
maker's preferences for those consequences are included in each of the models.
The first paper, by Ozernoi and Gaft, suggests a general approach to addressing
multiple-objective decision problems under certainty. The focus is on the con-
struction of decision rules consistent with the decision maker's preferences. The
technique employs an iterative procedure in which the decision maker's preferences
are obtained in steps; after each step, alternatives are examined, and dominated
ones are dropped from further consideration. This allows one to eliminate alter-
natives sequentially, beginning with very vague information about the decision
maker's preferences and progressively requiring more precise information. An
illustration of the use of this technique for evaluating the design and technological
layout of coal mines is presented.
In Chapter 2, Roy wishes to isolate the set of "best" alternatives where the set
may be specified as containing one or more alternatives. First, the decision maker is
guided through an essentially creative process to identify his true criteria and then
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map the implications of each alternative onto those criteria. Next, he is asked to
examine pairs of alternatives holistically to construct outranking relationships.
These pairs specify whether one alternative is at least as good as another in terms
of a given criterion. By examining all the outranking relationships, one identifies
inferior alternatives and eliminates them. To address problems in which the decision
maker's preferences are not completely known, Roy introduces a "fuzzy out-
ranking" relationship that indicates the degree to which one alternative outranks
another. This information on strength of preference aids in ranking the noninferior
alternatives.
Zionts and Wa11enius describe their iterative procedure for solving multiple-
criterion mathematical programming problems in Chapter 3. The method assumes
that the decision maker can specify concave objective functions for each objective,
but it does not presuppose the formalization of the value trade-offs. Via an inter-
active computer program, pairs of nondominated alternatives are offered to the
decision maker, and he is asked to respond to the proposed choices by choosing the
better one or indicating his uncertainty. Subject to consistent preferences, the
method converges on a best alternative. Initial experiences with implementation of
the model are discussed.
Peschel and Riedel, in Chapter 4, are concerned with identifying the Pareto-
optimal set of alternatives - that is, the set of nondominated alternatives. More
specifically, the focus is on the class of problems in which control theory can be
effectively utilized. Several procedures for selecting the best point from the
Pareto-optimal set are suggested, and a number of applications concerning the
optimal design of technological devices, such as switching circuits for machine
tools, are discussed.
The next three papers differ from the first four in that the overall decision
problem is not considered. Rather, these papers focus only on structuring aspects
of the preferences of the decision maker. Such information must then be integrated
with the consequences of each alternative in order to allow selection among the
alternatives.
In Chapter 5, MacCrimmon and Wehrung are concerned with quantifying the
value trade-offs of the decision maker. They focus on two representations that do
this - indifference curves and preferred proportion curves. Several procedures for
eliciting such curves from decision makers are discussed.
Luce surveys conjoint measurement, which is concerned with numerical repre-
sentations of orderings on Cartesian product sets, in Chapter 6. The emphasis is
on decomposable representations of these orderings. In the multiple-objective
context, these representations can formalize the decision maker's value structure
for consequences under certainty.
Chapter 7, by Fishburn, reviews von Neumann-Morgenstern utility theory.
Different independence conditions on consequences or gambles defined on the
set of consequences are examined, and special representations of the utility func-
tion implied by such conditions are noted. Aspects of verification of the conditions,
their applicability, and assessment of the resulting utility function are discussed.
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The next two chapters discuss factors that are crucial in applying multiple-
objective evaluation procedures. In Chapter 8, Larichev addresses the issue of
subjective criteria - that is, criteria requiring the development of a subjective
index to indicate degrees of achievement on them. He suggests that an index
based on qualitative estimates in terms of verbal descriptions of only a few quality
levels seems to work best. An example of the evaluation of R&D projects is discussed
briefly.
Tversky writes about the elicitation of preferences in Chapter 9. More specifi-
cally, he discusses two phenomena that often bias assessments of utility functions.
First, individuals tend to value a specific outcome more if it is certain than if it is
uncertain. Second, individuals often evaluate options relative to a reference point,
such as the status quo or the aspiration level. These effects are illustrated and
their implications discussed.
Chapters 10 and 11 address preferences over time. In Chapter 10, Kulikowski
introduces a dynamic consumption model that prescribes how a consumer should
utilize financial resources for consumption over time. For a specific consumption
model described in the paper, the optimal allocation strategy for resources is
derived. In Chapter 11, Meyer introduces the idea of state descriptors to simplify
the assessment of preferences for time streams of consequences. Such descriptors
allow one to summarize the effect of past experiences on present preferences in
terms of a few variables - namely, the levels of those state descriptors. The struc-
ture imposed on the utility function when the state descriptors take on certain
intuitively appealing properties is derived.
APPLICATIONS
While the seven applications papers do cover a variety of problems involving mul-
tiple objectives, not all the various approaches to such problems are represented.
Several of the papers discuss the use of decision analysis in a variety of contexts.
As indicated in the preface, the reason for this is that our research concentrates on
decision analysis, and consequently we were more familiar with applications in this
area than in others.
Edwards, in Chapter 12, is concerned with social decision making by groups
of individuals with conflicting value structures. He indicates that multiattribute
utility measurement, by making explicit each individual's values, can help show
how they are different and can frequently result in a reduction of these differences.
He describes the application of multiattribute utility measurement in two specific
cases, management of the coastal zone in a part of Los Angeles, California, and
selection of research programs for the Office of Child Development of the U.S.
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.
In Chapter 13, Hax and Wiig discuss the use of decision analysis for appraising
possible capital investment strategies of a major mining company. The company's
basic problem was to decide whether to bid on two parcels of land with extensive
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ore deposits. The company could bid on either or both parcels with or without a
partner. Assuming aquisition of a parcel, production decisions about development
and exploitation of the parcel were analyzed. The implications of an analysis with
two objectives indicated a different best strategy from that suggested by initial
single-Qbjective "dollars and cents" analyses. The decision maker chose to act
in accordance with the two-Qbjective analysis.
The evaluation of potential sites for nuclear power facilities in the state of
Washington, U.S.A., is discussed by Keeney and Nair in Chapter 14. A series of
screening models identified nine specific sites for evaluation. A decision analysis
was used for an evaluation of these sites based on six major objectives concerning
human health and safety, environmental effects, socioeconomic impacts, and
financial considerations.
In Chapter 15, Wegener and Bauer discuss the use of multiattribute utility to
assist interested citizens in joining in public planning and decision processes. Speci-
fically, they examine alternative urban development plans with an urban simulation
model and an evaluation procedure based on multiattribute utility. Experimental
applications of the technique in Darmstadt, a city in the Federal Republic of
Germany, are described.
Nakayama, Sawaragi, and Inoue discuss aspects of a large environmental pol-
lution control project in Japan in Chapter 16. They first illustrate the use of the
multiplier method for optimization of a class of environmental control problems;
the main application concerns the problem of thermal discharge in steam power
plants. A second case discussed briefly is that of urban planning, where the intent
is to evaluate citizen consciousness of the quality of urban life.
In Chapter 17, Dyer and Miles illustrate the use of various approaches for fa-
cilitating the selection of trajectories for spacecraft. Eleven teams of scientists,
each with a different set of objectives, were involved in the evaluation of more than
thirty pairs of trajectories for two spacecraft scheduled to be launched to Jupiter
and Saturn. The overall evaluation process was used in selecting the trajectory pair
finally adopted for a 1977 launching.
Bell discusses the application of decision analysis for forest pest management in
Chapter 18. A model was developed by the ecology project at IIASA for examining
alternatives for combating the spruce budworm, a forest pest, in New Brunswick,
Canada. The paper describes the process of articulating the objectives - employ-
ment, lumber company profits, and the recreational value of the forest - eventually
used in the evaluation process. A utility function was assessed over these attributes
that explicitly took into account the long time horizon involved.
CONCLUSION
These papers give a sample of the current approaches being tried in many countries
in the hope of improving our ability to analyze complex problems. The variety of
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successful applications is encouraging, and, taken together with further examples
appearing regularly in the scientific and business literature, suggests that these
techniques are finding acceptance among analysts and decision makers.
No one approach will ever be proved to be best in all circumstances. This volume
provides extensive coverage for those who wish to become familiar, or more fam-
iliar, with the techniques currently available.
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Part One
Methodology

1Multicriterion Decision Problems
V. M. Ozemoi and M. G. Gaft
1.1 INTRODUCTION
A large number of publications devoted to multicriterion decision problems have
appeared: the theory, techniques, and practice. Nevertheless, no formalized tech-
niques are available that cover all decision steps from the initial statement of the
problem to the choice among alternatives for achieving the desired result. This
paper suggests a general approach to multicriterion decision problems under cer-
tainty and develops a multicriterion model with the following elements: (a) a state-
ment of the problem, (b) a set of feasible alternatives, (c) a set of criteria, (d)
estimating scales, (e) a mapping of the feasible alternatives for the set of vector-
valued estimates, (f) the system of preferences of the decision maker, and (g) de-
cision rule. Included are a general-procedure flowchart with formalized and non-
formalized steps and a discussion of the construction of all the model's elements
and consideration of their correction and updating at subsequent steps. Various
possible ways of constructing these elements are analyzed, and guidelines are given
for those steps in the model's construction that cannot be formalized.
The major focuses of attention are on the establishment of decision rules and on
the decision maker's preference system, largely because most difficulties that
arise in developing and using multicriterion models can be attributed to these
sources. The technique suggested is an iterative procedure in which data on the
decision maker's preferences are obtained in steps. The information obtained at
each step is used to form a new decision rule more informative than the previous
one. Thus, the sequence of decision rules is ensured: the initial decision rule, which
is weakest of all, uses the simplest information and most evident assumptions; all
subsequent decision rules are obtained from previous ones and incorporate ad-
ditional assumptions consistent with those accepted earlier and with the additional
information.
The formal properties of these decision rules are investigated, with emphasis on
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meaningfulness and on consistent criteria for obtaining useful information for the
decision maker. A classification system is developed to define the sequence for
obtaining various types of information according to the decision maker's pre-
ferences.
The approach suggested here has been repeatedly used for the solution of
complex practical problems. The paper describes in detail its use in design of the
technique for identifying the required number of most preferable coal mine lay-
outs. This technique ensures that in the early design stages one may develop feasible
layouts for a wide range of geological conditions by means of a morphological
analysis, provide an estimate of all the layouts in terms of 25 nonanalytical techno-
logical and economic indices (criteria), compare feasible layouts, and identify the
most preferable among them.
1.2 MULTICRITERION DECISION-MAKING MODEL
When applying formal techniques to decision problems, alternatives should be
compared and ordered by means of a decision-making model that permits estimates
to be made and preferences to be revealed among them. Thus, construction and use
of a model become part of the decision process (Ozernoi, 1974).
1.2.1 BASIC ELEMENTS OF THE MODEL
A multicriterion decision-making model may be presented in the following way:
{t, S, K, X, f, G, r},
where t a statement of the problem
S a set of feasible alternatives
K a set of criteria
X = the estimating scales
f = a mapping of the feasible alternatives for the set of vector-valued
estimates
G the decision maker's preference system
r the decision rule
The statement of the problem characterizes the decision maker's goals. De-
pending on the meaningfulness of the statement, the most preferable alternative
should be found, the set of feasible alternatives linearly ordered, or the set of non-
inferior alternatives identified.
The sel. S is the totality of alternatives that satisfy constraints and suggest
possible ways of achieving the desired goal. S may either be given initially or be~
formed during the analysis. Elements from the set S are also referred to as "feasible
alternatives," "feasible solutions," "decision versions," "strategies," "actions,"
"variants," and so on.
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Each alternative leads to a specific outcome, the consequences of which are
estimated by the criteria K l , K 2 , ••• ,Km , m?i>2. In some problems, a set of
criteria K may be given, but it generally is formed during the course of the analysis.
K would be criteria that are
• Considered to be important with regard to the desired goal of the decision
maker
• Common for all feasible alternatives
• Necessary to characterize the overall decision utility, so that the decision
maker wishes to obtain the most preferable estimates of those criteria (Le., they
cannot be presented in the form of constraints)
Among other terms used for designating the criteria are "local criteria," "indices,"
"performance indices," "goal functions," and "factors."
A scale in the form of the set of estimates with order relations should be con-
structed for each criterion. The scales Xl, X 2 , ••• ,Xm forming the set X may be
either numerical (discrete or continuous) or nonnumerical. The set X may contain
various types of scales.
The Cartesian product Y = Xl X X 2 X ••• X X m forms the set of vector-valued
estimates. Each alternative is estimated by the scales X b X 2, ..• ,Xm , i.e., the set
of feasible vector-valued estimates A s;. Y corresponds to the set of feasible alter-
natives S by means of the mapping f: S -+ A.
The totality G of some sets with preference relations (for instance, the criterion
sets, intervals between estimates on the scales, feasible solutions of a certain type,
and other data obtained during the analysis) comprises the decision maker's pref-
erence system. These preferences are usually revealed and formalized (and some-
times verbalized) during the part of the analysis in which the model is constructed.
A decision rule is an analytical expression, algorithm, or verbal expression that
operates on the set of vector-valued estimates with preference relations to produce
either an order or a quasi-order in the set A. The ordering of the set A by means
of some decision rille and the mapping of fpermit judgments to be transferred from
preferences on set A to those on set S, and hence S can be ordered. The decision
rule should permit an ordering of the set of feasible alternatives that corresponds to
the meaningful statement of the problem and is in accordance with the assumptions
and preference system of the decision maker. Various decision rules may be con-
structed, depending on the assumptions given and on the goals and preferences of
the decision maker (Ozernoi, 1974).
The basic problems that arise in constructing models for multicriterion problems
are caused by difficulties in obtaining the necessary information for developing
such models. In many cases, a full list of feasible alternatives is not available;
criteria characterizing the quality of alternatives are either incomplete or unknown;
some or all criterion scales have not been constructed; estimates have not been
obtained for all alternatives in terms of the criterion scales; the decision maker's
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preference system is not known; and/or the decision rule has not been constructed
for obtaining the required ordering.
Thus, the construction of a multicriterion decision model is a complex pro-
cedure involving both formalized and nonformalized steps. One should note that
for any specific multicriterion problem, no "true" or "objective" model is available.
The results of such a study should not be used unconditionally: because of a large
number of factors that may be taken into account in any specific problem, it is
always possible to present the same situation by different models. The appropriate-
ness of these models may be checked only in the context of their practical appli-
cation to real situations. Let us consider some elements of the multicriterion models
and possible ways of constructing these models.
1.2.2 DETERMINING THE SET OF FEASIBLE ALTERNATIVES
No universal techniques are available for determining a set of feasible alternatives.
Such alternatives are developed from information about similar phenomena in
similar situations, from problem constraints, and from the experience of decision
makers and experts.
A morphological analysis may be used in many problems to determine the set
of feasible alternatives (Jantsch, 1967). This technique can be used to divide a
problem into a number of independent subproblems (levels). For each level, pos-
sible solutions of subproblems (elements) are defined. A set of elements including
exactly one element of each level is the decision alternative. The possibility of
including each pair of elements from different levels in one decision alternative is
investigated for feasibility. As a rule, the identification of the infeasible com-
binations decreases the number of elements in the set of alternatives. In addition,
morphological analysis reveals new alternatives and facilitates meaningful de-
scription of the decision alternatives (Burchakov et aZ., 1972; Emel'ianov et aZ.,
1972). One difficulty in conducting the morphological analysis, however, is that it
is necessary to use experts' estimates to define the subproblems, form the elements
of each level, and explore the possibilities of including elements of different levels
within one alternative.
There are other techniques that can be used to determine the set of feasible
alternatives. One is to use "brainstorming" (Jantsch, 1967). In constructing a
"goal tree" (Lopukhin, 1971), various techniques can be used to achieve the
lowest-level goals, and these techniques can lead to the formation of a set of fea-
sible alternatives. Search in the parameter space (Artobolevskii et aZ., 1974) and
simulation are additional possibilities. A more detailed listing of feasible alternatives
is an independently complex problem; a creative approach is often necessary in
place of partially formalized techniques. And, moreover, the discovery of a new
alternative often influences the decision process greatly.
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1.2.3 ESTABLISHING THE SET OF CRITERIA AND CONSTRUCTING THE SCALES
Two tendencies should be taken into account in establishing a set of criteria. The
first is the wish to construct a decision model that corresponds as closely as possible
to a real-life problem. This tendency can lead to an increase in the number of
criteria considered and thus complicate the model and restrict its use. The second
tendency is to decrease the number of criteria to make the model simpler and less
time-consuming to use. Let us say that the number of criteria is necessary and
sufficient if introducing any additional criteria does not affect the problem so-
lution but neglecting at least one of the chosen sets changes the results.
Forming a list of criteria is a complicated multistep iterative procedure that
cannot be fully formalized because most information necessary for compiling
the list can be obtained only through the assistance of the decision maker and
experts in the relevant areas of expertise. Nonetheless, a certain sequence of reason-
able steps for establishing the list of criteria is suggested (Ozernoi, 1974). A block
diagram illustrating these steps is provided in Figure 1.1.
The first step of the procedure is to compile a preliminary list of criteria. This is
generally done in consultation with the decision maker (and experts, as appro-
priate). An analysis of this list, step 2, reveals the most essential criteria for esti-
mating the quality of the system from the point of view of the decision maker.
The analysis focuses on the adequacy of the individual criteria; in particular, it is
necessary to check if a particular criterion under consideration directly indicates
the quality of the decision; if the criterion does not, it should not be included
(for instance, "system redundancy" is not a criterion, although "reliability of the
system" is).
Step 3 is the determination of at least one empirical indicator for each criterion
(Beliaev, 1967). This permits the elimination of nonuniformity and inaccuracy
in the criteria.
A scale is then constructed for each criterion in the form of a set of estimates
with order relation (step 4). The choice of scale type depends on the measuring
technique to be used and on the properties of the magnitude measured. Depending
on the desired accuracy of measurement, values should be determined for the
magnitude characterized by the empirical indicator, and these values should be in
the region of feasible estimates.
In the course of constructing the scale, it might be found that a criterion is
complex (Ozernoi, 1974), reflecting several alternative properties at once. In this
case (step 5), empirical indicators of its components should be verbalized (tran-
sition to step 2). If a check shows that the criteria are not complex, updating of
all criteria, empirical indicators, and scales developed thus far is necessary (step 6).
The mutual correspondence of each criterion and the corresponding scale is
then checked (step 7). This check should indicate whether each estimate included
in the scale characterizes a particular criterion or an additional one as well. The
check should also indicate whether the criteria and their empirical indicators were
verbalized correctly.
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1 Compile the preliminary list
of criteria
~
... 2 Analyze criteria I.
'1
~
... 3 Determine empirical indicators
~
.I 4 Construct the estimating scalesI
~
5 Check complexity of criteria ~y
~ no
6 Update criteria, indicators, and
scales
!
<7 Check for mutual correspondence of criteria ~and their indicators and scales~ no
8 Correct correspondence of criteria, indicators,and scales
...
9 Revise the list of criteria, indicators,and scales
1
10 Check the possibility of using the scalesfor estimation of decision alternatives
FIGURE 1.1 Sequence of 10 steps for establishing a set of criteria.
23
When there is no mutual correspondence in step 7, step 8 provides for analysis
of the causes of noncorrespondence and a transition to one of the previous steps.
If mutual correspondence of all the scales and criteria is established, revised lists
are produced for the criteria, empirical indicators, and scales (step 9), and their
appropriateness for estimation of the specific decision alternatives is checked
(step 10).
1.2.4 USING THE SCALES TO DEFINE ESTIMATES OF THE DECISION
ALTERNATIVES
Usting the criteria and constructing the scales permit definition of all the feasible
decision alternatives in terms of the set of criteria. As a rule, alternatives may be
estimated only by specialists - the experts or the decision maker. The "degree of
objectivity" of the estimates is affected by the nature of the criterion, the type of
scale, and participation of the expert in the process of obtaining the estimates.
Thus, when quantitative criteria and criterion estimates are developed through
calculations or direct measurements (provided these calculations or measurements
have been carried out correctly), the estimates do not depend on the persons who
developed them.
If, however, experts are asked to give estimates in terms of the criterion scales -
involving judgment - different specialists may give different estimates for the
same alternative. Therefore the analyst should try to construct scales so detailed
and concrete that the answers of most experts will be practically identical (in-
creasing the "degree of objectivity").
When it is necessary to obtain estimates from a group of experts, the techniques
and procedures used in sociology may be put to use to ensure that measurement is
reliable and valid (Pinto and Grawitz, 1967).
If the numbers of feasible alternatives and criteria are too large (for instance,
several thousand alternatives and several dozen criteria), it will be impossible for
experts to achieve direct estimation of each decision alternative. In such a case, a
procedure for forming feasible alternative estimates in terms of all criterion scales is
suggested (Burchakov et al., 1972; Emel'ianov et al., 1972). This procedure is as
follows:
• The set of feasible alternatives is presented in the form of a morphological
diagram.
• Criteria are estimated in terms of which elements of a given level they con-
tain.
• Estimates are obtained for all elements of each level in terms of the scales.
• Tables are constructed, in consultation with experts, containing estimates
for all possible combinations of elements from each level in terms of the criterion
under consideration.
• A computer is used to form the overall estimate for each alternative in terms
of all the criteria.
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1.2.5 ASSESSING THE DECISION MAKER'S PREFERENCE SYSTEM
Decision theory assumes that a decision maker uses some rational, uncontradictory
preference system (or structure). Each decision maker has such a system, although
he is not always aware of it. Assessing the decision maker's preference system is
the most difficult step in formulating decision rules in multicriterion problems.
A decision maker's preference judgments are linked closely with the relative im-
portance of criteria, the estimates generated through the scales he uses, and so on.
A serious difficulty in assessing these preference systems is that, in practice, answers
to many questions are almost impossible to obtain. Moreover, attempts to gain
some kinds of information about preferences may be completely futile. The more
complicated the assumptions about these preferences, the lower the level of confi·
dence in their substantiality. Thus, when assessing preferences, the analyst should
use simple and reliable information and include only those data without which the
problem could not be solved. The more complicated information about preferences
should be used only if the available information does not give the ordering required
in the problem.
Another difficulty in assessing the preference system is that a decision maker
may in practice be inconsistent (Luce and Raiffa, 1957; Granberg, 1966). It is often
difficult to discover inconsistency in the preference system, both for the decision
maker and for the analyst who takes part in the decision process.
In assessing the decision maker's preference system, the analyst should
• Verbalize the assumptions on which preferences are based and verify their
correctness
• Consider the methods of obtaining required information and choose the
most convenient ones from the point of view of the decision maker
In multicriterion problems, assessing the preference system involves the decision
maker's judgments on ordering the model's elements. For example, the assessment
may consist of the following:
• Defining the relative importance of estimates included in each criterion scale
by constructing order or numerical utility functions for each scale
• Specifying the intervals between estimates in the scale of each criterion
• Ordering vector-valued estimates that are combinations of the best and the
worst estimates in the scales of all the criteria
• Examining the vector-valued estimates that differ when, for example, arbitrary
estimates in the scales of two criteria are used.
1.2.6 CONSTRUCTING THE DECISION RULES
Constructing the decision rules is one of the most vital steps in solving a multi-
criterion problem. It is here that the notion of "preference" is concretely defined,
and thus the order of the alternatives is determined.
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Decision rules used in multicriterion problems may be divided into three groups:
heuristic and axiomatic rules, according to the principles of their construction;
one-step and multistep rules, according to procedure (Ozernoi, 1975); and rules
leading to full or partial ordering of the set of feasible alternatives, according to
purpose (Roy, 1972). The axiomatic approach to constructing decision rules
assumes that a number of axioms are established for the set of alternatives, the
nature (structure) of the decision maker's preference judgments, the possibility of
obtaining preference information, and so on. This approach is the basis of pre-
scriptive utility theory (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1953; Fishburn, 1970),
which considers various sets of axioms and thereby permits proof of the existence
of a scalar, positively defined utility function on the set of vector-valued estimates.
A decision rule in this sense is a generalized or global criterion and depends on
alternative estimates in terms of all the criteria.
The most thoroughly studied forms of utility function are the additive, multi-
plicative, and quasi-additive forms. l The basic difficulty in constructing the utility
function is that the axioms cannot be accepted for all practical problems, and the
appropriateness of these axioms is often difficult to verify. For example, the
axioms of completeness or negative transitivity (Fishburn, 1970) of the preference
system cannot be satisfied in many situations. There are a number of works that
treat the existence of utility functions for noncomplete preference relations2 but
questions of practical utility function construction are given little consideration.
Thus, decision rules implementing the construction of the utility function generally
include a full ordering of alternatives. Using such decision rules in problems where
a full ordering is not required (for instance, in identifying the required number of
most preferable alternatives) results in redundant information in the decision
maker's preference system.
Several approaches are used to construct decision rules. The axiomatic approach
does not always require construction of the utility function.3 The heuristic ap-
proach means a decision rule based on quite reasonable considerations, although
no assumptions are formulated.4 Decision rules based on this approach often base
decisions on a subset of the criteria (Germeier, 1971 a,b). A number of works
(e.g., Borisov, 1972) consider a set of decision rules from which a decision maker
should select one consistent with his understanding of the problem. Such an ap-
proach is justly criticized by Venttsel (1972) for transferring the arbitrariness
from one area into another.
The construction procedures for both heuristic and axiomatic decision rules
may be one-step or multistep. Multistep decision-making techniques make it
1 See, for example, Roy (1972), Fishburn (1966, 1967a, 1974), Yntema and Klem (1965), and
Keeney (1968,1974).
2 See examples of this in Fishburn (1970), Luce (1956), Aumann (1962), Chipman et ai.
~1969), and White (1972).
See Roy (1972), Larichev (1972), Shapot (1971), and Buianov and Ozernoi (1974 and 1975).
4 See Roy (1968 and 1972), Larichev (1971), Podinovskii and Gavrilov (1975), Ozernoi (1971),
Volkovich (1968), Salukvadze (1971), and Dedikov and Kukharev (1971).
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possible to combine mathematical models with the experience and intuition of the
decision maker.! With such procedures, a decision maker answers questions re-
vealing preferences. This approach implements the decision rule of a certain type
and subsequently updates some of its parameters, although it does not guarantee
consistency of the preference information obtained.
Analysis of the techniques available for constructing decision rules shows that in
general one-step procedures are used in problems where a full ordering of alter-
natives is required; multistep procedures are preferred in problems that call for a
partial ordering.
None of the known decision rules may be considered free of limitations
(Ozernoi, 1975; Roy, 1972; Larichev, 1971). Thus, the construction of universally
applicable decision rules is likely to be impossible in principle because different
decision rules may be constructed for different orderings of the set of feasible
alternatives, depending on the decision maker's goals, his preferences, and the
possibilities of obtaining data. Accordingly, for each specific problem general
procedures should be developed for constructing decision rules, depending on the
desired result. One suggested procedure is described in the next section.
1.3 A PROCEDURE FOR CONSTRUCTING THE DECISION RULES
1.3.1 BASIC CONCEPTS
Difficulties in assessing the decision maker's preferences seem to call for an iterative
procedure for constructing decision rules. Two basic requirements must be met:
• The additional information on preferences obtained from a decision maker
at the (i + 1) step of the decision procedure should permit preferences to be
established between at least two vector-valued estimates that are incomparable at
the ith step (the criterion of meaningfulness applied to additional information).
• The preference between any two vector-valued estimates revealed at the ith
step of the decision procedure should not change in subsequent steps (the criterion
of consistency applied to additional information).
The use of a decision rule in comparing the vector-valued estimates unam-
biguously sets a certain binary relation on the vector-valued estimates of the set Y.
Depending on the properties of the binary relation thus obtained, it is referred to
either as the preference-indifference relation {R, Y} (nonstrict preference) when
it is transitive and reflexive, or as the strict preference relation {P, Y} when it is
transitive and nonreflexive (Fishburn, 1964).
! These techniques are demonstrated in Shapot (1971), Buianov and Ozernoi (1975),
Podinovskii and Gavrilov (1975), and Roy (1968).
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Let us denote the binary preference-indifference relationship obtained when
we compare the vector-valued estimates from the set Y through the ith decision rule
of the procedure as {Ri, Y}. This relationship is a quasi-order one (Le., transitive
and reflexive); it determines the relationships of strict preference, equivalence,
and noncomparability (Gaft and Ozernoi, 1973). Thus,
DEFINITION 1 Defme the relationships of strict preference, equivalence,
and noncomparability in the following way:
{pi, Y},wherepi = {(x,y)E Yx YI(x,y)ERi,(y,x)~Ri}
{Ii, Y}, where Ii = {(x, y) E Y x Y I(x, y) E R i, (y, x) E R i }
{Ni, Y},whereNi = {(x,y)E Yx YI(x,y)~Ri,(y,x)~Ri}
Let us consider the properties of binary relationships that may be obtained at
various steps in constructing the decision rules leading to the certain ordering
required in the problem.
The above requirements of iterative procedure for constructing decision rules
can be formally expressed as
pi <;.pi+1
(1.1)
(1.2)
Equation (1.1) dictates the strictness of the insertion; Eq. (1.2), nonstrictness of
the insertion, is explained by the fact that the information obtained at the (i + 1)
step reveals the strict preference among the vector-valued estimates that were
incomparable at the ith step, as well as their equivalence.
Assumptions written as Eqs. (1.1) and (1.2) should be used with care by the
analyst, since in practical cases decision makers may change their preferences in
the course of analyzing and solving the problem, which will lead to inconsistency
of information obtained from those preferences. Thus, the information gained in
constructing the decision rule should be thorougWy analyzed and compared with
that obtained earlier. As a result of this analysis, any contradictions (and their
sources) will be discovered, and measures can be taken to eliminate them. Only
after this checking can the information obtained be used for constructing a decision
rule.
Let us consider some implications of the assumptions of Eqs. (1.1) and (1.2).
RESULT 1 If the relations {pi, Y} and {R i+1, Y} satisfy Eq. (1.1), the fol·
lowing expressions result:
Ii <;. Ii +1
Ni::JNi+l
pi U N i 2pi+1
(1.3)
(1.4)
(1.5)
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(1.6)
At least one of Eqs. (1.5) and (1.6) will be strict.
Equations (1.3) through (1.6) may be used to check the consistency of the
information obtained from a decision maker.
Relations satisfying Eqs. (1.1) and (1.2) will be referred to as inserted. Let us
consider the relationships among the sets of noninferior elements that are isolated
by using inserted relations. Suppose that a set of scales is given for the criteria
with which the alternatives are estimated and thus the set of vector-valued estimates
Y is defined. The set of feasible solutions S corresponds to some vector-valued
estimates in subset A ~ Y. Thus,
DEFINITION 2 Let the subset LRi (A) be defined as the set of xEA such
that no yEA exists with y preferred to x using pi. We define L R i (A) as the set of
noninferior estimates derived from A using the preference-indifference relationship
{R i , Y}.
RESULT 2 If the R i, R i+1 satisfy Eq. (1.1), the following is true:
L Ri(A)2LR i+.(A) (1.7)
Equation (1.7) indicates that the (i + 1) step diminishes (or at least does not
increase) the subset of noninferior estimates obtained at the ith step.
It is not difficult to check the subset LRi(A) to ensure that it consists of in-
comparable and equivalent elements. Therefore, the necessary and sufficient
condition for
LRi(A):J L R i+. (A)
will reveal preferences among the incomparable elements from LRi(A) at the
(i + 1) step.
1.3.2 CLASSIFICATION OF PREFERENCE INFORMATION
In constructing decision rules the question arises: What sort of information about
the decision maker's preferences is necessary, and how much information is neces-
sary to solve the multicriterion problem? Various ways of obtaining preference
information are described in the literature. l
Let us consider the classification of information used in various models of
multicriterion problems for constructing the decision rules. Such classification was
initially suggested by Roy (1969); however, the scheme lacked a uniform classifying
"yardstick." In this paper we select as the yardstick the relationship between the
information obtained and one or several criteria. Three classes (types) of infor-
mation can thus be identified (Ozernoi and Gaft, 1974):
1 Yntema and Klem (1965), Larichev (1972), Fishburn (1964, 1967b), and Goorin (1974).
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• Information about the influence of a change in estimates for one criterion
scale on the overall value, or utility, of the alternative (type A information)
• Information about the way a change in estimates for one criterion scale - in
comparison with changes over another criterion scale - influences the overall value,
or utility, of the alternative (type B information)
• Information about the way a change in estimates for the scales of one group
of criteria - in comparison with those for another group, and provided that at least
one of the compared groups includes more than one scale - influences the overall
value of the alternative (type C information)
Let us consider these types of information. Assume that a scale (at least, the
ordering one) is constructed for each criterion. Obtaining information of the first
type may be regarded as the process of measuring the utilities of the estimates. In
the course of measuring, the elements in the scales for other criteria should be
maintained at a certain fIXed level (Stevens, 1951). Thus, it is convenient to classify
type A infonnation by the utility scale that may be obtained from it. Obtaining
type B and type C infonnation makes comparison of various utility scales possible
and reduces the incomparability of the alternatives. Infonnation of this type should
be classified by the degree to which it influences the elimination of the incompar-
ability of the vector-valued estimates.
Type A information includes the following kinds of information;
AI; Infonnation about various preferred estimates for a one-criterion scale.
This information, if obtained for each estimate, allows the analyst to construct
an ordinal utility scale for the criterion, and it is generally possible to accomplish
the same for each criterion in the decision problem.
A 2 : Information about changes in estimates in the criterion scale that make it
preferable to other scales. This information, if obtained for changes in all estimates,
allows the analyst to construct an interval utility scale for the criterion.
A 3 : Information about the relationships between the utility changes and changes
in estimates for the criterion scale, or information about the absolute values of the
utilities of the estimates. Such information, if obtained for all relationships in
numerical form, permits the analyst to construct a utility relationship scale for
the criterion.
Type B information is classified in the following way:
Bo: Complete lack of type B information.
B1 : Information about a change in estimates, from best to worst, for the scale
of a criterion, such that this change is preferable to a similar change in estimates for
the scale of another criterion.
B2 ; Information about a change in estimates for the scale of one criterion, from
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best to some other estimate, such that this change is preferable to a similar change
in estimates for the scale of another criterion.
B3: Information about an arbitrary change in estimates for the scale of one
criterion, such that this change is preferable to an arbitrary change in estimates
for the scale of another criterion.
B4 : Information about changes in utility relationships corresponding to changes
in estimates for the scales of two different criteria.
Type C information is classified as follows:
co: Complete lack of type C information.
C1 : Information about changes in arbitrary estimates for the scales of one group
of criteria, such that such changes are preferable to changes in arbitrary estimates
for the scales of another group of criteria. This information allows the analyst to
develop further details regarding both the nature of the changes in estimates (simi-
lar to that in Bl> B2, B3 , and B4 ) and the number of criteria in the respective
groups.
1.3.3 THE SEQUENCE OF STEPS FOR OBTAINING INFORMATION
The classification scheme outlined above contains all the components in the se-
quence for obtaining the necessary information to construct the ordering required
in the problem. A diagram of the procedure for obtaining such information is
shown in Figure 1.2. It should be mentioned that the information necessary for
the ordering may not always be obtained from a decision maker. This means that
the sequence of steps for obtaining the information shown in Figure 1.2 cannot
be correlated to each specific problem. A sequence may end at any step either
because the required ordering is completed or because further information is
impossible to obtain. Nevertheless, in all cases the sequence of obtaining the various
types of information corresponds to that shown in Figure 1.2. If there is no need
for a certain type of information, that does not imply that more complicated infor-
mation is not necessary.
There are no A2BoCo(Cd, A~OCO(Cl)'A2B1CO(C1), A 3B1CO(C1), or A 1B4 CO
(Cd classes of information in Figure 1.2 because such information does not reveal
new preferences among the incomparable alternatives outlined in previous steps.
For example, if a problem contains the A1B1Co(Cd class of information, type A 2
information is useless.
1.4 EXAMPLES OF DECISION-RULE CONSTRUCTION
Let us consider the way decision rules are formed using the classification of pref-
erence information suggested in section 1.3.2. Here we shall assume the inde-
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pendence of criteria on preference (Keeney, 1974) - Le., assume that information
on preferences with regard to several criteria does not depend on fIxed estimates in
the other criterion scales.
According to the classifIcation of preference information, A IBoCo is the sim-
plest type of information. This information permits construction of the decision
rule that establishes the following relationship of preference-indifference {RO, Y}
for the set of vector-valued estimates Y: a vector-valued estimate x E Y is not less
preferable than y E Y if each component of x is not less preferable than the cor-
responding component of y.
There are such cases when the use of the decision rule leading to the relation
R O results in identifIcation of only one noninferior (maximal) vector-valued esti-
mate from the set A or in linear ordering of this set. In the majority of cases,
however, more complicated information than A ]BoCo is necessary to solve the
problem. Given AI, the use of A 2 or A 3 information does not produce any stronger
decision rule unless some type B information is obtained.
1.4.1 DECISION RULES BASED ON A 1 B 2 Co INFORMATION
Let us construct a decision rule using the A ]B2CO information. Assume that the
A] information is available for every scale and that B 2 information can be obtained
for certain scale pairs derived from X.
Consider the partitioning of the set X intoJ classes {M] ,M2 , •••• ,MJ}, I <.j <. J.
According to the assumptions made on the possibility of obtaining B2 information
for each pair of scales belonging to one class, the analyst may order the influence
of specifIc levels of these pairs on the alternative utility. By utilizing the inde-
pendence assumption, this information can be used to construct uniform utility
scales for each class Mj • After uniform utility scales are constructed for all scales
of each class, a decision rule based on A ]B2CO information is used over the reduced
number of dimensions in the same manner as the decision rule based on A IBoCo.
A decision rule based on A ]B2CO information should unite the decision rules
corresponding to different partitionings of the set X. Let us say that such a de-
cision rule leads to the preference-indifference relationship {R*, Y}.
1.4.2 DECISION RULES BASED ON A,B.Co INFORMATION
The vector-valued estimates y, z E Y may not be comparable to relationship R* for
two reasons: (a) there is a class of criteria scales for which the estimates cannot
give preference to the vectors y and z; and (b) there are two classes of criteria such
that the estimates corresponding to one of them give preference to vector y and
the estimates corresponding to the other, to vector z.
It is possible to bring about partial elimination of incomparability in R * attrib-
utable to the fIrst reason if a change is made from reliance on type A I information,
which permits construction of an order utility scale, to type A 2 , which leads to
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construction of an interval utility scale. Another way to accomplish this partial
elimination of incomparability is to change from B2 to B3 information. To elimin-
ate incomparability in R· completely, A 3 B4 CO information is necessary. A 3
information, which permits construction of utility relationships for the criterion,
should be obtained for all scales of this class, thereby producing estimates that
would lead to elimination of incomparability. B4 information should be obtained
for all pairs of scales in this class.
1.5 A SOLUTION TECHNIQUE FOR MULTICRITERION PROBLEMS
A diagram is provided in Figure 1.3 for developing and using the multicriterion
model in a decision problem. A statement of the problem (step 1) is followed by
establishment of the set of feasible alternatives (step 2), a list of criteria and em-
pirical indicators (step 3), and construction of scales (step 4). All alternative esti-
mates are defined in terms of the scale for each criterion (step 5).
A decision rule stating the desired result is constructed according to the pro-
cedure suggested in section 1.3. This procedure is generally carried out in several
steps. First, information is obtained about a decision maker's preference system
(step 6). This information is analyzed, verified, and then used to construct a de-
cision rule (step 7). The sequence for obtaining this information is the same as that
illustrated in Figure 1.2.
The decision rules obtained at each step of the procedure are used for ordering
the set of feasible alternatives (step 8). The results of this ordering are analyzed
(step 9), and a check is made to ascertain that the ordering is satisfactory (step 10);
unsatisfactory ordering could be caused by contradictory preference information
obtained at various steps, an incomplete set of criteria characterizing the quality
of the feasible alternatives, disparity between the estimating scales for certain
criteria and measuring potential, or errors in estimating alternatives in scales of
certain criteria.
Depending on the reasons for the unsatisfactory ordering, different measures
may be taken to eliminate them. It may be necessary to update the problem state-
ment; include new alternatives in the initial set; or update the list of criteria, their
scales, and estimates of alternatives in terms of new scales. It may also be necessary
to correct the information upon which preferences or decision rules are based.
A check should be made to determine if the ordering of the set of feasib,le
alternatives obtained satisfies the problem stated (step 11); if there is no corre-
spondence, some additional preference information should be obtained and a new
decision rule constructed. The analysis of incomparable alternatives in the ordering
in step 11 makes it possible to establish the class of information necessary to form
a new decision rule.
When the ordering of alternatives meets the problem requirements and is ac-
cepted by the decision maker as satisfactory, it is regarded as final. If a decision
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1 Provide a statement of the problem
J.
2 Form the set of feasible alternatives..
+
3 Compile a list of criteria and empirical.. indicators
..
~ 4 Construct the scalesI
J.
5 Define alternative estimates in terms
of the scale for each criterion
+J 6 Obtain information on preferences t..~I
~
7 Analyze and verify information;
construct decision rule
j
8 Order the set of feasible
alternatives
j
9 Analyze the ordering
+~ 10 Check for satisfactory ordering
"I
.. yes
<11 Check to determine if ordering obtained ~satisfies the problem stated~ yes
12 Select the alternative
FIGURE 1.3 Sequence of 12 steps for developing and using a multicriteria model.
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maker behaves rationally, he will make a decision consistent with the ordering
obtained (step 12).
1.6 APPLICATION: THE PROBLEM OF SELECTING COAL MINE LAyours
1.6.1 A STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
The basic problem in the design and reconstruction of working coal mines is
the application of a technological-economic (technoeconomic) index to the
optimal layout. There may be a great number of feasible layout alternatives for
any geological condition (for some types of deposits the number exceeds 7,000),
yet no reliable techniques for evaluation are available. Accurate computations
of the technoeconomic indices are difficult to program, particularly when there
are many possible layouts to process. Today this selection is performed in two
stages. At the first stage, a team of expert designers identifies several layouts that
are optimal in the view of the group. The number identified at this stage is dictated
by further possibilities observed for mine development. At the second stage, tech-
noeconomic calculations are performed for the layouts; this may require many
months of work for a large number of design engineers. These calculations are
necessary for the identification of the one optimal layout.
In the first stage the number of layouts is usually very high; no single expert
could possibly analyze all of them. The technoeconomic indexes of the layout
are unknown at this point and cannot be used in selection of the "best" layout;
thus, each expert has to rely on his own selection rule. The rule intuitively used
by the expert can be based either on recognition of a large number of criteria
characterizing the layout or on the desire to identify the layouts that contain
"the best" elements in the opinion of the expert. In the first case, there is the
danger that layouts with high technoeconomic indexes may be left out at the
initial stages and eliminated from further consideration because the experts have
different sets of criteria and hold different views on the comparative importance
of each criterion. In the latter case, it is generally impossible to find one layout
that contains only those "best" features, and so the experts have to reduce the
requirements for the elements. The question of which requirements are the most
essential is resolved by each expert independently, depending on his knowledge
and experience.
Thus, the experts' opinions on the advantages and disadvantages of certain
layouts may differ greatly. Expert opinion is one approach to the selection of an
optimal layout, and in the absence of impartial data, it might be the only approach.
Sound decisions require, however, a well-defined statement of the problem, special
expert estimation and processing procedures, and the use of decision-making
techniques. The search for an optimal coal mine layout is clearly a multicriterion
decision problem. Let us consider a technique suggested for solving the problem.
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1.6.2 DETERMINING THE SET OF FEASIBLE COAL MINE LAYOUTS
In a coal mine layout six possible levels or considerations can be distinguished:
methods for opening, opening layout, sequence of preparatory operations, pre-
paratory technology, sequence of steps in working the mine, and the system of
mining. Depending on the type of mining to be undertaken and the geological
conditions, each level contains a finite number of elements from which a single
element is selected for each alternative layout. Not all elements taken in pairs
from different levels, however, may be joined in one layout scheme for economical
or technological reasons. In some cases the number of feasible layout alternatives
exceeds 7 x 103 (and the number of possible layouts exceeds 2 x 105 ).
The analysis of feasible layout alternatives can be carried out on the basis of a
morphological analysis (Jantsch, 1967; Burchakov et al., 1972; Emel'ianov et al.,
1972). All feasible layout alternatives may be presented in the form of a morpho-
logical scheme. Each horizontal row of vertices will correspond to a level of a mine
layout design, and the vertices themselves to elements of a given level. Links among
the vertices of different levels allow for the possibility of combining the corre-
sponding elements into a joint technological scheme. The morphological scheme
presents each feasible alternative in the form of a chain of elements (one element
from each level).
1.6.3 ESTABLISHING THE CRITERIA AND CONSTRUCfING THE SCALES
The set of criteria characterizing the quality of a mine layout in the early design
stages is the union of the sets of criteria characterizing each level of the layout.
For each level, sets of criteria can be established and corresponding scales can
be constructed. A complete list of criteria, scales, and estimates for selecting
layouts is given in Burchakov et al. (I 972). The list contains 25 technical, eco-
nomic, and technoeconomic criteria; all criteria are qualitative measures, and all
scales are ordering ones. An example of a criterion is "possibility of mine moderni-
zation without affecting its work." The corresponding scale is "(a) possible, (b)
partially possible, (c) impossible."
1.6.4 DEVELOPING ESTIMATES
The number of possible combinations of elements to be estimated may be very
large (of the order of several thousand). This number may be reduced by using an
assumption: any two elements of one level having the same estimates in terms of
the scale of one criterion may be said to represent the estimate of the entire alter-
native in terms of the scale of this criterion. Thus, rather than estimate all possible
combinations of elements from levels affecting the overall layout estimate, it is
sufficient to estimate all possible combinations of elements of these levels in terms
of one criterion.
For each type of mining and each geological condition, it is possible to develop
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tables to estimate various combinations of elements from two or more levels based
on the scales of the criteria met at each level. The tables developed by Burchakov
et al. (1972) for coal deposits might serve as examples.
1.6.5 FORMING THE SEQUENCE OF DECISION RULES
The set of preferred coal mine layouts containing approximately the desired num-
ber of alternatives can be identified by using three decision rules based on suc-
cessive implementation of information of the types A IBoCo,A IB 2CO, and A:J34CO'
When constructing a decision rule based on A :J34CO information, all scales divide
into four classes; A 3 information can be obtained for all scales of each class, and
B4 information for all pairs of scales of each class. Changes in utility relationships
can be estimated by numerical intervals (Burchakov et al., 1972).
The technique outlined above, based on the construction of successive decision
rules, was used to identify 21 preferable mine layouts for the Chicherbay area of
Kuzbass and 4 layouts for the reconstruction of a V.I. Lenin "Tom'-Usinskaya
1-2" mine, one of the largest in the Soviet Union. In the former case, there was an
initial set of feasible layouts containing 7,704 possibilities; in the latter case, 3,126.
It is evident that the suggested technique facilitated selection, considerably short-
ened the time, and reduced the cost of design. The technique is currently being
used in the design of other coal mines in the Soviet Union.
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2 Partial Preference Analysisand Decision-Aid:
The Fuzzy Outranking
Relation Concept
B.Ray
The purpose of this paper is to examine some major aspects of a prescriptive
theory, called Decision-Aid.
Whenever a decision-making problem comes on stage, it is understood that there
is a decision maker, for whom the scientist is working, waiting in the wings. The
objective of Decision-Aid is to shed light on the decision but not to fix it; in partic-
ular, Decision-Aid must not suppress the activity and free will of the decision
maker. Moreover, it is convenient to introduce a third person, almost always
present, who stands between the scientist and the decision maker (whom the
scientist never, so to speak, meets); we will call this third person the "demander."
Generally, it is the demander who sets the problem, and it is he who is confused
at times, but wrongly, with the decision maker, for it is he who commissions and
finally judges the scientist's work and conclusions.
It is well to bear in mind that a decision is very rarely the reflection of the pref-
erences of an isolated person, nor even of a well-defined group of people. For ex-
ample, the person who accepts or rejects a demand for credit is often influenced by
the impression his subordinates may have of the client who asks for credit - never-
theless, this person will try to conform to the company's policy for this type of ser-
vice. The decision is an important stage in the evolution ofa process, and providing
Decision-Aid means taking part in this process. This implies the identification of the
one among the various actors who plays a determining role in the achievement of
the process and for whom, or in whose name, Decision-Aid is provided. In our eyes
it is this more or less circled entity that covers the concept of "decision maker."
It must be stressed that above all it is the demander's duty to furnish the scien-
tist with the means of acquiring as good an understanding as possible (within his
available means) of the class of phenomena and question field specific to the
The author wishes to thank Howard Raiffa and Jeannette Lindsay for the amendments they
have made to this paper.
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decision problem. In particular, it is up to him not to imprison the scientist in an
ill-defined problem - i.e. an out-of-eontext problem or one formulated in such a
way that it cannot be incorporated into the decision process. The model, no matter
how lifelike it is, is never reality but a substitute; the model is designed to be
appropriate only to a specific field of questions, about which it is destined to give
an insight, or rather an idea, since the model studies only a fragment of reality,
which always is more complex and broader than the model. To be aware of the
reality in its essential aspects, to isolate the correct fragment with respect to the
question field, it is necessary to have a valid and exhaustive perception. In this,
the demander plays a dominant role.
Finally, the scientist's function is to build the model and to draw from it con·
clusions that are intelligible to the decision maker and that can orient his action.
His success in this depends very much on the way in which, in relation to the
demander, he defines the model, refines the problem formulation, and chooses
the operational attitude. Will he progress from the set embracing the only feasible
exclusive actions to a statement of the "best" action or of a group of dominating
actions? If the particular formulation chosen (for example, in a credit demand)
leads to retaining not one unique action but several (without the number being too
imposing), will he classify (in decreasing order) all the nonexclusive actions con-
templated, or will he construct a decision tree leading to decisions of the type
"accept," "reject," "demand complementary information"? Will he agree to give
up the idea of comparing any two actions, or will he undertake an immediate line
towards classical optimization? Finally, would he prefer to tackle a more interactive
problem seeking to bring to light one or more compromises embraced by a set A of
possibilities defined a priori, or would he wish to consider also the genesis of the
actions and "negotiation" that lead to reconsideration of the limits of feasibility?
In summary, Decision-Aid refers to the activity of a scientist who tries, by
means of more or less formalized models, to help a decision maker to improve his
control (this word having its cybernetic connotation) of the decision process. To
"improve" in this context means to increase the coherence between the evolution
of the process and the different objectives intervening in it. This includes, among
other things, eliciting the objectives, clarifying their antagonisms, and finding
implementable solutions which satisfy them. In this perspective, modeling has,
first, a passive role in helping the actors to comprehend the phenomena, by the
mastery it gives of the various possible actions, and by the reflections it gives of
pre-existing preferences; second, modeling has an active role in the sense that the
model contributes to the formation and the evolution of the preferences of the
different actors on stage, by making them acceptable or by discovering possibilities
that were previously rejected or not even considered.
In this paper, we will particularly study questions dealing with
• How to conceive and build a model of the preferences of an identified de-
cision maker, who may not necessarily be a single person (sections 2.1 and 2.2)
• How to use such a model so as to help the decision maker (section 2.3)
42
The preferences in question are those of the decision maker in connection with
feasible actions or, more generally, potential actions (section 2.1.1). Consequences
of any of them can be analyzed (by the scientist with the help of the demander)
using primary concepts (section 2.1.2); comparison of such actions can then be
based on vectors g(a) =gl(a), ... ,gn(a) that associate with any potential action
a n values, each one corresponding to a particular criterion gj' The set of then
criteria defines what we will call a consistent family of criteria (section 2.1.3).
The heterogeneity of conflicts between criteria, the incomplete knowledge of
conditions of substitution between small variations of each one, and the qualitative
nature or fuzziness of some of the data entering in their definition are some of the
factors that render preference modeling particularly difficult (section 2.2.1).
Considering those difficulties, it seems necessary to introduce a priori four funda-
mental exclusive situations in modeling of preferences (Table 2.1). More precisely,
as a starting point for a prescriptive theory of Decision-Aid we will set the following
basic axiom, which seems to be as unrestricted as possible.
FUNDAMENTAL PARTIAL COMPARABILITY AXIOM Preferences can be
modeled by means of four binary relations I, P, Q, and R, having the following
properties1:
I (indifference): reflexive and symmetric
P (strict preference): irreflexive and antisymmetric
Q (large preference): irreflexive and antisymmetric
R (incomparability): irreflexive and symmetric
Moreover, exactly one of a'Ia, a'Pa, aPa', a'Qa, aQa', and a'Ra holds for every
potential action a and a'.
Classical decision theory excludes incomparability and large preference since it
is based on the following, more restrictive axiom.
COMPLETE TRANSITIVE COMPARABILITY AXIOM Preferences can be
modeled by means of two binary relations I and P having the following properties:
I (indifference): reflexive, symmetric, and transitive
P (strict preference): irreflexive, antisymmetric, and transitive
Moreover, exactly one of:
a'Ia, a'Pa, aPa'
holds for every potential action a and a'.
1 Terminology is that of Fishburn (1970a, pp. 10-11).
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TABLE 2.1 Situations to Which the Comparison of Two Potential Actions a, a'
May Lead (a =1= a')
Situations
Four fundamental exclusive situations
Indifference: a'la & ala'
Strict preference: a'Pa or aPa'
Large preference: a'Qa or aQa'
Incomparability: a'Ra & aRa'
Two important regroupings
Presumed preference: QUI
Preference: Q uP
Definitions
The two actions are indifferent in the sense that
there exist clear and positive reasons to choose
equivalence; example: gj(a) = g/a') Vi, some
of the equalities not being rigorous but only
approximate
One of the two actions (which one being known) is
strictly preferred to the other; example:
g/a) =gj(a') Vi *- k, gk(a') - gk(a), a signifi-
cant difference
One of the two actions (which one being known) is
not strictly preferred to the other, but it is im-
possible to say if the other is strictly preferred
to or indifferent from the first one because
neither of the two former situations dominates;
example: gj(a) = gj(a') Vi *- k, gk(a') - gk(a),
neither sufficiently small to justify indifference
nor sufficiently large to justify strict preference
The two actions are not comparable in the sense
that none of the three former situations domi-
nates; example: gj(a) > gj(a') for i = 1, ... ,p,
gj(a') > gj(a) for i = p + 1, ... ,n, the majority
of the differences being significant
This excludes the strict preference and incompara-
bility situations, and consequently embraces
indifference and large preference situations be
they separated or only assumed separable;
example: see Tables 2.5 and 2.6 (prescription
concept)
This covers the two situations of strict and large
preference separated or assumed separable and
consequently excludes indifference and incom-
parability; example: see Tables 2.5 and 2.6
(condition 2 and the quasi-eriterion concept)
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Let us observe that, for real-world problems, this latter axiom implies! (and
vice versa) the existence of what we will call a value function 2 VA (a) defined on A
such that:
VA(a') = VA (a) ~a'Ia and VA(a') > VA(a) ~a'Pa.
There exist many problems for which the most appropriate preference modeling
is provided by an adequate expression of such a value function based on n criteria:
As will be shown in section 2.2.1, there are also many problems for which
multicriterion Decision-Aid does not fit in with the assessment of such a value
function. An alternative possibility of preference modeling will be described in
sections 2.2.2 and 2.2.3. It is especially appropriate when large preference and in-
comparability cannot be excluded a priori and when indifference and strict pref.
erence are not necessarily transitive.
In section 2.3, we will show how a partial and fuzzy knowledge of preferences
can be made to conform to the fundamental partial comparability axiom (but not
necessarily to the complete transitive comparability axiom) and can be made
operational for Decision-Aid. Three types of problem formulation will be studied.
2.1 WHICH ACTIONS ARE TO BE COMPARED AND ON WHAT BASIS?
2.1.1 POTENTIAL ACTIONS AND THE PROBLEM FORMULATION
Usually, the scientist orients his modeling work toward the elaboration of
• Alternatives, conceived as mutually exclusive, each one representing a global
action that describes, in an extensive way, every aspect of the decision
• A set A embracing all imaginable global actions that are surely implementable
(usually called feasible alternatives) - this a priori delimitation is based on the
existence of a rigid objective frontier separating the admissible and inadmissible
However, there may be problems for which it is futile or simply awkward to
use such a set as a starting basis for Decision·Aid. First, the frontier between the
acceptable and the unacceptable is often fuzzy. Sometimes this depends on the
nature of the boundaries. In other cases, it is the diagnosis of acceptability in its
globality that will create the problems, because of the complex arrangement of
1 This implication is not true in general, but the additional condition existence of a countable
subset of A P-order-dense in A given in Fishburn (l970a, theorem 3.1) is always verified in
practice.
2 So as to avoid confusion with the utility function in the von Neumann sense, we do not use
the term utility here: VA(a) may be quite inappropriate to mathematical expectation calcu,
lations.
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The elements of A
are mutually exclusive
Case globalized Case fragmented
and stable and fixed
Case globalized Case fragmented
and evolutionary and evolutionary
(or flexible) (or flexible)
The set A is a priori
defined in a strict and
exhaustive manner (by
a rigid frontier, a non-
ambiguous test of mem-
bership, and so on)
(
YES
NO
YES NO
FIGURE 2.1 Four cases for the modeling of the set A of potential actions.
the diverse fragments constituting the envisaged actions. Second, insufficient per-
formance brought to light by a preliminary calculation, the clash of ideas between
the principal actors in the decision process, and simply the impossibility of im-
agining beforehand all the possible actions, are all circumstances that lead to the
evolution of the set A (see Figure 2.1).
Moreover, let us point out that analysis of the subject matter of the decision
often brings out the artificial and uselessly complicated character of a conception
that necessitates the definition of mutually exclusive actions. Many false problems
are born from this conception. Let us consider, for example, the decision regularly
taken in a bank in relation to requests for credit or in a private firm in relation to
the remuneration of personnel or by a panel in connection with the granting of a
diploma. When the actions are not naturally exclusive, we may seek to determine
those configurations or fragments that are. Thus we are led to substitute for the
natural set A of elementary compatible actions, a subset of PeA) (set of all subsets
of A), the elements of this subset appearing as global actions pairwise incompatible.
By doing this we are taking the risk of encountering difficulties (occasionally
insurmountable) in delimiting the subset of peA) of acceptable configurations
(feasible alternatives).
The important point in connection with the set A is that the potential! actions
in the context of a given stage in Decision-Aid are clearly identified. This by no
means signifies that the actions are mutually exclusive or independent but that they
may be considered separately from one another without becoming devoid of
meaning. This does not mean either that they are all immediately acceptable;
there is nothing binding, and some may be considered unacceptable at a subsequent
stage.
! I feel that the terms "action" and "potential" are more appropriate respectively than "alter-
native" and "feasible" or "admissible," which seemed to be too strongly related to case A
globalized for the former and to caseA fixed for the latter.
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Depending on the problem studied, A may be defined (modeled)
• By a list that very precisely identifies each potential action (e.g., the siting of
a factory, a research project)
• By a generator enabling systematic generation (at least in theory) of all
potential actions (e.g., demand for credit, work planning)
• As the solution set of a series of conditions or constraints, expressed math-
ematically, on the characteristics of the potential actions (e.g., product mix, in-
vestment plan)
There are two fundamental modeling options that have to be clarified: the
conception of the set of actions (discussed above) and the choice of problem
formulation. For this latter choice, the scientist has to take into account the level of
intervention of the model and its actual stage of development. Table 2.2 lists three
types of problem formulation.
It is often thought that problem formulation a is the only natural one. The
unique quality of the final decision in the case of A globalized has come to rein-
force this belief.
By experience we know how difficult it is for a scientist to convince the prin-
cipal actors in the decision-making process that the optimal solution in keeping
with his model is the one that should be adopted. Moreover, this particular problem
formulation a ceases to be self-evident when A is evolutionary or fragmented.
The scientist may then consider either problem formulation ~ or 'Y (see Table 2.2).
More details on each one will be given in section 2.3.
This double option (see Figure 2.1 and Table 2.2) leads to 4 x 3 = 12 cases, each
corresponding to a real situation. A superficial analysis may leave us with the
impression that the globalized cases imply the a type of problem formulation.
In actual fact, they do not, as we will see in section 2.3. The fragmented cases do
TABLE 2.2 Types of Problem Formulation on A
Type of
Problem
Formulation
a
Objective of the Problem
To help to choose one action
considered the "best" among those
studied
To help to sort out all those actions
that seem "good" among those
studied
To help to rank in a ~ecreasing order
of preference the actions that seem
the "best" among those studied
Output of the Model
A choice or
a selection procedure
A sorting or a segm.:n-
tation procedure
An ordering or a ranking
procedure
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not exclude problem formulation a, since Decision-Aid can then proceed by suc-
cessive iterations, each consisting of the selection of a "best fragment."
In the progressive development of the analysis, there may be successive problem
formulations and successive definitions of the sets of potential actions. Each of
these successive problem formulations, which is a guideline for discussion and
gathering of the data, critically influences the adoption (or rejection) of the study
by the principal actors intervening in the decision-making process. Therefore, at
each step, the problem formulation has to be determined in connection with what
can be understood and accepted by the principal actors so that the scientist can
make a useful contribution to the decision process.
Regardless of the nature of A and the associated problem formulation, it is clear
that Decision-Aid assigns a fundamental role to the notions of best, worst, good,
and bad. It is for this reason that Decision-Aid is not easily separable from a ref-
erence to one or more scales of values or even thresholds. Scales or thresholds
relative to whom? Relative to the decision maker in the sense laid down above.
This means that Decision-Aid is very rarely conceivable without agreeing (pro-
visionally) to "play the game" of a certain decision maker. The scientist can do this
by treating the global preference modeling problem not only for the decision
maker, but successively for several of the actors in the decision process. In reality
he is often tempted to seek refuge in a pretended neutrality in order to evade the
inherent difficulties of identifying the decision maker in whose name, or for whom,
he is working. In so doing, he generally assumes a confused position that makes him
run the risk of treating a problem different from the one in question. In fact, the
notions of best, worst, good, and bad rarely have an absolute objective sense, and
it is unreal, I believe, to talk about preferences without specifying the actor who
expresses these preferences and seeks to have them accepted in the decision-making
process. According to whether these preferences have been more or less faithfully
represented, the quality of the help that this model can give will change.
Nevertheless, the analysis of the elementary consequences of the diverse poten·
tial actions can generally proceed independently of the chosen decision maker. But
then the scientist should clearly try to disassociate
1. The formal description of all the elementary consequences that at least one of
the actors may wish considered. [In doing this, he will have to try to synthesize
evaluations by using a consistent family of criteria that is acceptable and com-
prehensible to all (this will be the subject of the remainder of section 2.1).]
2. The modeling of global preference, taking into account the decision maker's
personality. (He will have to try to do this according to the operational attitude
that seems to him to be the most effective in the decision process.)
2.1.2 THE PRIMARY CONCEPTS USED IN CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS
Even relative to a clearly identifiable decision maker (a manager, a selection com·
mittee, a community), the consequences of a potential action a, on which this
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action is supposed to be judged (with a view to comparing it with others eventually)
will appear at first sight imprecise, badly differentiated, multiple, and confused.
For this reason we call this complex reality the cloud of consequences of the
action a, and denote it by v(a).
The scientist, with the help of the demander, must therefore devote himself
to analyzing and modeling in order to construct an abstract representation of v(a)
that integrates all the relevant consequences needed for the assessment of global
preferences. The elaboration of such a model is generally based on several primary
concepts. I have attempted to define these concepts in Tables 2.3 and 2.4 so that
they underlie a coherent methodology that is as general as possible. More details
and illustrations are given in Roy (1976; in press).
The personality of the actors, the nature of the potential actions and scales, and
the mode of elaboration of the state and modulation indicators are the basis of
diverse types of frequently intermingled thresholds (see Table 2.5). Consider, for
example, a situation in which different actors are indifferent to two actions leading
TABLE 2.3 From Elementary Consequences to Valuations in the Analysis ofv(a)
Concepts and Notations
Elementary
consequence
Dimension
State indicator "Yj(a)
Grade e
<i
Set v = {I, ... , n} of
dimensions
Modulation
indicator oj(a)
Valuation of a on
the dimension i
Definitions
Aspect or attribute of v(a) considered pertinent to the problem and
for which the possible states can be evaluated on a dimension by
a state indicator
Common feature of the set of states associated with an elementary
consequence determining a complete order and destined to
justify their comparison in relation to preferences
Process that is operational and homogeneous from the point of view
of comparison used by the scientist to identify, in relation to the
dimension i, the state or states to which the potential action a
may lead. Formally we set "Yi(a) C E j (scale associated with the
dimension I)
Completely ordered set taken as the formal representation of the
state set associated with dimension i
Element of a scale representing a state relative to the corresponding
dimension
Order relation translating on E j the inherent order in the dimension i
List of dimensions considered necessary and sufficient (for the
problem) to make the description of v(a) realistic and complete
on the basis of corresponding state indicators, possibly com-
pleted by modulation indicators
Complementary information about "Yi(a) when the valuation is
non-single-point on the dimension i (see Table 2.4)
"Yj(a) if "Yj(a) EO E j : the valuation is then said to be single-point;
["Yj(a), oj(a) I if "Yj(a) C E( the valuation is then said to be
non-single-point
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TABLE 2.4 Nature of the Modulation Indicators Used in Non-Single-Point
Valuations
Most Usual Cases
Distributional (von
Neumann-
Morgenstern utility
theory)
Relational (Arrow
social welfare
theory)
Single "indexed event"
(game theory)
Complex "indexed
event" (scenarios
method)
Distribution defined on 'Yj(D) used by the scientist to quantify the
relative importance of the diffOlrent states (according to the size
of the population concerned, to a degree offuzziness of member-
ship, in a probabilistic sense, with respect to dates, etc,)
Number of vectors associated with 'Yj(D) used by the scientist to
establish a relation (preference, indifference, incomparability)
between 'Yj(D) and 'Yj(D') for each potential action D' (based on
modulation of importance, of likelihood, and so on, between the
states of each of these two subsets)
Mapping from 8, (set of exclusive events) onto 'Yj(D) used by the
scientist to characterize the state 'Yf(D) to which event € E 8,
leads; to each event of the class 8" Iij(D) then associates a single
point valuation, If 8, is provided with a probability distribution,
Ii /(0) then defines a probability distribution on 'Yj(o)
Mapping from 8, (set of events) into P !'Yj(D) I [set of parts of
'Yj(o) I used by the scientist to characterize those states to which
each of the events of the class 8, may lead, this mapping being
eventually enriched by a distribution or relational modulation
when the image in P['Yj(D) I is a subset containing at least two
elements of 'Yj(D)
to the same valuations, except on one dimension (for example, on the average
operational cost, for which the valuations are e and e - T/), This indifference may
have several different explanations:
T/ is a negligible sum in comparison with the sums at stake elsewhere and with
the sensitivity of each actor in this dimension.
T/ is too low a sum in view of the techniques used for the data collection.
T/ is a nonsignificant sum in view of the risks that the mode of calculation sets
aside.
To illustrate the use of Table 2.5, let us assume that two actions have identical
valuations except for dimension i, which is a financial cost dimension. Let the
valuations be e and e - T/.
By definition (Table 2.5), si(e) is the maximum value of T/ such that e - T/ is
not recognized as significantly bette.r than e. For T/ ,,;;;; si(e), the scientist may con-
sider either that e - T/ has presumed preference to e, or (more simply) e - T/ is
indifferent from e [si(e) =q1(e)].
To avoid giving a discriminating role to differences that are scarcely significant,
the scientist will sometimes be led to pay particular attention to such thresholds in
the neighborhood of the goal and, for example, he might define an interval [s;, s;']
so
TABLE 2.5 Other Information Specifying the Significance of the Evaluations
with a View to a More Synthetic Modeling of v(a)
Concepts and Notations
Goal OJ
Threshold of
indiscrimination
Threshold of
imprecision
Threshold of
unforeseeableness
Threshold of presumed
preference si(e)
Threshold of
indifference qi(e);
q i(e) <; sHe)
Modular informational
relation from the
dimension h to the
dimension i
Defmitions
Grade of Ej such that 'fie, e' E E j e' is preferred to or is indifferent
from e when e < i e' " i OJ or OJ " ie' < i e
Maximum interval between 2 grades (of the same scale) indis-
criminated by the actors who do not consider them as really
distinct; it may vary along the scale
Maximum interval between 2 grades (of the same scale) for which
the imprecision of the state indicator does not allow the two to
be separated for certain; it may vary along the scale
Maximum interval between 2 grades (of the same scale) for which
the reliability of the anticipation does not allow the two to be
distinguished for certain; it may vary along the scale
Generic term used for one, or a mixture of the preceding thresh-
olds such that e' is strictly preferred to e when e < ie' " i OJ
or OJ .;;; ie' < i e and that the interval [e, e'] (defined by
reference to a measure: e.g., number of grades) is strictly
greater than (in absolute value) si(e); for a smaller interval
there is a situation of presumed preference that includes
situations of indifference and large preference (Table 2.1)
Maximum interval between 2 grades of Ej such that e' is indif-
ferent from e when e < ie' .;;; i OJ or OJ <; ie' < e and that the
interval [e, e'] (defmed by reference to a measure) remains
strictly less than (in absolute value) qi(e); for a larger interval,
there is large or strict preference
The precision of a state eh E 'Yh(a) c Eh leads to a modification of
the modulation lij(a) relative to 'Yj(a) c Ej
Modulation indicator on the dimension i conditioned by eh
Global indicator integrating all the modular informational
relations
(containing OJ) for which all the states falling within this interval will be judged as
"good" since they are sufficiently close to the goal.
2.1.3 THE CONCEPT OF A CONSISTENT FAMILY AND THE UNDERLYING NATURE
OF THE CRITERIA CONSTITUTING IT
When Iv I= n> 1 or when the unique valuation is not a single point! the de-
scription of v(a) obtained
lin this latter case, using the complete transitive comparability axiom, von Neumann-Morgen-
stern utility theory provides a solution for transforming the non-single-point valuation into a
measurable criterion (see below).
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ViE v
merits a slight transformation so as to be more manageable, as much for global
preference modeling as for Decision-Aid.
This transformation consists of elaborating what we call a consistent family F of
criteria (see Table 2.6).1 It is important to note initially that the correspondence
between criteria of the family and dimensions retained in the analysis is simple
(see, in particular, Table 2.6 "single-point equivalent on the dimension i") only in
the case where the criterion gk brings into play indicators relative to a single dimen-
sion. When this is the case for all criteria, the passage from thresholds relative to the
scales to those of the same nature relative to the criterion k [denoted by si(x) and
qi(x), respectively] presents no major difficulties. In the case of subaggregates,
this passage may be a little more complex. Finally, if f(x) is any increasing func-
tion, the substitution in F off [gk(a)] for gk(a) allows us to define a new consistent
family for the problem.
According to the discriminant power recognized for the criterion k, we define
(see the end of Table 2.6):
• Pseudocriterion (most general case): if it calls into play an indifference
threshold qt(x) and a threshold of presumed preference st(x), st(x) ~ q~(x)
• Semicriterion: a pseudocriterion for which qt(x) = s~(x)
• Precriterion: a pseudocriterion for which qt(x) = 0 or is not defined
• True critenon: a pseudocriterion for which qt(x) = Sk(X) = 0 (every dif-
ference is significant)
That these thresholds cannot be any function of x is indicated in Table 2.6 for a
threshold of presumed preference, and this remains true for an indifference thresh-
old. This is quite simply explained by the fact that, for y >x, there cannot exist
(without inconsistencies) a value z of gk such that
y +Sk(Y) <z ~x +Sk(X).
On studying the underlying structure of each one of these types of criterion, it
is easy to deduce that we are concerned with
A linear order for a true criterion
A semiorder for a semicriterion
What appears to be an oriented semiorder for a precriterion
A more complex structure for a pseudocriterion, which we shall call a pseudo-
order.
In what folows, a semiorder is characterized by the definition of two relations
I and P such that
1 The notation F designates the family of criteria as well as the set 1,2, ... ,n of indices.
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TABLE 2.6 Modeling /)(a) on the Basis of a Consistent Family of Criteria
Concepts and Notations
Criteria vector g(a) == g1(a),
... ,gn(a)ER n
Consistent family F of
criteriagjj == 1, ... ,n
orjEF
Single-point equivalent
on the dimension i
g{ subaggregate of
dimensions ii' ... , ip
Explosion of the
dimension i
gk is a true criterion
gk is a precriterion
Definitions
Exhaustive resume (for the problem) of v(a) given by the n
values assumed, with regard to action a, by the criteria gj
j == 1, ... , n forming a consistent family relative to the n
dimensions considered
A family of n functions (called criteria) subject to three condi-
tions:
1. Exhaustivity condition: the g/a) are real-valued func-
tions, arguments of which are the state and modulation indi-
cators constituting the valuations ofa on the ndimensions;
they are defined in such a way that gj(a) == g/a')
j == 1, ... , n =>a is indifferent from a';
2. Monotonous comparability condition: ifa and a' are
two actions such that g/a) == gj(a') Vj '* k and g/t(a') >
gk(a); then a' is preferred to or is indifferent from a (see
Table 2.1);
3. Nonredundancy condition: dropping anyone of the gj
of the family invalidates one or more of the preceding con-
ditions for a pair of actions (a, a') real or fictitious
This implies:
The valuation on the dirnensionj is single point Va E A
OJ is the highest grade of Ej for which grades are identified by
figures
The valuation on the dimension i is not single point (at least for
one action), but it occurs only in a single criterion, which is
justified by the existence of a single-point equivalent (e.g.,
average value, certainty equivalent, realized value) substi-
tutable for the couple state indicator, modulation indicator
gj appears as a resume of the valuations relative to the dimen-
sions il' ... , ip
The valuation on the dimension i intervenes, by at least one of
its indicators, in more than one criterion
If the condition 2 above implies strict preference (indifference
and presumed preference being excluded)
If the condition 2 above involves, besides strict preference,
presumed preference situations that can be characterized as
follows by a threshold function s1«x):
Presumed preference if gk(a) == x <gk(a') "x + s1«x)
Strict preference otherwise
So as not to lead to inconsistencies, s1«x) must also satisfy:
S--"k:...:.(X_)_-_S...:::h...:::(Y-,-) ;;. 1
X-Y
where x, Y are possible values for the precriterion gk
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TABLE 2.6 (continued)
Concepts and Notations
gk is a semicriterion
gk is a pseudocriterion
Definitions
If the condition 2 above involves, besides strict preference, in-
difference situations that can be characterized as follows by a
threshold function q;'(x):
Indifference if gk(a): x < gk(a') .;;;: x + qi.(x)
Strict preference otherwise (large preference here is
excluded)
So as not to lead to inconsistencies q;'(x) must also satisfy the
condition for a precriterion, given above
If it is a precriterion for which presumed preference involves,
besides large preference (see Table 2.1), indifference situ-
ations that can be characterized as follows by a threshold
function q;'(x) .;;;: sk(x):
Indifference ifgk(a) = x < gk(a')';;;: x + gk(x)
Large preference if x + qi.(x) < gk(a').;;;: x + si.(x)
Here qi.(x) must satisfy the same condition as sii(x)
lis reflexive and symmetric (which corresponds to indifference)
P is an antisymmetric "complement" of / in the sense that one and only one of
the following three possibilities holds 'Vx,y: x/y, xPy, or yPx (i.e., strict preference)
PIP c P (implies the transitivity of P)
p 2 n /2 = (/) [for further details, see Fishburn (l970a) or Jacquet-Lagreze
(l975a).]
In order to complete an elucidation of the use that he may make of the criterion
k, the scientist must investigate the relations that connect any two intervals of the
type
defined by two ordered pairs (a. b) and (a', b') of potential actions such that
gj(a) = gj(b) = gj(a') = giCb')'Vj=l=k,gk(a) = xk,gk(a') = x~
gk(b)-gk(a) = Wk ~O,gk(b')-gk(a') = w~ ~O.
Do such intervals reveal an underlying reality sufficiently to allow assessment,
in a significant and operational way, of a comparison between the superiority of b
over a and that of b' over a'? The objective of this comparison is to lead the scien-
tist to opt (as in Table 2.1) in favor of one of the following fundamental exclusive
situations:
Superiority identical: (Xk + Wk) differs from XI< exactly as (x~ + w~) differs
from x~
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Superiority strictly greater: (Xk + Wk) differs from Xk strictly more than
(x~ + w~) differs from x~
Superiority weakly greater: (Xk + Wk) differs from Xk at least as much as
(x~ + w~) differs from x~ but it is impossible to say if it is strictly or exactly
Superiority incomparable: neither of the three former situations dominates
These considerations lead us to formulate the following question:
QI How can one discriminate among the preceding four fundamental mutually
exclusive situations so as to compare the "importance" of any two intervals of the
type Wk and w~ ?
When one of the two intervals is null, the reply to this question has already been
given through the concepts of thresholds (which may depend on the abscissa x
of the non-null interval). Thus it is with the other cases with which we are now
concerned.
Most often the scientist is led to admit implicitly that the reply is given in-
dependently of Xk and x~ by a simple examination of the sign of Wk - w~.
Frequently he goes as far as treating the ratio Wk/W~ as a measure of the superi-
ority of b over a when that of b' over a' is taken as unit. It is clear that there is a
very strong hypothesis that makes the criterion k appear to be a high-precision
instrument. Not only is gk a true criterion, but it is self.imposing up to a positive
linear transformation; Le., gk is a measure (with reference to the set of intervals):
only the unit and origin are arbitrary.
If the scientist can define a function f(x) (nondecreasing) for which f[gk]
(substituted for gk in F) is a measure, then we will say that gk is a measurable
criterion in F. For such a property to hold, gk must satisfy axioms I through 4
below. But first let us introduce a new definition.
By discriminating interval we will refer to an interval of the type Wk = [Xk,
Xk + Wk] such that b is strictly preferred to a.
AXIOM 1 Any non-null interval is a discriminating interval (gk is a true
criterion).
AXIOM 2 The reply to QI is independent of the values gia) = gj(a') =gib) =
gib'),j =1= k, whatever the pairs a, b and a', b' may be.
AXIOM 3 The reply to QI excludes superiority incomparable.
AXIOM 4 On the subset of discriminating intervals, the reply to question QI
excludes superiority weakly greater and leads to transitive answers compatible with
inclusion and union of the intervals, for superiority identical as well as for superi-
ority strictly greater; consequently, the two binary relations -* and >-* so defined
are in conformity with the complete transitivity axiom (notations used by Fishburn,
1970b).
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These four axioms do not imply measurability, as the reader may easily verify.
When the set of possible values of gk is an interval, a set of axioms necessary and
sufficient I to imply measurability may be obtained by completing axioms 1,2,3,
and 4 by the following axiom:
AXIOM 5 For all three values of gk: x <x' <y', there exists one unique value
y of gk such that the superiority of y over x is identical to that of y' over
x' ([x, y 1-* [x' ,y' D.
Past experience has shown that in a good many real-world problems, it is im-
possible for the scientist to justify the exact values that axiom S postulates (either
because there is more than one single value or because none is acceptable to all the
actors who intervene in the decision-making process). Reliance on the idea of
approximation to justify the arbitrary part included in the selected values (and in
order to remain within the framework of the set of axioms) is not always realistic.
In fact, this difficulty usually arises because axiom 1 is not operational. It follows
that axiom 4 must also be reconsidered.
I suggest that the criteria that satisfy axioms 2 and 3 be called graduable and
that the term graduation be used to designate those (graduable) criteria for which
the answer to question QI can be assessed only on the values of Wk and w~ (see
the example in Roy, 1976).
The structure introduced (by an axiom similar to axiom 4) on the set of intervals
of the type Wk by replies to question QI is evidently intimately related to the
techniques used to assess these replies. In the case of graduable criteria, we can
characterize the criteria as follows:
Truly graduable: weak order structure (cf. axioms 1 and 4)
Semigraduable: semiorder structure
Pregraduable: oriented semiorder structure
Pseudograduable: pseudo-order structure
2.2 HOW TO CONSTRUCT A MODEL OF GLOBAL PREFERENCES
The purpose of this section is the description of some of the concepts and tech·
niques that the scientist may use to elicit global preferences on the basis of F
enriched with complementary data he may obtain. We emphasize cases in which the
underlying nature of the criteria (pseudocriteria, nonmeasurable criteria, and so
on) - their heterogeneity or antagonism, the fuzziness of complementary data
required for aggregation - a priori strengthens the interest for the fundamental
I Under the Archimedean condition: "rI [x', y'] , there exists E[x'. y'] > 0 such that y - x <
E[..:'.y'] - [x,y] -<* [x',y']. The author thanks P. Vincke for having formulated this ad-
ditional condition and for his contribution to the verification of the exactness of this assertion.
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partial comparability axiom and opposes the acceptability of the complete transi-
tive comparability axiom.
2.2.1 COMPLETE OR PARTIAL MODELING OF GLOBAL PREFERENCES
Although Table 2.1 has a general significance, until now the comrarison of two
potential actions has been studied only in the particular case when gla) = gla')
Vj =1= k and where the analysis prejudges the personality of the decision maker
as little as possible. This, together with the fact that the consistent family of
criteria must be, as far as possible, comprehensible and acceptable by all the actors
in the decision-making process, implies proscribing ail premature subaggregates,
a source of confusion and contestation. The comparison according to a single
criterion k consequently only summarizes what the analysis has objectively shown
on a single dimension, or on several dimensions subaggregated (because they appear
very homogeneous or highly correlated). Now we must pass to a higher level: that
of global preferences.
Apart from the relatively exceptional case when the synthetic description of
v(a) naturally leads to a consistent family reduced to a single criterion, comple-
mentary information and reflection are necessary in order to determine the con-
ditions that, on the basis of associated criteria vectors, will allow the scientist to
state that such an action is good or bad, better or worse t"An another in the eyes
of the identified decision maker. Let us note that the question of knowing whether
an action a is good or bad can always be posed in terms of comparison: comparison
of a with reference actions (real or fictitious) acting as norms (see section 2.3.2).
To specify the relative importance of the criteria, to elucidate the conditions
of substitution between slight variations of one into another of the criteria, to
clarify the cases of preferential independence - these are some of the data required
by the scientist in order to answer the following question:
Q2 How can one discriminate among the four fundamental mutually exclusive
situations of Table 2.1 when gla) =1= gj(a') j E J c F and IJ I> 1?
Most often the scientist seeks a reply to Q2 which a priori conforms with the
complete transitive comparability axiom. For reasons given in the introduction he
may then consider that the most appropriate modeling of preferences consists in
an adequate expression of a value function:
Such a function appears as a true criterion aggregating the n criteria of the family F.
To reply to Q2 in this way is relatively easy when the n criteria are measurable.
In fact, subject to preferential independence of each pair of criteria in F, the work
of aggregation practically reduces itself to the determination of substitution rates
(see Keeney, 1974; Raiffa, 1969; Ting, 1971). In practice the hypotheses required
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by this type of answer are seldom rigorously verified. Moreover, the means gener-
ally available for the study do not permit the scientist to ascertain how true the
supposed approximation is. In fact, the type of reply to Q2 that the scientist may
formulate as objective depends to a great extent on the underlying nature of the
criteria (see section 2.1.3), and to confine oneself a priori to complete transitive
comparability increases the risk of reaching a dead end. Details (real-world examples,
reformulation of Arrow's theorem in a multiple-criterion Decision-Aid context, and
the like) on this point can be found in Roy et al. (1975).
To end with a formal examination of question Q2, let us stress that, in order to
overcome the encountered difficulties, nothing from a theoretical point of view
precludes the possibilities that:
I and/or P could be nontransitive
VA could be a precriterion, a semicriterion, or a pseudocriterion
There could exist pairs of actions for which P and I would not be separated
I u P could be only a partial binary relation
These are crucial options for the scientist that cannot be discussed independently
of the operational approach he chooses or even of the direction in which he expects
to steer Decision-Aid.
In many cases it is not possible to build a general aggregation rule. But we can
most often make reference to a unique value function VA: an implicit function of
the g/s likely in ideal conditions to represent the global preferences of the decision
maker. The most widely adopted attitude consists in elucidating such a value
function acting as a single true criterion. It has incontrovertibly proved its ef-
ficacity (especially when the scientist adopts the problem formulation ex on a
globalized and stable set A) to such an extent that for many it is the only attitude
that comes to mind. However, this attitude is a source of impediment for the
scientist who may
For certain pairs of actions, not know how to, not want to, or not be able to
compare them (Roy, 1974a)
For rough, qualitative, random evaluations, or evaluations expressed in hetero-
geneous units (francs, minutes, number of inhabitants, degree of similarity) be in
no position to extract a common dimension (Ponsard, 1975)
Under criteria that are more or less correlated, nonmeasurable, or counter-
balancing within a complex imprecise logic, not know how to synthesize them in
a unique criterion (Bertier and de Montgolfier, 1971)
For an a priori delimited set of potential actions with frontiers that are almost
artificial in their clarity, not feel capable of appreciating, beforehand and in all
their aspects, the structural transformations to be integrated in the definitions of
a unique criterion VA acceptable within A, so as to extend it to the frontier and a
little beyond (Theys, 1975)
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For an evolutive set A consisting of nonexclusive potential actions and/or a
problem formulation for which the objective is not to select directly a unique
action, not judge this an appropriate approach (Roy, 1974b)
For these and several other reasons, he may renounce this first approach or wish
to make it more flexible, or even to delay its adoption.
2.2.2 OUTRANKING AND FUZZY OUTRANKING RELATIONS
An alternative solution may be to seek a reply to question Q2 while accepting
incomparability situations and clarifying preference and indifference situations
only in the cases where the scientist is able to establish them with an objectivity
and security that he judges satisfactory. This means, among other things, that he
renounces the complete transitive comparability axiom (see the introduction).
It is precisely this attitude that was (Roy, 1968) the origin of the notion of out-
ranking relation!
The term outranking refers to those of the preferences thus modeled; given two
potential actions a and a',
a' outranks a signifies that the scientist has enough reasons (particularly with
respect to what g(a) and g(a') really mean) to admit that in the eyes of the decision
maker a' is at least as good as a (consequently a' is indifferent from or preferred
to a).
a' does not outrank a signifies that the arguments in favor of the proposition
"a' is at least as good as a," are judged insufficient; this does not imply that cogent
arguments in favor of the proposition "a is at least as good as a'" exist (conse.
quentlya is incomparable or preferred to a') (Table 2.1).
Within such a framework, the scientist may be more or less willing (may take more
or fewer risks) to accept the outranking, whence the concept of fuzzy outranking
(Zadeh et al., 1975).
A fuzzy outranking relation s1 can be characterized by the definition of a
degree of outranking d associating with each couple (a', a) a number d(a', a), where
d is a criterion that fixes the more or less high credibility of the outranking of a by
a'. More precisely, the degree of credibility must possess the following properties:
1. The number d(a', a) calls into playa' and a only through their evaluations
[ri, lid ViE v;generally2 we set dCa', a) = d[g(a'),g(a)].
1 Partial preference relation could be an appropriate alternative term if it did not appear. in
the eyes of so many people, so strongly connected with transitivity and with a necessarily non-
ambiguous distinction between indifference and strict preference.
2 It may be interesting to economize on the defmition of F and to establish directly d on the
f'Yi,od [see Jacquet-Lagreze (l975a, b); the adaptation of property 2 raises some rather
delicate questions).]
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2. dCa', a) increases with the reliability of the outranking of a by a'; thus, in
particular, dCa', a) is a nondecreasing function of gia') 'rJj and a nonincreasing
function ofgj(a) 'rJj.
3. d(a', a) = I implies a certain outranking of a by a', whereas d(a', a) = 0
implies either a certain nonoutranking of a by a' or the total absence of arguments
in favor of such an outranking; it follows that 0 .,;; d(a', a) .,;; I.
Table 2.7 illustrates several of the consequences of these definitions and proper-
ties; Figure 2.2 states the conventions that allow us to associate with s1 a graph
G1, called an outranking graph (see Figures 2.3 and 2.4).
Let us, as an example, examine what could be the outranking relation associated
with a pseudocriterion g. (Here g can be viewed either as the result of the aggre-
gation of all criteria of F or as a particular pseudocriterion of F, in which case all
the actions considered have the same value on the other criteria of F.) According to
the definition of d and to property 3:
dCa', a) = I ifg(a') - g(a) ~ 0
dCa, a') 0 ifg(a') - g(a) ~ s+ [g(a)]
dCa, a') if 0 ";;g(a') - g(a) .,;; q+ [g(a)]
So the only case that remains nondetermined (see Figure 2.3) deals with the value
of dCa, a') when
q+ [g(a)] <g(a') - g(a) < s+ [g(a)] ,
but from property 2 it follows that dCa, a') increases from 0 to I when g(a')
decreases from g(a) + s+ [g(a)] to g(a) +q+ [g(a)]. The remaining indetermination
TABLE 2.7 Connections between Criterion Vectors, Degree of Outranking, and
Situations Described in Table 2.1
The Hypotheses
gj(a') =gj(a) i '* k and
gk(a') - gk(a) > sk [gk(a)]
Kj(a') =gj(a) Vi '* k and
o<gk(a') - gk(a) < sk [gk(a)]
Kj(a') =gj(a) Vi '* k,h and
o<gk(a') -gk(a) <sk[gk(a)]
0< gh(a) - gh(a') < sii [gh(a')]
gj(a') =gj(a) Vi '* k, h and
o< gk(a') - gk(a) < Sk [gk(a) l
gh(a) -gh(a') > sh[gh(a')]
gjCa') =gj(a) Vi '* k,h and
gk(a') - gk(a) > sk[gk(a)]
gh(a) -gh(a') > s';[gj(a')]
Igh(a') - gjCa) I 0;;; qj [Min (gj(a),gj(a'»] Vi
Are Compatible with
d(a',a) = 1 and dCa, a') = 0
d(a', a) = 1 and O<d(a,a')<l
0< d(a', a) < 1 and 0 < dCa, a') < 1
d(a',a) =0 and O<d(a,a')<l
d(a'. a) = 0 and dCa, a') = 0
d(a', a) = 1 and dCa, a') = 1
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a a
0.6 0.6 0.9
Indifference
a
Strict preference
a
0.8 0.1
Large preference Incomparability
FIGURE 2.2 Examples of configurations that may appear in the graph ej as-
sociated with S~. The arcs are oriented according to the order of the actions in
the couple considered; the absence of an arc corresponds to a degree of null out-
ranking.
with g(a') from 1 to 0
~_....---~
tC~~ -----4t--~-:-:-*--""---~ g(a')~
FIGURE 2.3 Fuzzy outranking relationship associated with a pseudocriterion.
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of d may then be solved by the adoption of any function having such a property:
for instance, a linear interpolation may be chosen. Finally, the following formula
synthesizes this discussion:
( ') _ s+[g(a)] -Min [g(a')-g(a),s+[g(a)]]
da,a - s+[g(a)] -Min [g(a')-g(a),q+[g(a)J] .
This example shows that the degree of credibility is a different concept from the
intensity of preference (Fishburn, 1970a).
It is sometimes reasonable to impose a fourth property on the degree of credi-
bility:
4. Coherence property: dCa', a) must satisfy certain conditions bringing into play
the values dCa, a'), dCa', b), deb, a) (b EA). Among the most interesting are
d(a', a) ~d(a, a') x dCa', b) x deb, a) 'Vb =1= a', a
d(a', a) ~ Min [d(a, a'), dCa', b), deb, a)] 'Vb =1= a', a
dCa', a) ~d(a', b) x deb, a) 'Vb =1= a', a
dCa', a) ~ Min [dCa', b), deb, a)] 'Vb =1= a', a
Once a fuzzy outranking relation S~ is defined, it is often interesting to intro-
duce the outranking relation (nonfuzzy) S~ defined by
a' S~ a <? d(a', a) ~ A.
Taking into consideration a decreasing sequence of values Ameans introducing a
nested family of outranking relations (nonfuzzy) that are richer and richer, but
more and more risky (insufficiently justified). Inversely, the scientist may be led to
build a sequence directly:
sl c c s~ c c s~ ... (c c strict inclusion in the set theoretical sense)
without the upper indices' referring to a precise value of A, except for the first,
which generally corresponds to A= 1. We can always treat such a sequence as a
particular form of fuzzy outranking s~ in which the credibility criterion d ranges
upon a completely ordered discrete set of grades but for which assigning a precise
value is useless.
In relations of this type, the degree of credibility appears, since it compels
appreciation of the high credibility of outranking, as a not necessarily graduable
true criterion.
As property 4, and more generally the last sentence of property 1, underlines,
the elements of A - {a', a} may be called upon to playa role in the determination
of the value dCa', a). In other words, the general context of the set A carries in-
formation that the scientist may wish to exploit. This possibility of outranking
contingent upon the reference set A conflicts with the independence of the
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irrelevent alternatives axiom (Arrow, 1951). For more precision, see Roy (1973),
whose Figure 4 illustrates in particular the impoverishing character of this axiom.
These aspects will be discussed further in the section on logical extrapolation,
below.
2.2.3 CONSTRUCTION OF A RELATION s5t.
The construction technique must obviously be compatible with, and make the best
use of, the properties linked to the nature of the criteria 1 (only pseudocriteria or,
contrarily, true criteria; only graduable or, contrarily, measurable criteria, and so
on). In particular, it is the case for the five techniques described below; these may
be used on their own, or they may be combined.
Compensation
A first series of techniques consists in establishing the outranking of a by a' or its
degree of credibility d(a', a) in an attempt to provide a direct answer to the fol·
lowing question:
Q3 Does the "cumulation" of favorable differences Wj = gj(a') - gj{a) ~
qj [(gJ(a)] "compensate" in a significant way for the cumulation of unfavorable
differences Wj = gj{a') - gj(a) 0;;;; -qj[gj(a')]?
More precisely, let us consider the trichotomy of F defined by
F(a'>- a) = {j/jEF,O*gj(a')-gj{a)~qj[gj(a)]}
F(a' -< a) = F(a >- a')
F(a' - a) = [F(a' >- a) u F(a' -< a)]
The cumulation of favorable differences (introduced in question Q3) is a quantity
of the form
Q(a'>-a) = Q[wj,jEF(a' >-a)].
In order to answer Q3 directly we must define the formula Q of aggregation of
differences and define d(a', a) (or a rule of acceptance of outranking) founded on
a comparison of Q(a' >- a) with Q(a -< a'), the comparison taking into account the
relative importance of the criteria contained in F(a' - a).
To illustrate these techniques of compensation, we will cite the technique that
we have used to compare different lies for a given highway (Betolaud and Fevrier,
1973). In this problem, as in many others, the introduction of a trade-off ratio sj,
1 This subject, together with the presentation of a precise but nevertheless general enough
method for constructing an outranking relation, is treated in Roy et al. (1977).
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which permits us to assign a precise value to each cumulation of differences by
using a formula of the type 'r.j EJ sj • Wj, runs up against theoretical and practical
difficulties. The only significant data we could reasonably hope to obtain were of
the type:
Sl is certainly greater than I and less than 2
S2 is close to, and probably slightly less than, 3
S3 is of the same order of magnitude as Sl + S2
S3 lsi can not easily exceed s41s2
Let S eRn be the domain defined by all the data that the scientist can gather
in such a context, so that the set
n(a' > a) = {L sj - wjls E S}
jE F(a'>-a)
delimits, at best, the realistic values of the cumulation of favorable differences,
taking into account the imprecise character of even the notion of the trade-off
ratio itself and the multiplicity of values that the different actors want to give to
those ratios.
The condition of outranking or its credibility may then be defined in many
ways, notably by using:
m = Min " sj • w·
sES L. J'
jft.F(a' -a)
M = Max L sj -Wj
sES ,
jff-F(a - a)
n = relative weights of the nondiscriminant criteria, Le., forming F(a' - a)
Domination Structure
According to Yu (1975) and Yu and Leitmann (1973), a domination factor for
g(a') is any vector W having the following property:
'VA> 0 a' is preferred to a if g(a) = g(a') + A- w.
like Yu, let us call D(x) the family of all domination factors for x E R n , and
D( .) the totality of the D(x) for all x image of a potential action. The definition
of such a domination structure D ( .), or of several solidly established such struc-
tures, leads in a natural way to an outranking relation or several nested relations.
Let us add that, in practice, only the knowledge of D(x) for x = g(a) fJ E A is
necessary, and a limited number of "extreme" domination factors are sufficient to
suitably outline D(x), at least under hypotheses little more restrictive than con-
vexity. Finally, under these same hypotheses, there exists a simple polarity relation
between substitution vector and domination factor; hence, the possibility of
conceiving techniques based conjointly on these last two directions.
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Concordance
The trade-off ratios are weights supposed to be defined in such a way that to
multiply them by differences of the type gj(b) - gJ(a) and add the products thus
obtained has a significance (see the section on compensation above) for a wide class
of differences. Because of this, these ratios vary, except in restrictive hypotheses,
with the points x ERn from which the differences are calculated [as the cone D(x)
depends on x]. When in practice we speak of "weights" that a decision maker
accords to such and such a criterion, we refer to something intrinsic that allows us
to appreciate the global importance of this criterion in relation to others. It is
natural to formalize this notion of weights (importance indicators) by positive
numbers Pj defined 'Vj E F, which we allow ourselves to combine among them-
selves (as explained below), but which, because of their global character, cannot
be amalgamated with the evaluations.
From such a set of weights p, we may seek to define analogous weights for
supercriteria that are the unions of criteria of the type F(a' >- a), F(a' -< a) and
F(a' - a). We will denote them by
pea' >- a) = pO, pea' -< a) = pL, pea' - a) = pl.
The simplest form that springs to mind to defme the weights p* of a supercriterion
defined by a subset F* of F is obviously
p* = L Pj·
jEF*
It supposes a certain form of independence between the criteria. When this hypoth-
esis is not acceptable, we may seek to correct in the preceding formula over-weighting
effects that arise from certain subgroups of criteria, including, for one thing, the
same aspect of the cloud of consequences. When we can make the hypothesis that
these duplications are proportional to Pi> and thus for each subgroup of criteria, we
will be able to adopt the following formula:
p* = P [1 - n (1 - '!.J)] where
jEF* \ p
p = L Pj'
jEF
Irrespective of the definition adopted, the idea covered by the term concordance
is the following: the more pL appears weak compared with pO, the greater is the
concordance of the criteria in favor of the outranking of a by a'. A number of
indicators may even be envisaged so as to define a degree of credibility. In Roy
(1968, 1972) the reader will find the defmitions of those already experimented
with through numerous applications within the framework of the method ELECTRE
I and II. Others are proposed in Roy (1974a) and Jacquet-Lagreze (l975a, b).
The latter has notably described interesting techniques in the case of non-single-
point evaluations: these have in particular the merit of allowing us to escape from
a formalization of the criteria in the case where this formalization is particularly
delicate.
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This third technique only partially exploits the information contained in the
evaluations, and we shall see, in connection with discordance, that it may be
dangerous to base the outranking on concordance alone.
Discordance
Accepting an outranking a' SA a [likewise the definition of a degree of credibility
d(a',a)] frequently necessitates paying particular attention to those criteria that
are discordant. By that we mean the criteria of F(a' -< a) for which the difference
wj(a', a) violently opposes (either because it is very large or because, although
moderate, it concerns a very important criterion) this outranking a'SA a. One
must ask oneself if this difference alone is not of such a nature as to prohibit such
an outranking, rather like a powerful opponent in a jury, or an underprivileged
minority in a community intervening to stop a decision.
It is certain that, when compensation calculations have been made with suf-
ficient care, we may be justified in proceeding without further examination. How-
ever, if such calculations have not been carried out, or if they are far too
questionable, we may judge that in certain cases such disagreements can play an
obstructing role.
A suitable modeling, which allows the best use of these considerations, consists
in a fonnalization of those pairs of values (xj, Xj) that may in certain cases make
a'SAa inadmissible because gj(a') = xj and g/a) = Xj' Let Dj - called the discord-
ance set - be the set of these pairs for the criterion j. If gj is a graduable criterion,
Dj can be characterized by a limit OJ to the magnitude of Xj-xj. For reasons of
simplicity and security, we might quite simply decree that, in order to state that
a' SA a, it is necessary that
'fIj E F(a' -< a).
This condition may seem brutal, but it is easy to improve it. These improve-
ments, however, depend on other aspects that intervene in the assessment of the
outranking. We may, for example, establish a hierarchy of these discordances by
defming for each criterion a sequence of nested subsets (if gj is a graduable criterion,
it can be characterized by OJ <oj <oj < ... ):
Dj = Dr~ DJ ~ DJ ~ . " .
The more the arguments brought to bear, by the other aspects [criteria of
F(a': >- a)] in favor of outranking, are reliable, the more the discordance set, which
is to be substituted for Dj in the above condition, must be restricted: if we combine
concordance and discordance for relatively small values of the concordance indi-
cator, we shall keep Dj = D7; for higher values, we shall replace Dj by DJ ; and so
on. The way in which this "parameterization" of the discordance set must be
developed evidently depends on the problem and the risks (incomparabilities
multiplied to the excess or outrankings rasWy accepted) that the scientist tolerates.
The reader will find in Grolleau and Tergny (1971) a first utilization of these ideas.
66
Logical Extrapolation
Let S~ be an already built outranking relation. The bringing to light of certain
peculiarities (presence of intransitivity or other configurations considered ab-
normal) may justify a transformation of S~, by the modification of some values
of the degree of credibility (or by the addition or removal of arcs in the nonfuzzy
case), into another outranking relation. These transformations rest on a logical
extrapolation aiming, most often, to satisfy a coherence property (see p. 61 and
Roy, 1973).
2.3 HOW TO IMPLEMENT THE INSERTION INTO THE DECISION PROCESS
It is important to note that the preference model, when reduced to a value func-
tion, replaces the decision maker in the sense that it dictates the decision to be
made. It is a different matter when the model is an outranking relation. How can
the scientist use this model to help the decision maker? We attempt to give an
answer to this question now by successively reconsidering the three problem
formulations of Table 2.2.
We should point out first that S~ is a surrogate model to VA, generally weaker
and poorer, built with less effort and fewer hypotheses, but not always allowing
a conclusion to be drawn. It is therefore particularly adapted to roughing out a
problem, but it may have to be completed by a more thorough analysis of a more
restricted problem.
2.3.1 PROBLEM FORMULATION a: TO HELP CHOOSE A BEST ACTION
(SELECTION PROCEDURE)
When A is concerned with, for example, variants for highway lies, development
plans for a region, new activities for a firm, or even candidates for a well-defined
post, the problem may be set in the following terms: to help the choice of one
among the actions of A that appears in the eyes of the decision maker as the best.
If, by good fortune, S~ (nonfuzzy relation derived from a supposed previously
defined relation S~ by fixing d = 1) is such that there exists an a* E A verifying
'Va E A : a* S~ a,
it is clear that the scientist may opt to select a* . In general, S~ will be too weak for
such an element to exist. Then he will be able to determine if, for a value A=1= 1
that nevertheless reflects a sufficiently significant credibility for the outranking,
S~ (see section 2.2.2) admits an element of the type a*. Finally, if no unique
element can be found, he can contribute to the final problem formulation a, which
he has decided upon, by searching to determine a subset N of A as limited as
possible that has a property analogous to a* . In doing so, he carries out a dichot-
omy by putting candidate actions for the first place in N and noncompetitive
actions in A - N.
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By definition, we shall say that N c A is an outranking subset in A with regard
to an outranking relation S~ (not fuzzy) if each action of A not in N is outranked
by at least one action of N. In fact, what we are interested in here are the minimal
outranking subsets (Le., such that the retraction of anyone of the actions they
contain makes them lose this property of global outranking). It is clear that such
minimal outranking subsets exist regardless of S~, but they are not necessarily
unique.
This multiplicity is evidently very embarrassing for the scientist. It is certain
that even the definition of outranking, by restricting the subsequent development
of the process (more detailed study, group discussion, the decision maker's judg-
ment, and so on) to any minimal outranking subset N (in other words, by elim-
inating all the actions of A - N), does not run "great risks," in the sense that N
almost certainly contains "one of the best actions." This form of reasoning may,
however, induce him, when there are many minimal outranking sets, to retain
those actions appearing in several of them. But, when he prefers to retain one of
the minimal outranking subsets (with a view, for example, to iterating the pro-
cedure, as discussed below), he may hesitate on the selection technique. For this
selection, he may consider exploiting the idea of internal stability.
A subset of vertices of a graph is said to be internally stable when there exists
no arc connecting any two of its vertices. Here the property signifies that the
actions constituting the subset are each, pairwise, noncomparable. Because of the
global character of the outranking of a subset N with respect to its complement
A - N, the scientist may think it preferable to retain among the minimal domi-
nating subsets those weakest in pairs of comparable actions and, consequently, if
there are any, those that are internally stable. Such subsets are called kernels.
Let us specify that, if there exist graphs without kernels and graphs admitting
several kernels (for more precision, see, for example, Roy, 1969, sections IV.C.
and V.C.), there exists a category of graphs (important in the present context)
for which the kernel always exists and is unique: these are graphs without circuit
(directed cycles). Moreover, only circuits formed from an odd number of arcs
imply the nonexistence of a kernel. The scientist must then ask himself if the
credibility of such arcs has not been overestimated. Always by logical extrapo-
lation, he may also ask himself if the pairs (a', a) such that
a' does not outrank a [dCa', a) null or too weak]
3 a" E A such that a' outranks a" and a" outranks a
have not given rise to an underestimation of d(a', a). This justifies the use of the
concept of quasi kernel proposed in Roy (1914a). From these ideas, Hansen et al.
(1916) have developed some interesting selection techniques. In a more general
way, all these rules of selection are based on the consideration of the following
two parameters:
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Maximum value of d for which N remains an outranking subset S~
Maximum value assumed by d on the set of pairs formed from distinct actions
ofN
Having thus selected a subset N 1 such that al, a2, a6, a7 form a kernel (Figure
2.4) of S~ for A= 0.9, the scientist may judge it too rich and wish to iterate the
procedure. He will then be led to study NIsi (the restriction of si to N 1 ). The
same selection technique can be conserved, under the condition that the level of
exigence is changed. Thus (Figure 2.4), he will select N 2 = {aI, a6} the kernel of
N 1 s~ for A= 0.7, and so on if justified. It is essential, in this type of iteration, to
have a good understanding of why the successive eliminations are carried out and
thus to better appreciate the nature and importance of the risks taken.
The reader will find in Buffet et aI. (1967), Guigou (1971), and Roba et aI.
(1970) the analogous steps relative to specific concrete contexts and based on the.
particularities of the definitions of outranking relations adopted in ELECTRE I
(Roy, 1968).
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FIGURE 2.4 Value graph representative of a fuzzy relation si.
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2.3.2 PROBLEM FORMULATION (3: TO HELP SORT OUT ACTIONS ACCORDING TO
INTRINSIC VALUE (SEGMENTATION PROCEDURE)
When the actions of A involve such matters as admitting a candidate into an edu-
cational establishment, awarding a diploma, allowing credit, giving a grant or a
subsidy, or accepting a minor project or exploratory research and development
project, the scientist may, for example, envisage the problem in the following
terms: accept all the "sufficiently" good actions, reject all those "far too" bad, and
ask for an additional examination of the others. He is then led to use (or to pre-
scribe the use of) a procedure realizing the following segmentation of the set A:
A = A 1 uA 2 uA 3
an action ah E A being
for h"* k,
In A 1 if it merits acceptance without the intervention of the decision maker
In A 3 if it merits rejection without the intervention of the decision maker
In A 2 if it merits an additional examination (e.g., seeking supplementary in-
formation, discussion, decision maker's judgment)
In order to find such a trichotomy, the scientist may, for example, seek to
characterize a reference situation from combinations of limits on the criteria gj,
indicating the "combined limits" of sufficiently good and sufficiently bad. He can
always do this by introducing into A two subsets Band C formed from actions
(real or fictitious) each being characterized by a vector in R n (criterion space)
corresponding to these configuration limits of acceptance and rejection. Band C
can in certain cases be reduced to a single element. By definition, it follows that
A certain coherence is necessary between the definition of these reference
subsets and that of the relation s1.. The scientist may, for example, impose
Vb EB, cE C: d(c, b) = 0 and d(c, a) x dCa, b) x deb, c) = 0 Va EA.
It remains for him to define an assignment rule. There are many possibilities.
Among other elements, the scientist may consider the four following parameters:
Max dCa, b) = di
bEB
Max deb, a) = d1
bEB
Max d(c, a) = d~
cEC
Max dCa, c) d~
cEC .
Figure 2.5 illustrates what such a rule may be. The reader will find in Moscarola
and Roy (1977) several methodological developments and the description of two
concrete cases (entry into an educational establishment and division of a subsidy).
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FIGURE 2.5 A rooted tree defining an assigment rule from three thresholds
dr, d;' d;.
2.3.3 PROBLEM FORMULATION "1: TO HELP RANK ACTIONS IN DECREASING
ORDER Of PREFERENCE (ORDERING PROCEDURE)
The cases are plentiful in which the decision maker, without being constrained
to accept only a single action ofA, knows beforehand that he must forgo accepting
all the good ones. This may be the case when the actions concern, for example,
important research and development operations for a firm, regional development
projects, equipment conceived to fulfIll certain functions, candidates for a series of
similar posts, magazines for starting a publicity campaign, or stocks or bonds
to be included in an investment portfolio. Here it is the spirit of competition that
prevails.
The elements of A must be regrouped into equivalence classes, as smal1 as
possible, and these classes must be put in a linear order: i.e., a weak order must
be defined on A. It is this weak order that will serve in establishing the final de-
cision. If the modeling of A belongs to the fragmented case, the demarcation line
(acceptance/rejection) may be either a matter for arbitration by the decision
maker, who will judge its capability of acceptance (financial, physical, psychological,
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and so on) or a subject for negotiation, or even for a local study (it should be noted
that it is only in this critical zone of demarcation that it is important to have the
classes as small as possible). The use of such a linear order can be higWy different
in the globalized case: considerations arising from the modeling problem may,
for instance, lead the decision maker to sequentially examine the elements of A
that have been ranked in a "sufficiently good" position (let us remark that the
subset of A that he has to consider is not defined on the same principle as the one
defined for the purpose of a problematic a).
To give both a rigorous and operational characterization of an unknown weak
order P with respect to s1. is not an easy thing to do. We might think of calling
into play, on the one hand, a set 1r of weak orders that are a priori acceptable
(arising from a possible restriction in terms of s1. of the set of all weak orders
defined on A), or, on the other hand, a distance d(P, s1.) defined for all PE 1r and
all s1. providing a significant model to appreciate the quality of the approximation
of s1. by P.
The scientist may then put forward to the decision maker a weak order P mini·
mizing d(P, s1.). Nevertheless, he risks running up against a very difficult optimi-
zation problem even with a distance as easy to manipulate as the symmetric
difference (Barbut, 1966; Heuchenne, 1970; Jacquet-Lagreze, 1969).
There exist, nevertheless, other methods, more empirical and more operational.
Let us cite the one proposed in Roy and Bertier (1973) and named ELECTRE II;
this is based on outranking relations in which only 2 non-null values of the degree
of credibility are allowed. We shall indicate below how, for the example of Figure
2.4, this method may be generalized to the case of any fuzzy relation. l
The relation (nonfuzzy) s19 produces a subset B = {al' a2, a6, a7} of four
actions for which none is outranked in A with a credibility greater than 0.9. We
may consider them as candidates for the first place in a classification P' that is
being sought. BS1. (restriction to B of s1.) may allow us to choose between them.
In effect, a2 and a7 are both outranked in B with a credibility of 0.75; thus they are
eliminated as candidates for the first place. Is it correct to accept al and a6 ex
aequo? Admittedly, the outranking of one by the other with a credibility of 0.55 is
significant, and we class only al first. If this reasoning is continued on A - {al }, it
leads to a study of B: {a2' a3, as, a6, a7 }and to class second ex aequeo a2 and a6.
We thus construct the weak order
Before proposing such a weak order to the decision maker, the scientist must
examine the weak order P" constructed following the same principle but pro-
ceeding in the opposite direction. The actions of C = {a2' a3, a4, as, a7} do not
outrank any other with a credibility greater than 0.9. From these candidates for
the last place we remove first of all aid(a2' a3) = d(a2' as) = 0.75) then a4(d(a4'
1 For more details, see Roy et ai. (1977, annexe B).
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a3) = 0.55). We are thus left with the last three ex aequo which we remove from A
in order to find the next to the last. We finally obtain
p" = {ad, {a2' ad, {a4}, {a3' as, a7}'
Evidently, there are no more reasons to opt for p' than for P". When the two
classifications are far too different, it may be much wiser not to retain either of
them but to reconsider the problem data. Vice versa, when they are closely related,
we may retain an intermediary classification P according to the principles adopted
for the application of ELECTRE II to media planning (Abgueguen, 1971). In the
example above, this leads to putting
P = {ad, {a2' a6}, {a4}, {a7}, {a3' as}.
In the same vein, many other approaches may be envisaged in order to define
a weak order. Finally, let us mention those introduced at Air France (1968) and
those proposed by Bernard and Besson (1971). For this third problem formulation
more than for the two preceding, much work remains to be accomplished in order
to reconcile the simplicity and realism that the user would like with the elegance
and rigor that preoccupy the theoreticians.
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DISCUSSION
FISHBURN: In the middle ot' Table 2.7 you give the case in which a' dominates
a significantly in criterion k and a dominates a' in criterion h. In this case you have
dCa, a') == dCa', a) == 0, and that is of little use. I would imagine that this will be
the prevalent situation, and therefore, when you take this into account, there is
not much left in the theory to help you when the choice is particularly complex.
JACQUET-LAGREZE: Yes, but in the table, there are only examples of situ-
ations that lead to different degrees of outranking. The situations that arise in
practice will depend on whether the ranking procedures are fuzzy or not and on
how precise these trade-offs are. When those relationships are fairly precise, you
will have complete comparability most of the time.
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MEYER: Let's compare two situations. The first has dCa', a) = dCa, a') = 0.9,
and the second has dCa', a) = dCa, a') = 0.1. How do one's interpretations about a
and a' differ in these two cases?
ROY: In the 0.9 case indifference is almost assured, whereas in the 0.1 case, it is
almost a case of incomparability. The 0.1 case does not often occur, but it is
important to separate incomparability from indifference.
ZIONTS: Could we say that the outranking relationship means "is probably
preferred to"?
ROY: I would not use "probably" because of the connotation of probability.
There is no probability value here.
ZIONTS: "Likely" perhaps.
ROY: Yes, that's better.
ZIONTS: Perhaps one could write a computer program with definitions of the
d's. The output would give you different subsets of incomparable decisions so that
when you are finished, you would be able to give the decision maker a set of
unoutranked solutions. Have you had any experience with this sort of thing?
ROY: Remember that we do not supply the decision maker with a decision and
tell him that it's the best one. This approach should be used as a decision aid. If we
were to give the decision maker a lot of outranking subsets, I think he might
become confused. The idea is merely to give the best such subset and let him
restrict his attention to that. My experience - and not only mine - suggests that
the whole procedure is very well perceived by the decision maker. It's very easy to
discuss with a wide range of people.
RAIFFA: I would be interested to see a comparison of this methodology with
the methodology that I am used to, multiattribute utility analysis. It would be
nice to see some concrete examples. It seems that this procedure may be well
suited to screening the alternatives to identify the viable ones; then a more quanti-
tative approach may be used for examining the remaining alternatives.
3 A Research Project onMulticriterion Decision Making
J. Wallenius and S. Zionts
3.1 INTRODUCTION
In 1973 Wallenius and Zionts undertook a project on multicriterion decision
making at the European Institute for Advanced Studies in Management. The
reasons for beginning such a project were many. Wallenius had recently completed
a study in which he tested three decision-making methods using a sample of univer-
sity students and middle-level managers. He found the results disappointing: for a
rather well-defined and well-structured problem a somewhat naive method
(Wallenius' unstructured approach) seemed to work as well as or better than two
current state-of·the-art methods (Geoffrion, 1970; Benayoun et ai., 1971). Zionts
had earlier developed a normative approach together with Contini (Contini and
Zionts, 1968) that contained rather strong assumptions and produced some in·
teresting results. Zionts then attempted to apply this approach in several instances
- the development of a model for allocating steel production (Zionts, 1967) and
a possible solution to a labor-management problem of U.S. railroads - although
neither exercise went beyond the formulation stage. There have been other
methods proposed (for example, Aubin and Naslund, 1972; Belenson and Kapur,
1973; Dyer, 1972, 1973), and there have been numerous attempts at application
(for example, Agarwal, 1973; Geoffrion et ai., 1972), although the methods have
not been widely used in practice.
It was against this background that Wallenius and Zionts embarked on a joint
project to develop a workable framework and method for solving multicriterion
problems, a methodology that could be used by persons unfamiliar with mathe·
matical methods and would be applicable to reasonably complex problems. The
The research described in this paper was begun when the authors were with the European
Institute for Advanced Studies in Management, Brussels.
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authors agreed to adopt a framework of constrained optimization with several
objectives and one decision maker. Because linear programming methods are higWy
developed for solving large problems, a framework based on an additive utility
function that had concave objectives on a convex set and linear approximations
was chosen.
In this paper the authors present the background, method, extensions, and
current status of their implementation effort.
3.2 THE METHOD l
We assume that the decision maker can specify his objectives as concave functions
to be maximized, but that he cannot explicitly specify his utility function. We
further assume that the utility function is additive in the objectives, and we sub-
sequently relax this assumption to a general concave utility function of objectives.
The method is interactive in that the decision maker is presented with a sequence of
efficient (undominated) solutions and for each solution is asked to indicate his
reaction to a set of proposed feasible trade-offs. In other words, we ask him to
respond "yes," "no," or "uncertain" to each trade-off proposed. The method
converges in theory and seems to converge in practice as well.
To state this more formally, it is assumed that there are p objectives Uj that are
explicitly known concave functions of the decision variables Xl, ••• 'Xn (or x in
vector notation). Without considering conflicts among objectives, the decision
maker wishes to maximize each objective (without loss of generality). The overall
utility function U is assumed to be a linear function (and, more generally, a concave
function) of the objective function variables Uj, i = 1, ... ,p, but the precise weights
in such a function are not known explicitly. Because we rely heavily on piecewise
linearization in the method that we propose, it is important to realize that certain
additional assumptions, though not necessary, will greatly simplify the linearization
process. Thus, if the objectives Uj are additively separable functions of the decision
variables XI, .•• ,Xn , the linearization may be accomplished separately for each
variable XjU = 1, ... ,n). We emphasize that such an assumption is a convenience
in practice, although it is not required in theory.
The case in which the implicit utility function is some general concave function
of objectives will be treated as a modification of the basic method in which an
additive utility function is assumed. In this case, the optimal solution will be in a
neighborhood (ideally a small one) that can be expressed as the convex combi-
nations of a known subset of solutions. Depending on the situation, further analysis
mayor may not be desirable to locate a solution within the neighborhood.
I This section is based on the discussion presented in Zionts and Wallenius (1976).
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3.2.1 SOME NOTATION
Let the linearized approximation to the constraint set be
Ax = b x~O, (3.1)
where A and b are, respectively, a matrix and vector of appropriate order, and x is
a vector of decision variables of appropriate order. Further, assume that each ob-
jective function is of the form Uj =fi(x) (i = 1,2, ... ,p). The equality constraints
in Eq. (3.1) may be derived from inequality constraints to which slack variables
have been added. We can approximate such a function as accurately as we wish by
piecewise linearization, introducing the constraints
j=l, ... ,p(i), (3.2)
where II is a row vector of appropriate order, gi are constants, and Uj is the value
of the objective function fi(x). (If Uj can be unrestricted in sign, some precautions
must be taken to allow for that in the computational process.) If the functions
fi(x) are, in addition, additively separable, a somewhat different set of constraints
may be used. In either case, designate the entire set of constraints for all objective
functions in matrix form as
Eu _·Cx";;'g, (3.3)
where g is a vector of the constants g{ . If each I is a linear function of x we will
have E = I, an identity matrix, and C will be a matrix of all objective functions.
If each I is not a linear function of x, E will be a matrix having for each row a unit
vector (all elements except one 0 and the nonzero element, 1). However, there
will be more than one unit element in each column corresponding to a U that is
nonlinear in x.
We also assume certain absolute minimal levels of U as part of the pmblem
constraint set: that is,
u~h. (3.4)
Consider now the linearized convex set of Eqs. (3.1), (3.3), and (3.4) as the
constraint set of the problem. Given the above preliminaries, we can present the
method as a sequence of instructions, first noting that it is generally a good idea
to scale the objective functions so that the nonzero coefficients of C are close to
1 in absolute value. Then we use the following sequence:
1. Generate an initial set of weights {Aj~ €}, with € a sufficiently small positive
constant. (We employ a constraint ~Aj = 1 for convenience, although it is not
necessary in practice.)
2. Using a current set of weights {A}, solve the linear programming problem
whose constraints are Eqs. (3.1), (3.2), (3.3), and (3.4) and whose objective is to
maximize AU. The optimal solution x will be an efficient or undominated solution
in terms of the objective vector u. Then, let x j , i = 1, ... ,I be those extreme
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points of the feasible region that are adjacent to this optimal solution. By means of
a new linear programming optimization, check each xi to see if there exists a
feasible Ai (feasible with respect to all known constraints on the Ai from previous
operations) such that Aiu(xi ) > AiU(X*). (This particular approach is mentioned
only for the sake of clarifying the idea; the method we use has been described in
section 3.2.) If there are no such extreme points, stop. The marginal rates of sub-
stitution of objectives to an adjacent point comprise a trade-off offer; a question
posing such an offer to the decision maker is called an efficient question.
3. Ask the decision maker to consider each efficient question with respect to
the current solution. He should indicate "yes" (he accepts the trade-off proposed);
"no" (he does not accept it); or "uncertain" (it is difficult to determine whether or
not he would accept it).
4. Find, through an optimization, a set of weights {Ai} ~ e consistent with all
previous questions (as before, with ~Ai = I). Go to step 2.
To elaborate on the above, for each nonbasic variable Xj let Wij represent the
increase in objective function Ui due to some specified increase in Xj' Then for
each variable of a subset of efficient variables the decision maker is told: "Here is
a trade-off. Are you willing to accept an increase in objective function u 1 of Wlj,
an increase in objective function U2 of W2j> ••• , and an increase in objective func-
tion up of Wpj? Respond 'yes,' 'no,' or 'uncertain' to the desirability of the trade-
off." (There will be at least one positive wij and at least one negative wij for each
efficient variable.)
Using the decision maker's responses, we construct constraints to restrict the
choice of the weights A to be used in finding a new efficient solution. For each
"yes" response, we construct an inequality such as the following (where e is a
sufficiently small positive number):
p
L WijAi ~ e.
i=l
For each "no" response, we construct an inequality of the form
p
L WijAi 0;;;- e.
i=l
(3.5)
(3.6)
Earlier we used the "uncertain" responses to attempt to satisfy (as an objective) the
constraint
p
L WijAi = 0,
i=l
(3.7)
but currently we do not use these responses. To identify a set of weights consistent
with previous responses we use linear programming to find a feasible solution to
the constraints, Eqs. (3.5) and (3.6), and also Ai ~ e and ~Ai = I.
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Thus, the underlying problem would be an ordinary linear programming prob-
lem, if the decision maker's Awere known. Initially there are no restrictions on the
vector A, but constraints are added successively to restrict the choice of weights.
Once we find the optimal solution for a given set of weights, we identify the
efficient trade-off questions. The method for doing this is based on linear program-
ming (section 3.2). The trade-offs are given by the shadow prices for each of the
objectives for anyone nonbasic variable, and the efficient questions are derived
from a subset of the nonbasic variables.
A proof of convergence may be built on the finiteness of the number of ef-
ficient extreme-point solutions. Each question session, except possibly the last,
excludes at least one efficient extreme-point solution. Thus, the procedure is
finite. This finiteness may not seem very appealing, however, because of the large
number of efficient extreme points that may exist. In practice, the convergence
experience for sizable problems has been good. Although a utility increase between
successive applications of step 2 is not assured, and does not always occur, it has
occurred almost every time in practice (except for a specifically contrived ex-
ample).
3.2.2 THE METHOD FOR ARBITRARY CONCAVE UTILITY FUNCTIONS OF
OBJECTIVES
The method can be extended to solve a more general class of problems having a
general concave utility function of objectives that are, in turn, linear functions of
the decision variables. In such a case, the method has a solution within some
(ideally small) neighborhood of an optimum. (If desired, further optimization,
which is not a part of the method, may be undertaken to find an optimum.) The
extension is based on local linearization of the utility function and periodic removal
of previous responses. We first solve the original linear programming problem with
an arbitrary set of multipliers and find an efficient solution. Then we generate a
set of efficient questions and ask the decision maker to respond "yes," "no," or
"uncertain" to the questions. (We may alternatively compute the efficient extreme
points that are adjacent in the objective-function space. Fandel and Wilhelm (1975)
interpreted our method in this way; it has an advantage for a subsequent phase
of the algorithm.)
Using these responses, we generate a new set of multipliers and find a new
efficient solution. Up to this point the method is exactly the same as before. We
then ask if the new solution is preferred to the old. If so, all previous responses are
removed, a new set of efficient questions is generated, and the procedure is con-
tinued from the new solution. If the old solution is preferred, we continue the pro-
cedure from an efficient solution adjacent to the old solution in the objective-
function space corresponding to a favorable ("yes") response. If there is no such
solution (the condition for termination), the optimal solution to the problem
lies in the neighborhood of the old solution defined as the convex hull of the old
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solution and all efficient solutions adjacent to the old solution in the objective-
function space. (There are numerous options for implementing the procedure; we
have suggested only one. The selection of the variation that works well in practice
must await implementation and testing).
As mentioned above, further optimization to find the optimum may then be
used if desired, but if the solutions are relatively "close" in terms of the objective-
function values, it will probably be worthwhile to terminate with the solution
obtained through use of the altered method. We have not tested this change in
practice, but its validity follows from the concavity of the implicit utility function
and the linearity of the constraint set.
3.2.3 AN EXAMPLE
We now present a small example of the method in some detail. Consider the fol-
lowing set of constraints:
2x 1 + X2 + 4X3 + 3X4";;; 60 (slack xs),
3xI + 4X2 + X3 + 2X4";;; 60 (slack X6),
and the following objective functions, all to be maximized:
UI = 3XI+X2+2x3+X4,
U3 = -XI + 5x2 + X3 + 2X4.
For the example, we assume that the (implicit) utility function is 0.58uI + 0.21u2
+ 0.21u3' but we will use the knowledge of this function only in answering the yes
or no questions. Initially, we arbitrarily choose ~'I = A2 = A3 = 0.333 and maximize
0.333uI + 0.333u2 + 0.333u3 subject to the problem constraints. The optimal
solution is UI = 24, U2 = U3 = 66. The nonbasic variables are XI,X3,XS, and X6' The
increases for each of the three objective functions corresponding to a unit in-
crement in each of these variables are for XI: +2, -0.5, -4.5; for X3: + I, -4.5,
+0.5 ;for Xs: --0.2, -1.8, +0.2; and for X6: -0.2, +0.7, -1.3.
By way of explanation, problem (3.9) (for finding the set of efficient nonbasic
variables) for XI is
Maximize 2AI - 0.5A2 - 4.5A3
subject to: Al - 4.5A2 + 0.5A3";;; 0,
-0.2AI - 1.8A2 + 0.2A3 .,;;; 0,
-0.2AI + 0.7A2- 1.3A3";;; 0,
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Since the maximum is positive (infinite), the trade-offs offered by Xl are ef-
ficient. Similarly, variables X3 and X6 offer efficient trade-offs, whereas Xs does not
offer an efficient set of trade-offs. We then ask the decision maker whether he
likes or dislikes each set of efficient trade-offs. Thus, for X I, is he willing to accept
an increase of 2 units of UI in return for a decrease of 0.5 units of U2 and a decrease
of 4.5 units of U3? To simulate a response we compute an evaluation: 0.58(2) +
0.21(-.5) + 0.21(-9.5) >0. Thus, there is a net increase in the decision maker's
utility; he should like that set of trade-offs. Similarly, he does not like the trade-
offs posed by X3 and X6' We thereby generate the inequalities of the form (3.5)
and (3.6) and find a feasible solution to the set of constraints (arbitrarily setting
e = 0.001)
2AI - 0.5A2 - 4.5A3 ~ 0.001,
Al - 4.5A2 + 0.5A3 ~ -0.001,
-0.2AI + 0.7A2- I.3A3 ~ -0.001,
AI+A2+A3 = 1,AI,A2,A3~0.001.
A basic feasible solution is Al = 0.777, A2 = 0.222, A3 = 0.001. Using these
multipliers to generate a new utility function, which we maximize over the two
constraints of the original problem, we find the optimum to be UI = 66, U2 = 30,
U3 = -12. Corresponding to that solution there are four nonbasic variables: X2, X4,
Xs, and X6. By solving problem (3.9) for these variables using the constraints
derived from the answers to the earlier trade-offs, we find that the only efficient
trade-offs are those associated with X4. Accordingly, the set of trade-offs associated
with X4 is put to the decision maker for his evaluation. Because the set is attractive,
the trade-offs are used to generate the constraint -1.5A} + 2.5A2 + 2A3 ~ 0.001,
which is added to the constraint set above. A feasible solution is Al = 0.594,
A2 = 0.160, A3 = 0.246. Using these multipliers to generate a utility function we
find the optimal solution to the original problem for this function to be UI = 48,
U2 = 60, U3 = 12. Appending the generated constraints in problem (3.9), we find
that none of the nonbasic variables at this solution is efficient; hence the solution
is optimal and the multipliers Al = 0.594, A2 = 0.160, A3 = 0.246 are equivalent
(for this problem) to our unknown multipliers.
3.3 EXTENSIONS TO THE MULTICRITERION DECISION-MAKING
METHOD
In addition to refining the multicriterion method, we have developed three ex-
tensions. The first was described in section 3.2.2, where we extended the method
to a general concave utility function of objectives. In this section we present two
other extensions: a method for solving integer programming problems and a meth-
od for determining the efficient subset of a set of vectors.
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3.3.1 INTEGER LINEAR PROGRAMMING WITH MULTIPLE OBJECTIVES I
Using the framework presented in section 3.2, it seems that a natural extension of
that method would make it possible to solve integer programming problems by
solving the continuous multicriterion problem and, using the multipliers thus
obtained, solving the associated linear integer programming problem. Unfortu-
nately, however, that extension does not necessarily work. The following example
is an illustration. Given the constraints
XI + h2';;;; 3!
hi +x2';;;;3~
with objectives UI =XI and U2 = X2 and multipliers Al and A2 (>0) that satisfy
the following relationships
then the continuous solution XI = 2.34, X2 = 2.34 is optimal. However, even for
this simple problem there are three optimal integer solutions corresponding to the
same continuous optimum, depending on the true weights:
If AI> 2A2, then XI = 3, X2 = 0 is optimal.
If 2A2 > AI> 0.5A2, then XI = X2 = 2 is optimal.
If Al < 0.5A2, then XI =0, X2 = 3 is optimal.
The example could be readily made more complicated, but it serves to show that
further precision is required in the specification of the multipliers.
The difficulty is that additional questions must be asked to specify the multi-
pliers more precisely. Assuming that the utility function is additive, if the multi-
pliers were known exactly, the problem would be an ordinary integer programming
problem whose objective is simply to maximize Au.
There are numerous possible ways of further specifying the weights; we present
two of them, both as yet untested.
The first is a dual cutting-plane approach. It is a logical extension of any dual
cutting-plane method with respect to multicriterion decision making. Let k be a
nonnegative integer, a choice variable that may be sufficiently large to be effec-
tively infinite. The procedure is the following:
1. Find the continuous multicriterion optimum and set i to O. Use the associated
weights to generate a composite objective function.
2. Adjoin a cut, increase i by one unit, and optimize using the present composite
objective function. Denote the result as the incumbent solution.
I Further details are provided in Zionts (1975).
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3. If this incumbent solution is an integer, go to step 4. Otherwise, if i is not
equal to k, go to step 2. If i is equal to k, go to step 5.
4. Set i to zero; generate efficient questions for the current solution that are
consistent with previous responses. If the decision maker fmds none of the trade-
offs attractive (or if there are no efficient trade-offs), stop; the optimal solution
has been found. Otherwise, use the responses to find a new composite objective
function and perform the iterations necessary to achieve a linear programming
optimum. Designate the associated solution as the incumbent solution, and go to
step 3.
5. Set i to zero; generate efficient questions for the current solution that are
consistent with previous responses. Use the decision maker's responses to generate
a new composite objective function and perform the iterations (possibly none)
necessary to achieve a linear programming optimum. Designate the associated
solution as the incumbent solution, and go to step 3.
The validity of this method can be shown as follows. Every time an integer
solution is found (and as long as k is not infmite, more often), questions are gen-
erated and the multipliers may be altered by the procedure. Every time step 4 is
utilized, the optimality of an efficient integer solution (an efficient extreme point
of the convex hull of all feasible integer solutions) is confirmed or denied. If it is
confirmed, the optimality has been demonstrated; if it is denied, one extreme
point has been eliminated from consideration. So long as the solution space is
closed and bounded, the number of extreme points is finite. Therefore the pro-
cedure is finite.
The efficacy of choosing k to be finite is not clear, nor is the efficacy of the
method known. How well this scheme works depends on the power of the cut
method employed. Dual cut methods are not currently used much because they
do not work well in practice; thus it is unlikely that a multicriterion scheme based
on a dual cut will work well. We therefore turn our attention to branch and bound
algorithms. The essential theorem of Zionts (1975) is the basis for such an algo-
rithm:
THEOREM 1 A solution may be terminated without further branching, provided
two conditions hold: The decision maker prefers a feasible integer solution to it,
and all efficient trade-off questions associated with the solution are viewed nega-
tively or with indifference.
Proof As shown by the decision maker's preference, the known integer so-
lution has a greater objective-function value than the solution in question. Further,
since no continuous neighbor is preferred to the solution, any further restricted
solution will have a lower objective function than the solution in question and,
therefore, than the integer solution.
The question of preference is first checked by comparing the preference relation-
ship with previously expressed preferences (derived from responses) to see whether
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the preferences can be deduced. If they can be deduced, the preference is known;
if not, a question is posed to the decision maker, and the responses further restrict
the multiplier space. Whenever a new set of multipliers is found, it is to be sub-
stituted for the old set. An algorithm and an example should help to illustrate the
above presentation.
1. Use the continuous multicriterion method described in section 3.2 to solve
the continuous problem and obtain a set of weights that yields a linear programming
problem for which the continuous optimum is the optimal multicriterion solution.
Place that solution in the list of partial solutions.
2. Choose the partial solution having the maximum value of the current ob-
jective function. (Other criteria may also be used.) If the list is empty, stop; the best
integer solution is optimal. (If none is found, there is no feasible integer solution.)
3. For the partial solution, choose an integer variable whose solution value
is fractional. Solve two linear programming problems, one with the upper bound
of that variable fIxed at the next lower integer, the other with the lower bound of
that variable fIxed at the next higher integer. For each solution perform the fol-
lowing tests in the given order:
a. If there is no feasible solution, discard the solution.
b. Test the solution against the best integer solution using previously gen-
erated constraints and the theorem. If the results are not decisive, pose questions
to the decision maker. Discard the solution if it is ruled out by the theorem.
c. If the solution is integral and preferred to the best integer solution, replace
the best integer solution by it; if it is not, add the solution to the list of partial
solutions.
4. Either zero, one, or two solutions will be added to the list. If none is added,
go to step 2. If one is added, remove that solution from the list and go to step 3.
If two are added, choose the preferred solution; remove it from the list; go to
step 3. To fInd the preferred solution, fIrst check the two solutions against pre-
viously generated constraints to see if the preference is implied. If not, ask the
decision maker.
Further improvements based on other branch-and-bound integer algorithms may
also be used.
To determine whether a preference is implied from earlier responses, a very
small linear programming problem must be solved using the constraints based on
all earlier responses of the decision maker. To illustrate, we use the same example
presented earlier in this section. We assume that the true weights are ~I.t = 0.7,
A2 = 0.3, but that the weights chosen at the continuous optimum are AI = 0.3,
A2 = 0.7. The tree of solutions is given in Figure 3.1. The circled number in each
block indicates the order in which the solutions are found.
The following display shows the optimal continuous solution, where X3 and X4
are the slack variables. (The identity matrix has been omitted.)
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2.34 1.125 -0.375
2.34 -0.375 1.125
2.34 1.125 -0.375
2.34 -0.375 1.125
Two questions are found in the last two rows of the display: Are you willing to
decrease UI by 1.125 units to increase U2 by 0.375 units? A simulated response is
obtained by using the true weights. Here we compute -1.125 (0.7) + 0.375 (0.3).
Since the sum is negative, the response is "no." Are you willing to increase UI by
0.375 units by having U2 decrease by 1.125 units? (Response: "no.") The negative
responses confirm the optimality of the solution of the display. The constraints
are then
Al > ~A2
Al < 3A2
By using Al + A2 = 1, and eliminating A2' we have
0.25 <AI <0.75.
As indicated above, we use Al = 0.3 (noting that the true value is Al = 0.7). Solving
the two linear programming problems by branching on x I from the noninteger
optimum, we have solutions 2 and 3. The preferred solution is not obvious; thus,
we illustrate the test. Solution 3 has a utility of 3AI + 0.375A2' Solution 2 has a
utility of 2:\.1 + 2.458A2. The utility of solution 3 less that of solution 2 is
Al - 2.0833A2'
When we use A2 = 1 - AI, we have 3.0833AI - 2.0833.
Because 0.25 < Al < 0.75, the expression can be either positive OJ negative;
hence a question is asked. The decision maker prefers solution 3, and we have a new
constraint:
3.0833:\.1 - 2.0833> 0, OJ AI> 0.675.
Thus, we now have 0.675 < Al < 0.75; we choose Al = 0.71. We then branch on
solution 3 to find solutions 4 and 5 (the latter infeasible) and then branch on
solution 4 to find solutions 6 and 7 (the latter infeasible). Because solution 6 is
an integer, we compare it with the only active solution on the list, solution 2.
The answer is not implied, so we ask the decision maker which solution he prefers.
He prefers solution 6; then the constraint
or AI<0.711
is added. This results in 0.675 < Al <0.711, and we choose Al = 0.69. Branching on
solution 2, we obtain solutions 8 and 9, both of which are implied to be less
CD No~integer
optimum
UI=U2=XI=X2
= 2.34375
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Ul = Xl = 2
U2 = X2 = 2.4583
®
Ul = Xl = 2
U2 = X2 = 2
®
Ul = Xl = 0.375
U2 = X2 = 3
®
UI=XI=3
U2 = X2 = 0.375
®
Not feasible
o
UI=XI=4.125
U2 = X2 = 0
®
Ul = Xl = 3
U2 = X2 = 0 Not feasible
FIGURE 3.1 Branch-and-bound solution of the example.
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attractive than the best-known integer solution. Since the decision maker views
trade-offs at solutions 8 and 9 negatively, both solutions can be discarded. Since
there are no solutions remaining on the list, solution 6 is optimal.
Neither of these proposals has yet been tested; we can only speculate about
the performance. Clearly the branch-and-bound approach appears to be promising.
In addition, in view of the success of branch-and-bound procedures in solving
certain integer programming problems, unless the number of practical solutions
that must be examined is much larger than what is currently encountered, the
method appears quite feasible. Further statements must await empirical testing.
3.3.2 IDENTIFYING EFFICIENT VECTORS l
As part of the basic method presented in section 3.2, we defined the efficient
questions to solve the problem of identifying the efficient trade-off vector. A
naive method for solving the problem was to solve a number of linear programming
problems, one for each vector considered, but as we showed in Zionts and Wallenius
(1975), this procedure can be greatly streamlined and is currently an important
subprogram of our method. To give an idea of how the methods work we provide
some background on the problem of finding efficient trade-off vectors and present
a statement of the method as well as some results.
An efficient trade-off vector must have at least one negative component.
Further, the vector indexed k is not efficient if there exists a set of multipliers IJj
satisfying
L IJj wij ;;. wik
j*k
IJj ;;'0.
1, ... ,P
(3.8)
By attributing a null minimizing objective function and writing a dual linear pro-
gramming problem, we have
Maximize
subject to
p
L Wij Ai ~O
i=l
ji=k
(3.9)
If the maximum is positive (it will be infinite), the vector indexed k is an efficient
trade-off vector.
The method is to begin to solve the linear programming problem given in (3.9).
We denote the slack variables as vm and at each iteration use tests based on the
lThis section is based on Zionts and Wallenius (1975).
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following theorems (proofs of which are given in Zionts and Wallenius, 1975) and
their corollaries for all vectors. Whenever the status of the vector corresponding
to the objective function becomes known, we change to an objective function that
corresponds to a vector whose status is not known.
THEOREM 2 Suppose that variable vm is nonbasic. If in every row in which the
variable has a negative coefficient the basic variable is nonzero, vector m is efficient.
Remarks In all iterations of interest all basic variables will have zero values.
Thus, the theorem can be simplified to the following: if variable vm is nonbasic
and has only nonnegative elements in the column of the tableau, vector m is ef-
ficient.
THEOREM 3 If variable vn is basic for a basic feasible solution, and all coef-
ficients in the associated row of the simplex tableau (excluding that of vn ) are
nonpositive, the vector n is inefficient.
Remarks We may also observe a row having exactly one negative coefficient
with a value of bi of zero. In such a case, if the variable having the negative coef-
ficient is a variable Vn , then n is not an efficient vector. Whenever a variable vn
corresponding to an inefficient vector is basic, the associated constraint may be
eliminated.
We use formulation (3.9) with a tableau that omits the identity matrix. Each v
variable has an initial status of unknown; each Avariable, an initial status of known.
The status of a row is that of its basic variable; the status of a column, that of its
(nonbasic) variable. By "known," we also mean efficient and inefficient. Thus,
1. For any row with status unknown, with all coefficients nonpositive, change
the status of the row to inefficient and delete the row. Go to step 2.
2. For any row with precisely one coefficient that is negative, change the status
of the column (if it is unknown) corresponding to the negative coefficient to
inefficient. Go to step 3.
3. For any column with status unknown that has all coefficients nonnegative,
change the status of the column to efficient. Go to step 4.
4. For any column having precisely one coefficient that is positive, change the
status (if unknown) of the row corresponding to the positive coefficient to ef-
ficient. Go to step 5.
5. If the first row has a status of efficient or known, go to step 6. If not, choose
a nonbasic variable with a positive coefficent in the firSt row and perform a simplex
iteration so that it is basic (employing perturbation methods if necessary to prevent
cycling). If the entering variable is inefficient, delete the row in which it appears.
Go to step 1.
6. If there are any other rows having unknown status, exchange one of these
rows with the first, and go to step 5; if not, go to step 7.
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7. If there are no columns with unknown status, stop; all vectors have been
classified. If there are any columns with unknown status, perform an iteration to
make one of them basic in the first row (exchanging rows if necessary), and
then go to step 1.
Thus far we have not developed measures of performance of the efficiency method
per se but the method as stated above is an integral part of our multicriterion
method and seems to be performing adequately. Variations of the method may be
used to solve other problems (see Zionts and Wallenius, 1975).
Extensions of this method have been discussed, although not pursued. Professor
H. Thiriez of the Centre d'Enseignement Superieur des Affaires, Jouy-en-Josas,
France, has suggested use of the method by several decision makers in a Delphi-
like setting. Various aspects of this idea have been considered in informal dis-
cussions.
3.4 TESTING AND APPLICATION
Although much work has been done in developing algorithms for solving multi-
criterion problems of constrained optimization, there is little evidence of appli-
cation of such methods in practice. Because much of our work was motivated by
the need for a workable framework, the performance and use of the method in
practice is of great importance. In developing the method, we solved a number of
small and medium-sized test problems in which we assumed that the utility func-
tions were known, solely for the purpose of simulating responses to the questions
raised. Although our testing was not exhaustive, the performance was sufficiently
good that we felt the next question was to explore the applicability of the method
in practice. We were concerned with such questions as how well the method
worked, whether managers would be consistent when using it, and whether they
would find the method useful. We searched for an appropriate practical problem
and tried to find a firm that was already using linear programming and was willing
to try our method.
3.4.1 AN ATTEMPT AT IMPLEMENTATION
After much searching, we found a company willing to participate in our study.
We subsequently learned, however, that the firm was not using linear programming
to solve the multicriterion problem proposed for the study but instead to solve
another problem, a single-objective short-term scheduling problem. Thus, to set up
the test we had to take part in developing a model for the company. To avoid
confounding the evaluation of the method with that of the model, we emphasized
to the managers that we wanted to make a distinction between the method and the
model, insofar as possible.
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The company with which we worked was S. A. Cockerill, a large steel cor-
poration in Seraing, Belgium. Our initial contact was a manager in the Corporate
Planning Department who is responsible for making various special long-range
planning studies. Although he uses certain packaged computer routines, he does
not consider himself a specialist in computers or operations research. Our early
work on the model was almost entirely in cooperation with this manager, but
his superior, a more senior manager, later became involved.
During the first sessions we discussed the problem, the system currently used
to solve the problem, our method, and our objectives in the study. The problem
was important to the company, and substantial resources were used in trying to
solve it. A simulation approach was used whereby the effects of alternative
decision choices were computed and extrapolated. Management was not pleased
with the performance because of the results obtained with the trial-and-error
approach. The strategy that we agreed to follow was to start by solving a simplified
version of the problem and later expand and refine the problem representation.
The point of departure for us was a simplified multiple-objective linear program-
ming example developed by one of the managers for demonstration purposes.
However, because there was no conflict among the objective functions of the
problem, the objectives had to be reconsidered and the example improved. We then
demonstrated the use of the method to the managers by simulating responses to
questions according to an assumed utility function.
Within 2 months, during which we worked closely with one of the managers,
we developed two models - a small, simplified model and a larger, more realistic
problem representation - and then planned the objective functions to be included
in the study. The problem was to make some long-range capital investment de-
cisions regarding steel production facilities; these decisions involved multiple
criteria. A simplified representation of the steel plant was constructed jointly with
the managers. Various processing units were represented, as were scrap losses, and
other factors. The financial aspects of the model are represented in considerable
detail (separate short-term and long-term financing, depreciation, and taxes),
whereas marketing aspects are less precisely represented. In the simulation approach
numerous measures of effectiveness were used. Together with the managers, we
established four objectives as key criteria in the evaluation of corporate planning
decisions:
Maximize cumulative cash flow at the end of the horizon.
Minimize long-term loans taken during the horizon.
Maximize net worth at the end of the horizon.
Minimize short-term loans (slightly different formulations were used in the two
models).
We now briefly consider the nature of the conflict among these objectives.
Maximizing cash flow or net worth is in direct conflict with minimizing long-term
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or short-term debt. We can further regard the first two objectives as measures of
return and the last two as measures of risk. Cash flow and net worth differ because
of depreciation, and long-term and short-term debt have different associated
effects.
As mentioned earlier, two versions of the model were formulated: a small two-
period model in which each period represents 1 year, and a larger four-period
lO-year model in which successive periods represent 1, 2,3, and 4 years. The
smaller model has 21 equations and 47 variables; the larger model, 143 equations
and 248 variables. (The number of variables includes slack but not artificial vari-
ables. Upper bound constraints and associated slack variables are not counted.)
Data for the models came from existing information as well as projections available
to the managers. More detailed information regarding the models may be found in
Wallenius (1975b).
The computer program used for the tests was implemented on the IBM 370/158
computer at S. A. Cockerill. The MPSX (Mathematical Programming System Ex-
tended) program was used with FORTRAN subroutines to provide the linkage, to
determine the questions to be asked of the decision maker, and to accept the
responses. Because of the computer configuration at S. A. Cockerill, all the tests
had to be made in a batch processing mode. Any results, therefore, should be
enhanced when an interactive processing mode is used. In addition, because of
the time pressures during the programming phases, no attempt was made to gen-
erate an efficient program. The emphasis was on simplifying the programming
task. Thus, there were many parts of the program that could have been improved.
For example, each time a composite objective function was used to generate an
efficient solution consistent with previous responses, no use was made of previous
problem solutions. Although many such improvements should be considered and
made in using the method for regular problem solving, the current program is
capable of solving reasonably large problems.
A brief discussion of the test results seems appropriate here. We first solved the
models using simulated responses based on an assumed utility function. We then
solved the models interactively by asking the managers individually to answer the
questions.
We began to solve the simplified model by arbitrarily maximizing a linear utility
function consisting of all objective functions equally weighted (after accounting
for the different scales of measurement). We obtained two questions at the starting
solution, and used the knowledge of an assumed utility function in answering the
questions posed. We then found a set of consistent multipliers and solved the
original problem using these multipliers. This time there were three questions to
be asked. Using the multipliers implied by the answers to all five questions, the
optimal solution to the problem was generated.
The same starting solution and the associated set of questions were used with
the actual responses of managers. Both managers found the first set of trade-offs
attractive. At the second iteration one manager gave two "yes" and one "no"
93
response to the questions; the other gave one "yes" and two "no" responses. At the
third iteration only one question was asked. The response of both managers was
"no," and the use of the method was terminated after three sessions and six
questions. Using the small model, both managers were consistent in their responses
(although they were not in agreement with each other) and feasible multipliers for
the objective functions could be found. With each successive set of multipliers, the
associated solutions were preferred to those that had been used previously, both
for the simulated responses and for the actual responses by the managers. As
demonstrated by Zionts and Wallenius (1976), this does not always occur.
After completing the runs with the simplified model, we solved the large model
twice by assuming different known linear utility functions to generate the responses.
In the first trial 28 questions were asked; in the second, 24. Each trial consisted of
six sessions to find the optimal solution. In addition, the implicit utility increased
(although not necessarily strictly) from each solution to the next.
After the simulated runs were completed, one of the managers used the method
on the large model. The first trial required 8 question sessions and 23 questions,
and because of the batch mode of operation we changed the piOgram somewhat.
The current program is the same as that described here; more information about
the change may be found in Wallenius and Zionts (1975). The second trial required
4 question sessions and 19 questions.
We now address the reactions of the managers to the method and to the models.
The linear programming models (both small and large) were rather hastily
constructed and were criticized for lack of realism. Several suggestions were made
for making the models more realistic, such as increasing the number of periods,
adding consideration of human resources, and complicating debt arrangements and
dividend policy. These and other improvements in the models will have to be the
subject of future work.
Our initial experience with the method was favorable. The managers seemed to
find satisfactory solutions using the method. The method was also sufficiently easy
to use and to understand for persons unfamiliar with mathematical multicriterion
decision methods. In more detailed discussions many interesting points were
raised. The number of questions was not considered to be too large in any trial,
but the first trial with the large model required too many sessions (8) to complete
the runs within a day. (A time-sharing mode of operation would alleviate this
problem.) The majority of the questions were easy to answer, and the few difficult
questions were dealt with adequately by responses of "uncertain." The managers
were consistent in their responses, and we were therefore able to find feasible
multipliers for the objectives.
After completing the tests with the middle-level managers, we made a presentation
of our work to a senior manager, a member of the Board of Directors. We simulated
some of the early responses but did not have a chance to make a complete trial run
using the computer. The reaction of the senior manager was favorable, but he
expressed some concern for the program's inability to solve problems involving
integer variables.
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A few other observations may be of interest. When we undertook the project,
it was regarded by the company largely as an academic exercise, and although the
company was willing to participate, there was considerable reluctance on its part to
commit time and resources. As the study progressed, however, the company re-
garded it more seriously, contributed more, and there was participation at higher
levels of management.
3.4.2 CURRENT IMPLEMENTATION AND TESTING ACTIVITY
In the interests of implementation, we have made our program available to pro·
spective users. We have sent listings to numerous companies and individuals. We
have been working with some of them and have asked all of them to keep us
informed of their work with the method. We shall now briefly describe the current
activities of which we are aware.
In conjunction with us, Reinhilde Van de Vlaed of the University of Ghent and
Wally Van Gamplaer of Sidmar (Siderugie Maritime SA), Ghent, are developing a
general·purpose FORTRAN computer program implementing the method that is
intended for any linear programming system. The intention is to have a well-
documented program that can be used for application and other test purposes.
It will be freely available as soon as it is completely tested. Sidmar then plans to
use it in a short-term steel production planning problem; its objectives include
profits and other measures of performance, including a measure of change in
product mix. The model has already been run as a linear programming problem,
using profits as the objective function with constraints on some of the other ob-
jectives.
Professor H. Muller plans to use the multicriterion method at the University of
Ghent in the context of a management game. He intends to compare the perfor-
mance of teams in the game as a function of their use of the multicriterion method.
N. V. Phmps, of Eindhoven, the Netherlands, has used our program and has
developed a strategic planning model for Philips. The model considers interactions
among the various major divisions at Philips as well as with the markets. Objectives
such as overall profits, growth rates, and share of the market are included. Some
objectives that are considered to be subsidiary are incorporated via constraints,
and the remainder as objectives. A preliminary test of the model has been made,
and it is now being further tested at the management level.
3.5 CONCLUSION
We have not yet achieved our primary objective of having the method used in
practice by managers; however, we have made significant progress in this direction.
We are now concentrating on
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Publicizing our work and making our program widely available
Assisting organizations in the implementation and use of the program
Identifying and correcting any problems in the functioning of the method and
the program
Implementing the general concave-utility-function version of the method as well
as the mixed-integer version.
Comments, questions, and suggestions regarding our work are most welcome.
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DISCUSSION
LARICHEV: I would like to ask a question about convergence. Your decision
maker may not be able to give consistent answers, especially at the beginning of
the process, when he may confuse his aim of trying to maximize all his objectives.
Have you had any practical experience with this?
ZIONTS: Yes. We worked with a manager in one corporation and though per-
haps we were lucky, he gave a response of "uncertain" in cases that were difficult
for him, and we ignored those. If it became apparent that there was some contra-
diction, we would have to go back and review his answers or adopt a different form
of questioning.
EDWARDS: In the example with 143 equations and 248 variables, what sort of
questions do you ask the decision maker? How much information concerning the
positions of the 248 variables does the decision maker review?
ZIONTS: He sees only the values of the four objectives for each position. He
can have more information if he needs it, although that implies that he has more
than four objectives.
DYER: In problems where there are many objectives, isn't it going to be dif-
ficult for the decision maker to sort out his preferences? Isn't it likely that some
of his responses may be inconsistent?
ZIONTS: We had planned that the number of objectives should be less than six,
although, of course, any number may be used. In practice, I think some of the
objectives could be handled as constraints. We recognize that the human ability to
discriminate is not so precise. That is why we have the "uncertain" response and
hope that any errors will fall into that class.
EDWARDS: Is there some way of varying only subsets of the objectives at a
time and then aggregating them a different way, repeating the process and then
deducing an overall position?
ZIONTS: I think so; that's a good point. However, such an idea may not work
very well in the general concave utility case.
4 Use of Vector Optimizationin Multiobjective Decision Making
M. Peschel and C. Riedel
4.1 OVERALL FORMULAnON OF THE PROBLEM
4.1.1 INTRODUCTION: DECISION MAKING FOR INDUSTRIAL SYSTEMS
We assume that we are dealing with a system that has some control variables that
occur freely within given boundaries. The effect of optimization is measured by
one or more quality criteria, which are functions of the control variables. The
determination of the relationship between the quality criteria and the control
variables is the main task of modeling; this modeling precedes optimization and
often has a great influence on the result.
There are many cases in which the objective of a system is determined not by
one but by many objective criteria that depend on the same set of control variables.
For example, the objective might be to achieve a maximal effect (quality-para-
meter, accuracy, profit, production) with a minimal effort (cost, material, labor,
energy). In general, if we want to optimize a number of criteria simultaneously,
contradictions will arise between different demands, and these can be resolved only
through a compromise. The contradictions occur because the individual criteria
assume optimal values at different points within the common control area.
Two different controls can have different types of relationship: (a) one control
will be preferred to another because it leads to better values for all criteria, or
(b) the two controls cannot be compared because some criteria lead to better values
for the first control, while other criteria produce better values for the second.
If we represent all possible values of two criteria, designated as Q1 and Q2' by
points in a plane with a Cartesian system of coordinates, we see that the com-
parison of different control variables is equivalent to a comparison of the corre-
sponding criterion vectors (Ql' Q2) having the semiorder of their components in
vector-space. The semiorder is the natural one. A vector is preferred to another
only if no criterion is worse in the first vector than in the second and if at least one
criterion is strictly better. This procedure is known as Pareto preference.
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We can find examples of this in industry: the design of an electrically powered
vehicle, the development of positioning circuits for machine tools, and the ad-
justment of the free parameters of a controller in automatic control. In all such
cases, we are interested in choosing one compromise point out of a set of all ef-
ficient points in the sense of Pareto preference. The choice of the compromise
point depends on additional conditions, demands, and experience and, in addition,
on the subjective considerations of the decision maker. This optimization task is
referred to in different ways in the literature. We find the terms "Pareto optimi-
zation," "polyoptimization," and "vector optimization." We shall call this kind of
research vector optimization.
We can assume that preferences for all criteria are monotonically increasing as
i = 1,2, ... , k.
The control vectors x = (x), X2, ... , x n) are generally restricted to a control area
X; the criterion vectors Q = (QI, Q2' ... , Qk) range across a corresponding area Y
in the criterion space.
We have a static problem of vector optimization if we seek a solution that is a
time-independent vector x*; we speak of a dynamic problem of vector optimi-
zation if we seek a solution in the form of a time function x*(t).
For determining the Pareto set of all efficient points we have to compare only
the same components of the criterion vector. The problem of scaling arises if we
want to have a compromise weighting, where each objective is weighted in com-
parison with the others.
To obtain sufficient solutions it is generally necessary to apply procedures
having a "dialogue" character, which allow the decision maker to use his intuitive
feelings to develop, step by step, an increasingly improved understanding of the
structure of a Pareto set.
After obtaining adequate information about the Pareto set, we can establish a
compromise with the help of decision theory. Figure 4.1 illustrates the interactions
among vector optimization, model building, and decision making. Vector optimi-
zation supplies the decision maker with more information about the interrelation-
ships among the criteria so that he may infer better compromises and so that he is
better able to deal with situations in which he must make decisions in the presence
of stochastic influences.
4.1.2 MATHEMATICAL BACKGROUND OF VECTOR OPTIMIZATION
We assume that we have at our disposal a set X of allowed control vectors x = (Xl,
X2, •.. , x n ) that are given through the constraints
X = (xERnljj(x)~O, j = 1,2, .. . ,m).
Through the correspondence
iEK (l,2, ... ,k),
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FIGURE 4.1 Schematic of the interactions among vector optimization, model
building, and decision making.
the set X of the control space will be transformed to a set Y in the k-dimensional
criterion space. Every element of the set Y,
Y = (Q(x)ER h IxEX),
is called an objective vector. We consider its components to be criteria of a vector-
optimization task. Without any constraint we can state
Q = Q(x) ~ max.
For the Pareto preference relation we use the semiorder of vectors defined in the
following way:
if Qi";;; Q; for i = 1,2, ... ,k.
Q* is a solution of the vector-optimization problem if it is a maximum element
of the vector semiorder; in other words, there exists no point Q E Y with Q; ,,;;; Qi
for all i E K and Qj <Qj for at least one j E K.
The set of all solutions of the vector-optimization task is the set of efficient
points or the Pareto set Ph. For a set S = (i I, iz, ..• , is) and s < k let us determine
for the criteria Qi" Qi" ... ,Qi
s
the corresponding Pareto set Pso Suppose
Q* E Ps c RS , and let us consider all the control vectors x* that determine the
point Q*. Some control vectors may exist that lead to different values for the
secondary criteria Qj with j E S. Let us choose such control vectors x* so that with
fixed Q* the secondary criteria Qj will be vector maximized. We then obtain for
Q* a point Q* E Ph, and Q* can in some sense be considered as a projection of
Q*.
The set of all Q* constructed in this way is a subset of Ph; thus, we designate it
by P~: P~ s;. Ph. All controls x that lead to efficient points in the criterion space are
called efficient controls. Obviously, x* is an efficient control if no control vector
x exists with Q(x) > Q(x*).
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For determination of the Pareto set Ph, two monotonic properties are of im-
portance: criteria and control. For the first property, the control set X may be
given. From all k criteria Qi we choose s < k and Qi, ,Qi, ' ... ,Qi
s
and construct
the corresponding Pareto set p•. Taking into account the possibilities of the sec-
ondary criteria as described above, we develop a Pareto set P~ ~ Ph' For s = 1 we
obtain the optimal points of a single criterion; and for s = 2, the curves of bilateral
compromises. For the second property, control, we vary only the components
xi, ,Xi" •.. 'Xis; the other components Xj are fixed at the levels Xj = xj . Ph(Xs )
comprise the Pareto set determined under the additional constraints. We obtain
the following property:
The results can be improved only if we remove the constraints.
In some cases, the Pareto set Ph (Xn) can be determined as an envelope of all
constrained Pareto sets Ph(Xn - I ); therefore, we speak of the monotonic envelope
property of vector optimization. In the following discussion we shall assume that all
criteria are functions with continuous derivatives in all the control variables.
Consider X as a connected domain having inner points and a boundary. X is
transformed by the function Q(x) into the domain Y in the criterion space. Y then
has a boundary that possesses a tangential hyperplane at every point. The di·
mension of Ph (Xn ) satisfies
Because the boundary of Y has this tangential hyperplane in every point, we obtain
the following necessary condition (generally not sufficient) for the Pareto set Ph:
At every point Q* E Ph there exists one set of parameters Ai with
and
hL MQ*)dQi = O.
i=1
That is, every efficient point Q* is a stationary point of a certain "global" criterion
Q, which is a linear combination of the Qj,
n
Q = L AiQi
i=1
with Ai ~ O.
Thus, the efficient points Q* E Ph can be parameterized with the help of non·
negative parameter vectors A= (AI, A2' ... , Ah)' It is obvious that every point that
is a global maximum of a linear combination Q = ~~=1 AiQi with Ai ~ abelongs to
the Pareto set Ph ; in general, the inverse statement does not hold.
It is shown in Focke (1973) that the following statement holds: if the control
domain X is convex and all criteria are strictly concave, there exists an efficient
control x* E X if and only if x* determines a global maximum of some linear
combination
"Q = L AiQi
i=l
with Ai ~ o.
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j = 1,2, ... , n.
(j = 1,2, ... , k; m = 1,2, ... , n)
Let us now deduce some conclusions from the stationary condition for the case
of an unbounded control on X = R n . Similar conclusions also can be derived for
the case with constraints. Assuming that x is an interior point of X, we obtain from
the stationary condition the following system of equations to determine the coef-
ficients A(
3Q = t Ai 3Qi = 0
3xj i=l 3xj
For the solution of these equations, the rank of the Jacobian
3Qj
3xm
is of importance. For the rank p of the Jacobian p ~ min (n, k), two cases are of
interest.
In the first case, n ~k. For p = k there exists a unique but trivial solution,
A= O. The condition p = k obviously can be fulfilled only at interior points of Y,
because at boundary points there exists a tangential hyperplane. For p < k there
exist solutions A=1= 0, and the Pareto set P" can be parameterized by A. The most
important case is p = k - 1. In this case, we can interpret the rank-condition in
the following way: k - 1 gradient vectors (for example, grad Qi' i = 1,2, ... ,
k - I) are linearly independent and grad Q" is a linear combination of them. Thus,
"-1
grad Q" = L lJ.i grad Qi·
i=l
This rank-{;ondition can also be expressed as k - I sensitivity vectors (3Q/3xj,
i = 1,2, ... ,k -I), which are linearly independent, and all other sensitivity
vectors (3Q/3xj,j = k, k + I, ... ,n) are linear combinations of them. Thus,
3Q "-1 3Q
3- = L IJ.ji 3-·Xj i=l Xi
This last result can be interpreted as a step-by-step envelope-building process.
For j = k we form the envelope of all hyperplanes with x" = Xk. For j = k + 1 we
build an envelope of all the envelopes derived previously having the parameters
X"+l = Xk+1 , and so on.
In the second case, n ~ k - I, the mapping Y of X through Q = Q(x) has no
inner points in the k-dimensional criterion space. For n = k - I we obtain Y in
the form of a k - I dimensional hyperplane of which P" must be a part. As n
decreases, the dimension of Y also decreases; thus, for n = I, the mapping Y
will be a curve in the k-dimensional criterion space of which P" is a part.
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The stationary condition expressed through the linear dependency of the gradi-
ents is
which is very similar to the Lagrangian optimization process, whereby Qj = Q7;
i = 1,2, ... ,k - 1 is constant; and Qk is maximized. For n ;;;. k, in general the p
gradients (grad Qj, i = 1, 2, ... , p) are linearly independent and the other gradients
(grad Qj, j = p + 1, ... , k) are linear combinations of them. Thus,
p
grad Qj = L Pji grad Qj.
j=1
This stationary condition is also necessary for the points of the Pareto set Pk .
It follows that the Pareto set can be described by one global criterion that expresses
this linear dependency of the gradients. An example of this global criterion is the
following procedure.
Suppose we determine for each linearly independent gradient (grad Qj, i = 1, 2,
... ,p) so-called dual gradients (grad dQj) using an algorithm described in Peschel
(1975) that fulfill the conditions
(grad Qj, grad dQ.) = OJ' = {I for i = j}.
J J 0 f ........or I -r- ]
With the dual gradients we establish the following criterion:
Q = . t [(grad Qj, grad Qj) - .f (grad Qj, grad Q) (grad dQj, grad Qj)] .
J=p+1 1=1
It can be proved that Q;;;' 0 with Q= 0 on the boundary of Y. If we exclude
degeneracy, we can always assume that p = k - 1. In this case, we have for all
Pj in the linear combination
h-I
L pj grad Qj
i=1
the condition Pj .;;;; 0 for the points of the boundary belonging to the Pareto set
Pk ·
Now the question arises: How should we proceed if the variation of Xj is con-
strained by inequalities fj(x)';;;; 0, j = 1,2, ... , m? If we know which inequalities
exist, that is,
fj,(X) = 0,fj2(X) = 0, ... ,fj/x) = 0,
obviously the number of free parameters reduces to n' = n - r. If we now obtain
the case in which n' .;;;; k - 1, we have to treat the degeneracy of the dimension
as described above; nevertheless, if n';;;' k, then for the one interesting case,
p = k - 1, we can apply the results above in a slightly modified way. Accordingly,
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we use our gradient conditions, for it is necessary to introduce only the active
constraints into the definition of the gradients.
Thus, we reduce the gradient vectors to the components corresponding to
Xi, i = 1,2, ... ,n' by redefming these components as follows:
aOi = aQi + ± aQi aXj ,
aXt aX t j=n'+l aXj aXt
where the derivatives axJaxt can be determined from
al~+ ± aIm aXj _ o.
aX t j=n'+l aXj aXt
With these modified gradients, the linear-dependency condition,
h-l
grad Oh = L Pj grad OJ,
j=l
also holds.
The problem consists in recognizing which conditions will exist during the
determination of the Pareto set Ph. If we use search procedures to determine
particular points of Ph, we need accompanying tests for the existence of boundary
conditions. We meet difficulties in the case of degeneracy when n ,.;; k - 1 + T.
To illustrate how this method works, let us consider a very simple example:
with the constraints
and
First we consider the unbounded case, ignoring the constraints. We obtain the
following gradient condition:
grad QI = (1,1,1)
with the obvious solution Xl = X2 = X3, with J1 <O. In other words, this part of
the boundary can be a Pareto set only when we want to minimize QI and maximize
Q2, or vice versa. This part of the boundary is characterized through the sign of
the equality in the inequality Q2 ,.;; (QI /3)3 . Let us now assume that the constraint
klxl + k2X2 + k3X3 = K exists. Then we must work with the modified gradients
d (l-k l 1 -k2 )gra QI= ~'~
dQ _ (X2X3- k IX IX2 XIX3- k 2X IX2)
gra 2 - k
3
' k
3
•
From the gradient condition grad QI = - J1 grad Q2 and the constraint, we obtain
the following system of nonlinear equations for the determination of XI, X2, X3 as
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functions of JJ., the parameter of the Pareto set:
(k3-kd = JJ.X2(2x1k1+X2k 2- K ),
(k3 - k 2) = JJ.Xl(2x 2k 2+ x1k 1 - K),
k3X3 = K - k1Xl - k2X2.
4.1.3 THE PREFERENCE PROBLEM
Every decision maker makes use of preferences. In a given situation he uses these
preferences to make a rough approximation of what will be better and what will be
worse. Let us first assume that we have a decision maker who makes his preferences
according to the semiorder of vectors. We shall discuss this preference relation only
for the case of two quality criteria, Ql and Q2' We obtain in the plane Ql, Q2 an
optimal indifference curve, the Pareto curve, on which all the efficient points lie.
Obviously, this is a monotonically decreasing curve.
Any set of monotonically decreasing functions that cover the domain Y without
intersections is a possibility for the set of indifference curves in the sense of a
Pareto preference. The preference axioms of Fishburn (1970) provide an example
of axioms with a scalar utility function. In the case of Pareto preference, the axiom
of a weak order, especially the negative transitivity,
(not Q;;:' Q', not Q';;:. Q") => not Q;;:' Q",
is not fulfilled; and the axiom of a strict partial order does not hold, nor does the
conclusion that one of three cases should always hold: Q< Q', Q' <Q, or Q' - Q
(indifference). The Pareto preference and its indifference curves can be estimated
using experimental data. For example, we choose some control vectors and deter-
mine the corresponding points Ql, Q2, ... ,~ in the criterion plane (see Figure
4.2).
---- ....
------t---,
• I. I----~--+.,
• I I I
I I I
I. I I
I I I
I I I
I I
FIGURE 4.2 Example of the criterion plane and the corresponding control points
for control vectors of a Pareto preference.
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For every experimentally determined point we establish the set of dominated
points in the sense of the vector semiorder. All experimental points that are not
interior points of such an area form the estimation of the indifference curve, the
curve including all efficient points. We remove these optimal points and repeat
this procedure for the other experimental points. Thus, we obtain the next
"smaller" indifference curve. We continue this procedure until no experimental
points remain. The Pareto preference principle is not obligatory, although certain
considerations have an axiomatic character. In every situation characterized by a
certain point Q in the criterion space, the decision maker knows
• Which points are better. The transitive law holds for the "better relation."
If Ql is better than Q2, and Q2 is better than Q3, then QI is better than Q3.
• Which points are worse. The transitive law also holds for the "worse re-
lation." If QI is worse than Q2, and Q1. is worse than Q3, then QI is worse than Q3.
• Which other points Q" have no preference in comparison to Q. It cannot be
assumed that the indifference relation in general possesses the property of transi-
tivity; on the contrary, small differences that seem to be indifferent in some com-
parisons can be accumulated through transitivity.
4.2 PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
4.2.1 PROCEDURES TO DETERMINE ONE OR MORE EFFICIENT POINTS
Partial Aims Method
We assume that the criteria are functions of the control variables
i=I,2, ... ,k
with continuous derivatives in all variables Xi' The variables Xi are restricted to a
control domain
(X: Jj(x) '!(O, i = 1,2, ... , m).
At every stage of our search procedure we are at a certain criterion point QI. To
obtain a better point in the criterion space we try to reach a point Q2 = QI + vl:i.Q.
The increment I:i.Q > 0 is a nonnegative vector; it is Vi = I if we wan t the criterion
Qi to be maximized, and Vi = -I if we want Qi to be minimized. At the control
vector Xl, which realizes QI, we seek an increment Ax, with X 2 = X I + Ax; thus,
x 2 realizes Q2. Because in general the transformation Q= Q(x) consists of non-
linear functions, we want to determine the Ax with the help of a linear approxi-
mation.
i=I,2, ... ,k
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We solve the following system of linear equations:
n [aQ1JV.~Q' = L - &.
I I j=1 aXj %=%' J
With the derived &j we obtain criterion values {j2, which differ from the desired
criterion values Q2 because of the approximate character of the linear equations.
A test can be designed to determine which components show the desired tendency.
For the determination of the next increment, ~Q, we use the following state-
ment:
{ Si~Qi if ~Qi ~ 0, andx 2 EX;~Qi = - .-~Qi - Si~Qi if ~Qi < 0, or x 2 f$X
The constraints Sj ~ 0 are step-width parameters that can be modified by an evo-
lution law, s: = I(s, K, L), in which K is a parameter having the smallest possible
value of the step width and L determines the rate of decrease of the step widths.
This search procedure ends when the Qi lie within tolerance limits ~i'
Some remarks about solving the linear equations are appropriate here. Thus,
n aQ.
ViQi = L lij&f, with/if = aQJ~ .
j=1
As long as we are searching within the domain X, the rank of the Jacobian F = (]ij)
will be k and it will diminish on the boundary of the domain Y = Q(X). When we
approach the neighborhood of efficient points, the condition of the matrix will
worsen. To reach an efficient point, we need a procedure for the solution of the
linear system of equations that is insensitive to the rank of the matrix. Any pro-
cedure that exploits pivot elements can be used in principle. We propose the fol-
lowing procedure.
After changing the order of the sequence Qi we can express the system of
equations as
The sequence AQi can be chosen in such a way that 11 contains the element of
(]ij) with the largest absolute value; 12 contains the element of (]iJ without the
elements 11 with the largest absolute value; and so on. With the use of an algorithm
described in Peschel (1975) we determine dual vectors ej with (]i, ef ) = or If we
observe that one vector, Ii ,nearly is a linear combination of previously considered
vectors, It. we discard li
o
: thus gaining an additional degree of freedom for the
determination of &.
Let us first consider the case in which the rank (]iJ = k. We can then immedi-
ately solve the equation
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for the vectors Ii that are k linearly independent (without restriction we assume
these are the first k of the vectors), obtain the solution
i = 1,2•... , k,
and the 1ixj. j = k + 1, ... , n can be freely chosen. For the 1ixj we organize a
search procedure,
{
tj 1ixj ifx 2 EX}
1ixj : = ,
- Xj - tj 1ixj if x 2 f$. X
with an evolution law for the step width of the tj ~ O. This holds if in the last step
the variable Xj was a free variable; otherwise, we start anew with
]
1/2
1ix( = ~ [(/1 '/1) + (/2 '/2) + ... + (/k'/k)
Antiparallel Gradients Method
In section 4.1.2 we established that at all efficient points for a vector-maximization
problem the condition of antiparallel gradients holds such that
gradQ2 = -p grad QI, with p > O.
The efficient curve between the extrema of QI and Q2 can be parameterized with
p. We can use this result for approaching the efficient curve P2 if we are within the
domain Y or we can go along the efficient curve if we start at a point that already
lies on P2 • We demonstrate this method only for the case of two criteria, but it
can be extended to the general case. If there are existing constraints, we will have a
curve of stationary points in the control space with branches, only one of which
will allow us to approach the efficient curve.
Let us assume that all criteria Qi are strictly concave functions having
PIQi(X I) +P2Qi(X2) ~ Qi(PIX I +P2X2 ),
with Pi ~ 0 and PI +P2 = 1. We use the following heuristics for the search pro-
cedure: if we build at an arbitrary point of the control domain X the two vectors
al = grad QI/II grad QIII and a2 = grad Q2/11 grad Q211, then the vector
points in the direction of the efficient curve. We modify a2 by a factor E, E ~ 1 and
form the following search step:
The factor E operates in such a way that we can approach the efficient curve
beginning within the control domain X and can also proceed on the efficient curve
in the direction of the extremum point of Q2' By varying E, the sensitivity of the
3Q·J= -'
3xj
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algorithm can be adapted according to the distance from the efficient curve. The
algorithm is most sensitive for E = I, for then the search point rapidly approaches
the efficient curve, and will stop there if we do not let E increase. If we increase E,
we obtain an oscillation around the efficient curve with a tendency to lead in the
direction of Q2 max' Through appropriate modification of these heuristics, E can
be chosen as a function of the sensitivity of the algorithm and can thus influence
the sensitivity at the subsequent step. Experience shows that the best limit for
the step wid th d is
XEI and XE2 are the best controls for QI max and Q2 mWe> respectively.
Stochastic Search Procedure
A stochastic search procedure with an increment Ax in the control domain X leads
to a better control point Xl + Ax in the sense of vector optimization if we obtain a
corresponding increment LlQ in the criterion space with
Q = Q(x+Ax)-Q(x)~O.
The corresponding probability can be expressed as p = P(LlQ ~ 0) = ¢/2rr, where
¢ is the angle between the two gradients grad QI and grad Q2 of the search point
Xl. Obviously, the probability of obtaining better stochastic search points di-
minishes as we approach the efficient curve.
Often we work in stochastic search procedures with a termination rule, which
depends on the number of consecutive failures, but a termination rule cannot
operate well in our case because we have to await a great number of failures.
We assume that we have a measurable control domain with the volume V. In our
procedure we use an equal distribution of stochastic points in the control domain;
in other words, we have to work with a probability distribution of the form
I
f(XI,X2,'" ,xn ) = V·
The stochastic vector X will then be transformed through the functions Q = Q(x)
into a stochastic vector in the criterion space. Because of the property that the rank
of the Jacobian
displays (i.e., it will diminish from k to k - I, at least if we approach the boundary
of Y), the probability density f(Q I, Q2, ... , Qk) will in every case increase to
infinity as we come nearer to the efficient curve. Thus, we obtain the following
important property: if we choose some equally distributed points in Y, the cor-
responding points Qi in the criterion space will be concentrated near the boundary.
We make use of this property if we
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1. Choose N equally distributed points xi E X and determine the corresponding
points Qi in the criterion space.
2. Select from the set of the N experimental points Qi only those points that
are efficient in the sense ofthe vector semiorder. This may be the points QL QL ... ,Qk.
3. Establish in an s-neighborhood of the points Qj (perhaps a sphere with the
radius s) the N equally distributed points Xi, determine the corresponding points
Qi in the criteria space, and add these to the formerly determined relative efficient
points Qj.
4. Proceed with step 2 above as long as the gain in step 3 is significant when
measured by a certain distance function or by the number of new points in relation
to the formerly determined best points that remain maximal points in the sense of
the vector semiorder.
In this case also it is necessary to use a certain evolution mechanism for the step
width s, for example,
s: = [(s, K, L).
Proposals [or Dialogue Methods As an Aid to the Decision Maker
With the assistance of a dialogue method the decision maker proceeds to develop
the Pareto set Pk of a vector-maximum problem. At every step of such a procedure
he must answer the following questions:
1. Is the determined efficient solution acceptable?
2. Which additional demands must be taken into account in the next step?
Because continuous control problems are also of interest, we use one of three
different approaches for finding dialogue methods:
• The decision maker demands that lower limits of some components of the
criteria vector be taken into account. These are aim-oriented dialogue methods.
• The decision maker accepts previously computed values of some criteria and
uses them as lower boundary conditions for a search procedure in the control
space. These are obviously control-oriented dialogue methods.
• The decision maker requires that some components of the criterion vector
receive better values at the cost of the values of other components. These are also
control-oriented methods.
An example of an aim-oriented dialogue method - a modification of the method
described in the section on the partial aims method - is as follows.
We assume that we are at a point QI, which has been previously determined to
be an efficient point (but in general it is allowed that QI lies within the domain Y).
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For a given set of indices i 1 , i 2 , ••• ,ir , we demand a prescribed amount of increase
Qii > O. We must solve the system of linear equations
vQ = Ftix, F = (fi)'
We choose the ii as the first r lines of this system of equations. In some cases we
may find contradictions in our demands when we attempt to determine the dual
vectors ei , but these instances will seldom occur. The increase of some !1Qj with
j =1= i 10 ••• ,ir can be derived by linear dependency; other !1Qj can be chosen
freely, so we have additional degrees of freedom in choosing the values of tix j.
We use these degrees of freedom in tixj to maximize the most interesting criteria
Qi' to the extent possible. If no degrees of freedom remain, we can be certain that
J
we have reached one efficient point within a tolerance area that best satisfies our
demands. By examining the properties of this point, we can decide to stop the
process or to continue with modified demands to the components of the criteria
vector.
An example of a control-oriented dialogue method might be a case in which a
decision maker at an actual point Q1 of the criterion space formulates the fol-
lowing.
He decomposes the index set K = (1,2, ... ,k) into three disjoint sets J, S, and
M:
K = Ju SuM;
He then formulates the conditions:
J n S = J n M = S n M.
• Qi withj EJ will result in better values.
• Qs with s E S will result in values that are not worse than those obtained
previously.
• Qm with m EM are of no interest at this stage.
From these conditions he derives two subsets of criteria:
• Qi with j E JuS, which cannot result in worse values, N = JuS.
• Qm with m EM =N, which can result in worse values.
We assume that all criteria are concave functions of their arguments and that X
is a convex domain; in this case, all points of the Pareto set Pk can be determined
by a global linear compromise,
At the point Q1 we have the vector parameter X}. We consider the point Q1 as a
special compromise between two linear compromises in the following way:
111
with
During the dialogue we vary the linear compromise between the coefficients di and
show the efficient curve between
and
to the decision maker. If we follow the direction of a maximum of Q~ and discover
that one of the Qn results in worse values, the demands of the decision maker
become contradictory. Then we must terminate this subprocess, and the decision
maker must formulate new conditions. This must also be done if one of the second-
ary criteria Qm assumes worse values.
4.2.2 LONG TIME HORIZONS
For many decision-making problems some foresight is necessary. We consider
these problems as vector-optimization problems for dynamic .>ystems. We must
have some sort of extrapolation or prognosis model of our system for the future.
In these cases we consider the decision making as a step-by-step decision process
and assume that in every decision the vector criterion Q has a certain increase !1Qj,
depending on a local control vector yi and an actual-state vector Zi:
!1Qj = qj(zi,/).
The decision yi causes the state zi of the system to evolve to some other state zi+l ;
the evolution equation takes the form zi+l = g(zi ,yi). We next establish Bellman's
functional equation for the optimality criteria and for the case of a vector criterion.
Difficulties occur, however, if we want to use proposed methods for determining
the Pareto set Pk at every step beginning with the last step in the future.
On the one hand, if we use only necessary conditions for the points of pi, the
set of solutions that are not maximum points in the sense of vector semiorder will
increase. On the other hand, if we prefer to use sufficient conditions for the points
of Ph, we discard an increasing number of points at every step of the decision
process, a procedure similar to applying a branch-bound algorithm, although we
cannot determine if the "most efficient" points will remain.
4.2.3 TWO GROUPS WITH DIFFERENT INTERESTS
Let us assume that there are two groups of people, one group with a vector
criterion Q{I) and the other with Q(II). The groups have individual control vectors
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mI and mll at their disposal and search for an efficient point of their individual
Pareto sets Pk(I) or Pk(II). In general, this is not a simple task. The process used by
the first group (decision maker I) is interconnected with the process of the second
(decision maker II) and vice versa; these interconnections are disturbances for the
individual controls of the two decision makers.
There are two possibilities for treating this situation. One approach is for the
individual decision maker to consider these disturbances as stochastic influences
and to attempt to overcome them. The other possibility is to choose a third party
as a coordinator, a person who is neutral and who has sufficient knowledge about
both decision makers' objectives that he can coordinate their individual decisions in
such a manner that neither of them loses. This third person is also a decision maker,
yet he must follow a certain coordinating strategy. Perhaps he himself has some
interests. These interests of the decision maker on the higher level may have a
greater priority compared with the interests of the decision makers at the first
level. Such a hierarchy of systems, each with its individual decision maker, must be
organized so that contradictions will not develop between the aims of the decision
makers at the lower level or between the interests of the decision makers at the
lower level and those of the decision maker at a higher level.
Thus, we demand that the so-called efficiency axiom must hold; every sub-
system should find an acceptable decision point in its individual Pareto set, which
moves along this Pareto set, if some other interests from the same or higher levels
demand some coordinating strategy. If we demand that all subsystems be con-
trolled with an efficient point according to the individual vector-optimization task,
the decision maker on the higher level can use as coordinating variables only the
additional influences he asserts on the subsystems or the degrees of freedom that
are left to him.
An example of this process is a process to be optimized that consists of three
subprocesses with the following individual criterion functions:
Subprocess 1
Subprocess 2
Subprocess 3
Q3 = 3xr + 7x~ + 5x~ + 2xIX2 + 4XIX3 + 6x2X3 - l6x1 - 29x3 + S13.
The process model is characterized by the following equations:
Subprocess 1
S13 = -20xI + 5s21 + 46.
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Subprocess 2
Subprocess 3
S32 == -2x3- O.2s13 + 28.2.
A set of three constraints is given as
fl: xI~-12x2-3x3+30.
f2: X2 ~ -0.49xI -1.5lx3 + 1.25.
f3: X3 ~0.39xI -0.98x2 + 1.87.
The solution of the coordination according to the global criterion
Q == QI + Q2 + Q3 = min
is given together with other efficient control vectors for weighting coefficients
different from Al = A2 = A3 = 1 in Figure 4.3. There are two projections of the
curve of efficient control vectors between the individual minima of Q2 and Q3 that
cross the point of optimal control for the minima. In Figure 4.3 the intervals of
the efficient control curve with active constraints are marked by f3 for f3 active;
f3 and f2 for f3 and f2 active; and f2 for f2 active. The relative error found in
applying the algorithm of Fishburn (1970) was equal to 0.5 percent.
4.2.4 MULTIOBJECTIVE DECISION MAKING UNDER UNCERTAINTY
In general we cannot assume that the relationship between the criteria and the
control variables can be reliably described with the help of deterministic equations;
in the case of decision making over time we cannot assume that the extrapolation
model of systems behavior can be described as the behavior of a deterministic
automaton. Therefore, it is necessary to introduce into the methods of decision
making a description of the fuzziness of the phenomena. The description of sto-
chastic influences with probability theory is only one of many possibilities we have
at our disposal using the fuzzy-set concept.
We first describe an algorithmic approach based on fuzzy-set theory, in which
we have already introduced promising results using stochastic search procedures
(Riedel, 1975). Later we present more generalized considerations in terms of fuzzy
relationships.
A procedure for simultaneous searching in the objective space and the control
space is as follows.
We describe the optimum efficient point Q for which we are searching in the
objective space by a fuzzy set Q' having a membership function f(Q, Q'). The value
f(Q, Q') has the following significance: it is a measure of the chance that point Q is
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FIGURE 4.3 Efficient control vectors for different weighting coefficients.
i:=I,oo.,N
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the optimal point Q', the position of which is unknown. During the process of
approaching (developing) better values for the vector criterion, the fuzziness de-
scribed by the membership function f(Q, Q') must decrease. Therefore, we need a
strategy for modifying f(Q, Q') in a manner that automatically takes into account
our increasing knowledge about the vector criterion. The same remark also holds
for f(x, x'), which describes in a similar way the fuzziness of the corresponding
control vector x' in the control space. Our procedure has six steps.
The first step is to choose a set of equally distributed points qi in the parameter
space. We construct elementary membership functionsfA(q;qi), taking uncertainty
into account in producing the single control qi. We compute or measure corre-
sponding points Qi in the criterion space and describe them by the elementary
membership functions fA(Q; (!), which allow for computation or measurement
errors. According to the section on stochastic search procedure, above, the points
Qi will condense in the neighborhood of the boundary of the domain Y in the
criterion space.
Second, we estimate by a sequential procedure the membership functions
f(Q; Q') and f(q; q'). In this estimation procedure we reward the elementary
membership functions fA(' ; .) if they are efficient. From the current estimation
f*(Q; Q') we determine the optimum decision point
Q'* +- max f* (Q; Q').
We compare Qi with Q' by evaluating
k
d(Qi, Q'*) = L jj(QJ - Qj*).
j:l
Herein we use fj(u) with ujj(u) > 0 as reward functions. Taking the values d({!,
Q'*) as weighting coefficients we obtain the following sequential estimation pro-
cedure:
f*(Q; Q'): = max [f*(Q, Q'), d(Qi, Q'*) fA (Q, Qi)]
f*(q, q'): = max [f*(q, q'),d(Qi, Q'*)fA(q,qi)]
The third step is to design the search point qi+l for the subsequent experiment
qi+l +- max [f* (q, q')].
By measurement or computation we determine the corresponding point
Qi+l = Q(qi+l),
and compute the elementary membership function!A(Q, (!+l) as we did previously
and !A(q, qi+l) through the following modification:
fA(q, qi+l): = gA(q, qi+l)f*(Qi+l, Q'),
using gA(q, qi+l) as an impulse shape employed in the first step above. The
weighting factor f*(Qi+l, Q') provides a better chance to achieve results Qi+l
having greater values, bringing us closer to efficient point Q'.
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The fourth step is to discount the formerly received estimations
[*(Q,Q'): = max[(l-s)[*(Q,Q'),d(Qi+I,Q'*)h(Q,{1+I)]
[*(q,q'): = max [(l-s)[*(Q,Q'),d(Qi+I,Q'*)!.d(Q,Qi+I)]
with the discount factor 0 ,;;;; s ,;;;; 1.
Fifth, we must establish an evolution law for the discount factor s. From our
experience with stochastic extrema search methods we use for the variation of s the
following evolution law:
s:
K
withK ~ 1.
L is linearly interpolated between two values, L I and L 2 , with L I ~ L 2 and the use
of the formula
L:
L z-ds(L 2 - L ,)
(ds - d(Qi))
k
L !j(Qj).
j=1
Here, ds is a fixed upper value at which the decision maker will be satisfied.
As a final step six, if the decision maker is not yet satisfied, return to step three.
4.3 APPLICATION: DESIGN OF OPTIMAL SWITCHING CIRCUITS FOR
MACHINE TOOLS
Numerically controlled machine tools offer an example of application in which we
meet the problem of stopping a support that initially moves with a velocity Vo at a
given position L, using only a negative acceleration b. We want to transfer the
support into the position L in a minimum transfer time T. According to the theory
of time-optimal control, the optimal motion has in the phase plane (x,Y) a form
like that shown in Figure 4.4.
The support moves with the velocity Vo until it reaches the position xo; at that
point the negative acceleration b is introduced, and the system runs on a parabola
to position L, where it arrives with the velocity O. On a numerically controlled
machine tool this strategy cannot be realized because comparisons of the positions
are possible only at time points in a sequence with period T. It can be assumed that
the stochastically occurring lag time is equally distributed in an interval (0, T).
In general, an overrun distance of .10 = VoT occurs at the position L, which lies
beyond the allowed tolerance. To remove this effect we introduce a sequence of
intermediate velocities vo> VI > V2> ..• > v m . From Vo we switch to VI, and
then we run the support with constant velocity VI until we reach a coordinate XI,
when we again apply the negative acceleration until we reach the next velocity
level V2' We continue with this velocity to position X2 and proceed in this way
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FIGURE 4.4 Time-Qptimal control: the form of optimal motion in the phase
plane (x, v).
until we reach the last velocity level Vm , which has a corresponding overrun dis-
tance ~ = ~m = vm T and lies within the allowed tolerance at the position L.
The corresponding coordinates Xj must be chosen so that there is no point in the
future when we intersect the ideal parabola (Figure 4.4). This demand can be
fulfilled only if we allow at every velocity level Vi the maximum possible overrun
distance for all preceding velocity levels. Under this condition we obtain for the
strategy of m-tuple T-levels the following equations:
v2
x m = L-....!!!-~2b
Xj_1 = Xj - ~i-I ,
2 __.2
+ Vi-I VI (I'
Vj_1 T 2b 1,2, ... ,m).
For Xo we obtain
1Tn m-Ixo=L-~-~-T 'LVj.
2b i=O
The elementary step on the velocity level Vi requires the time
Vj - Vi-I Vi ( )Ti = Tj + b + -V. T - T; .
1+1
In comparison with the ideal motion, we obtain the stochastic time increment
m;'1 (Vi Vi) ~I ( Vi) Vm~T-T f..., - -- + f..., Tj 1-- + Tm -T- .j=O Vi+1 Vo i=o Vi+1 Vo
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The control variables are the number of levels m, the values of levels VI, V2, ••. ,
vm - I , and the stochastic lag times To, TI. ... , Tm' The stochastic influence leads to
a search for a strategy that is optimum in the mean; we use mean value and variance
as the first two objectives. For these objectives we obtain the following expressions:
QI = M(AT) = m + 1 _ v m +mf (~ _Vi)
T 2 Vo i:O 2Vi+1 Vo
02(AT) 1 [ m-I ( Vi )2]Q2 = --2- = - 1 +?: 1--
T 12 ,:0 Vi+1
A third objective is the required positioning tolerance
A Am VmQ3 = - = - = - =
Ao Ao Vo S
The compromise situation is shown for QI and Q3 in Figure 4.5 and for QI and Q2
in Figure 4.6. From Figure 4.5 we obtain the necessary number m velocity levels
for the minimum of QI:
S ,.;;; So
m
3 11
2
42
3
165
4
644
5
2,521
6
For given values of Q3 we obtain the Pareto set after computing the minimum of
the linear compromise
m-I
+A2 L (l-<pa2-/l<PO<PI,···,rI>m-l·
i:O
V·
We find the following solution for <Pi = -' :
Vi+1
+
Figure 4.7 shows the necessary number of velocity levels dependent on the
positioning tolerance S and the compromise parameter AI'
Compromise situation for QI and Q3.FIGURE 4.5
0.05 0.1 0.2 0.3
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FIGURE 4.6 Compromise situation for QI and Q2.
H(~T)0 1=--
T
120
m1098765432
1.000
AI = 0.8
100
AI = 0.5
10 AI = 0.25
10.000
s
FIGURE 4.7 Velocity levels dependent on the positioning tolerance s and the
compromise parameter AI.
REFERENCES
Bachmann, G.K., H. Elster, and M. Petry. 1973. On the problems of geometric optimization.
(In German.) Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift der Technischen Hochschule Ilmenau, Vol. 19,
pp. 13-39.
Dinkelbach, W. 1969. Sensitivity Analysis and Parametric Programming. (In German.) Springer-
Verlag, Berlin.
Diich, W., and M. Bliefernich. 1972. Operational Research. (In German.) VEB Deutscher Verlag
der Wissenschaften, Berlin, 2 vols.
Duffm, R.J., E.L. Peterson, and C. Zener. 1967. Geometrical Programming. John Wiley, New
York.
Emel'ianov, S.V. 1972. Models and methods for vector optimization. (In Russian.) Preprint.
Institute for Control Problems, Moscow.
Ester, 1. 1975. A compromise strategy for the statistical optimization of additive and vector
quality functions. (In German.) Dissertation, Technische Hochschule, Karl-Marx-Stadt.
Ester, J., M. Peschel, and C. Riedel. 1975. Polyoptimal Approach to the Control of Hierarchical
Multilevel Systems. In Sixth World Congress ofIFAC. Boston, Vol. lIlA.
Fandel, G. 1972. Optimal Decisions with Multiple Objectives. (Lecture Notes in Economics and
Mathematical Systems, Vol. 76.) (In German.) Springer-Verlag, Berlin.
Fishburn, P. 1970. Utility Theory for Decision Making. John Wiley, New York.
Focke, J. 1973. The vector-maximum problem and parametric optimization. (In German.)
Mathematische Operationsforschung und Statistik. Vol. 4, pp. 365-369.
Griessbach, V., and F. Krauss. 1974. Contribution to the examination of the constitution of
the properties of rubber in pressure die cast tools. (In German.) Dissertation, Technische
Hochschule, Faculty of Mechanical Engineering, Karl-Marx-Stadt.
121
Heilmann, P.W. 1974. Selection and optimal positioning of driving forces for electrically
operated road vehicles. (In German.) Dissertation, Technische Hochschule, Faculty of
Electrical Engineering, Karl-Marx-Stadt.
MacCrimmon, K.R. 1972. An overview of multiple objectives decision-making. In Multiple
Criteria Decision Making (J.L. Cochrane and M. Zeleny, eds.). University of South Carolina
Press, Columbia.
Peschel, M. 1965. Investigations into the idea of convexity. (In German.) Dissertation, Hum-
boldt University, Faculty of Mathematics and Natural Sciences, Berlin.
Peschel, M. 1972. Statistical Modelling. (In German.) Series on Automation Techniques, Vol.
173. VEB Verlag Technik, Berlin.
Peschel, M. 1974. Statistical Determination of Characteristic Values. 2nd ed. (In German.)
Series on Automation Techniques, Vol. 125. VEB Verlag Technik, Berlin.
Peschel, M. 1975. The use of a dual basis for the determination of characteristic values in
parametric-linear models Oinear regression). (In German.) Messen. Steuern. Regeln, Vol.
4, pp. 120-122.
Peschel, M., and C. Riedel. 1975. Polyoptimization - A Decision-Making Aid for Technical
Engineering Compromise Solutions. (In German.) VEB Verlag Technik, Berlin.
Riedel, C. (ed.). 1975. Polyoptimization - Contributions to Optimization with Multiple Ob-
jectives. (In German.) Technische Hochschule, Karl-Marx-Stadt.
Russig, A. 1968. The use of numerically controlled machine tools. (In German.) Paper pre-
sented at the International Colloquium on Machine Tools, Technische Universitlit, Dresden.
Straszak, W. 1972. Polyoptirnization of large-scale systems with multilevel control structure.
In Fifth World Congress ofIFAC Paris.
Strejc, V. 1970. The Scaling of Continuous Linear Feedback Control Systems in Practice.
Series on Automation Techniques, Vol. 97. VEB Verlag Technik, Berlin.
DISCUSSION
KURZHANSKI: Is the set of efficient solutions stable with respect to changes in
the initial data? And is your algorithm stable with respect to perturbations?
PESCHEL: Yes. In the examples we have solved, although no mathematical
theory predicts stability, we have found that perturbations did not greatly affect
the final solution.
ZALAI: Have you considered looking for trade-offs that would enable you to
restrict the dimension of the search? Your methods are reasonable for two criteria,
but in higher dimensions there may be difficulties. It would not be wise to let the
opportunity sector be too wide.
PESCHEL: Yes, if we can find such a restriction it would be useful to introduce
them. One condition, however, must remain true. The number of controls minus
the number of active constraints must be greater than the number of objectives,
otherwise the algorithm is not applicable.
WEGENER: Your procedures work toward finding optimal criteria, the Q,
rather than optimal level of decision variables, the x. In your examples the relation-
ship between the Q and x were quite straightforward, but suppose that this relation-
ship were not clear, what could you do then? In social systems this relationship is
most complex; would your methods work in these cases?
PESCHEL: We have not applied these techniques to social systems, although we
have applied them to industrial systems. For example, we have a time theory for
122
the load sequence of an energy system. We are seeking a fuzzy relationship between
the consecutive loads in the sequence to make this forecast. I think the approach of
using fuzzy relationships is a good one, because you can use it as a surrogate for the
behavior of the system.
ZALAI: I would answer Mr. Wegener's question by saying that if you do not
know the relationship between the decisions and the outcomes, then you do not
have a decision problem.
WEGENER: That is my point.
FISHBURN: This is related to the first question. The relation between the Q and
x may depend upon some parameters. Perhaps the first question to some extent
asked if perturbations to these parameters affected the final solution. That is, not
perturbations to the search procedure but rather to the relations between the
actions and the outcomes.
PESCHEL: In the approach I described, we have only tried perturbation to the
search process; we have not perturbed the equations. But we have performed an
application to heart circulation diagnosis: we had four rough models, and we tried
each to determine how the final solution varied among the models.
5 Trade-off Analysis:The Indifference and Preferred
Proportions Approaches
Kenneth R. MacCrimmon and
Donald A. Wehrung
5.1 INTRODUCTION
Individuals and organizations make decisions in order to attain particular ends. So it
follows that a decision maker should evaluate alternatives in terms of the extent to
which each alternative will lead to the attainment of these ends. Such ends, or
goals, may be considered in terms of a hierarchy in which the goals at the top tend
to be abstract (e.g., living the "good life"), and the ones near the bottom tend to be
concrete (e.g., owning a house located within 5 miles of place of employment). A
decision maker can more easily deal with concrete goals than with abstract ones,
so he usually perceives, describes, and evaluates his alternatives in terms of these
lower-level goals. To the extent that different decision makers have approximately
the same goals, they will describe the alternatives in terms of the same goal-related
attributes.
A decision maker often has multiple goals and must consider the multiple
attributes of each of the alternatives in terms of his attainment of goals. However,
a decision maker attempting to choose among alternatives will almost always find
that although one alternative is preferable when one particular attribute is con-
sidered, another alternative will be preferred when a different attribute is con-
sidered. Seldom will one alternative be superior for every attribute contributing
toward the goals. Hence, a decision maker often must accept lower values on some
attributes to obtain higher values on others.
Trade-offs of this kind are at the core of multiple-attribute decision making. This
paper explores how a decision maker can use trade-offs to express preferences over
interdependent attributes and how these trade-offs can help him to make better
decisions. I To the extent that the decision maker has fully identified the attributes
I The role of trade-Qffs in the context of a variety of multiple-attribute decision methods is
considered in MacCrimmon (1968, 1973).
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and the attributes fully describe his goals, he can base his decision on those at-
tributes. The primary benefit of basing decisions on goal-oriented attributes of
alternative actions rather than on the actions themselves is that comparisons of the
relative importance of various attributes become the central focus of the decision
process. These comparisons can then be made in relation to the decision maker's
preferences.
Determining the number and type of attributes to describe an alternative is a
complex task, and the more complex the alternatives, the larger the number of
possible attributes. The subset of a few (or a few hundred) attributes that the
decision maker focuses on is determined by his underlying goal structure. Since
the focus in this paper is on trade-offs, we assume that we have identified the
attributes that are most important in attaining the decision maker's goals.
We must next decide upon an appropriate way to measure the values of the
attributes identified. We can choose to use standard measures, or we can construct
special scales. The most complete scales are numerical; they can be used to add
and multiply attribute values to obtain meaningful comparisons (e.g., a house
that costs $30,000 is half as expensive as a house that costs $60,000). Such scales,
called ratio scales, are completely defined except for a scale unit. There are other
numerical scales, called interval scales, that are less informative and have an arbi-
trary origin. Numerical scales make a problem easier to deal with, but we are often
unable to obtain these scales for every attribute of relevance. If, for example, we
are judging the neighborhoods of houses we are interested in buying, we may be
able to rank neighborhoods in terms of tranquillity, but we may not be able to
develop any meaningful numerical scale. In a situation like this, we can order only
the relative tranquillity of the neighborhoods and hence obtain only ordinal scales.
Least useful are nominal scales, appropriate for situations in which we can only
assign attribute values but cannot even order these (e.g., names of types of heating
systems in houses we are interested in buying).
To demonstrate the types of scales and how they can be used in combination,
let us consider the multiple-attribute decision of buying a house, focusing specif-
ically on pairs of house attributes used in the examples above. First, let us take
two attributes measured numerically; the price of a house and the distance from
the house to place of employment. In such a case we may consider changes in both
magnitude and direction of each attribute. These attributes are illustrated in Figure
5.1. The dots represent alternative houses. We can say that the difference in price
between house A and house B is the same as the difference in price between A and
C, or that C is twice as far from place of employment as A, and that B is midway
between A and C in distance to work. We can express trade-offs on either attribute;
that is, we can talk about the change in distance we would want for a particular
change in price or the change in price we would want for a particular change in
distance.
Now, suppose we want to consider one attribute that is measured numerically
and another attribute that is measured ordinally (Figure 5.2). The numerical
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FIGURE 5.1 Two numerical attributes.
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attribute is the price for houses A, B, and C; the ordinal attribute is the tranquillity
of the neighborhood. We assume that we can characterize neighborhoods by their
level of tranquillity from dull to frantic but that we cannot express particular
amounts of change in tranquillity. All we can say is that house A has a more tran-
quil neighborhood than house B and that B has a more tranquil neighborhood than
C. We can say nothing about the magnitude of the differences. We can, nevertheless,
express a trade-<Jff by noting the change in price we would want for a particular
change in tranquillity, say from a peaceful to an active neighborhood. Although we
could also express the change in tranquillity we would want for a particular change
in price, the ordinal nature of the tranquillity dimension makes this converse
approach less meaningful.
Next, suppose we want to consider one numerical attribute, price of house,
combined with one nominal attribute, type of heating system (Figure 5.3). Again,
we have the earlier relationship among the prices of houses A, B, and C. However,
in considering the type of heating system for these houses, we can say only that
they are different; we cannot assert a difference in either magnitude or direction.
We can, nevertheless, form trade-<Jffs by considering the change in price we would
want for a given change in heating systems. In contrast, it would not be meaningful
for us to talk about the change in heating systems that we would want to offset a
change in price. In this case, then, when one attribute is numerical and the other is
nominal, the trade-<Jff is asymmetrical.
We shall not go on at this point to consider the possible combinations of attri-
butes: ordinal-ordinal, ordinal-nominal, and nominal-nominal. We will be
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FIGURE 5.3 A numerical attribute and a nominal attribute.
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concerned mainly with cases that have at least one numerical attribute so we can
obtain a full expression of trade-offs. Ifsuch an attribute does not exist in a decision
problem as initially defined, it may be possible to introduce a numerical attribute.
Obviously, money is an attribute that either enters problems from the outset or can
often be introduced to yield meaningful trade-offs. In sections 5.2 thmugh 5.4 each
attribute is assumed to be numerically scaled. In subsequent sections we consider
trade-offs where some attributes are not numerically scaled.
Note that we do not have to consider trade-offs on all possible values of each
attribute we identify. Obviously, some attribute values will be infeasible; that is,
some will not correspond to any real alternative. Therefore, in scaling our pref-
erences for particular attribute values, we do not have to consider these infeasible
values. In addition, we will probably find some attribute values unacceptable, even
though they are feasible. It is these critical values of infeasibility or unacceptability
that serve to restrict the relevant attribute space (MacCrimmon, 1969). Although
we may be unable to discriminate finely between feasible and infeasible attribute
values or between acceptable and unacceptable attribute values, we can probably
establish some imprecise boundaries. The main reason for establishing these bound-
aries is to reduce the amount of information we will have to process in forming our
trade-offs. In other words, by placing constraints on the domain of attribute values
being considered, we make our decision problem more manageable.
5.2 THE INDIFFERENCE APPROACH VERSUS THE PREFERRED
PROPORTIONS APPROACH
In sections 5.2 through 5.4 we will consider trade-offs on attributes that are each
numerically scaled. It is easiest to begin with a reference alternative A o, defined by
two attributes (Xo, Yo). We discuss two types of trade-off:
In the indifference approach, a trade-off is the change in attribute Y that is
necessary to offset a given change in attribute X so that the new alternative, AI,
is indifferent to A o.
In the prefe"ed proportions approach, a trade-off is the proportion of change
in attributes X and Y that the decision maker would most prefer if he could move
away from (Xo, Yo) in some particular way.
In both these approaches there is a trade-off between the values of X and the values
of Y.
To demonstrate the differences between these two approaches, let us reconsider
the housing example. Suppose that the attribute X is the price of the house (in
thousands of dollars) and Y is the distance to place of employment (in miles).
Consider Ao as a reference point, a house whose price is $50,000 and whose
distance from place of employment is 18 miles. Ao can be expressed, then, as
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(50,18), as shown in Figure 5.4. The indifference approach would require a new
alternative, say, A I (85, 10), that the decision maker would deem equivalent in
preference to A o. By obtaining a number of such points, we would trace out a
curve of indifference through A o. The indifference curve is, then, the locus of all
attribute values indifferent to a reference point (the solid line in Figure 5.4).
The steep slope at the right end of the curve implies that the decision maker is
willin!; to trade off a considerable increment in price in order to live closer to his
place of employment when he is 15 to 20 miles away. Around A 1 this slope tends to
level off, indicating that the decision maker is not willing to pay much more to live
closer than 10 miles from place of employment. At about 5 miles, the curve turns
down, implying that the decision maker would never pay more to live closer than
5 miles and would, in fact, have to fmd a bargain price in order to be indifferent
between living that close and living in a house described by the initial reference
point. This situation might occur if the neighborhood of the place of employment
were undesirable.
The preferred proportions approach involves changes of particular amounts,
say any combination of decrease in price and decrease in distance up to a total
of 15 units (in this case, a unit is either $1,000 or 1 mile). This constraint restricts
the allowable movement away from Aoo Suppose that the most preferred new
alternative that meets this constraint is A 2 (45,8). This preference implies a
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trade-off ratio of 10 miles for $5,000. By checking a number of possible changes in
distance from A 0, we could trace out a curve of preferred proportions. The pre-
ferred proportions curve is, then, the locus of attribute values that the decision
maker would prefer when moving away from the reference point in some series of
constrained moves. The shape of the preferred proportions curve (the dashed line
in Figure 5.4) exhibits the same preference rationale described above. It is level
around A o, implying that the decision maker would make most changes to reduce
distance. At about 8 miles the curve begins to drop off steeply, suggesting that
the decision maker would not want to live much closer and hence would prefer
to have a lower price rather than a shorter distance.
As might be expected, there is a direct relationship between the indifference
approach and the preferred proportions approach. In considering infinitesimal
changes from a given reference point, the indifference trade-off (called a marginal
rate of substitution) is orthogonal to the preferred proportions trade-off (called a
marginal rate of preferred proportions). However, increments of finite size from a
given reference point will not, in general, be orthogonal. Similarly, the line linking
two indifferent points, say A o andA J in Figure 5.4, is not likely to be the marginal
rate of substitution at either point, nor is the line linking the reference point with
a new preferred proportions point the marginal rate of preferred proportions at
either point.
Another way to express the relationship between the two approaches is to relate
them to a preference function U(X, Y) on the attributes. An indifference curve
is a contour of this function; that is, a locus of points of equal height or preference.
A preferred proportions curve is a path up the preference surface under particular,
allowable moves away from a given point.
By far the most commonly used trade-off is the indifference approach. It is
particularly useful because it divides the set of all attribute values into (a) those
indifferent to the reference point, (b) those preferred to the reference point, and
(c) those to which the reference point is preferred. We know, then, that any point
on the preferred side of the indifference curve is preferred to any point on the
curve or on the nonpreferred side of the curve. Hence, if we are asked to compare
A o with any other alternative, we can immediately indicate a choice. However, if
we are given several points on the preferred side of the indifference curve, we
cannot say which is the most preferred. It would be necessary to draw new in-
difference curves.
This situation is reversed in the preferred proportions approach. If the new
alternatives given are on the preferred proportions curve, we can immediately order
them in terms of preference. Compared to all possible alternatives, however, few
would be expected to be on the curve. Therefore, if any two points are chosen at
random, the probability of being able to make a preference judgment from a
particular preferred proportions curve is close to zero.
From these comparisons we can conclude that if we start with a given alternative
and can adjust the corresponding attribute values fairly readily, a curve of preferred
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proportions could be useful. If, in contrast, we are trying to assess our preferences
before confronting a set of alternatives from which we must choose, the curve of
preferred proportions would be of less use.
5.3 CONSTRUCTIVE PROCEDURES FOR TRADE-OFF ANALYSIS
There are two basic modes for obtaining trade-offs from a decision maker: by
inferring them from a series of successive choices he makes, or by having him state
a trade-off value directly. Each of these modes can be used with either the indif·
ference approach or the preferred proportions approach.
To use the successive choice mode with the indifference approach, we present
the decision maker with a sequence of choices between pairs of alternatives. From
a sufficient number of choices, we try to infer the decision maker's points (or
zones) of indifference. When the choice situations are real, i.e., when the alter·
natives are actually realized by the decision maker, we would expect him to be
higWy motivated to reveal his true preferences. In the terminology of economics,
an alternative A o is revealed preferred to alternative A' if A o is chosen when
A' is also available. However, only in simple situations involving consumer choice
do we begin to meet the requirements of the revealed preference methods. Gener-
ally, we can present the decision maker only with hypothetical choices. Although
this limitation may affect the care with which he evaluates his preferences, it
allows us to control the points that are presented for consideration. We can, for
example, base\our selection of alternatives on the decision maker's previous choices,
and we can present those points that are likely to be the most informative. The
successive choice mode, whether hypothetical or real, allows the decision maker to
make relatively easy assessments (i.e., which of two points is preferred); hence this
mode takes into account the limitations of human thought processes.
The use of the successive choice mode with the preferred proportions approach
involves a similar procedure. Choices may be either real or hypothetical, and the
successive choice mode assists in reducing the cognitive strain on the decision
maker. The only difference is that, instead of comparing a new alternative with
the reference point, we generate two new points and ask the decision maker which
one he would prefer. From a sufficient number of such choices, we attempt to infer
which points fall on the preferred proportions curve.
Using the direct mode with the indifference approach requires the decision
maker to specify his preference equivalences directly; that is, we ask him to identify
points that he considers to be indifferent to the reference point. Such judgments
are difficult to make because there are an infinite number of points that can be
considered and because making judgments about precise indifference points is a
more complex task than that of judging strict preference. In other words, the
direct mode requires the decision maker to perform the multiple operations of
"generate and test" rather than the single operation of "test" required by the
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successive choice mode. If the direct mode did yield points of true indifference, it
would be more efficient than the successive choice mode; however, because the
direct mode imposes a high degree of cognitive strain on the decision maker, it runs
a high risk of yielding unreliable responses.
The same advantages and disadvantages apply when we use the direct mode with
the preferred proportions approach. In this procedure, the decision maker states
the point he most prefers, rather than a point indifferent to the reference point.
The ideal procedure for assessing a decision maker's trade-offs would offer the
efficiency of the direct mode and the cognitive assistance of the successive choice
mode. Furthermore, it would capture the motivational incentives found when the
choices are actual rather than hypothetical. l In the remainder of this paper, we
emphasize those methods that efficiently obtain trade-offs without taxing the
cognitive abilities of the decision maker. Below, we first describe procedures for
obtaining irIdifference curves and then procedures for obtaining preferred pro-
portions curves.
5.3.1 INDIFFERENCE CURVES
An indifference curve through (Xo, Yo) can be obtained in various ways. The
methods differ primarily in the extent to which the decision maker must work
unaided and the extent to which he is given help by the procedure and the analyst.
When the decision maker receives no assistance, he is merely told to identify all the
points he finds indifferent to (Xo, Yo). Generating and evaluating every possible
point in the space of feasible attributes is clearly an onerous task. In contrast, the
procedure and analyst may assist the decision maker by generating a series of points
at random and asking him whether he prefers a particular point to (Xo, Yo),
whether he prefers (Xo, Yo) to the generated point, or whether he is indifferent.
This method can, however, lead to great inefficiencies unless the new points are
generated on the basis of the decision maker's preceding choices. later in this
section we consider random generation procedures, but here we focus on three
types of structured procedures: (a) generating points by fixing only one attribute;
(b) generating points by fixing both attributes, but fixing them one at a time;
and (c) generating points by fixing both attributes simultaneously.
Indifference Curves Obtained by Fixing Only One Attribute
Cognitive strain experienced by the decision maker when he must consider changes
from a reference point can be reduced by fixing the change in one of the attributes
to a particular amount. Suppose, for example, that we want the decision maker to
search for attribute values indifferent to (Xo, Yo). (For simplicity of discussion, we
assume that there is a single point of indifference; the problem of the decision
1 We shall not go into the motivational problems here (see MacCrimmon and Toda, 1969, and
Toda and MacCrimmon, 1972, for further discussion).
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maker's inability to find a single point will be discussed later in this section.)
We could fix X at, say, XI, and then ask the decision maker to find a Yvalue that
will make (XI, Y) indifferent to (Xo, Yo). Hence we are, in effect, identifying a
line X = XI and asking the decision maker for a point of indifference on this line.
This will be called the line procedure. As the preceding discussion indicates, either
we can ask the decision maker to identify an indifferent point directly, or we can
assist him by generating points for his consideration. If we were using the direct
mode, we would ask: "What value of Y would result in indifference between
(Xo , Yo) and (XI, Y)?" If we were using the successive choice mode, we would
ask: "Consider (Xo, Yo) and (Xl> Y'); which do you prefer, or are you indifferent?
Now consider (Xo, Yo) and (Xl> Y"); which do you prefer, or are you indifferent?"
(The values y', y", and so on are specific levels of Y used in presenting the
choices.) We would present the decision maker with a series of such choices until
he indicated his indifference between (Xo, Yo) and one of the presented alter-
natives, call it (XI, YI ).
For the remainder of section 5.3 we assume that the points of indifference
sought in these procedures e~ist. This assumption will be relaxed in section 5.4.
Indifference Curves Obtained by Fixing One Attribute at a Time
By asking the decision maker to consider merely points along a single line, the line
procedure reduces cognitive strain but its very simplicity may produce boredom
and hence may cause the decision maker to give insufficient thought to his choices.
This disadvantage suggests that the procedure be modified and extended. We could,
for instance, fix both X and Y, but fix them one at a time; hence the decision
maker would be asked to compare points along two lines. This may be thought of
as a bending of the line X = XI at some point, say (XI, Y 2), to form a right angle in
the line. (Let us choose Y 2 so that Y 2 - Yo = X o - XI') This concept is illustrated
in Figure 5.5.
The right angle can be thought of as one corner of a rectangle or a square cen-
tered on (Xo, Yo). With this procedure, which we call the square procedure,! we
can proceed just as we did in the line procedure. That is, we can use either direct
questioning or successive choices among the set of points defined by the square
to determine a point of indifference (X2 , Y2 ). Note that this is a different point
from (X I, Yd, although both points must lie on the same indifference curve
(of course, it would have been the same point if YI ~ Y 2 ).
The square procedure reduces the boredom effect by presenting different X and
Y values. Because each new pair contains a particular X and Y value (namely,
XI and Y2 ), this procedure does not cause much increase in cognitive strain.
I Although a rectangle is more general, we can form a square by rescaling the attribute values.
Since a square is a simpler figure, we adopt that form here. Other possible procedures (e.g., a
cross procedure) could be given that would vary only one attribute at a time, but the square
procedure appears to be the most efficient.
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Indifference Curves Obtained by Fixing Both Attributes
The above procedure suggests that we might attempt to fix the values of both
attributes simultaneously. This certainly tends to reduce boredom but increases
the cognitive strain. Unlike the two preceding procedures, this one offers a large
number of ways to define the sets of alternatives under consideration. We could,
for example, define the sets of alternatives by using a diamond procedure or a circle
procedure. The diamond procedure (Figure 5.6) was used implicitly in the house
example given in section 5.2 (there, however, it was used to obtain the preferred
proportions curve). A circle procedure (Figure 5.7) seems particularly appropriate
here because it uses a Euclidean metric to measure the distance from (Xo, Yo).
As discussed earlier, we could produce more general shapes (e.g., a parallelogram or
an ellipse), but simpler figures are used to provide a better intuitive understanding.
Summary ofProcedures for Obtaining Indifference Curves
In each of the above procedures, we considered only a single set of points; that is,
we considered only one line, one square, one diamond, or one circle. If we want
to obtain a relatively complete indifference curve, we must consider a number of
structured sets of points. Hence, we would present multiple lines, squares, dia-
monds, or circles. To obtain a complete curve from the results of these sets of
choices, we may have to interpolate among the choices or use the choices to esti-
mate the parameters in fitting a curve of a particular functional form.
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Some of the procedures we have described have been used by various re-
searchers. The most common method is the line procedure with direct questioning.
This has the virtue of simplicity but gives minimal aid to the decision maker.
Geoffrion et ai. (1972), as well as Dyer (1973) and Feinberg (1972), discuss a
variety of methods, most of which are variants of the line procedure. They also
use a procedure that fixes one attribute at a time, but, because it has lines through
the reference point, it is not the same as the square procedure. MacCrimmon and
Toda (1969) use an unstructured procedure with the successive choice mode.
Since this procedure takes advantage of an assumption of monotonicity, we defer
a discussion of it to section 5.4. MacCrimmon and Siu (1974) use the concentric
circle procedure with successive choices. Thurstone (1931) uses a very inefficient
procedure of asking the decision maker to make successive choices between the
reference point and all points in the domain of interest.
5.3.2 PREFERRED PROPORTIONS CURVES
The techniques for presenting a decision maker with structured sets of alternatives
to determine his preferred proportions of change are analogous to the techniques
for determining the indifference curve. Thus, we may (a) fix only one attribute,
(b) fix one attribute at a time, or (c) fix both attributes simultaneously. These
techniques will lead, respectively, to the line, square, diamond, and circle pro-
cedures. There is, however, one main distinction between using these procedures to
obtain an indifference curve and using them to obtain a curve of preferred pro-
portions. In the indifference approach the reference point determines the points
being generated and is also one of the alternatives in each of the choice pairs. In
the preferred proportions approach, on the other hand, the reference point is not
one of the alternatives in the choice pairs - it is used only as a basis for generating
points to present to the decision maker.
Procedures for Obtaining Preferred Proportions Curves
Fixing one attribute, say X at Xi> yields a set of points along a line. To obtain a
preferred proportions curve we must determine which would be the decision
maker's most preferred value of Y along this line if he could move to some place
on the line from the current reference point.1 In this approach, as in the indifference
approach, the decision maker directly assesses his most preferred point on the line
or an analyst assists him in this assessment by presenting him with successive
choices. In Figure 5.8, the most preferred point on the line is circled; all the points
have been compared with the others rather than with (Xo, Yo).
1 If more of Y is always better, then the preferred point will have an infinite amount of Y.
To facilitate representation of the curves, we assume that the most preferred point is at an
intermediate value. The implications of nonmonotonicity assumptions will be covered in
section 5.4.
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FIGURE 5.8 Line procedure for obtaining preferred proportions curves.
By following this approach for a number of different X values and obtaining
a point of preferred proportions for each, we can trace out a curve of preferred
proportions. The curve gives the path of points that the decision maker would most
like to move along when starting from (Xo, Yo) for fixed changes in X. This does
not mean, however, that he would want to move out along the curve as far as
possible.
Preferred proportions curves may be assessed by using procedures similar to
those described for indifference curves, by fixing one attribute at a time through
the use of the square procedure, or by fixing both attributes through the use of
the diamond or circle procedure.
Summary ofProcedures for c,:;taining Preferred Proportions Curves
The procedures for obtaining preferred proportions curves can be used for any
value of the incremental change. It seems reasonable to construct such a curve by
beginning with a small increment, A, and by increasing it gradually. If a most
preferred point in the entire attribute space is identified for some A, further in-
creases in A may lead to less preferred points. Consequently, it is useful to com-
pare the attribute values generated by successive values of A to determine whether
there is a need to identify ad6itional points on the preferred proportions curve.
To obtain the complete preferred proportions curve we may use either inter-
polation or the fitting of a particular functional form.
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Relatively little attention has been paid to developing curves of preferred pro-
portion. MacCrimmon (1969) used a rotated line method in which the locus of
preferred proportions is traced out on a line having a negative slope. This procedure
was based on the use of budget curves in consumer choice. Geoffrion et aZ. (1972)
suggest using preferred proportions curves but do not go into detail about how to
construct them.
5.3.3 CONSIDERATIONS RELEVANT TO BOTH APPROACHES
We have assumed that the decision maker's preference discriminations are well
specified. However, few people have precise indifference points or precise points
of highest preference. Most people have a range of indifference or highest pref-
erence. This range would be represented as an indifference band or a preferred
proportions band rather than as a single curve traced out through precise points.
Sets of indifferent points having this property are called thick indifference curves;
such curves will not be considered in detail in this paper.
There is a major difference between the procedures for constructing indifference
curves and those for constructing preferred proportions curves. Whether an in·
difference curve is constructed by fixing only one attribute, one attribute at a time,
or both attributes simultaneously, the same indifference curve results. When dif-
ferent procedures are used to construct a preferred proportions curve, however,
different results may occur. For example, the use of the line procedure with a series
of Ll may produce a different preferred proportions curve from that produced by
using the square procedure. The reason for this is that the different procedures
for constructing preferred proportions curves limit in different ways the changes
from the reference point that the decision maker may consider. As long as one
procedure is used consistently for constructing preferred proportions curves, no
difficulty should arise.
With both the indifference approach and the preferred proportions approach,
the application of procedures will yield a sequence of discrete points. To obtain a
curve from these points, a somewhat arbitrary interpolation may be necessary.
If the preference surface is highly irregular, the curves we may attempt to draw
might bear little resemblance to the real preferences. Alternatively, if we were
trying to fit a particular function, the functional form we used might be quite
inappropriate.
The square, diamond, and circle procedures present the decision maker with
a range of attribute values that completely circumscribes the reference point.
Clearly, other procedures having this property are possible.
We could easily develop procedures in which the reference point was not a part
of the final indifference or preferred proportions curve. For example, with the line
procedure for indifference curves, suppose that a decision maker said he preferred
a point (X), Ys) to the reference point (Xo, Yo). Then, rather than selecting
another Y value (say, Y4) and asking him to compare (XI, Y4 ) and (Xo, Yo), we
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could choose another X value, call this value X s, and ask him to compare (X" Y s)
with (Xs , Yo). If these were indifferent, then the indifference curve would go
through these points and not through (Xo, Yo). This seems to be the procedure that
Geoffrion et ai. (1972) call the two-dimensional indifference curve procedure.
In the line procedures for obtaining indifference curves, the particular line
chosen can serve as a numerical attribute for obtaining indifference curve" over a
number of attributes. This procedure is discussed by Raiffa (1969, section 4.2).
Occasionally, it may be useful to set the line at X = 0 (or Y = 0) to find the value
of the other attribute that would just compensate for an alternative yielding a zero
value of X(or of Y). Raiffa (1969) utilizes this approach in a medical example with
seven attributes.
Also relevant to both basic approaches is the procedure for generating successive
choices. In general, we would want to use information at hand in generating points.
If it is valid to assume additional properties for preferences, the problem of gen-
erating points can be somewhat simplified. When such assumptions are appropriate,
even unstructured approaches can be quite efficient. The following section con-
siders assumptions on preferences.
5.4 THE EFFECT OF ASSUMPTIONS ON PREFERENCE CURVES
A decision maker's preferences are generally assumed to satisfy the conditions of
comparability and transitivity (continuity of preferences is a condition that can be
assumed without operational difficulty). Comparability requires that the decision
maker be able to compare any combination of attribute values. This assumption is
quite reasonable, at least in a localized region such as the one surrounding the
reference point. Transitivity implies that indifference curves do not cross. Viola-
tions of transitivity could lead to nonunique trade-offs as well. When decision
makers are presented with their own intransitivities, they usually resolve them
after further consideration. The decision maker's preferences are assumed to
satisfy comparability and transitivity throughout this paper.
5.4.1 MONOTONICITY
Monotonicity Assumptions for Obtaining Indifference Curves
An additional, more restrictive, assumption can be made about the monotonicity
of preference on attribute values. For each attribute, preference is assumed to be
either always increasing or always decreasing for higher values of that attribute
(monotonicity is defined only for attributes that are at least ordinally scaled).
This assumption rules out the possibility that the decision maker would be totally
satisfied or satiated with an intermediate level of an attribute. In the typical situ-
ation, we have two attributes, both of which are desirable, and for a given level of
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Attribute X
Xo
FIGURE 5.9 Circle procedure for obtaining indifference curves with two mono-
tonic attributes.
one attribute we prefer as much as is obtainable of the other attribute. This yields
the typical indifference curves, as shown in Figure 5.9.
When we know that preferences are monotonic, we can use the successive
choice mode to minimize efficiently the number of points presented to the decision
maker. For example, Figure 5.9 shows that, before we begin, we know that any
point in the region above and to the right of the reference point is preferred to the
reference point and any point in the region below and to the left of the reference
point is not preferred. These regions are indicated by the vertical shading. If we are
using the circle procedure and we find two points, 0 and b, that are both preferred
to the reference point, we know that there cannot be an intermediate point on the
arc between them that is not preferred. Furthermore, we know that when we
consider a new circle, the points on the arc between 0' (directly above 0) and b'
(directly to the right of b) must be preferred to the reference point. The corre-
sponding argument holds for the nonpreferred points c and d (and hence c' and d').
When there is monotonicity on both attributes, the structured procedures have
no particular advantage. Note that we could select any point in the unshaded
regions of Figure 5.9, and, after determining whether it was preferred or not
preferred, we could remove a large number of points from further consideration.
The MacCrimmon-Toda procedure (1969) relies heavily on monotonicity and
hence does not deal with a structured set of points such as a line or circle.
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As long as the decision maker's preferences are monotonic in one of the attri-
butes, the line procedure will be effective for any fixed value of another attribute.
For example, if the decision maker always prefers more of attribute Y but has a
satiation level for attribute X, the line procedure will generate a point indifferent
to (Xo, Yo) for any line X = Xl. Furthermore, the monotonicity assumption
requires that the indifference curve not cross this line more than once. If the
successive choice mode is used, monotonicity also allows portions of the line
to be removed from the search for a point indifferent to (Xo, Yo). If point a is
found to be preferred to (Xo, Yo), we know that any higher point on the line will
be preferred, and if point b is found not to be preferred to (Xo, Yo), any lower
point on the line will not be preferred. MacCrimmon and Toda (1969) also consider
this procedure.
If a line is chosen for a fixed value of a monotonic attribute, difficulties may
arise with the line procedure. For example, there may be no points indifferent to
the reference point, or there may be several. If neither attribute is monotonic, the
line procedure will generate a point of indifference only when the line is suf-
ficiently close to the reference point and on the appropriate side of it.
In the circle procedure for indifference curves, monotonicity for at least one
attribute guarantees the existence of two or more points of indifference. This
holds for whatever radius is chosen for the circle. Moreover, if both attributes are
monotonic, the decision maker can restrict his consideration to only two quadrants
of the circle. For the attributes shown in Figure 5.7, only the upper-left and lower-
right quadrants centered at the reference point need to be considered. When neither
attribute is monotonic, Figure 5.1 0 shows that points of indifference need not exist
unless the circle is sufficiently close to the reference point.
Monotonicity Assumptions for Obtaining Prefe"ed Proportions Curves
As long as the decision maker's preferences are not monotonic in one of the attri-
butes, the line procedure for preferred proportions curves will operate satisfactorily
for any fixed value of the other attribute. In this case, a most preferred point on
the line can be found. For example, if the decision maker's preferences are mono-
tonic on attribute X and nonmonotonic on attribute Y (as in Figure 5.11), a most
preferred point on the line X = Xl can be found, namely (Xl, Yd. Because pref-
erence is monotonic on attribute X, (Xl, Yo) must be preferred to (Xo, Yo).
Since (Xl, Yo) is on line X = Xl and preferences are assumed to be transitive, it
follows that the decision maker must prefer (Xl> Yd to (Xo, Yo). If both attributes
are monotonic, a (finite) most preferred point on the line can be found only if the
line is bounded. This can be done using the feasibility region for each attribute
described earlier.
The circle procedure can always be used to find a most preferred point, even if
the feasibility region is unbounded. This is because the circle is itself bounded.
With this procedure, monotonicity of both attributes allows the decision maker to
restrict his consideration to two quadrants of the circle.
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Attribute X
Xo
FIGURE 5.10 Circle procedure for obtaining indifference curves with both
attributes nonmonotonic.
Attribute Y
Attribute X
FIGURE 5.11 Line procedure for obtaining preferred proportions curve with
one monotonic attribute.
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5.4.2 CONVEXITY
Convexity Assumptions for Obtaining Indifference Curves
Another preference assumption that is often made is that of convexity of pref-
erences. Preferences are called convex if the following condition holds for any two
combinations of attribute values (Xl, Yl) and (X2 , Y2). If the decision maker
prefers the first to the second, or is indifferent in a choice between them, he must
also prefer the new combination (X3 , Y3 ) = (0.5X1 + 0.5X2 , 0.5 Y 1 + 0.5 Y2 ) to
(X2 , Y2 ), or be indifferent in a choice between them. One implication of convexity
is that indifference curves cannot bend back on themselves.
The assumption of convexity guarantees that the search for a point of indif-
ference or a most preferred point can be restricted to two quadrants centered at the
reference point in the circle procedure. The use of the convexity assumption to
obtain this advantage is beneficial only when at least one of the attributes is not
monotonic (because the monotonicity of both attributes also leads to the same
conclusion).
The principal benefit of the convexity assumption to trade-off analysis is that
the marginal rate of substitution at a reference point (Xo, Yo) can be used to
identify a halfspace of (X, Y) values in which all points preferred to (Xo, Yo)
must lie. This property is especially useful when the decision maker is searching
for a sequence of better points rather than identifying a single indifference curve.
(In the rare situation where both attributes are so similar that there is an axis of
symmetry for the decision maker's indifference curves, convexity guarantees that
best points must be on this axis. If such a best point is desired, consideration can
then be restricted to identifying the axis of symmetry and then searching along it.)
Thus far, we have discussed only individual properties for a decision maker's
preferences. As mentioned in the subsection summaries of section 5.3, it is also
possible to assume a parametric form for the indifference curves or preference
function and then to estimate the appropriate unknown parameters. Trade-offs can
then be calculated from the identified preferences. We would probably want to
assume convexity of, at least, the indifference curve. This method will not be
developed further here, but it should be clear that the procedures we describe could
be used to obtain the data on which estimates of the parameters would be based.
5.5 N ATTRIBUTES: DIMENSIONALITY REDUCTION
When a decision problem has alternatives with only two attributes, we can use
the techniques discussed in the preceding sections in one of two ways. We can
either (a) select a best alternative from a set based on trade-off information in the
form of indifference curves or (b) design a best alternative subject to particular
constraints based on trade-off information in the form of preferred proportions
curves. Few actual decisions, however, are confined to only two attributes. Hence,
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if we wish to develop useful trade-off procedures, we must be able to deal with n
attributes, where n > 2. In this section we examine a variety of ways to consider
the n-attribute situation. The first methods will cover ways to deal with only two
of the n attributes, or at least only two at a time. Subsequently, we examine ways
to handle three or more attributes at a time.
5.5.1 N ATTRIBUTES: TRADE-OFFS ON NO MORE THAN TWO ATTRIBUTES
AT A TIME
The simplest way to deal with trade-offs on n attributes is to ignore all but two
attributes. This is not as ridiculous as it may sound. The cognitive limitations of
decision makers force them to ignore information - not just irrelevent information.
If two attributes could be carefully considered, with accompanying trade-offs, that
might often be the best that could be expected. It would be preferable, of course,
if the two attributes were the most important ones to the decision maker.
Lexicographic Trade-offs
By considering trade-offs on these two attributes, we have the elements of an
extended lexicographic method. In the standard lexicography, the attributes are
ordered by importance, and the alternative is chosen with the best value on the
most important attribute. If there are two alternatives of equal value, the procedure
is repeated for those alternatives on the next attribute, and so on until a unique
alternative emerges (or until all attributes are considered). With the extended
lexicography we consider here, we obtain the importance ranking in terms of
classes of one or more attributes. If the most important class has more than one
attribute, we form trade-offs among these attributes. The second most important
class of attributes is considered only if there are several alternatives having equally
preferred attribute values in the most important class.
This extended lexicography, then, has some of the simplifying aspects of stan-
dard lexicography and, in addition, overcomes the noncompensatory characteristic
of the standard lexicography by considering trade-offs within a class. The standard
method is an extended case of the extended method, Le., when the classes con-
sidered have only a single attribute.
Hierarchical Combinations
The extended lexicographic method depends on forming equivalence classes based
on importance or salience. Another type of classification that can facilitate the
handling of n attributes is one based on the natural composition of particular
attributes. The indifference curves that show the decision maker's trade-off be-
tween two attributes can be labeled to form an ordinal scale for a new composite
attribute. If this procedure can be carried through for pairs of the remaining n - 2
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attributes, we will have a new set of nl2 attributes. Similarly, if these composite
attributes also have pairs of natural combinations we can consider the trade-offs
among the pairs and use the indifference curves we obtain to scale a new higher-
order composite attribute. We can continue this hierarchical combination until
we obtain two high-order composite attributes for which we again form the trade-
off. As a result, we will incorporate all the attributes.
To select the preferred alternative with this approach, we must be able to
locate it in the final composite space. This can be done by assuring that each
alternative is on an indifference curve in the initial spaces; thus, the combination
of values defining an alternative will be one of the scale values for the new attri-
bute. By including these combinations on an indifference curve each step of the
way, we can ensure that the alternatives will be representable in the highest-order
space we finally consider.
Note, then, that although this method considers only two attributes at a time,
it includes all n attributes. This is in contrast to the extended lexicographic method,
which ignores many of the attributes (assuming that there are not many alternatives
of equal value in the early classes). This additional consideration, however, relies on
a major assumption that may have been apparent to the reader. The use of this
method requires that the attributes be independent among the initial classes. That
is, while the trade-off between any initial pair can be nonconstant and higWy in-
terrelated, this trade-off cannot depend on the level of the other attributes. This
restriction suggests that a useful way to form the initial pairs is by grouping attri-
butes that seem relatively independent from the other ones. This notion is similar
to the hierarchical format of Manheim and Hall (1968).
5.5.2 N ATTRIBUTES: TRADE-OFFS ON THREE ATTRIBUTES
Making trade-offs among three attributes is usually more difficult than making
trade-offs between two attributes. To reduce cognitive strain on the decision
maker, the assessment of trade-offs on three dimensions can be decomposed into
a series of one- and two-dimensional assessments. This section presents these de-
composed procedures as extensions of the line and square procedures; these are
called cube procedures.
Indifference Surfaces in Three Dimensions
Suppose we wish to construct an indifference surface through the reference point
(Xo, Yo, Zo). The surface that surrounds this point will be a cube defined by adding
or subtracting a positive amount .£l to or from each of these attribute values. If the
.£l selected is sufficiently small, the indifference surface must cross at least one side
of the cube. Depending upon the slope of the surface, it could cross from one to six
sides of the cube. The indifference surface illustrated in Figure 5.12 crosses three
sides.
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Indifference surface in three dimensions.
The analyst using the cube procedure begins by asking the decision maker to
compare each of the cube's eight vertices with (Xo, Yo, Zo). This comparison
identifies regions of preference and nonpreference around the reference point.
We assume that there is at least one edge of the cube for which one endpoint
(vertex) is preferred to the reference point, which in turn is preferred to the other
endpoint. (When none of the vertices is preferred to the reference point, some other
preferred point on the cube must be identified and the procedure appropriately
modified.) Let us suppose that this edge is given by (Xo +~, Yo + fly, Zo + ~),
where -~,,;;; fly ,,;;;~, as in Figure 5.12. The point (Xo + ~, Yo + ~, Zo + ~) is
preferred to the reference point, and the reference point, in tum, is preferred to
(Xo+~, Yo - ~,Zo + ~).
Because of the usual continuity properties assumed for indifference surfaces,
there must be some point on this edge that is indifferent to the reference point
(there could be a region of indifference if the indifference surface were thick).
The procedure for finding such an indifferent point is similar to the line procedure
for indifference curves in two dimensions. More specifically, a fixed increment,
~ > 0, is added to the first and last attribute values of (Xo, Yo, Zo) and a scalar
fly, - ~ ,,;;; fly ,,;;;~, must be found ~uch that (Xo + ~, Yo + fly, Zo +~) is indif-
ferent to (Xo, Yo, Zo). The only difference between this three-dimensional line
procedure and the two-dimensional line procedure is that the former fixes two
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attribute values, while the latter fixes only one. In Figure 5.12 the indifferent point
is labeled (Xo+ ~, Yo + e5y, Zo + ~).
Having identified this point, we can now use any of the procedures defined
earlier (line, square, diamond, circle) to determine a two-dimensional curve of
points indifferent to (Xo, Yo, Zo) on a side of the cube. The point (Xo+ ~,
Yo + 8y , Zo + ~) is on the side of the cube given by (Xo + ~, Yo + Oy, Zo + oz),
where -~.;;; Oy .;;; ~ and -~.;;; Oz .;;; ~.1 We seek several points on this side indif-
ferent to (Xo + ~, Yo + 8y , Zo +~) and hence also indifferent to the reference
point. The line procedure used in Figure 5.12 constructs new lines on this side of
the cube by temporarily fixing Oz at some level. This procedure is nearly identical
to the line procedure for indifference curves in two dimensions, except that the
third attribute (X) is fixed (at Xo+~) throughout the procedure. The result of
this line procedure is the indifference curve between (Xo+~, Yo+8y,Zo+~)
and (Xo+ ~, Yo + ~, Zo + 8z ). The line (or square, diamond, or circle) procedure
can also be used to construct indifference curves on the sides of the cube given
by Y = Yo + ~ and Z = Zo + ~. For example, in Figure 5.12 an indifference curve
through (Xo + ~, Yo +~, Zo + 8z) can be generated on the side of the cube given
by Y= Yo+~.
Depending on the shape of the indifference surface, the cube procedure as
described above will generate two-dimensional segments of the indifference surface
through (Xo, Yo, Zo) on one or more sides of the cube. Using a cube defined by
smaller or larger values of ~ will generate additional segments of the indifference
surface. Such a procedure allows us to determine a three-dimensional indifference
surface by making a series of trade-offs that are only one- or two-dimensional in
nature.
Additional assumptions regarding the monotonicity and convexity of the de-
cision maker's preferences simplify the cube procedure for indifference surfaces.
For example, if the decision maker's preferences are monotonic on at least one
attribute, the indifference surface must cross at least one side of the cube, regard-
less of the ~ chosen. When all the attributes are monotonic, at least one vertex of
the cube must always be preferred to the reference point, and the reference point
must always be preferred to at least one vertex. In Figure 5.12 all three attributes
are monotonic, and these vertices are, respectively, (Xo -I-~, Yo +~, Zo +~) and
(Xo-~, Yo - ~,Zo -~) for any ~ >O. As a result, an edge of the cube can
always be found for which one endpoint is preferred to the reference point, which,
in turn, is preferred to the other endpoint. Furthermore, the assumption of convex
preferences guarantees that only one point of indifference on this edge can be
found via the line procedure for indifference surfaces in three dimensions.
The assumption of monotonicity on all three attributes also guarantees that the
indifference surface must cross at least three sides of the cube. The vertex having
values of each attribute higher than the reference point always determines three
1 It is also on the side of the cube where Z is fixed at Zo + ~ and both X and Y can vary.
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such sides. In Figure 5.12 these sides are determined by X = Xo + .::l, Y = Yo + .::l,
and Z = Zo +.::l. Of course, the indifference surface might intersect more than
three sides. This would be the case in Figure 5.12 if one or more of the vertices
(Xo -.::l, Yo +.::l, Zo + .::l), (Xo+.::l, Yo- .::l,Zo + .::l), or (Xo+.::l, Yo + .::l,Zo -.::l)
were preferred to the reference point.
Use of the line procedure for indifference curves on a side of the cube can be
simplified if the variable attribute is monotonic. In this case there must be a single
point on each of the lines that is indifferent to the point on the edge of the cube.
For example, in Figure 5.12 attributes X and Z are fixed at X o+.::l and Zo + 0z,
respectively, and attribute Y is variable. The monotonicity of Y guarantees a single
point indifferent to (Xo+ .::l, Yo + 8y , Zo + .::l) on each line and allows us to restrict
our attention to only one segment of each line. This means that we need to con-
sider only those alternatives having more than Yo + 8y of attribute Y.
Preferred Proportions Curves in Three Dimensions
The procedures for preferred proportions curves in three dimensions are similar to
those for indifference curves.
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6 Conjoint Measurement:A Brief Survey
R. Duncan Luce
6.1 INTRODUCTION
At its most general level, the purpose of conjoint measurement is to understand
what sorts of numerical representations exist, if any, for orderings of Cartesian
products of sets. The problem is ubiquitous:
1. In physics, one can order pairs consisting of a homogeneous substance and a
volume by the mass of that volume of the substance - this can be done with a pan
balance and a set of containers without having numerical measures of either mass or
volume or, of course, substance. Presumably, if we understand matters correctly,
we should end up with numerical measures of mass, volume, and density.
2. In economics, one can order commodity bundles - a listing of amounts of
various goods - by preference. A numerical representation corresponding to
preference would, on one hand, be a kind of utility measure and, on the other,
tell something about how different commodities are aggregated by an individual.
3. In economics, statistics, and psychology, one can order gambles - con-
sequences assigned to chance events - by riskiness and thereby arrive at a numerical
scale of risk that shows how the consequences combine with the events to yield
a measure of risk.
4. In psychology, one can present one intensity of a pure tone to one ear and
a different intensity to the other ear, producing an overall sensation of loudness
that is some composite of the loudnesses perceived by each ear separately. Given a
subject's ordering by loudness of such pairs, we may study the existence of a
numerical scale of loudness and of a law for combining loudnesses between the
ears.
The problem is one of uncovering both scales of measurement of the factors
and a law for combining these scales to form a composite or conjoint scale that
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recovers the qualitative ordering. Often the problem is partially constrained by the
existence of already known scales, derived in other ways, that should be related
simply to those obtained by conjoint methods. For example, in physical measure-
ment, we anticipate that the conjoint measures of mass and volume should relate
simply to the usual measures derived from the theory of extensive measurement,
which is based on the existence of an operation of combination that preserves the
attribute in question. Such "concatenation" operations are typified by placing
two masses together on a pan balance or by abutting two rods to form a new rod.
We shall confine our attention to one particularly simple class of numerical
representations. Let A and P be sets and C: a binary relation on A x P. We say
that the structure <A x P, C:) is decomposable if and only if there exist functions
¢A on A and ¢p on P into the real numbers and a function F from the real plane
into the reals such that F(¢A, ¢p) represents C:. To be specific, for all a, b in A
andp, q inP,
(a, p) C: (b, q) iff F[¢A(a), ¢p(p)] ~F[¢A(b),¢p(q)].
Another way to describe this is to say that there is a binary operation 8 on the
reals such that ¢A 0 ¢p represents C: , where, of course, for all real rand s, the
following relation between 0 and F holds:
r 0 s = F(r, s).
Our attention will be restricted to the decomposable case and the obvious generali-
zation of that concept for three or more factors.
Although this sort of representation seems incredibly general - certainly it
appears to cover all of the two-factor cases one runs into in physics - there are
simple, and perhaps interesting, cases not covered by it. For example, suppose
¢A, 1/JA, and ¢p, 1/Jp are functions on A and P, respectively, and C: is the ordering
generated on A x P by
then, except for a few special cases, <A x P, C:) is not a decomposable structure.
Nevertheless, this representation seems interesting because the interaction term
that is added to the additive part of a representation is itself multiplicatively
independent. The only relevant work (Fishburn, 1975) makes it clear that it will
probably be difficult to understand what properties of C: lead to such a represen-
tation.
When one already has measures of either the two factors A and P or of one of
those and of C: on A x P - this is true of examples 1, 2, and 4 above - then one
can represent the information given in the problem by means of indifference
curves. In the physical example, we have measures of mass and of volume, so we
identify with each substance the locus of mass-volume pairs that can arise. Each
substance will generate its own curve, and under reasonable assumptions these will
not intersect. In the psychological example, we have physical measures of the
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intensities presented to the two ears (usually we use the logarithm of intensities -
the decibel scale), and we plot the loci of intensity pairs that are judged to produce
equivalent loudness. The problem in these cases is to find a suitable numerical
representation of the indifference curves.
The question becomes one of deciding on what we mean by a suitable repre-
sentation. It appears that the only formal requirement for acceptance of the result
as a form of measurement is that the representation be nearly unique. Often the
degree of uniqueness is described in terms of the group (or semigroup) of trans-
formations that take a representation involving 0 into another representation based
on the same 0. For example, in the usual theory of mass measurement, the con-
catenation operation is mapped into + and C: is mapped into ;;;., and it is shown
that only multiplication by a positive constant takes one representation into
another representation. This corresponds to a change in units. However, when
o is more complex than + or ., explicitly describing the class of admissible trans-
formations can be difficult. It seems better simply to say how many values of the
representation must be specified in order to determine it uniquely. In the case of
mass, one value is sufficient. Thus, our interest will be in constructing represen-
tations that become unique when their values are specified at one or a few points.
The rest of the paper deals with most of what is known about decomposable
representations. First, both historically and in terms of mathematical simplicity,
is the additive case: when 0 is +. This is the most fully understood case and in
many ways serves as an underpinning to more general ones. Second, we look at
several results of a nonadditive sort. Third, we examine the problem of relating
conjoint structures to concatenation structures and the way in which this provides
some better understanding of the interplay of addition and multiplication, which
is exploited in dimensional analysis. Finally, we look at the, as yet, small literature
concerned with random variable representations of conjoint structures.
My main concern is with the key ideas and the general spirit, and so I shall
slight various points of mathematical nicety. The interested reader will find the
precise definitions and theorems in the references cited.
6.2 THE ADDITIVE REPRESENTATION
6.2.1 THE INFINITE C,\SE
Ideally, one would like to know two things: what are necessary and sufficient
conditions for (A x P, C: > to have an additive representation, and how does one
construct the functions cf>A and cf>p? We cannot yet answer either question fully.
When A and P are finite sets, necessary and sufficient conditions are known (see
section 6.2.2, below), and the representation, whose uniqueness is very difficult to
characterize, involves finding the solutions to a system of linear inequalities. Al-
gorithms for doing this are known and, because of the speed of computers, are
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feasible if the sets are not too large. In the infinite case, we know only sufficient
conditions for the existence of an additive representation, but we have systematic
procedures to approximate r/>A and r/>p, and they are unique up to specification at
two points. We take up the infinite case first.
The axioms are conveniently grouped into three types:
First-order axioms: necessary conditions. These include at least the following
three properties, each of which derives immediately from the intended represen-
tation by cancellations in the corresponding linear inequalities.
Transitivity: if (a, p) C::: (b, q) and (b, q) C::: (c, r), then (a, p) C::: (c, r).
Independence: if (a, p) C::: (b, p), then (a, q) C::: (b, q); if (a, p) C::: (a, q), then
(b, p) C::: (b, q).
Double cancellation 1 : if (a, x) C::: (f, q) and (f, p) C::: (b, x), then (a, p) C::: (b, q).
First-order axioms: structural conditions. These are not necessary consequences
of this representation; rather, they constrain the structures in ways that are thought
to be useful. Various requirements of nontrivialness are of this sort. Of more sub-
stantive interest are axioms that assume the existence of elements where one
wants them. If - is defined as above, the strongest form of solvability says that one
can always construct a complete indifference curve passing through any prescribed
point. That is, given a, b in A and p in P, there exists q in P such that (b, q)-
(a, p). Similarly, given a in A and p, q in P, there exists b in A such that (b, q) -
(a, p). As this is restrictive in many cases, a weaker form of solvability, called
restricted solvability, is usually invoked: it says, for the first component, that if
there are [j and b in A such that (li, q) C::: (a, p) C::: (b, q), then b exists in A such
that (b, q) - (a, p). A similar statement holds for the second component.
The primary role played by these solvability conditions is to ensure the existence
of what amounts to equally spaced elements. The method of finding such a se-
quence in one coordinate is to balance them off against a pair of elements in the
other coordinate. Thus, we say that a sequence ai in A, where i is in a set Iof
successive integers, is a standard sequence if there are p, q in P such that for all
i, i + 1 in I,
(ai, p) - (ai+l' q).
We see that if an additive representation exists, then
and so the successive intervals of the standard sequences are, indeed, equal. Without
solvability, there is no reason for any standard sequences to exist. With solvability,
llf (a, p) ~ (b, q) is defined to mean (a, p) G: (b, q) and (b, q) G: (a, p), then double can-
cellation for ~ is called the Thomson condition.
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even restricted solvability, some do exist, and they playa vital role in the con-
struction of the representation.
Second-order axioms. The third kind of axiom is again a necessary condition,
but it is a second-order axiom in the sense of logic. The one usually invoked is
called an Archimedean axiom. 1 It simply states that any standard sequence that is
bounded from above and below is finite. Such second-order axioms are infuriating
to the empirical scientist because they cannot be tested directly. For this reason,
it is reassuring to know that the Archimedean axio~ is dispensable, provided one is
willing to accept representations into the nonstandard reals (Narens, 1974a; Skala,
1975). Put another way, (a, p) >- (b, q) maps into </JA(a) + </Jp(p)~ </JA(b) + </Jp(q)
(>- goes into ~, rather than into».
The major theorems in the infinite case invoke a mix of first-order necessary and
structural axioms, together with the Archimedean axiom, to prove the existence of
functions </JA on A and </Jp on P such that </JA + </Jp is order-preserving. Moreover,
if </J~, </J~ is another representation, then there are constants 0: >0, {3A, and {3p such
that </J~ = O:</JA + {3A, </J~ = O:</Jp + {3p.
There is a distinct trade-off between the strength of the necessary axioms one
needs to invoke and the strength of the structural conditions. For example, Luce
and Tukey (1964) and Debreu (1960), who used strong topological assumptions,
invoked weak ordering (transitivity plus connectedness of <:::), double cancellation,
nontrivialness, and solvability. Later, following work of Holman (1971) and Luce
(1966), Krantz et al. (1971) used weak ordering, independence, Thomson condition,
non-trivialness, and restricted solvability. The trade-off involves weakening solv-
ability to restricted solvability and compensating by replacing double cancellation
with the weaker Thomson condition together with the property of independence.
Both systems also invoke the Archimedean property.
The method of proof is of some interest. Independence means that <::: induces a
unique weak order on each component; e.g., G: A is defined by a G:A b iff (a, p) G:
(b, p) for some P in P, and <;:: p is defined similarly. Fix ao and Po. By solvability,
define the function 1T by (ao, 1T(a» - (a, Po), and by solvability define the operation
°A on A as the solution to
In this construction, ao acts like a zero element because 1T(ao) -p Po and
whence a 0A ao -A a. It turns out that the set of elements A o of A that are >- AaO
and the restriction of °A and <;:: A to that set behave mathematically just like
1 In some axiomatizations, the Archimedean axiom and the solvability condition are combined
into a somewhat stronger topological axiom called completeness. See Ramsey (1975) for a
defense of this and Narens and Luce (1975) for an objection to it. In other axiomatizations
the existence of a countable order-dense subset is postulated.
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length or mass, and the theory of extensive measurement (see Krantz etal., 1971,
Chapters 2 and 3) ensures the existence of I/>A that is additive over aA' This func-
tion is easily extended to the elements =f. ao. The methods for approximating it in
terms of a standard sequence are well known. In particular, if a standard sequence
aj, beginning with ao, is constructed relative to Po and Pl(>-PO), then we can
choose I/>A so that I/>A (aj) = i. For any a >- ao, and any n, find i(n) such that
aj(n) >- na G: aj(n)-l ,
which is possible according to the Archimedean axiom. Thus,
and so, to within an error of lin, I/>A(a) = i(n)ln. This means that the construction
of the conjoint representation is feasible via standard sequences.
The function I/>p can be constructed similarly; however, it is easier merely to
define it as
Thus the problem is reduced to proving that I/>A + I/>p is order-preserving.
Additive conjoint measurement on three or more factors is a bit simpler. In-
dependence is generalized to mean that the ordering induced on any set of factors
is independent of the common value selected for the complementary factors. No
analog of double cancellation or Thomson condition is needed because, in the
presence of the other axioms, these conditions can be derived for any pair of fac-
tors. So, when there are three or more factors, an additive representation exists if
the following conditions hold: weak ordering, independence, restricted solvability,
nontrivialness, and an Archimedean property.
Another approach, not involving solvability conditions but invoking many can-
cellation properties, which extends techniques from the finite case to the infinite
one, can be found in Jaffray (1974).
6.2.2 THE FINITE CASE
Data developed using standard sequence techniques are rather more special than an
ordering of an arbitrary finite A x P, which arises when one runs a straightforward
factorial design. In the latter case, no solvability properties whatever will be satis-
fied, and so all one has to work with are the first-order necessary conditions. These
include the ones we have listed and any others that can be derived from linear
inequalities by canceling common terms. One might hope that a finite set of such
inequalities would suffice, but Scott and Suppes (1958) proved that to be im-
possible. The number of inequalities necessary and sufficient for <in additive repre-
sentation increases with the number of elements in A x P. Scott (1964) and
Tversky (1964) independently devised a compact way of formulating these
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necessary and sufficient conditions (see Krantz et al., 1971, Chapter 9). This type
of condition has been generalized to countable and noncountable situations by
Jaffray (1974).
In practice, one simply writes down for each data inequality the corresponding
numerical linear inequality and then searches for a solution to the resulting system.
Computer programs for doing this have been developed by Tversky and Zivian
(1966) and Young (1973), among others.
Narens (1974b) raised the question of when a nested collection of finite additive
conjoint structures approaches a countable additive conjoint structure whose
representation is unique up to interval scales. To get at this, let C be an indepen-
dent weak ordering ofA x P. On A, define
a - b >-A C - d iff there exist p, q in P such that(a, p) >- (b, q) and (c, q) >- (d, p).
In terms of this notion, for b >- Aa we say c, d in A form a trisplit if
b >-Ad >-AC >-Aa, b - C >-A C - a, d - a >-Ab - d, b - C >-Ad - c,
andc-a >-Ad-c.
If for each pair of elements from each component there is a trisplit, then we say
the conjoint structure is trisplittable. Narens shows that if each member of the
nested set is trisplittable, then the above convergence obtains.
6.2.3 FUNCTIONAL MEASUREMENT
Anderson and his associates have published extensively on functional measurement,
which is, in many ways, closely related to conjoint measurement (see Anderson,
1970, 1971, and 1974, for surveys and bibliographies). There are two key features
of Anderson's work. First, the data take the form of numbers, usually arising from
some sort of rating or category method: for example, if the stimulus (a, p) consists
of sound intensities to the two ears, the subject provides a loudness rating that fits
into, say, one of seven categories. Second, the data (or, in some cases, some trans-
formation of them) are assumed to satisfy some explicit representation. One case
is the additive representation just discussed, but much more important in
Anderson's work have been representations of weighted averages. If I understand
him correctly, these representations are axiomatized by the bisymmetric operations
of section 6.4.1, below.
Various techniques, closely allied to analysis of variance methods, are used to
obtain the scales from the category ratings. These methods have been applied to a
wide range of situations, from psychophysics to impressions of personality obtained
from verbal descriptions.
Anderson makes much of the internal consistency he finds when these repre-
sentations are coupled with category scaling, and he criticizes (Anderson, 1970)
another method initiated by Stevens (1957, 1975) and widely used in psycho-
physics. Stevens' magnitude estimation differs from the category methods in that
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the range of possible numerical response is not limited and the subject is asked to
use the numbers so that they reflect the subjective ratios of stimuli. On the face of
it, one would not expect the additive or averaging models to be appropriate to these
instructions, but certain multiplicative representations might be. Because magnitude
methods are very easy to use and, at least in psychophysics, are widely useful and
their detailed properties are becoming better understood (Green and Luce, 1974;
Marks, 1974; Moskowitz et al.• 1974; Stevens, 1971, 1975), they probably should
be given serious consideration by students of factorial situations.
Both the category and magnitude methods have, for factorial designs, the
advantage over the ordering methods in that they provide a numerical scale without
requiring the solution of systems of linear inequalities. All these methods, of
course, have the disadvantage, compared with studying axioms individually, of not
localizing the difficulty when the model fails to fit the data.
A great deal of controversy exists over the relationship between functional and
conjoint measurement - see, for example, the criticism of Anderson (1971) by
Hodges (1973) and Schonemann et al. (1973), with a reply by Anderson (1973).
Roughly, the lines are drawn as follows. Measurement theorists point out that no
qualitative representation theorems are proved in the functional measurement
literature, to which the reply is "What good are such theorems?" The answer is,
first, that direct tests of axioms appear to be more revealing of the failure of a
representation than is fitting it to factorial data, and, second, that the proofs
of the theorems suggest ways to construct representations in nonfactorial situ-
ations. Anderson (1974) points out that his empirical methods go far beyond
anything found in the conjoint measurement literature. They suggest a substantive
hypothesis that, if true, is important; this hypothesis holds that particular data
collection procedures yield the representation directly without further trans-
formation and that techniques of the analysis of variance can be employed to cope
with error. Moreover, he and his colleagues have collected far more data than all
the measurement theorists put together, and these data do not support the additive
representation that has been so much the focus of conjoint measurement. The
measurement theorists have had little to say in reply, although they have informally
criticized specific studies (complaining, for example, that the dynamic ranges used
in the psychophysical studies are too narrow to test his methods rigorously). In my
view, the methods are largely complementary, not competitive.
6.2.4 UNIFORM SYSTEMS AND INDIFFERENCE CURVES
In the special, but important, case when there are numerical measures (often
physical, but not always) on A and P that agree with ~A and ~p, respectively,
the problem can be recast in terms of indifference curves in the plane. In fact,
the additive case is equivalent to finding transformations of the two given scales
so that the indifference curves become straight lines with slopes -1. When one
has all possible indifference curves in the plane, the theory of webs provides the
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solution (Blaschke and Bol, 1938; Aczel et al., 1960; Havel, 1966; Rad6, 1960,
1965). However, in practice, one usually has only a finite amount of information
about each of a finite number of curves. By reasonable interpolation, one can
replace this situation by a situation in which one knows a finite number of in-
difference curves completely. Note that this situation is not exactly like the in-
finite one, where one develops standard sequences, and it is certainly different from
the finite factorial one. Levine (1970, 1972) has studied such systems and general-
izations of them; some of his results are summarized by Krantz et al. (1971, section
6.7). Roughly, one constructs from any two given indifference curves F and G
another curve of the form F-I G, and these curves can be transformed into the
additive form if and only if none of the original curves nor any generated recur-
sively by forming F-I G intersect.
Levine (l975a, b) has been developing computer methods, based heavily on the
group theoretic character of his theorems, to make the search for additive (and
other) representations practical. He is applying these techniques to latent trace
models for test theory.
6.3 NONADDITIVE REPRESENTATIONS
Since even the additive case is far from fully understood, we can anticipate only
partial results in nonadditive cases. Again, we must distinguish between the in-
finite and finite situations. As the results in the finite case are quite abstract (see
section 9.5 of Krantz et al., 1971), and since they have not, to my knowledge,
been applied, I will not summarize them. So we deal with the infinite case.
Recall that a structure of the form (x 1= IA j ,(:) is decomposable if and only
if there are real-valued mappings cJ>j on Ai and a real-valued function F of n real
variables such that
It is monotonically decomposable if, in addition, F is strictly monotonic in each
of its arguments. Krantz et al. (1971, section 7.2) give necessary and sufficient
conditions for the existence of such a monotonically decomposable representa-
tion: (: must be a weak ordering, the equivalence classes of A = x 1= IA j under
(: must have a countable order-dense subset (i.e., a countable set B such that
between any two distinct elements of A there is an element from B), and each
Ai must be independent of the remaining components in the sense that for each i
if and only if
(b l , •.• , b j _ 1 ,a, bi +1 , •.• ,bn ) (: (b l , .•. ,b j _ 1 ,b, bi + 1 , ... , bn ).
157
Expressed verbally, the ordering established on A, is independent of the flXed
choices on the remaining components.
This result is less than satisfactory in two ways. It involves an awkward second·
order axiom, namely, the existence of a countable order-dense subset, and it
provides no insight into constructing the representation. For the case of two
components, Narens and Luce (1975) drop the countability requirement, and
they show how to reduce the construction of the representation to that of a non·
associative concatenation structure. Moreover, they work with a local (not con·
nected) ordering, which is sometimes useful. In the special case of a weak ordering,
their axioms are essentially those of the additive case, minus the Thomson con-
dition plus density: weak ordering, independence, nontrivialness, solvability,
density, and an Archimedean property. Using the same defmition of 0 A as in the
additive case, they show that <A, C::A , 0 A) is a positive concatenation structure
that is associative only if the Thomson condition holds. Thus, the problem of
constructing the representation is reduced to that of constructing one for the
operation 0 A . This is by no means generally understood.
More specialized results of Krantz (1968), Krantz and Tversky (1971) (summa-
rized in sections 7.3-7.4 of Krantz et al., 1971), and Falmagne (1973) hold for
simple polynomial representations. A simple polynomial is defmed inductively as
one for which the variables can be partitioned into two sets such that the given
polynomial is either the sum or the product of simple polynomials on the two
sets. For example, (4)1 +4>2)4>34>4 is simple, but 4>14>2 +4>24>3 +4>14>3 is not.
One can, in the presence of solvability conditions, work out necessary properties
that permit distinction among these cases. These properties, which are too com·
plex to state here, pennit one to search for additivity, 4>1 + 4>2 ; multiplicativity,
4>14>2 ; and various types of cancellation properties that arise from the distributive
property 4>1 (4)2 + 4>3) == 4>14>2 + 4>14>3. The models have been worked out in
detail for n == 3, where the four simple polynomials are
4>1 + 4>2 + 4>3,4>14>24>3,4>1 (4)2 + 4>3)' and 4>14>2 + 4>3 ,
plus pennutations on the indices of the last two. Some applications of these
methods are described below.
A general discussion of polynomial measurement in the finite case is given by
Tversky (1967a) (see section 9.5 of Krantz et aI., 1971); Richter (1975) has reo
solved a conjecture on the conditions under which systems ofpolynomial inequalities
have a solution.
6.4 RELATIONS TO OTHER FORMS OF MEASUREMENT
Conjoint measurement has proved more useful at a theoretical level than at an
empirical one. It is not that we lack empirical applications - see section 6.5 - but
that applications of conjoint measurement to theoretical problems have provided
deeper insight than have the empirical applications. Three applications are described
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in this section, and another has been described in the preceding section - namely,
a fairly general case where conjoint structures reduce to nonassociative positive
concatenation structures; our first example below is its converse.
6.4.1 CONCATENATION STRUCTURES
Classical physics exhibits two quite different kinds of binary operations - exten-
sive ones, such as juxtaposition of rods for length or set theoretic union for mass;
and intensive ones, such as temperature and density. The former are positive
in the sense that a 0 b >- a, b and also associative, whereas the latter are intern in
the sense that if a >- b, then a >- a 0 b >- b. If we drop all three special properties,
we have what are called concatenation structures.
Assume that the structure (A,~, 0) satisfies the following properties:
~ is a nontrivial weak order; Le., for some a, b in A, a >- b.
Monotonicity: a Cb iff a 0 c Cb 0 c iff c 0 a (:::; cob.
Restricted solvability: if b 0 c (:::; a (:::; b 0 c, then there are b in A such that
b 0 c ~ a (the parallel statement on the right is also true).
Archimedean property: let standard sequence aj satisfy aj 0 p ~ aj+1 0 q or
p 0 aj ~ q 0 ai+l for some p and q, then every bounded standard sequence is
fmite.
If C' on A x A is defined by
(a,b)~'(c,d)iffaob~cOd,
then it can be shown (see Krantz et al., 1971, section 6.101) that the conjoint
structure (A x A, C') satisfies the requirements for weak ordering, independence,
restricted solvability, the Archimedean property, and nontrivia1ness. Moreover,
if we add the important property of bisymmetry,
(a 0 b) 0 (c 0 d) ~ (a 0 c) 0 (b 0 d),
then ~'satisfies double cancellation. In the latter case, we can use the additive
conjoint representation and prove there is an order-preserving representation ¢
and constants J1 >- 0, v >- 0, Asuch that
¢(a 0 b) = J1¢(a) + v¢(b) + A.
Additional properties on 0 place restrictions on the constants:
If a 0 a ~ a, as in the intensive case, J1 + v = 1 and A = O.
If 0 is commutative, i.e., a 0 b ~ bOa, then J1 = v.
If 0 is associative and commutative, as in the extensive case, J1 = v = 1 and, with
no loss of generality, A= O.
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Narens and Luce (I975) have shown that there is a complementary relation
between one general class of intensive structures and nonassociative, positive
concatenation structures with half elements.
6.4.2 CONDITIONAL EXPECTED UTILITY
In an attempt to overcome some of the criticisms of Savage's (I 954) important
axiomatization of subjective expected utility, Luce and Krantz (1971) (see Krantz
et al., 1971, Chapter 8) axiomatized a notion of conditional decisions. One may
think of their formulation as based on an algebra ~ of events, a family j) of con-
ditional decisions that can be written fA , where A is in & (this suggests that fA is a
function from A into some set of consequences, which is one interpretation of the
model), and an ordering C:; of j). One of their key assumptions, and one that has
been strongly criticized by Balch (1974), Balch and Fishburn (1974), and Fishburn
(I974) and defended by Krantz and Luce (I974), is that g) is closed under unions
of decisions on disjoint events and under restrictions to nonempty subevents. The
axioms, too complex to restate here, are sufficient to show that a real-valued
function u exists on g) that is order-preserving and a probability measure P exists
on & such that for A, B in &with A () B = rf> and fA, gB in g),
This is the conditional expected utility property.
No attempt is made here to outline the proof, but it involves looking at all the
decisions on triples of mutually disjoint events, showing that these are additive
conjoint structures, and using the uniqueness theorem for such structures to intro-
duce the probability measures. To the extent that such structures are of interest
in decision making (and I think there are good reasons to believe they are consider-
ably more satisfactory than Savage's system), conjoint measurement has been put
to important use.
6.4.3 ALGEBRA OF PHYSICAL QUANTITIES
Physical measures exhibit two quite different numerical structures; some involve
an operation that satisfies the axioms of ·~xtensive (or more general) concatena-
tion measurement, and some triples of measures are related by equations of the
form
where some or all of x, y, and z are extensive measures. In the latter case, it is
clear that the ordering induced by z on the structure of (x, y) pairs must satisfy
the axioms of additive conjoint measurement. So, again, we see that this algebra
must play a role in a qualitative development of the measurement underpinnings
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of physical measures. The main problems in building such a theory are, first, to
formulate the qualitative interlock between the extensive and conjoint structures
and, second, to characterize the exponents a and 13. Krantz et al. (l971, Chapter
10) have made an attempt to do this, based primarily on the work of Luce (l965).
An improved version is provided by Narens and Luce (l975), and it is outlined
here.
Basically, there are two cases to be considered. Suppose that (A x p. C:: > is a
conjoint structure satisfying independence and that there is either an operation
°A on A (or op on P) or an operation ° on A x P. In the former case we assume
the following distribution condition:
if (a, p) ~ (c. q) and (b. p) ~ (d. q), then (a °b. p) ~ (c °d, q).
In the latter case, distribution takes the form
(a, p) ° (b, p) ~ (c. p) iff (a, q) ° (b, q) ~ (c, q).
This permits us to define °A by
aOAb = ciffor some p, hence for any p, (a, p) ° (b, p) ~ (c, p),
and this operation satisfies the first condition. What Narens and Luce prove is that,
under solvability conditions, if °A is an extensive operation with an additive
representation I/>A, then there is a scale I/>~ on P such that I/>A I/>~ is order-preserving.
Thus, distributivity coupled with extensiveness forces the conjoint structure to be
additive. If, in addition, op exists and is extensive with an additive representation I/>p,
then there are constants a, 13 such that 1/><;" qJJ, is order-preserving.
Because of the uniqueness of additive conjoint measurement, only the value of
a/13 is of significance. To characterize its value, one need only state the exchange
relation between concatenations on the two factors as fol1ows: there are positive
integers m and n such that for all a in A and pin P, either
or
(2m a. 2np) ~ (a, p).
Under these conditions, la/131 = n/m. Such statements are easily derived from the
representation.
In addition to laws of exchange, one must also consider cases where there is
an operation ° on A x P and °A on A. In such cases, the corresponding laws,
called laws of similitude, take the form either
or
Krantz et al. (l971, section 10.9) show how a family of physical attributes -
some of which are extensive and some triples of which are related, as above, either
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by laws of exchange or similitude - can be represented, in essence, as a multiplica-
tive vector space with a finite basis of extensive quantities. This is the model of
physical measures usually assumed in dimensional analysis. Thus, this theory
appears to serve as the qualitative basis for physical measurement - at least in the
classical case.
But there is still at least one vexing problem: the interplay of measures in
relativistic and quantum physics. The most striking exception to the distribution
property is provided by relativistic velocity. Let D = V x T denote distances
formed by pairing velocities with times - all qualitative. Let C:; be the usual order-
ing of distances. Let 0D, 0v, and 0T be the usual concatenations of distance, of
velocity (frames of references), and of times. And let Q>D, Q>v, Q>T be the usual
numerical measures of distance, velocity, and time. Then, even though <V, C::v, 0v)
is an extensive structure, the representation is:
Q>D(V, t)
Q>D [(v, t) 0D(V', t')]
Q>T(tOTt')
Q>v(V) Q>T(t)
Q>D(V, t) + Q>D(V', t')
Q>T(t) + Q>T(t')
Q>v(v) + Q>v(v')
1 + Q>v(v) Q>v(v')
Q>V(C)2
where c denotes the velocity of light moving in a vacuum. In this case, 0v does not
satisfy the distributivity condition.
Although the velocity formula has been given qualitative expression by Luce and
Narens (In press), it is not really satisfactory for the construction of the algebra of
physical quantities. An appropriate analogue to the distributive property is needed.
In summary, it is evident that the concepts of conjoint measurement are essen-
tial to a qualitative understanding of the algebra of physical measurement. The
difficult problem that remains is to establish the qualitative connection between
the extensive and conjoint structures that fail to satisfy distributivity. It is worth
noting that, when confronted with this problem, physicists retain the multiplicative
representation of the conjoint structure and abandon the additive representation of
the extensive one. This is not exactly what one would have anticipated from the
emphasis placed by philosophers of physics (e.g., Campbell, 1920; Nagel, 1961) on
the additive representation of extensive structures.
6.4.4 MEANINGFULNESS AND DIMENSIONAL INVARIANCE
Dimensional analysis works when one both knows all of the relevant variables and
assumes that the law relating them is dimensionally invariant. Roughly, this means
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that changes in the units of measurement do not alter the mathematical form of
the law. More exactly, it means that the law is some unknown function of one
or more products of powers of subsets of the variables, where each of the products
is dimensionless. The question has long been asked why physical and other scientific
laws should exhibit this property (see Chapter 10 of Krantz et al., 1971, for a
detailed discussion).
Apparently independent of that discussion, another one in the measurement
literature has concerned which statements, framed entirely in terms of a single
dimension, can be considered meaningful. For example, it is agreed that it is mean-
ingful to say that one mass is ten times as heavy as another, but that it is not mean-
ingful to say that today's temperature is 10% less than yesterday's. The consensus
(see Pfanzagl, 1971) is that a statement is meaningful if and only if it is invariant
under the group of transformations describing the uniqueness of the scale. Clearly,
this criterion is the natural analogue of dimensional invariance when there is only
one dimension.
In both cases one can raise the question of what in the underlying qualitative
structure corresponds to a meaningful statement or to a dimensionally invariant
one. Recently (Luce, 1976), I have shown that there is a simple answer. Intuitively,
a relation in a qualitative relational structure is meaningful if it can be expressed
in terms of the relations that define the structure. This is given formal meaning
as follows: By an automorphism of the structure one means any one-to-one trans-
formation of the elements that leaves the defining relations invariant. Another
relation is then said to be meaningful within a structure if and only if it does not
further reduce the set of automorphisms, i.e., it is also invariant under the auto-
morphisms of the structure. It is easy to see that this corresponds exactly to the
usual defmition of meaningfulness in terms of scales of measurement; it is some-
what more interesting to show in the case of the construction underlying the algebra
of physical quantities how it corresponds exactly to dimensional invariance.
6.5 EMPIRICAL APPLICATIONS
It is widely felt that there have been fewer applications of conjoint measurement
to date than might be expected from the interest in the theory. There are probably
many reasons: difficulty in understanding how the theory and representations
relate, doubts about what sort of design is best suited to testing the model and what
sort is suited to constructing representations, and lack of satisfactory statistical
procedures. Psychologists, for example, have been slow in fully understanding what
sorts of data are needed to reject simple algebraic representations. They have long
recognized that in 2 x 2 factor designs "crossed" data - a violation of indepen-
dence - reject an additive representation. Indeed, as we have seen, a failure of
simple factor independence rejects any monotonically decomposable representa-
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tion. Relatively few understand that to test additivity one should look carefully
into double cancellation, which means at a minimum a 3 x 3 design, or into multi-
ple-factor independence when there are more than two factors. Similarly, the
debates between Hull (1952) and Spence (1956) over the formulation of habit
strength models amount to choices, based on three factors, between two of the four
simple polynomials. It is interesting that in all the years of empirical research on
that problem, it appears that no one conducted an experiment adequate to make
the choice. One should keep in mind examples such as these, and their waste of
effort and resources, when dismissing fundamental measurement theory as an
arcane subject of no empirical value.
Examples will be presented here of various empirical approaches that rest on
additive conjoint techniques, either directly or indirectly, and on techniques for
the simple polynomials. Basically, four approaches have been taken to constructing
the representation: rescaling of a numerical function, construction of a function
using standard sequence techniques, scaling using factorial methods, and testing of
axioms. These three constructions are treated in the next section, and the testing of
axioms is treated in section 6.5.2.
6.5.1 CONSTRUCTION OF AN ADDITIVE REPRESENTATION
Scheffe (1959) (see discussion in Krantz et al., 1971, section 6.5.3; and Aczel,
1965) provided a mathematical solution to the following problem: given a numeri-
cal scale <p on A x P, when is there t, <PA, and <pp such that
Explicit expressions for t, <PA, and <pp are known. This is true whenever either t
is given as an explicit mathematical function or it can be approximated numerically.
An example of the former was discussed by Krantz et al. (1971, section 6.4.2):
Campbell and Masterson (1969) had fit factorial data with a function that, when
appropriately transformed, yielded an additive representation.
In principle, the same techniques can be used on data obtained by category or
magnitude methods, although in practice (e.g., Anderson, 1974) it seems to be
more usual to try to fit the data directly to an additive or averaging model. For
example, Feldman and Baird (1971) performed magnitude estimation first on loud-
ness and on brightness separately, finding the usual power functions of physical
intensity, and then on the two jointly. They attempted to fit the resulting responses
by a geometric mean and by an averaging model based on the functions for the two
modalities separately, and the averaging model fit reasonably well.
Although standard sequences are the major theoretical device in constructing
additive representations, it seems that only one psychological study has employed
it. Levelt et al. (1972) used the technique to study loudness summation over the
two ears. The stimuli were pairs of intensities of a lOOO-Hz tone, with different
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intensities directed at each ear. Two such stimuli would be presented with only a
short time between them, and the subject was asked either to order them by
loudness or to modify one of the intensities until a loudness match was achieved.
It was found that an additive representation seemed adequate and that the func-
tions rfJL and rfJR (for the left and right ears) were approximately power functions
of physical intensity with exponents comparable to those found using magnitude
methods. This result is both satisfying and disqUieting. It is satisfying because the
growth of loudness is comparable to that found by other methods and because
additivity across the ears is so simple. It is disquieting because there are other
reasons, among them physiological evidence for crossovers between the ears, to
doubt the additivity ofloudness. This is treated further in section 6.7.
Perhaps the most congenial approach to conjoint measurement for many social
scientists, especially those heavily influenced by analysis-of·variance designs, is
the factorial approach. For example, Tversky (1 967b) used the method to study
the expected utility model in which subjects chose between gambles in which a
desired consequence occurred with some probability and nothing occurred with the
complementary probability. If the utility of nothing is assumed to be zero, then if
c is the consequence and A is the chance event, the subjective expected utility
hypothesis (SED) becomes u(c) peA), which is an additive (under a logarithmic
transformation) conjoint representation. Tversky's data, derived from work with
prisoners, involved cigarettes and candy as consequences. Additive solutions, using
the Tversky and Zivian (1966) program, were found to fit the data well. (For de-
tails, see Tversky, 1967b, or Krantz et al., 1971, section 9.4.2.)
The most disturbing aspect of these data, from the point of view of an expected
utility theorist, is that if one demands that the probability measure be additive
in the sense that peA) + peA) = 1, then it is impossible to demand also that the
utility functions obtained from two different procedures, one involving only
gambles and the other pure consequences, be the same.
Since 1971, P.E. Green and his associates (Green and Rao, 1971; Green, 1974;
Green and Devita, 1974; and Green and Wind, 1975) have been advocating and
illustrating the use of the factorial conjoint measurement in various marketing
contexts. It remains to be seen whether it will prove sufficiently useful to warrant
general adoption.
It is perhaps worth noting here that the techniques of Anderson and his students
(for surveys, see Anderson, 1970, 1971, 1974) can be viewed as a program of fitting
additive and averaging models to factorial data. The major differences from the
techniques so far discussed appear to be that Anderson tends to treat the numerical
responses as the scale to be used in testing a representation, that he uses analysis-
of-variance techniques on these numbers to decide on the adequacy of the model,
and that he usually uses averaging models.
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6.5.2 TESTING AXIOMS
Although one may sometimes want or need the numerical representation, the
scientific interest is often not in the resulting numbers but in whether we know the
relevant independent factors that underlie the subject's behavior. In such cases,
it is probably wiser to design studies directly aimed at testing particular axioms,
such as independence, double cancellation, or one or another of the distributivity
axioms. Krantz (1972, 1974) makes a strong case for this approach, giving anum·
ber of illustrations.
We consider studies that have focused on the independence property (which,
it will be recalled, implies double cancellation when three or more factors are in-
volved and solvability is satisfied). There is also a literature on transitivity, which
we shall not go into here. Perhaps the best-studied example of independence is the
property known as the extended sure-thing principle of expected utility theory:
if (a, A, b) denotes a gamble in which a is the consequence if event A occurs and b
is the consequence if A occurs, then the extended sure-thing principle (extended
because a may itself be a gamble) is
(a. A, b) C(a', A, b) iff (a, A, b') C (a', A, b').
Ellsberg (1961) focused attention on this property by discussing instances in which
reasonable people feel they would violate it. MacCrimmon (1968) reported about
25 percent failure of the property among middle-rank business executives confronted
with hypothetical business problems. Becker and Brownson (1974), using graduate
students of business, found a violation rate of nearly 50 percent. MacCrimmon and
Larsson (In press) give a careful analysis of the problem and report an extensive
empirical study in which, again, a substantial proportion of the subjects violate
the extended sure-thing principle. It should be realized how sweeping this con-
clusion is: it not only rejects the SEU model but also invalidates any form of
monotonic decomposition that says preferences can be expressed in the form
F[¢(a, A), ¢(b, A)],
where F is strictly increasing in each argument.
The full significance of this for the study of choices under uncertainty seems not
to have been fully appreciated. For example, a number of studies attacking SED
(Slovic and lichtenstein, 1968; Payne, 1973a, b; Payne and Braunstein, 1971)
have proposed various alternative models that are decomposable and, hence, are
inconsistent with the empirical results cited above.
C.H. Coombs and his students have taken the failures of SEU seriously and have
proposed that our preferences for uncertain situations are heavily influenced by a
concept of risk. In an attempt to gain some understanding of how various aspects
of a gamble affect risk, they have manipulated three factors of gambles and
attempted to decide among the four simple polynomial models using the proce-
dures of Krantz and Tversky (1971). Coombs and Huang (1970) showed that only
the distributive model was supported. Later, however, Coombs and Bowen (1971),
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using closely related gambles in which the odds were changed without varying
either the expected value or variance, showed that risk varied with the odds. This
rejected not only an axiomatization of risk published by Pollatsek and Tversky
(1970) but also the distributive model. The cause of this inconsistency is not
known.
Tversky and Krantz (1969) did a three-factor study of schematic faces that were
varied as follows: long versus wide faces, open versus solid eyes, and straight versus
curved mouths. Subjects judged comparative similarities of pairs. Tests of inde-
pendence were well supported in this case.
A body of literature, typified by the work of Phillips and Edwards (1966) and
Edwards (1968), has focused on how well Bayes' theorem describes human
probabilistic information processing. If we let ~o denote the prior odds of two
hypotheses, HI and H 2 ; ~n the posterior odds after observing n sources of infor-
mation; and L the likelihood ratio of these data having arisen under the two hy-
potheses, we have from Bayes' theorem the additive representation
log ~n = log L + log ~o·
Wallsten (1972) pointed out that in order to understand how the information is
being assimilated, it may be useful to regard this as a conjoint measurement prob-
lem in the subjects' responses. He reported an experiment in which the probability
of the data conditional on each hypothesis, P(D lHi), and the number n of indepen-
dent observations were varied. Using the procedures of assessing three-factor simple
polynomial models outlined by Krantz and Tversky (1971), the distributive model
¢3(n) [¢I (DlHd - ¢2(DIH2)]
was sustained for 8 of 12 subjects. A number of substantive interpretations are
made from the calculated functions. Wallsten [In press (a, b)] and Wallsten and
Sapp (In press) have followed up this work.
6.6 ERROR
In any attempt either to test or to fit a measurement model to data, a major diffi-
culty is error. Everyone is confident that there is some element of inconsistency
in subjects' responses. We know that if we embed a choice in a long series of choices,
we do not necessarily get the same response each time it is presented. Whether this
is due to fatigue, to changes in attitude resulting from previous choices, or to other
sources of variability, we cannot be sure. But whatever the causes, it is clearly
inappropriate to demand exact fits of the model to data or to reject an axiom
every time an apparent failure occurs.
Although we have been well aware of these difficulties from the first tests of
SEU - e.g., those of Mosteller and Nogee (1951) - it is surprising how little has
been done to rectify them. Some probabilistic work on transitivity has been done,
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and some probabilistic choice models have been developed, but within the context
of either concatenation measurement structures or conjoint ones, little has been
done. The most significant breakthrough is the work of Falmagne (1976); it was
motivated by the study of Levelt et al. (1972) and the difficulty they had in
taking into account the statistical nature of the data.
Falmagne assumes that when a subject is asked to solve an equation of the
form
(a, p) ~ (b, q)
for, let us say, b (e.g., these are intensities to the left and right ears and the judg-
ment is equal loudness), then b is really a random variable Vpq(a). He then supposes
that the appropriate additive representation is comparable to the analysis-of-
variance models, namely,
where epq(a) is a random variable with 0 median.
The key property used in the analysis is that if X is a random variable, q; a
strictly increasing function, and M the median operator, then
M[q;(X)] = q;[M(X)] ;
i.e.,M and q; commute. Then, writing
mpq(a) = M[Vpq(a)],
he proves from the representation that the following cancellation property must
hold:
mpr(a) = mpq [mqr(a)] ,
which corresponds to the double cancellation property. A second property, corre-
sponding to transitivity, is commutativity:
mpq [m,..(a)] = mrs [mpq(a)] .
Falmagne shows that if we define e:- on A x P by
(a,p) e:-(b,q)iffmpq(a)~b
and assume that A and P are real intervals, that m is strictly increasing, and that
m satisfies the cancellation and commutativity properties, then e:- is a weak order
that satisfies double cancellation (and so independence because of solvability).
He then outlines methods of testing these two properties using median tests.
So far, only pilot data for loudness summation have been published (Falmagne,
1976); they indicate small but systematic failures in the cancellation property,
suggesting that additivity may not hold strictly. It is, however, much too early to
be sure. Additional data will soon be reported.
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6.7 CONCLUSIONS
It is reasonably clear that the simplest, best-known case of conjoint measurement,
the additive representation, has limited direct application to human decision pro-
cesses (section 6.5). Its main value is, first, in understanding more clearly the
basic measurement structures of physics (sections 6.4.3 and 6.4.4), with the
hope of eventually generalizing that structure to include behavioral and social
science variables, and second, in providing a tool for analyzing the structure and
representation of more complex conjoint structures. Examples of the latter are
the study of certain nonadditive representations (section 6.3) and of conditional
expected utility (section 6.4.2), which is of interest to decision analysts, economists,
and statisticians. One can, therefore, anticipate considerable future work on the
development and empirical testing of somewhat special, but still interesting, non-
additive representations. Experimental tests will continue to be somewhat frustra-
ting until an adequate theory of error is evolved (section 6.6).
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7 Multiattribute Utilities inExpected Utility Theory
Peter C. Fishburn
7.1 INTRODUCTION
This paper is an examination of aspects of the problem of assessing multiattribute
utilities within the context of a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function on a
multiattribute consequence space. Although there are well-known difficulties that
can arise in assessing a utility function on a single attribute, such as net wealth, the
paper will focus on problems that are peculiar to multiattribute situations. Promi-
nent among these are the sheer magnitude of the assessment task that arises in a
multidimensional context and the presence of evaluative interdependencies among
attributes in many multiattribute decision problems.
The theme of the paper - and the aim of most theoretical work in multiattri-
bute utility theory - is the investigation of possibilities for simplifying the task of
multiattribute utility assessment. Accordingly, a large part of the paper will be
devoted to the idea of expressing the n-attribute utility function as some com-
bination of conditional single-attribute utility functions. To this end, a sequence
of increasingly sophisticated independence conditions will be considered, begin-
ning with the concept of value independence among attributes, which is associated
with additive utility functions. Also examined are aspects of the concepts of
utility independence and generalized utility independence, which, in appropriate
combinations, lead to additive, multiplicative, or quasiadditive forms for the
utility function. This is followed by a discussion of the concept of bilateral
independence, which can accommodate more interdependencies among atuibutes
but still allows the utility function to be written in terms of conditional single-
attribute utility functions. The discussion of independence concludes with a
general view of fractional independence that involves numerous special cases,
including utility independence and bilateral independence. The final section, which
is not predicated on any independence conditions, considers the use of conditional
Single-attribute utility functions in constructing approximations of arbitrary n-
attribute utility functions.
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Although I shall comment briefly on aspects of independence condition veri-
fication/negation and on scaling procedures, a much more complete treatment of
these topics along with their theoretical background is provided in the recent book
by Keeney and Raiffa (1976). This work, as well as selected references given later
in the paper, offers detailed coverage of the subject matter reviewed here.
7.2 VON NEUMANN-MORGENSTERN UTILITIES
Although the expected utility theory of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1953)
falls within the Luce and Raiffa (1957) category of decision making under risk,
the ideas presented below can also be applied within their "decision under cer-
tainty" and "decision under uncertainty" categories. In the certainty context, one
usually talks about multiattribute alternatives rather than multiattribute con-
sequences. Although there are a variety of utility assessment techniques in the
certainty context that do not rely on von Neumann-Morgenstern gambles, it is
possible to introduce scaling probabilities into this context and evaluate utilities
of multiattribute alternatives from the perspective of expected utility theory. It
should not be inferred, however, that expected utility methods should be used for
decision making under certainty, but only that they can be used if such use is
believed to be helpfu1. On the other hand, it should be realized that nonprobabilistic
methods for scaling utilities of multiattribute consequences (unique at least up to
an order-preserving transformation) can sometimes be used to advantage in con-
junction with a final gambles-based transfonnation in decision under risk/uncertainty
contexts. I shall not consider these methods in the present review.
With regard to the decision under uncertainty category, it may be noted that
Savage's subjective expected utility theory (Fishburn, 1970b; Savage, 1972), which
does not presume "known probabilities," generates von Neumann-Morgenstern
gambles in a natural way from the derived probability measure on the states of the
world. Hence the developments of later sections apply to the Savage context as well
as to the von Neumann-Morgenstern context.
Throughout the paper, X denotes a generic set of consequences of potential
decisions with the understanding that, if x and yare any two distinct consequences
in X, then they cannot both occur as the result of the decision that is actually made.
In other words, the consequences in X are mutually exclusive. Moreover, it will be
assumed that some consequence in X must result from the decision that is made.
We shall also let P denote the set of all simple probability measures or gambles
on X. Thus each gamble p in P is a nonnegative real-valued function on X such that
p(x) > 0 for, at most, a finite number of consequences in X with the sum of all
p(x) equal to unity. The gamble p is to be thought of as a real or hypothetical
decision alternative that results in consequence x with probability p(x). With
00;;;; A0;;;; 1, the convex combination Ap + (1 - A)q of gambles p and q is the gamble
in P that assigns probability Ap(x) + (1 - A)q(x) to each x in X.
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The von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms (von Neumann and Morgenstern,
1953) can be expressed in terms of a strict preference relation >- on the set of
gambles, with p >- q interpreted as "p is preferred to q." For later use we defIne
the indifference relation ~ on P by p ~ q if and only if neither p >- q nor q >- p.
The relation >- on P is a strict weak order if, for all p, q, rEP, p >- q and q >- p do
not both hold (asymmetry), and either p >- r or r >- q when p >- q (negative
transitivity). If >- is a strict weak order, then ~ is an equivalence since it is then
reflexive (p ~ p), symmetric (if p ~ q, then q ~ p) and transitive (if p ~ q and
q ~ r, then p ~ r). The axioms for >- on P that are used in the following theorem
are taken from Jensen (1967) and Fishburn (1970b). Together, they are equivalent
to each of the axiom systems presented by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1953),
Herstein and Milnor (1953), and Luce and Raiffa (1957).
THEOREM I There is a real-valued function u on X such that
p >- q if and only if r-p(x)u(x) > r-q(x)u(x), for all p, q E P, (7.1)
x x
if, and only if, the following hold for all p, q, rEP:
AXIOM 1 >- on P is a strict weak order.
AXIOM 2 If 0< X< I and p >- q, then Ap + (1 - X)r >- Aq + (1 - X)r.
AXIOM 3 If p >- q and q >- r, then there are Xand J.I. strictly between °and I
such that Ap + (1 - X)r >- q and q >- J.I.P + (1 - J.I.)r.
Axiom 2 is a form of independence axiom that asserts the preservation of
preference under similar convex combinations of gambles, and Axiom 3 is a type
of continuity or Archimedean axiom. Although each axiom has been criticized for
its lack of complete psychological reality (Allais, 1953; Thrall, 1954; wee, 1956;
Fishburn, 1972a, 1976; Siovic and Tversky, 1974), they will be assumed to hold in
ensuing sections, with u satisfying (7.1).
To consider relationships between utility functions on which expected utility
representations such as (7.1) are based, we shall say that v on X is an affine trans-
formation of u on X if there are real numbers a and b such that t(x) = au(x) + b
for all x. This transformation is positive, null, or negative according to whether
a> 0, a = 0, or a < 0. In addition, R* will denote the dual or converse of any
binary relation R, so that, for example, p >-* q if and only if q >- p; and 0 will
denote the empty relation, with >- = 0 if and only if p >- q for no p and q.
THEOREM 2 Suppose (7.1) holds, >- =1= 0, and >-' is a binary relation on P.
Consider the representation
p >-' q if and only if r-p(x)v(x) > r-q(x)v(x), for all p, q E P. (7.2)
x x
If >-' = >-, then (7.2) holds if and only if v is a positive affme transformation of
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u; if >-' =: 0, then (7.2) holds if and only if v is a null affine transformation of u ;
if >-' =: >- * then (7.2) holds if and only if v is a negative affine transformation of
u. Moreover, if (7.2) holds and v is an affine transformation of U, then >-' equals
>- , 0 or >-*, according to whether the transformation is positive, null, or negative.
The >-' = >- part of Theorem 2 is alternatively expressed by saying that a von
Neumann-Morgenstern utility function u is unique up to a positive affine (or
positive linear) transformation, or that u is unique up to the choice of origin and
scale unit, or that u is measured on an interval scale (Stevens, 1946).
7.2.1 A STANDARD SCALING PROCESS
A common process for scaling u begins with the choice of consequences Xl and
xo, with Xl preferred to Xo [strictly speaking, p >-q when p(x l ) = q(x~ = 1] . These
are assigned utility values that satisfy u(x l ) > u(x~ and that set the origin and
scale unit for u. For convenience, u(x~ = 0 and u(x l ) = 1 are often used. Then, if
consequence X lies between Xo and Xl in preference, one estimates the probability
Q at which X is indifferent to p when p(x l ) = Qand p(x~ = 1 - Q, and, using (7.1),
one obtains u(x) = au(x l ) + (1 - Q)u(XO). If x is preferred to Xl or if XO is pre-
ferred to x, u(x) is determined from (1) in a similar manner by comparing the inter-
mediate consequence to gambles that involve the other two consequences.
Despite the apparent simplicity of this process, there can be many difficulties.
First, it seems unlikely that one could identify a unique probability at which a
gamble between two consequences is indifferent to an intermediate consequence.
More likely, there will be a zone of indifference; for example, when Xl >- X >- XO
and p(x l ) = Q and p(x~ = 1 - Q, an individual may be undecided about whether
he prefers X to p or p to X for a number of different values of Q. This phenomenon
is associated with the notion of nontransitive indifference discussed by Luce (1956)
and Fishburn (1970a), among others. Second, the choice of ftxed points XO and Xl
may affect the estimated u, in which case the process is subject to an anchoring
effect (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). Third, X may be very large or even inftnite,
in which case it is not possible to apply the process to all consequences in X.
These difficulties, which are present when X is unidimensional - a set of
monetary values, for example - can be compounded when the consequences are
complex entities composed of a number of aspects, characteristics, or attributes.
It is therefore desirable to consider possible ways of simplifying the task of utility
function assessment in multiattribute situations, and this is what we shall do in the
rest of the paper.
7.2.2 MULTiATTRIBUTE CONSEQUENCES
Henceforth we shall view X as a subset of the Cartesian product of n other sets
Xl> X 2, ••• ,Xn . Thus X ~ Xl X X 2 X ••• X Xn , where the product is the set of all
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n-tuples (Xl, X2,' •. , x n ) for which Xi E Xi (i = 1, ... , n). The Xi are factor sets, at-
tributes, or whatever it seems appropriate to call them. For X = (Xl ,X2,"" xn ) in
X, Xi is the value or level of attribute Xi (or of the ith attribute) for consequence x.
In some cases the consequences in X present themselves in a natural multi-
attribute form with a natural order for the subscripts of the Xi' For example, if
consequences are n-period income streams, then it is natural to take Xi as the set
of potential incomes in period i. However, it is usually true that the consequences
are not in a natural multiattribute form. Then it is necessary to identify the most
important aspects of the consequences and to structure the Xi accordingly. In this
case, the subscripts of the Xi are chosen by convention rather than by a natural
ordering. The initially unstructured situation can, of course, be recast into a multi-
attribute formulation in many ways, and some effort is required to obtain a formu-
lation that reflects the most important features of the consequences.
During the formulation process, a consequence X is mapped into an n-tuple
(X"X2" .• ,xn ) that, strictly speaking, is not identical to x. However, we shall
write X = (Xl, X2, ... , X n ), with the understanding that X in this usage is a reformu-
lated consequence that is identified by the indicated n-tuple. Moreover, even
though some elements in the set Xl x X 2 X ••• X X n may correspond to no actual
consequence, it will be assumed that all elements in the product set can be evaluated
by the decision maker, and we shall therefore take
(7.3)
in ensuing sections. Theoretical complications that arise when X is allowed to be
an arbitrary subset of the product set are discussed by Fishburn (I 971, 1976).
It will also be assumed that each Xi is essential in the sense that for some fIXed
values of the other n - 1 attributes there are x? and xl in Xi such that (x" ... ,XI-I'
xl, Xi+b ... ,xn ) is preferred to (x" ... ,Xi-b x?, Xi+b ... ,xn ). Beyond this, each
attribute could have a variety of forms that surely affect scaling procedures for u
and may affect some theoretical considerations. For example, Xi might be a two-
element set such as {no, yes} or {O, 1}, with 0 and 1 indicating that a consequence
does not or does satisfy a certain objective (Churchman and Ackoff, 1954), have a
specified aspect (Tversky, 1972), or indicate inclusion of a specified project. The
elements in Xi might be nonnumerical; Xi might be an interval of real numbers or
a convex subset of a fmite-dimensional Euclidean space; and so forth. In addition,
the various Xi may be essentially similar, as in the income stream example, or they
may be very different, which is usually the case in an initially unstructured situation.
Although many of the developments in ensuing sections depend in no way on the
specific structure of the attributes, other results or scaling procedures are tied to
particular structural assumptions, and, when this is true, it will be noted explicitly.
7.3 ADDITIVE UTILITIES AND VALUE INDEPENDENCE
Given (7.1) and (7.3), u is additive in the attributes if and only if there are
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real-valued functions Uh U2, ... , Un on X b X 2, ... , X n, respectively, such that
U(XhX2' ... ,xn) = UI(XI) + U2(X2) + ... + un(xn)
for all x EX. (7.4)
Debreu (1960) and Luce and Tukey (1964) identified axioms on preferences that
imply (7.4) in a nonprobabilistic setting. The first axiomatizations for additive
utilities in the context of (7.1) were provided by Fishburn (1965) and Pollak
(1967).
For each i let Pi denote the set of gambles on Xi, and for a gamble P in P let
PhP2, ... ,Pn be its marginal gambles on X h X 2, ... ,Xn, respectively. Thus, if
P(Xb X2)=P(YhY2) = 1/2 for n=2, then PI(XI)=PI(YI) = 1/2 with PIEPh
and P2(X2) = P2(Y2) = 1/2 with P2 E P2. Exactly the same marginal gambles are
obtained from q in P when q(x h Y2) = q(y h X2) = 1/2 even though P and q are
very different. For example, if the consequences are two-period income streams
(Xh x~ with Xi the income in period i, let
p($10,000, $10,000) = p($20,000, $20,000) = 1/2,
q($lO,OOO, $20,000) = q($20,000, $10,000) = 1/2.
Then PI = ql and P2 = q2. Some people would prefer q to P since q guarantees
$20,000 in some period, whereas there is a 50 percent chance of getting only
$10,000 in both periods under p. A general form of such behavior is called multi-
variate risk aversion by Richard (1975) and conservatism by Fishburn (1975). On
the other hand, P >- q shows evidence of multivariate risk seeking. As we shall see
momentarily, neither type of behavior satisfies (7.4). For (7.4) to hold, it must be
true that P and q are indifferent.
7.3.1 VALUE INDEPENDENCE
Additive utilities are implied by a condition of value independence that says that
the relative preference of a gamble depends only on its marginal gambles on the
attributes and not on the way in which the attribute values are combined to form
consequences.
DEFINITION 1 The attributes are value independent if and only if P ~ q
whenever P and q are gambles in P whose marginal gambles Ph ... , Pn and
qh··· ,qn satisfy Pi =qi for i= 1, ... ,n.
Actually, as noted by Fishburn (1965) and Raiffa (1969), a simplified condition,
which uses only 50-50 gambles and employs an arbitrary fixed consequence XO =
(xY • ... , x~), is equivalent to value independence in the context of (7.1) and (7.3).
LEMMA 1 The attributes are value independent if and only if the 50-50
gamble between XO and x is indifferent to the 50-50 gamble between Y and z
178
whenever x, y, and z are consequences for which x 1=xo and {x?,Xj} == {yj, zJ
fori== I, ... ,no
The condition in Lemma I is useful for testing the validity of value indepen-
dence. In doing this, the fixed consequence XO can be chosen in any convenient
manner. As suggested above, value independence will often be invalid in an income
stream context, and it may well be invalid in most situations where the attractive-
ness of an attribute's value depends critically on the values or levels of the other
attributes. For example, if one prefers red wine to white wine with roast beef but
white wine to red wine with fish, then the different classes of items on the menu
cannot be value independent. In a controlled experiment involving several two-
attribute situations (e.g., careers versus salaries, destination versus mode of trans-
portation) Delbeke and Fauville (1974) concluded that most subjects violated the
requirements of value independence. Nevertheless, in those situations where it
holds, or holds approximately, it leads to a significant simplification of the task of
utility measurement.
THEOREM 3 There are real-valued functions UI> U2, ... ,Un on the attributes
that satisfy (7.4) if, and only if, the attributes are value independent. Given (7.4)
and an affine transformation v == au + b, a> 0, real-valued functions vI> V2, ... , vn
on the attributes satisfy
V(XI, X2, ... , x n) == VI(XI) + V2(X2) + ... + vn(xn), for all x EX,
if and only if there are numbers b I, b 2 , ••• , bn such that b == b 1 + ... + bn and
Vj(Xj) == aUj(xj) + b j for all Xj E X j ; i == 1, ... , n.
Thus, value independence is both necessary and sufficient for additive utilities.
Moreover, the scale units of the Uj functions are invariant with respect to one
another. That is, if (7.4) holds and the Uj are aligned or scaled properly, and if one
Uj is changed by multiplying it by a positive constant, then all other Uj must be
multiplied by the same constant. In this connection it should be noted that the
weighted additive form
U(XI>X2, ... ,xn) == WIU'I(XI) + W2U~(X2) + ... + wnu~(xn), (7.5)
in which the Wj are positive numbers or "weights," is neither more nor less general
than (7.4). If both (7.4) and (7.5) hold, then Theorem 3 says that WjU;(xa = Uj(Xj)
+ b j for each i, with ~bi = O.
Many of the procedures outlined by Fishburn (1967b) for estimating the Uj
when (7.4) holds are designed for specific attribute structures such as those men-
tioned at the end of section 7.2. One class of methods uses the following approach.
First, select xl and x? for each i with xl preferred to x? and, as allowed by The-
orem 3, set the origin for each Uj by taking Uj(x?) = O. Suppose, for definiteness,
that (xl , x~, ... ,x~) C:: (x~ , x~, xg, ... , x~) C:: (x~ , x~, x~, x~, ... ,x~) ~ ...
>-: (x~, ... ,x~ -I> x~) >- XO == (x~, ... , x~), where ~ means "is preferred or
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indifferent to." To provide a base scale unit, set uI(xl) = 1. Then uj(xl) = (Xj when
(x~, ... ,X?_l,Xf,X?+I"" ,x~) is indifferent to the gamble that gives (xLx~, ... ,
x~) with. probability (Xj and XO with probability 1 - (Xj. Each Uj, which is specified by
Uj(Xj) = u(x~"",x?_i>Xj,X?+l""'X~) forallxjEXj, (7.6)
can then be fIlled out, either separately or by the use of tradeoff curves or by some
other method. The resultant Ui are then in the form required by (7.4). The same
result is obtained in the context of (7.5) if we set u;(xl) = 1 and u;(x?) = 0 for all
i and let WI = 1 and Wj = (Xj for each i> I, with Uj = WjU;. Because distortions of
additivity or value independence are most likely to occur for extreme values of the
attributes, it may be advisable to use x? and xl values that are not close to the
worst and best attribute values (if such exist) when additivity is being used as an
approximation for a more complex state of affairs.
7.3.2 INTERDEPENDENT ADDITIVITY
When the attributes are not value independent, there may still be a form of value
independence among subsets of attributes that mayor may not overlap. For
example, if n = 3 and if P - q whenever the marginal gambles of P and q on X I X X 2
are equal and the marginal gambles of P and q on X 2 x X 3 are equal, then U can be
written as
U(Xi> X2,X3) = UI2(XI,X2) + U23(X2,X3)'
Although this interdependent additive form is not as simple as (7.4), it does allow
some simplification in the assessment of u.
To generalize the value independence notion, let XI be the product of the X j for
all i in a nonempty subset I of {I, ... , n}, and let PI be the set of all gambles
defined on XI' For pEP, PI is the marginal gamble of P on XI' Thus if1= {1, 3}
and n = 3 with P(XbX2,X3) = 1/4 and P(Yi>Y2,Y3) = 3/4, then PI(Xi>X3) = 1/4
and PI(YI,Y3) = 3/4. The list of the Xj for iEI from xEX is XIEXI; hence
PI(XI) = 1/4 and piYI) = 3/4 in the preceding example. Now suppose that {Ii>
12 , ••• ,1m } is a collection of nonempty subsets of {I, ... , n} whose union equals
{I, ... , n}. We then say that the XI.U = I, ... , m) are value independent if and
I
only if P - q whenever Plj = qlj for i = I, ... , m. With {Ii> ... ,1m } as described
here, it can be proved that there are real-valued functions UI" ... ,Ul
m
on XI"
... , X lm such that
U(Xl""'Xn ) = udXd+"'+UI (XI)' forallxEX, (7.7)11m m
if and only if the Xlj are value independent. Fishburn (1967a, 1971) discusses
interdependent additivity and proofs of representations such as (7.7).
Even when the attributes are not value independent, (7.7) may hold for a
collection {Ib' .. ,1m } of mutually disjoint subsets of {I, ... , n}. For example,
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the attributes might fall into several natural categories that exhibit value indepen-
dence among themselves. Then, since the I j are disjoint, we can work with each UIj
separately to make an overall assessment of u, taking care to scale the several UI'
J
in a manner consistent with (7.7) when they are considered together.
7.4 UTILITY INDEPENDENCE
At about the same time that value independence was developed as a formal condi-
tion in multiattribute utility theory, a related but distinctly different independence
concept was being developed and explored by Pollak (1967), Raiffa (1969), Meyer
(1970), and Keeney (1968, 1971, 1972b). This alternative concept, which is an
extension of independence axioms used in nonprobabilistic additive conjoint
measurement (Debreu, 1960; Luce and Tukey, 1964) is concerned with situations
in which a preference order over the (marginal) gambles defined on a subset of
attributes that is conditioned on fixed values of the other attributes is indepen-
dent of those fixed values. This type of independence is referred to hereafter as
utility independence. For example, with X = XI X X 2 and PI the set of all gambles
on Xl> let >- x, be the decision maker's preference order on PI when the value of
X 2 is fixed at X2. Strictly speaking, PI>-x,ql if and only if P >-q when Pi and qj
are the marginals of P and q on Xi and P2(X2) = q2(X2) = I. Then XI is said to be
utility independent of X 2 if >- x, = >- y, for all X2 and Y 2 in X 2'
Utility independence always involves a relationship between two complementary
subsets of attributes. For I £. {I, ... , n}, we let I C denote the complement of I
relative to {I, ... , n}, so that I and I C are mutually disjoint with union {I, ... , n}.
Consequence x = (Xl> ... , x n ) will be written as (XI> XIC) where XI E XI is the list
of Xi for iEI and XIc EXIc is the list of Xi for iElc. Ifn = 4 andI= {I, 3}then
(XI> XIC) = [(Xl. X3), (X2' X4)] . When I is a nonempty proper subset of {I, ... , n}
and when wE XIc, we define >- w on PI by
PI>-wqI if and only if p>-q when PIC(W) = qIC(W) = 1. (7.8)
Thus >- w is the conditional preference order on PI, being conditioned on the fixed
values of attributes in I C as denoted by w.
DEFINITION 2 Let I be a nonempty proper subset of {I, ... , n}. Then XI
is utility independent of XIc if and only if the conditional orders >- wand >- z on
PI are identical for every pair of W and z in XIc.
A few aspects of this definition deserve brief comment. First, if the attributes
are value independent, then XI is utility independent of XIc for every appropriate I.
The converse implication is not true. Second, if XI is utility independent of XIc,
then XIc need not be utility independent of XI' Third, if the Xi are sets of real
numbers and if preferences on the consequences increase monotonically in each
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attribute, it does not follow that any XI is utility independent of its complementary
X IC' The reason for this is that utility independence involves orderings on gambles
and not just on consequences. However, if the conditional preference orders on
XI are not identical for any two wand z in Xlc, then XI cannot be utility indepen.
dent of Xlc. For example, in the wine-beef-fish example cited above, XI cannot
be utility independent of Xlc if I includes the beverage attribute and I C includes
the main course attribute since a reversal in wine preferences occurs when the main
course is changed from beef to fish.
There is, however, a generalized notion of utility independence that can accom·
modate reversals in conditional preferences to a limited extent. Its definition, based
on work by Fishburn (1974) and Fishburn and Keeney (1974, 1975), uses the
notions of dual and empty binary relations as defined just before Theorem 2.
DEFINITION 3 Let I be a nonempty proper subset of {I, ... ,n}, and let w
be any element in Xlc for which >- w on PI is not empty. Then XI is generalized
utility independent of Xlc if and only if >-z on PI equals one of >-w, >-: and 0
for each z E Xlc.
The effect of utility independence or of generalized utility independence on U
follows immediately from Theorem 2 when P and X are replaced by PI and XI'
THEOREM 4 Suppose XI is generalized utility independent of Xlc, and WO is
a fixed element in Xlc with >- W O *' 0. Then there are real-valued functions f and
°g on Xlc such that
U(XI, w) = few) + g(W)U(XI' w~ for all XI E XI and all wE Xlc,
with f(w~ = 0, g(w~ = 1, g(w) >0 if >-w = >-wo, g(w) = 0 if>- w= 0, and g(w)
< 0 if >-w = >-;:0. Moreover, if XI is utility independent of Xlc then g(w) >0 for
all wEXlc.
The three cases of >-w equal to >-w O , 0, and >-;: ° correspond respectively to
u(', w) being a positive, null, and negative affine transformation of u(', w~. Under
generalized utility independence, the conditional utility functions u(·, w) on XI
are all related to one another by affine transformations.
7.4.1 COMBINATIONS OF UTILITY INDEPENDENCE
Theorem 4 is used as a point of departure for examining the effects on U of com-
binations of utility independence for different ordered pairs of complementary
attribute sets. Such examinations have been made by Pollak (1967), Keeney (1968,
1971, 1972b, 1974), Raiffa (1969), and Meyer (1970). Combinations of generalized
utility independence relations have been examined by Fishburn (1974) and Fishburn
and Keeney (1974, 1975). Three of the many results obtained are described here.
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Generalized utility independence is used in each case because the utility indepen-
dence conclusions are special cases of the generalized conclusions.
Our first result shows what happens when XI is generalized utility independent
of Xlc and Xlc is generalized utility independent of XI.
THEOREM 5 Suppose I is a nonempty proper subset of {I, ... , n} and each
of XI and Xlc is generalized utility independent of the other. Let U be any function
on X which satisfies (7.1), and let yO,yl EXI and wo, Wi EXlc be any elements
for which u(y°, w l )"* u(y°, w~ and u(y1, w~"* u(y°, w~. Then
U(X['XIC) == kdu(x[, w~ + U(Y°,XIC)] + k2u(XI, w'1u(y°,XIC) + k 3 (7.9)
for all XI EXI and allXlc EXlc where, with
k = 1I {[u(y°, w~-u(y°,Wi)] [u(y°, w~-U(yl,w~]},
the constants in (7.9) are specified by
k l == k[U(yl, w'1u(yO, Wi) - u(yO, W~U(yI, Wi)],
k 2 == k[u(y°, w~ + U(yl, Wi) - U(yl, w~ - u(y°, Wi)] ,
k 3 = - klu(y°, w~.
When (7.9) holds, u on X is completely specified by the indicated form with
determination of the conditional utility functions u(·, wo.> on XI and u(y°, .) on
Xlc along with U(yl, Wi). If
u(y°, w~ + U(yl, Wi) = U(yl, w~ + u(y°, wI), (7.10)
then k I == 1, k2 == 0 and (7.9) reduces to the additive form u(x[, x IC) == u(x[, w~
+ U(Y°,XIC) -u(y°, wo.>. In other words, the hypotheses of Theorem 5 in con-
junction with (7.1 0) imply that I and I C are value independent. On the other
hand, if (7.10) is false, so that k 2 "* 0, then (7.9) can be written in multiplicative
form as
u(X['Xlc)+k l == k1 rU(x[,w~+kl] [U(yO,XIC)+k l ], (7.11)k 2 [ k 2 k1
since k 3 - kIIk1 == - k IIk 2• Moreover, if u is scaled so that u(yO, w~ = 0, then
k I = 1, k 3 == 0 and (7.9) becomes
U(XI,XIC) == u(x[, w~ + U(yO,XIC) + k 2u(x[, W'1u(Y°,XIC),
with k 2 = [U(yl,W1)-U(y°,w1)-U(yl,Wo.>]/[u(y°,WI)U(yI,Wo.>]; and, when
k1 "* 0, (7.11) can be rewritten as
k 2u(x[,XIC) + 1 == [k1u(XI, w~ + 1] [k2u(Y°,XIC) + 1]. (7.12)
The next two theorems, which are proved in Fishburn and Keeney (1975), are
concerned with the ability to express U as combinations of one conditional single-
attribute utility function for each of the n attributes. To simplify the combinatorial
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expressions for u, we shall set an origin for u as in the sentence following (7.11).
In particular, (7.6) will be used for Uj along with u(x~, ... ,x~) = O.
Three sets of nonempty subsets of {I, ... , n} will be used in the theorems,
namely,
1(1) = {{I, 2, ,n -I}, {I, ... ,n -2,n}, {I, ... ,n -3, n -I,n}, ... ,
{1,3,4, ,n}},
1(2) = {{I, 2}, {I, 3}, ... , {I, n}},
1(3) = {{I}, {2}, ... , {n}}.
Since the IE 1(3) involve only one attribute, these sets are probably easier to check
for utility independence or generalized utility independence than are the two-
attribute sets in 1(2) or the (n - I)-attribute sets in 1(1).
THEOREM 6 Suppose n > 3 and XI is generalized utility independent of
Xlc either for all IE 1(1) or for all IE 1(2). Let xO, Xl E X be chosen so that u(x~,
x~, ... , x~) =I=- u(x~ and u(xL x~, ... , x~) =I=- u(x~, set u(x~ = 0, define K by
u(x l ) - u(x~, xt ... ,x~) - u(xL x~, ... ,x~)
K = (0 I I) (I ° 0) ,u Xt>X2," . 'Xn U Xt>X2, . .. ,Xn
and let Ut> . .. ,Un be defined by (7.6). If K = 0, then the attributes are value
independent and (7.4) holds; ifK =I=- 0, then
Ku(x) + 1 = [KUI(XI) + 1] [KU2(X2) + 1] ... [Kun(xn) + 1]
for all X EX. (7.13)
The latter form is, of course, a multiplicative form. If K > 0, then the positive
affine transformation v =Ku + 1 with Vi =KUi + 1 gives vex) = VI(XI)V2(X2)
... vn(xn) for (7.13) with v(x~ = VI(X~ = ... = vn(x~) = 1. If K < 0, then the
positive affine transformation W = - [Ku + 1] with Wi = - [KUi + 1] gives
w(x) = (_1)n+I WI (XI)W2(X2)'" wn(xn) for (7.13) with w(x~ = WI(X~ = ...
= wn(x~) = - 1.
In distinction to the additive and multiplicative forms for U in Theorem 6, the
form given by (7.14) or (7.15) in the next theorem is referred to as a quasiadditive
utility function.
THEOREM 7 Suppose that n > 3, XI is generalized utility independent of
Xlc for all IE 1(3), and there are consequences xo, Xl E X such that u(x~, ... ,
X?-b xl, X?+b ... , x~) =I=- u(x~ for i = 1, ... , n. Set u(x~ = 0, define Ci by
i = 1, ... , n,
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let u" ... , Un be defmed by (7.6), and let
Uj(Xj, 1) = CjUj(Xj)
Uj(Xj,O) = 1 - CjUj(Xj)
Then
for all Xj E Xj , i = 1, , n;
forallxiEXj,i= 1, ,no
U(X) = L U1(XI, 0:1) ... Un(xn, O:n)u(x~I, ... ,x~n) (7.14)("I'···,"'n)
Elo.l)n
for all x EX; equivalently,
u(x) = L S(i" ... , ir)ci, ... CirUj, (Xj) •.. Ujr(xir), (7.15)
{(il' .... jr):I<;; r<;; n
and 1<;; i,< ... <ir <;; n}
for all x E X, where
S(il, ... , i r )
n
r+.~ "i" "
= L (- 1) 1=1 u(x I ', ... ,xnn).
("1' ...• "n) E{ o. l}n
such that "i =0
for alii E {i...... ir}
(7.16)
For n = 3, (7.14) in expanded form is
u(X"X2,X3) = CIC2C3UI(XI)U2(X2)U3(X3)U(xLxtx~)
+ clc2ul(xl)u2(x2)[1 - C3U3(X3)] u(xL x~, x~
+ CIC3U I(X I)U3(X3) [1 - C2U2(X2)] u(xL xg, x~)
+ C2C3U2(X2)U3(X3) [1 - CIU I(X I)] u(x~,xt x~)
+clul(xl)[l-c2u2(x2)] [1-c3u3(x3)]u(xLxg,x~
+ c2u2(x2)[1 - CIUI(XI)] [1 - C3U3(X3)] u(x~, xt x~
+ c3u3(x3)[1 - CIUI (x I)] [1 - C2U2(X2)] u(x~, xt x~),
and (7.15) is
U(X"X2,X3) = UI(XI) + U2(X2) + U3(X3)
+ CIC2 [u(xL xtx~ - u(xLxg,x~ - u(xtxtx~] UI(XI)u2(X2)
+ CIC3 [u(xL xg, x~) - u(xL xg, x~ - u(x~, xg, x~)] UI(XI)u3(X3)
+ C2C3 [u(xt xt x~) - u(x~,xt x~ - u(x~, xg, x~)] U2(X2)U3(X3)
+ CIC2C3[U(xLxtx~)-u(xLxtx~ -u(xLxg,x~) -u(x~,xtx~)
+ u(xLxg,x~ + u(xtxtx~ + u(x~,xg,X~)]UI(XI)U2(X2)U3(x3)'
where S(i)ci=(-1)2u(x~, ... ,x?_bxl,x?+b ,x~)ci=1 for each i. If the
attributes are value independent, then S(i" , ir ) = 0 whenever r> 2, and hence
U reduces to the additive form.
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AI> noted earlier, the forms of u in Theorems 6 and 7 require evaluation of one
conditional single-attribute utility function Ui for each attribute. In addition,
(7.13) requires evaluation of u(x 1) and u(x~,xt ,x~), and (7.14) or (7.15)
requires evaluation of U(X~l, ... , x~n) for all (QI> , Q n) E {a, I }n.
7.4.2 VERIFICATION OF UTILITY INDEPENDENCE
The usefulness of results like Theorems 6 and 7 in any specific situation depends on
whether the presumed independence conditions hold for that situation. Techniques
for judging the validity of utility independence assertions, and for structuring
attributes so that they will exhibit utility independence, are discussed by Raiffa
(1969), de Neufville and Keeney (1972), Keeney (1972a, 1973, 1974), Keeney
and Nair (1974), and Sicherman (1975). These papers also discuss utility assessment
techniques in the independence context and provide specific examples of the appli-
cation of these techniques.
There are two important facets of utility independence verification that are
worthy of comment. The first of these concerns the ability to deduce a utility
independence conclusion from a weaker independence condition involving the
same XI along with a utility independence condition for a different XI' We shall
use the following definitions, which do not involve gambles.
DEFINITION 4 Let [ be a nonempty proper subset of {I, ... , n}. Then XI
is preference independent of XIc if and only if the conditional orders >- wand
>-z on XI are identical for every w, z E XIc. XI is weak indifference independent
of XIc if and only if there is awE XIc such that, for all XI, X~ E XI and all z E XIc,
(XI, z) - (X~, z) whenever (XI, w) - (X~, w).
Preference independence is the typical type of independence that is used in non-
probabilistic additive conjoint measurement. Weak indifference independence is an
even weaker independence concept that is implied by preference independence. AI>
remarked earlier, XI is not necessarily utility independent of XIc when XI is prefer-
ence independent (or weak indifference independent) of XIc. However, the follow-
ing theorem, derived by Keeney (1974) and Fishburn and Keeney (1974), shows
that utility independence can be implied by a weaker independence condition when
certain other conditions hold.
THEOREM 8 Suppose that II> [2, and 13 are three nonempty and mutually
exclusive subsets of {I, ... , n} whose union equals {I, ... , n}, that each Xi is a
convex subset of a finite-dimensional Euclidean space, that u on X is continuous,
that XI is utility independent of XI U I , and that XI U I is weak indifference
1 :2 3 1 :2
independent of XI . Then XI U I is utility independent of XI .
3 1:2 3
The usefulness of this result can be shown with regard to Theorem 6. Suppose
the Xi have the structure presumed by Theorem 8, that u is continuous, that Xl is
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utility independent of X{2, ... ,n}' and that X{I, i}iS weak indifference independent
(or preference independent) of X{I,i}C for each i> 1. Given n ~ 3, it then follows
from Theorem 8 that XI is utility independent of Xlc for each 1 E 1(2). Con-
sequently, Theorem 6 implies that u can be written in either an additive or multi-
plicative form. Other results like Theorem 8 are given by Fishburn (1974).
The simplest way to show that XI is not utility independent of Xlc - if that is
the case - when XI is preference independent of Xlc and XI contains a large
number of elements is as follows: First, select a relatively desirable element yl
and a relatively undesirable element yO in XI, and select a relatively desirable
element Wi and a relatively undesirable element WOin Xlc, with (yl, Wi) >- {(yo, Wi),
(yl, w~}>- (yo, w~. Next, estimate an element y* EXI such that (y*, w~ is indif-
ferent to the 50-50 gamble between (yo, w~ and (yl, w~. Now, if XI is utility
independent of Xlc then it must also be true that (y*, Wi) is indifferent to the
50-50 gamble between (yo, Wi) and (yl, Wi). This might be the case. However,
if the comparative attractiveness of a gamble in PI depends on the fixed value
of Xlc (either W O or Wi), then indifference may well fail. For example, with the
improved element from Xlc in the second instance, the decision maker might
alter his risk attitude toward XI and become less conservative, as revealed by a
preference for the 50-50 gamble between (yo, Wi) and (yl, Wi) over the sure-
thing consequence (y*, Wi). On the other hand, he might become more conserva-
tive and prefer (y*, Wi) to the 50-50 gamble based on Wi. In either case, a violation
of utility independence is observed.
7.5 CONDITIONAL RISK ATTITUDES AND BILATERAL INDEPENDENCE
Although utility independence is violated when a decision maker's risk attitude
toward XI varies as changes occur in the conditioning element from Xlc, another
independence concept can deal with such variations, provided they are fairly
regular in form. This new independence concept, introduced by Fishburn (1973,
1974), utilizes conditional orders on PI that are based on two conditioning ele-
ments from Xlc rather than on one conditioning element as in utility indepen-
dence, and its resultant form for the utility function employs two conditional
utility functions on XI and two on Xlc. Moreover, like value independence, but
unlike utility independence, it is a symmetric independence concept in the sense
that if XI is independent of Xlc, then Xlc is independent of XI' For these reasons
I shall refer to it as bilateral independence, although Farquhar (1974), for geometric
reasons, has called it diagonal independence. Like utility independence, bilateral
independence has a "pure" and a "generalized" form. I shall use the generalized
form in this section and refer to it simply as bilateral independence.
Let 1 be a nonempty proper subset of {I, ... , n}. Given PI E PI and wE Xlc,
let (PI> w) denote the gamble in P that has PI as its marginal on XI and whose
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marginal on Xlc assigns probability 1 to w. Thus, if n = 3 and I = {I, 2} with
PI(XJ,X2) = 0.1 and PI(YJ,Y2) = 0.9, then (PI,X3) assigns probability 0.1 to
(Xl,X2,X3) and probability 0.9 to (yJ,Y2,X3)' The expression X(PJ,w)+(1-X)
(qJ,z) with 0";; X";; 1, PI,qIEPI and w, zEXlc, is the convex combination of
gambles (PI> w), (qI,z)EP as indicated at the beginning of section 7.2. Similar
definitions apply to gambles in P of the form (PIC, y) where PIc E PIC and
yEXI·
The doubly conditional preference orders on PI that are used to define bilateral
independence are based on 50-50 convex combinations as follows:
(7.17)
with pI>qIEPI and w,zEXlc. If w=z in (7.17), then, since the two gambles
in the right part of (7.17) are identical, we must have PI -ww qI for all PI' qIEPI>
so that >-ww = 0 is automatic. Moreover, if >-wz = 0 for all w, z EXlc then it
must be true that XI and Xlc are value independent.
Intuitively speaking, PI >- wz qI indicates that the decision maker finds the
50-50 gamble between the pairings (PI> w) and (qI> z) more attractive than the
50-50 gamble between the opposite pairings (PI> z) and (qI' w). If one of the
fixed conditioning elements is changed, say from w to w', then the indicated
preference might also change. Such changes are allowed for by (generalized) bi-
lateral independence, but only to the extent indicated by the following definition.
Since (7.17) says that PI >-wz qI if and only if qI >-zw PI> or >-:z = >- zw, we shall
use >-zw to indicate the dual of >- wz in the definition.
DEFINITION 5 Let I be a nonempty proper subset of {I, ... , n}. Then XI
is bilaterally independent of Xlc if and only if either >- wz = 0 for all w, z E Xlc,
or there exist w, zEXlc such that >-wz =1=0 and, for all w'EXlc, >-w'z E {>-wz,
>-zw,0}.
Fishburn (1974) showed that XI is bilaterally independent of Xlc if XI and Xlc
are value independent (>-wz = (/) for all w, z E Xlc), or if XI is generalized utility
independent of Xlc, or if Xlc is generalized utility independent of XI' Moreover,
XI is bilaterally independent of Xlc if, and only if, Xlc is bilaterally independent
of XI' Because of this symmetry, it is permissible to say that XI and Xlc are
bilaterally independent.
When XI and Xlc are bilaterally independent, every two nonempty doubly
conditioned preference orders on PI must either be identical or be duals of one
another regardless of whether the conditioning elements for the two orders overlap.
This follows easily from the next theorem.
THEOREM 9 Suppose I is a nonempty proper subset of {I, ... ,n}. Then
XI is bilaterally independent of Xlc if and only if there are real-valued functions
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II and gl on X/ and real-valued functions 12 and g2 on X/c such that
for all X EX. (7.18)
In particular, if X/ is bilaterally independent of X/c, if X/ and X/c are not value
independent, if yO,yl E X/ and wo, Wi E X/c -are such that u(y°, w~ + U(yl, Wi)
=I=- u(Y°, Wi) + U(yl, w~, and if u is scaled so that u(yO, w~ = 0, then
u(x) = u(x[, w~ + u(yO,x/c)
+ [u(x[, Wi) - u(x[, w~ - u(y°, Wi)] [U(yl, x/c) - u(Y°, x/c) - U(yl, w~]
[U(yl, Wi) -u(y°, Wi) -U(yl, w~]
for all x EX. (7.19)
The symmetry of bilateral independence is obvious from (7.18). The particular
form of (7.18) expressed by (7.19) shows that the general bilateral representation
depends on two conditional utility functions u( 0, w~ and u( 0, Wi) on X/ and two
conditional utility functions u(y°, 0) and U(yl, 0) on X/c. The ability of bilateral
independence to reflect variations in conditional risk attitude can be seen from
either (7.18) or (7.19). A specific example of this ability is given by Fishburn
(1973) for two-period income streams.
Next, the effect of bilateral independence between Xi and X{ i}C for each
i E {I, ... , n} is observed.
THEOREM 10 Xi and X{jk are bilaterally independent for i = 1, ,n if
and only if there are real-valued functions Ij and gi on Xi for i = 1, ,n and
constants c(i b ... , ir ) such that
n
u(x b ... ,xn ) = I fi(Xi)
i=1
+ I c(ib ... ,ir)gj(Xi) ... gi(Xi) (7.20)
{(il' ...• ir):2~r~n I 1 r r
and I';; i, <... < in';; n}
for all x EX. In particular, if Xi is bilaterally independent of X{i}C for all i, if no
Xi and X{iJc are value independent, if xo, Xl E X ,are such that u(x~+ u(x l ) =I=-
u(xo x~ x ~ XO 0) + ( I I" I I ) f . - 1b"" .-b .' i+b"',Xn UXb""Xi-I,Xi,Xi+b"',Xn or 1-,
... , n, and if U is scaled so that u(x~ = 0, then (7.20) hold for all x E X with
fi(Xi) = U?(Xi)
_ ul(xi) - U?(Xi) - ul(x?)
gi(Xi)
- ul (xl) - u?(xl) - uf(x?)
as in (7.16),
where
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A proof of Theorem 10 is given in Fishburn (1973). As indicated in the latter
part of the theorem, two conditional single-attribute utility functions are used for
each attribute when there is no value independence.
7.6 FRACTIONAL INDEPENDENCE
The last of the independence concepts to be considered here is a general scheme
for generating independence conditions developed by Farquhar (1974, 1975).
Special conditions, such as generalized utility independence and bilateral indepen-
dence, arise naturally within this scheme. For expository purposes, I shall focus
on ways in which Xi might be independent of X {i}c'
Farquhar's scheme uses preference orders on Pi that are conditioned on from
1 to 2n - 1 elements from Xfj}c. The conditioning elements come from {(X~I, ... ,
X~i', xf.!.t', ... ,x~n): Qi E {O, 1} for each j '* i}, where x7 and xl can be any values
of Xi for each j '* i. Generalized utility independence uses the conditioning element
xli}c, and bilateral independence uses X'fi}C and xll}c, Conditional orders on Pi are
based on primal fractions.
A primal fraction Fi is defined as a subset of {O, l}n that contains (1, ... , 1)
and does not contain (Q!> ... , Qi-I> 1 - Qi, Qi+1> ••• ,Qn) whenever it contains
(QI, ... ,Qi, ... ,Qn)· Thus IFd, the number of n.tuples in F;, can range from 1 to
2n -I. With respect to {x7, xl} for eachj '* i and with respect to Fi , the conditioning
elements for an order on Pi are identified by the set
Fi[xO,X I ] = {(X~I, ... ,Xf!I-I,xf.!.{I, ... ,x~n):
and the order on Pi conditioned on Fi [XO, Xl] is defined by
I °Pj >-Fj[xo, Xl] Pi
if and only if
" _1_ (XO<I pO<j xO<n) >- " _1_ (XO<I p~-O<j xO<n) (7.21)1... IF. 1, ... , i , ..• , n f..J IFI 1,···, I , ••• , n
Fi .1 Fj •
for all pI, p? E Pi- Here (X~l, .. . ,pf, ... ,x~n) E P has marginal pf on Xi and
assigns probability 1 to each xii for j '* i. Letting pI = Pi and p? = qj, (7.21) for
F i = {(1, ... , I)} is
pj >-Fj[XO, x'] qi iff (pj,Xhc)>- (qj,xtW),
which compares to (7.8), and (7.21) for F j = {(1, ... , 1), (0, ... ,O)} is
pj >- Fj[xo, Xl] qj
if and only if
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which compares to (7.17). These are the only two types of orders generated by
(7.21) when n = 2. When n > 2, (7.21) yields many other types of conditional
orders. One of these is based on Farquhar's "quasi-pyramid" primal fraction
Qi = {(1, ... ,l)}U{(ah ... ,an ):ai = Oand~aj = I},
with IQil = n. For n = 3 and i = 1, (7.21) gives
if and only if
!(PhXtX~)+ hqbXg,X~) + ~(qhXtX~
>- hqhXtX~) + ~(PhXg,X~) + hp1,XtX~.
(7.22)
DEFINITION 6 Let Fi be a primal fraction in {O, I}". Then Xi is generalized
fractionally independent of X{i}C for F i if and only if either >- F.[x o,Xl] = 0 for all
o t 9 1 IX{i}C,X irEXtl}c, or there exist x\i}C,X{I}cEX{i}c such that >-Fi[XO,X'] *0 and,
for all w{i}C E X{i}C,>- FI[xo, WI] E {>-FI[Xo,X I ], >-}i[XO,X I], 0}.
This definition is patterned after Definitions 3 and 5 for generalized utility
independence and bilateral independence and is consistent with those definitions.
Farquhar's main utility decomposition theorem, which is Theorem 3.2 in
Farquhar (1974) and Theorem 4 in Farquhar (1975), indicates the special form
for U that results when Xi is generalized fractionally independent of X{i}C for FI ,
for i = 1, ... , n. Theorems 7 and 10 above are special cases of his general theorem.
Both of these use the same FI for each i ({(l, ... , I)} for Theorem 7; {(l, ... , 1),
(0, ... , O)} for Theorem 10), but his general theorem allows different F i for the
different i. An example of this is given by the quasi-pyramid form, with Qi the
primal fraction for each i as defined by (7.22). When Xi is generalized fractionally
independent of X{j}c for Qj, i = 1, ... , n with n ;. 3, and when several other minor
conditions hold, U can be written as
n
u(x) = I CIUi(X;) +
1=1
+
I CijUliXI, Xj)
{(I,j):i < j}
I Ci , ... irUi, (Xi) ... Uir(Xi)'
{(I" ... ,lr ):3"';; r"';; n
and 1"';; I, < ... < Ir ",;; n}
This form requires assessment of n(n - 1)/2 two-attribute conditional utility
functions Ulj_ The single-attribute functions UI are determined by the uij' Some of
the other special forms for U discussed by Farquhar require the assessment of m-
attribute conditional utility functions for 2 <m <n.
7.7 APPROXIMATIONS OF MULTIATTRIBUTE UTILITIES
As is evident from sections 7.5 and 7.6, independence conditions that allow U to
be written in terms of conditional utility functions on fewer than n attributes can
(7.23)
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become complex. Although some of the more advanced conditions are more likely
to hold in practice than simpler conditions such as value independence and utility
independence, they are harder to understand and to explain. Moreover, some of the
special forms obtained for u require assessment of conditional utility functions
defined on two or more attributes, and some feel that it is difficult enough to
obtain accurate assessments of conditional single-attribute functions. In addition,
even if it were possible to examine all of the independence conditions set forth
above, there will surely be situations in which none of them are valid.
Consequently, there is a need to explore the general problem of multiattribute
utility assessment in the absence ofsimplifying independence assumptions. Although
there are several approaches to this problem, I shall comment here only on the
potential use of ideas in mathematical approximation theory (Cheney, 1966;
Lorentz, 1966) for approximating multiattribute utility functions on the basis
of conditional single-attribute utility functions.
Let u* be a real-valued function on X = XI X X2 X .•• X X n that is intended as
an approximation of u. A fairly large class of approximations for u is specified by
the multiplicative-additive form
m
U*(XI' X2, ... , x n ) = L ilj(XI)i2ix2)" .fnj(xn )·
j=1
Although other approximating forms could be considered, (7.23) is quite flexible
and seems a reasonable basis from which to proceed. Moreover, u * can be exact in
the sense that u* =0 u when appropriate independence conditions hold. Each real-
valued function iij on Xi may involve one or more conditional utility functions on
Xi, or it may be specified in some way that does not depend directly on u. For
example, the additive form would have m = n, iii = Ui and iij =0 1 whenever i i=- j.
Approximation theory often presumes that the function being approximated is
a continuous real-valued function defined on a compact Hausdorff topological
space. In our utility theory context this presumption is satisfied if u is continuous
and each Xi is a closed and bounded convex subset of a finite-dimensional Euclidean
space. Under this presupposition, the "distance" between u and its approximation
u* is frequently measured by the uniform norm II u* - u II, where, with 1•.• 1 denoting
absolute value,
lIu* -ull = sUP lu*(x)-u(x)l,
xt=X
with the supremum replaced by "max" if u* is also continuous. Hence II u* - u II
gives the maximum difference between u* and u. Other norms can be used, but the
uniform norm is simple and analytically manageable in most situations.
Fishburn (1975) explores the use of the uniform norm for approximations in
the form of(7 .23) when n = 2 and each attribute is a closed interval of real numbers.
It is assumed throughout that u on X I X X 2 is continuous and takes XI = X 2 = [0,1]
for notational convenience. Theorem 11, based on Theorems 2 and 7 in Fishburn
(1975), provides an indication of the potential usefulness of simple approximations
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for u. The theorem presumes that u is conservative (risk averse) on [0, I] 2, which
means that u is strictly increasing in each variable and that
(7.24)
whenever 0";;; XI <xr ..;;; I and 0";;; X2 <x; ..;;; 1. The two-period income stream
example following (7.4) gives a concrete instance of conservatism. We shall let
A = u(l,O)+u(O, 1)-u(O,O)-u(l, I),
which is positive according to (7.24), and let
¢ij(x b X2) = (_l)i+ j [U(Xb j) + u(i, X2) - u(x I, X2) - u(i, j)] for (i, j) E {O, I }2,
with ¢ij;;;' 0, again according to (7.24).
THEOREM II Suppose u on [0, I] 2 is continuous and conservative. Given
the additive approximation
U*(XI,X2) = U(XbX~+U(X~,XI)-U(X~,x~,
where (x~,x~ is a fixed point in [0, IP,
l1u* -ull = max {¢()()(x~,x~, ¢ll(X~,X~, ¢OI(X~,X~,¢lO(XtX~}
and (x~, x~ can be chosen so that II u* - u II < A/3; however, it is impossible to
have II u* - u II < A/4. Alternatively, when u* is specified by the bilateral approxi-
mation [compare (7.19)]
u*(x l , X2) = U(Xb 0) + u(O, X2) - u(O, 0)
[u(x b I) -U(Xb 0) + u(O, O)-u(O, I)][u(l, X2) -u(O, X2) + u(O, O)-u(l, 0)]
+ -A '
then u* is conservative and II u* - u II < A/2, with II u* - u II = 0 if and only if XI
and X 2 are bilaterally independent.
Hence if A is small compared to u(l, I) - u(O, 0) = max U(XI' x2)-min U(Xb X2),
then the simple additive form can give a close fit to u although this fit cannot be
exact; and, regardless of the size of A, the bilateral approximation has the potential
of providing a close fit to u that might be exact.
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DISCUSSION
KEENEY: Suppose you have two attributes X and Y, and X is utility indepen-
dent of Y and Y is utility independent of X. Furthennore, the utility function
u(x,y) is not additive, so it can be represented by the multiplicative utility func-
tion. Have you looked for the best additive approximation of this multiplicative
utility function?
FISHBURN: No, I haven't looked at that case specifically. I have looked at a
generalization of it, referred to as multivariate risk aversion or, alternatively, as
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conservatism. I used the additive form for approximation, and the approximation
was rather good in most cases. When you apply the additive form to that two-
dimensional multivariate risk aversion situation, you know that the approximation
cannot be exact. In addition, you can specify a lower bound on the uniform norm
for that case.
MEYER: I was bothered by your use of the uniform norm. It may result in very
nice pointwise approximations, but it approximates absolutely miserably in terms
of risk aversion. There may be segments of the utility function with zero risk
aversion over the pieces and others with infinite risk aversion at the points where
there is a discontinuity. I think that what you really want as a norm is as good an
approximation as you can achieve for the particular decision problem at hand.
Perhaps what you want to use as your norm when you have a particular decision
problem is the expected utihty for the alternatives for that decision problem. Have
you looked at that possibility at all?
FISHBURN: No, I haven't. This is a relevant concem in the context of a partic-
ular problem, and you are probably focusing on some fairly small subregion of the
unit square or whatever space you are working in. In this smaller region, you can
no doubt get a better approximation than you can for the entire region.
RAIFFA: For a unidimensional utility function, I find the work of Meyer and
Pratt ("The Consistent Assessment and Fairing of Preference Functions," IEEE
Systems Science and Cybernetics, SSC-4, 270-278, 1968) very illuminating about
the question of approximating decreasing risk aversion utility functions. What is
fascinating to me is the development in utility theory that goes something like this.
Instead of obtaining an exact utility function, one tries first to get some qualitative
ideas like decreasing risk aversion. Then, rather than specifying exact equivalents
for 50-50 gambles, one determines bounds for these. Information like that can be
translated into bounds on the utility function, and, very often, this information is
enough to allow a choice among alternatives. It is not necessary to go through the
whole procedure of deriving exact utility functions.
I don't know whether you can do that for two dimensions, but that is the
direction I would like to see approximation theory take.
PESCHEL: How can you take into account the feasible set of alternatives? It
may be that in the subset of nonfeasible points you get a good approximation and
in the interesting subset - the feasible set - you get a bad approximation.
FISHBURN: Currently, I have no good answer to that.
TVERSKY: It seems to me that one question that is essential to the quality
of an approximation is the problem of noise. The quality of an approximation may
be very different when it is studied under considerable noise. There are some results
that show that the quality of an approximation increases as you have more and
more noise.
FISHBURN: I considered that very briefly in the preface of my paper on two-
dimensional problems (Fishburn, 1975). In effect, for a first approximation, I
presume that there is no noise. That is, one could estimate u precisely if one had
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enough time. Bounding this noise complicates things considerably, and I have not
done this, although I am aware of the problem.
EDWARDS: Some computational work has been done that addresses the same
questions and theories from a different point of view. First of all, Fischer has
investigated linear approximations of utility functions that are monotonic in each
attribute. Generally, everything works beautifully. When very sharply nonlinear
nonmonotonic functions are considered, things start looking not so good.
There is another issue that we should look into here, that of environmental
independence, which is related to the questions raised by Dr. Peschel about the
feasible set of alternatives. Certainly you are not going to want a meal that is
overpriced and badly cooked. By the time you start reducing the list of alternatives
to the ones that you are willing to retain seriously, you are going to introduce a
large set of negative environmental correlations among the variables. Unfortunately,
this will produce worse approximations. How much worse, I don't know. It's
obviously going to be a function of, among other things, the number of dimensions.
We are working on this now, and the results will be reported.
RAIFFA: As Dr. Fishburn pointed out, there are many kinds of independence
assumptions that are convenient. If the ranges of the variables are wide, the assump-
tions become less palatable. By eliminating the alternatives that are obviously
inferior, you can often limit the ranges so that you can tolerate certain kinds of
independence assumptions that were intolerable before. This is an aspect of the
art of assessment.
MEYER: In practice, the feasible set described on this hypercube that we have
been talking about tends to lie in or near certain subspaces of lower dimension.
Thus, a set of coordinates of smaller dimension that adequately characterize this
subspace is desirable. The problem becomes one of assessment. How do you describe
these other coordinates so that the person of whom you are asking questions can
understand what they are? I think approximations such as those mentioned by Dr.
Fishburn should be made in whatever subspace is relevant.
RAIFFA: We have talked about various dependence and independence assump-
tions. In practice, if things are dependent, then it is interesting to understand why
they are dependent and to see if changes in variables or the factors Dr. Meyer
mentions (Chapter 11) could create independence. We are all accustomed to such
procedures in the probability domain. When we have variables that are probabilis-
tically dependent, we use all kinds of tricks to make them independent or con-
ditionally independent. To date, we haven't learned how to do much of this in the
value and utility domain.
8 A PracticaI Methodology ofSolving Multicriterion Problems
with Subjective Criteria
O. I. Larichev
8.1 INTRODUCTION
One typical problem in surveys of decision making methods is the small scale of
current practical applications of these methods (Clarke, 1974; Larichev, 1974).
There are many reasons for this. The path between the beginning of the practical
work and the possibility of application of a method is long and difficult. This path
is interesting by itself, but most of its stages depend on the specific circumstances.
In the following sections, possible factors hindering successful application of a
number of decision-making methods are discussed, and directions for development
of promising new methods are suggested.
8.2 THE PROBLEM
The decision-making problems under discussion here have the following character-
istics: (a) the decisions are nonrepetitive; (b) the criteria for evaluating the alter-
natives are subjective in that they can be defined only by the decision maker(s);
and (c) the alternatives can be evaluated in terms of these criteria only by experts.
This class includes strategic R&D planning, or selection of directions, topics, or
projects (Clarke, 1974; Larichev, 1974). The manager of an agency responsible
for strategic R&D planning has a policy that is expressed, above all, in a list of
criteria for evaluating lines of research or specific R&D projects. Most criteria are
essentially qualitative - for example, "skill of presumed participants" or "project
status." In estimating the alternative versions by these criteria, the decision maker
should use the advice of experts. The situation in which the problem is solved is
new each time, so no universal or standard solutions can be developed.
For many administrative and planning bodies, a large number of alternatives to
evaluate and select among is increasingly common. This makes it hard for a manager
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who wishes to retain his control over decision making even if he cannot evaluate
the proposed alternatives himself.
8.3 THE MEASUREMENTS
For each criterion, a list of evaluations should be made, resulting in an evaluation
scale. The criteria formulated by a decision maker represent his attitude toward
the problem of selection. Because the decision maker has to use the advice of
experts in evaluating the alternatives, these evaluative criteria and scales are the
language of communication between the decision maker and his experts. Even with
the best possible experts, the result is largely dependent on the way the data are
secured from them.
In my view, quantitative scales of evaluation are quite inapplicable to subjective
criteria. With subjective criteria a 10-point scale does not enable a decision maker
to obtain any reliable data, since each expert will have his own idea on the grade of
quality to be assigned to each point.
The only reasonable approach is to use discrete scales of evaluations with a small
number of qualitative evaluations in the form of verbal formulations of quality
grades. These formulations also represent the decision maker's policy and his desire
to distinguish certain qualitative differences in terms of a specific criterion. The
formulations should be sufficiently detailed that experts can understand which
grades are important to the decision maker. Evaluations on such scales, including
the definitions of the best and the worst, represent the opinion of the decision
maker; with another decision maker, these estimates might be quite different.
Table 8.1, adapted from Filippov et al. (1974), shows a possible scale for a very
involved criterion, "promise of the line of research." A detailed formulation is
needed to make the content of each estimate understandable to a set of experts.
Such scales greatly increase the confidence of decision makers in the data pro-
vided by the experts. Even though he agrees with quantitative scales, a rationally
minded decision maker still does not completely rely on them because he under-
stands the complexity, novelty, and ambiguity of measuring qualitative, subjective
notions in numerical terms. Verbal scales enable the decision maker to request
from the experts exactly what he needs.
8.4 SUBJECTIVE SELECTION RULES
The problem of evaluating the multicriterion alternatives will be solved when
relations of utility are determined for all or some combinations of estimates in
terms of the criteria. With subjective criteria these relations can be obtained only
on the basis of knowledge of the decision maker's goals and preferences. Indeed,
the degree to which evaluations in terms of partial criteria are combined in the
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TABLE 8.1 Estimating the Promise of Basic Scientific Research in a Field
(Probability of Breakthroughst
Criterion
B,
B3
Bs
Definition
World scientific consensus is that breakthroughs are highly probable
and can lead to new theories and experimental methods.
World scientific consensus is that there are grounds (enough
"mature," well-posed theoretical and experimental problems)
to allow the formulation of more general theories, qualitatively
different approaches to the description of the object of studies,
new principles of experimental studies, and new scientific
schools.
World scientific consensus is that steady growth, accumulation, and
generalization of theoretical results and improvement of
principles and methods of experimentation will continue over
the next 5 to 10 years.
World scientific consensus is that there is little probability of
qualitative changes; there is little innovation in approaches and
research methods, and none is likely.
World scientific consensus is that further basic research in this
direction will lead nowhere; the probability of reorienting the
theories and research methods in this direction is very low.
a Adapted from Filippov et al. (1974).
overall evaluation cannot be determined through impartial computation. It is in
comparison in terms of combinations of evaluations that the decision maker's goals
and his attitude toward the problem of selection are represented.
The relations of different combinations of evaluations leading to the desired
form of presenting the final decision will be referred to as the subjective model of
decision making.
How subjective decision-making models for many criteria should be developed
is a difficult question. There is a classical way (Morris, 1968) to determine prefer-
ences by comparing the utility of different lotteries; this approach, however, has
been the object of valid criticism (Hall, 1965). It has been shown that in real situ-
ations people do not act in compliance with the preferences revealed by this tech-
nique (Dolbear and Lave, 1967). Apparently, even if people take the experiments
seriously, they are aware of the wide difference between actual and model
situations. Also, people tend to make mistakes in determining subjective probabili-
ties (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973). In my view, the classical way of revealing
preferences is especially ill-suited to unique, nonrepetitive decision-making prob-
lems.
The above technique is not the only one in which decision maker's preferences
are used; there are also man-machine methods of decision making (Larichev, 1971),
but these methods disregard descriptive data on the possibility of obtaining reliable
information for people. In most cases, man is implicitly presumed to be omnip-
otent. Clearly, any preference-revealing procedures should rely on psychological
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and psychometric data on possibilities of elicitation of reliable information from
people in different situations.
The hypothesis that people respond probabilistically in solving comparison or
selection problems seems to be well tested (Luce et al., 1963): there is a high
probability that consistent answers will be obtained for a certain kind of problem,
but these answers are not necessarily correct.
Many authors (Marschak, 1968; Mirkin, 1974) agree that the basic reason for the
observed violations of the transitivity of preferences is the large number of attri·
butes in the objects to be compared, which cannot be tackled by a single person
at one time. This hypothesis also seems to be well tested.
These two hypotheses lead to the following suggestions for procedures for
finding the preferences of decision makers and for procedures for design of sub-
jective decision-making models. Above all, these procedures should include stability
and consistency tests of decision maker's preferences. Also, the procedures should
use those questions for which the probability of obtaining reliable information is
the highest. Hypotheses concerning the possibility of obtaining the desired infor-
mation from a decision maker should be formulated and tested.
Let us give one example. Scales of different criteria are taken in pairs [with N
criteria, the number of such pairs is !N(N - 1)]. Let the evaluations according to
all the criteria be ordered, with performance decreasing from the beginning to the
end of the scale. The hypothesis is as follows: with N:r;;; 6 or 7, the decision maker
can, with small violations of transitivity, compare the performance deterioration
in the scales of two criteria with the best estimates in terms of the other criteria.
To test the hypothesis, suppose we have the following scales of the criteria A
and C:
Criterion A: R&D Project Status
A 1 The considerable amount of work necessary for the project has already
been completed. No essential difficulties are expected in the remaining work.
A 2 A number of essential difficulties have to be overcome to complete the
R&D project, but ideas on how to solve them exist and directions of research
have been specified.
A 3 A number of novel little-known problems have to be solved, and no ideas
or proposals on their solution are available.
Criterion C: Necessary Resources
C1 No additional resources are reqUired for the project; only some organiza-
tional arrangements are needed.
C2 More personnel and material resources are needed within the framework
of existing laboratories.
C3 New laboratories should be set up for the project.
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r----------------t':A-J Cz
FIGURE 8.1 Uniform scale of criteria A and C.
The decision maker is told that initially the object has the highest values in
terms of all the N criteria. Let us take up two cases: (a) the performance in terms
of the criterion A has deteriorated (the value A z should be used instead of A 1);
and (b) the performance in terms of the criterion C has deteriorated (the value Cz
should be used instead of C1). The question is which of the cases is associated with
a greater deterioration in performance. The answers were used to plot the graph
of Figure 8.1 where the arrow denotes better performance; by this means, two
scales may be replaced by one scale of estimates for the two criteria A and C. In
this way, all pairs of criteria are considered. The information needed to obtain a
single scale for the N criteria is duplicated, with the amount of redundant informa-
tion increasing with the number of criteria. That redundant information can be
used to test the above hypothesis.
The data obtained in testing the above hypothesis confirm its validity. Thus, no
violation of transitivity was observed in questioning four decision makers with
four criteria and from three to five qualitative estimates on the scales. In question-
ing with six criteria, two answers out of fifty-six were contradictory.
What is important is that all answers were concerned with real situations. The
decision maker used his language in verbal evaluations for description of the
situation, and he consistently pursued his goals in making the comparisons. The
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results of testing this hypothesis indicate that comparisons of performance deter-
iorations in pairs of scales can be used in procedures to reveal the preferences of
decision makers (see, for example, Larichev et aI., 1974b).
8.5 STAGES OF DECISION MAKING WITH SUBJECTIVE CRITERIA
The need for separate stages for identifying the list of criteria and development of
qualitative verbal scales of evaluations was discussed above (Figure 8.2). Special
attention should be given to stage 3. If the set of multicriterion alternatives is
specified (e .g., expert evaluations are obtained for the alternatives under study),
then it would be useful to analyze that set by the methods of clustering (Ayvazian
et al., 1974) and decreasing the dimensionality of data (Teryokhina, 1973). In a
number of cases this analysis may affect the initial requirements of decision makers
as to the form in which the final decision should be represented, and in certain
cases analysis may result in immediate solution of the overall problem. If a decision
maker wants the set of alternatives to be divided into a small number of classes and
analysis shows that they decompose into three groups, then it would be logical to
assume that a final decision would require division of the alternatives into three
classes. If analysis also reveals that the resulting three groups are in domination
relation (each object in the first group is better than each one in the second group
in terms of all criteria, and each object in the second group is better than each one
in the third group in terms of all criteria), then the desired decision has been
obtained.
The desired form of the final decision significantly affects the problem of
decision making with subjective criteria. The most common forms are listed below:
• The alternatives are divided into two groups (with the better one identified).
• The alternatives are divided into a small number of groups.
• The alternatives are divided into a number of groups approaching, if possible,
the number of combinations of criterion evaluations.
At stages 5 and 6 the data of preceding stages are used to develop the overall
procedure for design of the decision rule, with the decision maker's preferences
taken into consideration. Hypotheses are formulated on possible ways to obtain
the data from decision makers; also formulated are ways to check these hypotheses.
The chief difficulty is in constructing procedures that can lead to a representation
of the final decision that incorporates those hypotheses that are the simplest and
easiest to check.
8.6 AN EXAMPLE
The proposed approach was used in developing a method for planning applied
research and development (Larichev et al., 1974a,b), a method for selecting
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promising directions of basic research (Filippov et aI., 1974), and a method for
estimating the quality of scientific manuscripts (Larichev and Glotov, 1974).
One of these methods was applied to a problem (Larichev et al., 1974a)
that can be regarded as portfolio optimization where the criterion of maximal
economic efficiency can be applied. In reality, however, a planning body recognizes
a number of qualitative criteria as well as cost and economic efficiency. Following
the identification of a list of criteria and development of scales, all R&D projects
were divided into two groups:
Those for which the effect of qualitative criteria dictates incorporation in the
plan in some version - especially important projects (EIP).
Those whose inclusion in or exclusion from the plan depends on the indices of
costs and cost effectiveness - common projects (CP).
The alternatives should thus be divided into EIPs and CPs. Note that in the
practical cases under consideration analysis of data by dimensionality-reducing
methods has revealed a large number of groups. To develop a subjective decision
rule for dividing the objects into two classes, the following hypothesis was put
forward:
Hypothesis 1 With N <" 6 and two classes of final decisions (CPs and EIPs) the
decision maker can in a stable way (with good repeatability with repeated question-
ing) and consistently (with rare violations of transitiveness) assign classes of final
decisions to all combinations of estimates of two criteria under the assumption of
best estimates in terms of the other N - 2 criteria.
As an example consider combining criteria D and F defined as follows:
Criterion D: Social effect ofimplementing an R&D project
D 1 The project will have a direct and very large effect on improving the living
standard of the population.
D2 The project will make a direct contribution to improving the living standard
of the population.
D 3 The project will make no direct impact on the living standard of the popu-
lation.
en'terion F: Expected results compared with world standards
F 1 Expected results will surpass world standards.
F2 Expected results will be on a par with world standards.
F 3 Expected results will be below world standards.
The information required from the decision maker is given in Figure 8.3. To check
Hypothesis 1, one can use data redundancy resulting from treating all pairs of
criteria and repeated questioning of decision makers over a period long enough to
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EIP EIP EIP
EIP CP CP
CP CP CP
FIGURE 8.3 Information required from decision maker. See text for definitions.
allow them to forget their earlier estimates when there are many of these (1 or 2
weeks).
In developing a decision rule, the following generalization may be used: with
deterioration in estimations the performance of R&D projects does not increase.
In other words, if some combination of estimations is associated with CPs, then
all combinations dominated by that combination also belong to that class.
When the estimations are binary and combinations of worse values of any three
criteria are necessarily associated with CPs, the data from decision makers who fill
in tables similar to Figure 8.3 for all pairs of criteria are sufficient for developing a
decision rule. One can arrive at this particular case by combining the estimates of
criteria that have the same effect on the quality of projects.
In a general case the information obtained through Hypothesis 1 is insufficient
for obtaining a decision rule. There may be combinations of estimates with in-
definite classes of quality. In this case, the following step can be proposed:
boundaries that divide projects into EIPs in the space of N criteria should be
checked in compliance with the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2 With N ~ 6 and two or three classes of final decisions (in our case
two classes, EIPs and CPs), the decision maker can consistently compare projects
differing in evaluations in terms of two criteria.
R&D projects that are on the boundary between EIPs and CPs are compared
with other, nondominated ones whose evaluation differs in terms of two criteria.
Let the character ~ denote better quality. Evidently, for the projects Pi and P2,
if Pi ~ P2 and P2 E EIP, then Pi E EIP. If Pi ~ P2 and Pi E CP, then P2 E CPo
Hypothesis 2 is checked through numerous comparisons to obtain redundant
information.
In actual design of the decision rule by the above method (with N = 4, 5, or 6)
the number of combinations associated with EIPs was not very large. Therefore,
only the data obtained through Hypothesis I could be used. That information was
consistent, which confirms Hypothesis 1.
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8.7 CONCLUSIONS
One characteristic feature of many weakly structured problems (Opther, 1965)
tackled by systems analysis is the subjective nature of their models. Neglect of this
fact and desire to obtain "pseudo-objective" models is one of the chief causes of
the failure of practical application of systems analysis methods and theories to a
wide range of problems (Schlesinger, 1963).
There are many problems in which qualitative, little-known, and uncertain
aspects tend to dominate. Solution of these problems may be made easier if a
method suitable to a particular decision maker or a group of decision makers is
devised and if a special-purpose language is developed to enable the decision maker
to express his policy and preferences as a subjective decision·making model.
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DISCUSSION
KEENEY: What experiences have you had in trying to generate subjective scales
for real problems? Could you give me an example of one case where you have done
that?
LARICHEV: I can refer to Figure 8.1. The two criteria, the amount of work
necessary to complete a project and the resources necessary for this completion,
were part of an analysis with real decision makers.
EDWARDS: I may have misunderstood, but I think you said that decision makers
prefer to express their opinions in a rather small number of categories and, indeed,
that they can do so only in this way, and that it is therefore undesirable to present
them with a larger response set. Did I misunderstand that?
LARICHEV: The number of evaluation points on each scale depends on the
particular case. We are trying - with the help of a decision maker - to find what
the desirable number of evaluation points is in real situations. Sometimes you can-
not place more than 5 points on a qualitative scale. In our practice we have usually
had no more than 6. Of course, it is much easier to expand this if we have a quanti-
tative scale.
RAIFFA: Suppose you have the situation depicted below, in which you write
down your alternatives x and y and have criteria A, B, C, and D where levels of each
of these are characterized by a verbal description.
Criteria
Alternatives A B C D
X A, B I C4 D.
y AI B 3 C, D4
W A, B, C, D4
You could ask decision makers directly how they would feel about x and y. As
another approach, do you ever create a hypothetical choice w, where w might be
(A 2, B b C2 , D4)? Notice that w is designed so that it makes it easy to make a choice
between y and w because they are equivalent on criteria C and D. Similarly, x and
ware equivalent on criteria A and B. It may be clear to the decision makers that y
is better than w, and it may be clear that w is better than x. Therefore, creating a
hypothetical situation might help the decision makers conclude that x is better
thany.
LARICHEV: Of course in this case you can utilize this approach, but, as you
said, it is easy now because you have the difference in only two criteria. In our
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problems, when there were many alternatives, it was impossible for decision makers
to compare all the alternatives directly. It was necessary for us to utilize ways that
directly compare only some of the alternatives that differ in a few criteria. Each
problem requires a new decision on the best manner to do this. I think this is a
very important question.
RAIFF A: When you compare pairs on criteria A and B, are you holding C
fIxed?
LARICHEV: I am holding C fixed at the best evaluation, which I describe
verbally to the decision maker.
9 On the Elicitation ofPreferences: Descriptive and
Prescriptive Considerations
. A. Tversky
Decision analysis is a formal framework for analyzing complex decisions involving
uncertainty and multiple objectives (see Keeney and Raiffa, 1976). It consists of
a coherent set of logical and statistical procedures, designed to assist the decision
maker in his search for optimal decisions. The data base for decision analysis con-
tains hard facts such as resources, costs, and deadlines, as well as subjective judg-
ments that express the beliefs and the values of the decision maker. Although it is
desirable to substitute objective facts for subjective judgments whenever possible,
most decision analyses contain a significant judgmental component.
In the absence of objective procedures for measuring probabilities and values,
the subjective judgments of the decision maker are treated as measurements of
uncertainty and value. Thus, the human judge serves as a measuring device for the
assessment of uncertainty and value, much as a ruler or a pan-balance is used to
measure distance and weight. Unlike physical measurements, however, which are
usually unbiased and fairly accurate, expressions of preferences and beliefs are
usually fallible and often biased.
Decision analysts are painfully aware of the presence of inconsistencies and
biases in judgments of values and beliefs. Indeed, the responsible decision analyst
does not "accept" judgmental data without probing further and conducting tests
of consistency. The analyst then encourages the decision maker to revise his judg-
ments whenever they are inconsistent or unreasonable.
Decision theory demands coherence, yet it provides no clues to how it should be
achieved. Given the fallibility of human judgments, what are the major sources of
judgmental error? What methods, or tests, should the analyst use to detect biases
and inconsistencies? How should the decision maker resolve his inconsistent prefer-
ences? Formal decision theory does not address these questions because it does not
acknowledge the fallible nature of judgmental data. Consequently, the decision
analyst must look elsewhere to find answers to these questions.
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The psychological analysis of the judgmental processes underlying the elicitation
of preferences and beliefs yields several results that are relevant to the conduct of
decision analysis. First, it isolates several classes of problem in which human
intuition is at variance with the maxims of rational choice. Second, it sheds light
on the nature of judgmental inconsistencies and indicates the avenues of inquiry
that lead to their resolution. Third, it suggests procedures for structuring the
decision problem and the elicitation task in order to eliminate, or at least reduce,
judgmental biases.
Over the past 5 years, Daniel Kahneman and I have studied the cognitive pro-
cesses underlying the formation of preference and belief. Our research has shown
that subjective judgments generally do not obey the basic normative principles of
decision theory. Instead, human judgments appear to follow certain principles
that sometimes lead to reasonable answers and sometimes to severe and systematic
errors. Moreover, our research shows (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974; Kahneman
and Tversky 1976) that the axioms of rational choice are often violated consistently
by sophisticated as well as naive respondents, and that the violations are often large
and highly persistent. In fact, some of the observed biases, such as the gambler's
fallacy and the regression fallacy, are reminiscent of perceptual illusions. In both
cases, one's original erroneous response does not lose its appeal even after one has
learned the correct answer. The present paper discusses some recent work, by
Daniel Kahneman and me, on the psychology of preference. Specifically, the paper
describes two widespread phenomena, called the certainty effect and the reference
effect, that lead to systematic violations of expected utility theory. These effects
are illustrated, and their implications for decision analysis are discussed.
9.1 THE CERTAINTY EFFECT
Let (x,p,y) denote the option where outcome x is obtained with probability p,
and outcome y with probability I - p. The option of receiving x with certainty
is denoted by (x). The outcomes x, y, and so on could denote any monetary or
nonmonetary consequences. The present discussion is primarily concerned with two
numerical attributes: human life and money. For simplicity, we shall restrict the
discussion to so-called objective probabilities, although our conclusions are not limi-
ted to this case. To illustrate the certainty effect, consider the following problem.
The Ministry of Health is faced with a choice among various programs for the
development of sophisticated medical equipment, such as kidney machines. Suppose
the costs associated with the various programs are roughly the same and the pro-
grams are judged by the number of lives they are expected to save. The decision
maker faces a choice between one program that has a 50-50 chance of saving 100
lives or none and another program that could save 45 lives with complete certainty.
The overwhelming majority of respondents who were presented with this choice
selected the second alternative. That is, they chose (45) over (loa, 1/2,0). The
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same respondents were then presented with the choice between a program that has
1 chance in 10 to save 45 lives or no lives, and a program that has 1 chance in 20
to save 100 lives or no lives. In this case, the great majority of respondents selected
the latter option, preferring (100,1/20,0) to (45, 1/10,0).
These preferences are clearly incompatible with utility theory. To demonstrate,
note that the first preference implies that 2u(45) > u(lOO) with u(O) set equal to
zero, whereas the second preference implies the reverse inequality. Specifically,
these preferences violate the substitution axiom of utility theory, according to
which the preference order is invariant over probability mixtures. That is, if an
option a is chosen over another option b, then (a, p, 0) must be chosen over (b, P, 0),
for any p. In the present example, the last two options are expressible as probability
mixtures of the first two options and zero with a probability of 0.1. The above
preferences indicate, therefore, that the substitution of a sure thing in a gamble
could reverse the preference ordering. Put differently, it suggests that the estimated
utility of saving 45 lives is higher when inferred from a choice in which this out-
come is certain than when it is inferred from a choice in which this outcome is not
certain.
The above alternatives were evaluated in terms of number of lives saved. We also
presented the same group of respondents with choices between altematives concern-
ing the loss of human lives. These problems were formulated in terms of the risks
associated with various hazards, such as accidents. The decision makers were to
choose between a 50-50 chance to lose 100 lives or none and a sure loss of 45
lives. Almost all respondents chose the first option. Next, they were to choose
between a 1-in-20 chance to lose 100 lives, and a 1-in-1O chance to lose 45 lives.
Here, the great majority of respondents chose the second option. Thus, our re-
spondents chose (-100, 1/2, 0) over (-45), yet they chose (-45, 1/10,0) over
(-100, 1/20,0). These preferences, again, violate utility theory because the former
implies that u(-100) > 2u(-45), whereas the latter preference implies the reverse
inequality. Thus, they suggest that the disutility of a loss of 45 lives is greater when
it is inferred from a choice in which this outcome is certain than when it is inferred
from a choice in which it is uncertain.
Several comments about the above examples are in order. First, the respondents
were all graduate students and faculty members in the School of Social Sciences at
the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. They were given considerable time to think
about and reflect on their choices. Furthermore, the respondents whose preferences
were inconsistent with utility theory were given the opportunity to revise their
preferences. While most of the respondents expressed mild embarrassment for
violating utility theory, very few were inclined to modify their choices. Second, the
preferences for negative gambles were the mirror image of the preferences for the
positive gambles. This is a direct consequence of the certainty effect. Third, precisely
the same pattern of preferences was obtained when monetary gains and losses were
substituted for human lives. The pattern of preferences for the corresponding
monetary gambles is given below.
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For positive-outcome gambles we obtained
($45»> ($100, 1/2,0) and ($45,1/10,0) < ($100,1/20,0),
whereas for negative-outcome gambles we obtained
(- $45) < (- $100, 1/2,0) and (- $45, 1/10,0) » (- $100, 1/20,0).
In summary, we have argued that human preferences are subject to a major bias,
the certainty effect, according to which the utility (or the disutility) of an outcome
looms larger when it is certain than when it is uncertain. The certainty effect
captures an essential component of people's attitudes toward risk that is reflected
in the differential treatment of certain and uncertain outcomes. It leads to risk-
aversion for positive outcomes and risk-seeking for negative outcomes. Such risk
averages, however, are incompatible with any concave or convex utility function.
Expected utility theory deals with the problem of risk through the shape of the
utility function for the respective attribute - e.g., money. In this respect, utility
theory does not permit attitudes toward risk per se, only attitudes toward money.
Note, incidentally, that the so-called paradoxes of Al1ais (1953) are all manifes-
tations of the certainty effect.
9.2 THE REFERENCE EFFECT
People generally perceive and evaluate stimuli relative to some reference point, or
adaptation level, provided by the past and present context of experience. For
example, an object at a given temperature may be experienced as hot or cold to
the touch, depending on the temperature of objects to which one has become
adapted. Similarly, a given letter of recommendation may be interpreted as more
or less favorable depending on one's expectations. In the same fashion, the con-
sequences of decisions are commonly perceived and evaluated as positive or negative
changes from some neutral reference point. Financial investments, for example,
are usually evaluated in terms of their potential gains or losses, and public policies
are often discussed in terms of the (positive or negative) changes that they are
likely to bring about.
The reference point defines the neutral point in the outcome space. Outcomes
that lie above the reference point (in the preference order) are perceived as positive,
and outcomes that lie below the reference point are perceived as negative. Hence,
by changing the reference point, one changes the perceived sign of the outcomes.
A new product, for example, could be regarded as a success when compared to
competing products, or as a failure when compared to the original plan. A tourist
who had lost $50 in one evening at the roulette wheel could regard this outcome as
a gain of $50 if he had budgeted $100 for spending in the casino that evening. As
we shall demonstrate below, a change in the reference point affects the evaluation
of outcomes and the preference between options. Changes in preferences due to a
shift in the reference point are called reference effects.
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FIGURE 9.1 Utility function for the total number of fatalities in traffic accidents
per year.
To illustrate this effect, consider the problem of assessing society's utility
function for loss of life in traffic accidents. A typical utility function, as assessed
by a scientific advisor to the Israeli Public Committee for the Prevention of Traffic
Accidents, is displayed in Figure 9.1. This function was constructed on the basis
of the expert's ordering of utility intervals. Specifically, the expert was presented
with problems of the following type.
Consider a reduction of the yearly death toll due to traffic accidents from 500
to 400, and compare it with a reduction from 200 to 100. Which of the two reduc-
tions is more significant in the sense that it justifies larger public expenditure? After
the expert stated that the former reduction is more valuable than the latter, the
reductions were modified until the expert judged them to be equally valuable. On
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the basis of such judgments, it was possible to construct the expert's utility func-
tion (Figure 9.1) for the total number of lives lost in traffic accidents. The function
is clearly convex, indicating that the value of the life of any single person decreases
with the total death toll. To validate this function we asked the expert to choose
between different uniform distributions of fatalities. For example, the expert was
asked to compare a uniform distribution of fatalities over the range (100, 500),
with a uniform distribution over the range (200,400). In this case, for example,
the expert preferred the former distribution since "the difference between 100 and
200 fatalities appears larger than the difference between 400 and 500 fatalities."
In general, the expert's choices between uniform distributions of fatalities agree
with his utility function. Essentially the same utility function was obtained using
two different procedures: a direct ordering of intervals and preference between
gambles.
These results are not restricted to a single expert. Other individuals who were
questioned using the same procedures also yielded convex utility functions over
the same domain. A similar function for loss of life due to acciden ts in transporting
hazardous substances is reported by Kalelkar et al. (1974).
Although traffic safety is measured by the total number of accidents or fatal-
ities, much of the discussion of new measures, such as a change in the speed limit,
is in terms of the potential increase or decrease in the current death toll. Therefore,
we have also assessed the utility function of our expert for increases and decreases
in the current level of fatalities due to traffic accidents. This function was con-
structed using the procedures described above, except that the attribute under
study was defined as changes in the number of fatalities rather than as the total
number of fatalities. Again, the data are orderly and consistent, and the ordering
of intervals generally coincides with the choices between gambles. However, the
resulting utility function, presented in Figure 9.2, is clearly inconsistent with the
utility function of the same expert presented in Figure 9.1.
Several features of Figure 9.2 are worth noting. First, the significance, or value,
of intervals generally coincides with the choices between gambles. However, the
are saved or lost. For example, our expert felt that society would be willing to
invest more to increase the number of lives saved from 100 to 200 than from 400
to 500. Similarly, he felt that society would be willing to pay more to prevent an
increase of the number of lives lost from 100 to 200, than to prevent an increase
from 400 to 500. Such judgments gave rise to a utility function shaped like a back·
ward S, which is centered on the current death toll.
A second feature of Figure 9.2 is that the utility for life lost is steeper than
the utility for life saved. For example, according to our expert, society would be
willing to pay more to prevent a given increase in the death toll than to reduce
the death toll by the same amount. In particular, the present state was preferred
by the expert to any gamble with an even chance to increase or decrease the death
toll by x lives.
A comparison of Figures 9.1 and 9.2 reveals the role of the reference point in the
assessment of utility functions. Apparently, the manner in which the problem is
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FIGURE 9.2 Utility function changes in the number of fatalities in traffic
accidents per year.
formulated determines one's reference point, which, in turn, determines the shape
of one's utility function. When the problem is stated in terms of the total number
of fatalities, zero fatalities is the natural reference point, and most people prefer
an even chance of losing 500 lives or nothing to an even chance of losing 100 or
400 lives. When the problem is stated in terms of changes in the number of fatal-
ities, the current level serves as the reference point. Suppose the current (yearly)
death toll is 500 lives. Then the problem becomes a choice between an even chance
to save 500 lives or nothing and an even chance to save 100 or 400 lives. Here,
almost all respondents prefer the latter option, contrary to their earlier choice.
The reference effect is not restricted to the assessment of the value of life. Very
similar findings are obtained for other attributes, notably money. When the utility
for money is assessed in terms of assets or wealth, one typically obtains concave
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functions. When the utility for money is assessed in terms of gains and losses, how-
ever, one often obtains S-shaped functions centered on the status quo. Several
examples of such utility functions elicited from corporate executives are reported
by Swaim (1966). Despite large differences in the ranges (the investigator adjusted
the range to the planning horizon of each executive) of the utility functions, their
shapes were very similar.
The reference effect is not limited to the assessment of unidimensional utilities.
It could also playa role in the assessment of multiattribute utility functions. To
illustrate, we presented a group of students with the following problem. Suppose
you can work an additional hour every day for an extra pay of 12 Israeli pounds.
Would you accept this offer? A second group of students was presented with the
converse problem. Suppose you can reduce your work load by I hour per day, and
reduce your pay by 1£12. Would you accept the offer? Almost all the participants
had been employed on either a part-time or a full-time basis.
In the absence of any effect due to the reference point, the overall proportion
(in both groups) of respondents willing to accept the new offer should be one-half.
On the other hand, if the utility associated with negative changes is steeper than the
utility associated with positive changes, then the overall majority of respondents
(in both groups) should reject the new offer. This is precisely what happened. In
each one of the questions, the majority of subjects preferred their present state to
the new offer. This result indicates that assessment of multiattribute utilities
depends on one's reference point and that the asymmetry between positive and
negative changes induces a conservative bias favoring the status quo.
These findings illustrate a general phenomenon, called the reference effect,
summarized by the following propositions:
First, attributes are often perceived and evaluated relative to some reference
point. The reference point typically corresponds to the status quo of the adap-
tation level, although it may also reflect one's expectations or level of aspiration. As
demonstrated in the above examples, different formulations of the same decision
problem could result in different reference points.
Second, the marginal utility of an attribute usually decreases with the (absolute)
difference from the reference point. According to this principle, the shape of the
utility function depends critically on the location of the reference point. If the
reference point coincides with the lowest value of the attribute, as in the assess-
ment of the utility for wealth, the resulting utility function will be concave. If the
reference point coincides with the highest value on the attribute, as in the assess-
ment of the utility for losses of lives or money, the resulting utility function will
be convex, as in Figure 9.1. Finally, if the reference point corresponds to some
intermediate value of the attribute, as in the assessment of the utility for gains and
losses, the resulting utility function will be concave above the reference point and
convex below it.
Third, the utility for negative changes is steeper than the utility for positive
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changes. Thus, u'(x) <u'(-x), provided u is increasing, and u(O) = 0, where u' is
the first derivative of u. The utility of gaining x units is thus generally smaller than
the disutility of losing x units. Whether a given outcome is viewed as a gain or a
loss is determined by the reference point.
The proposed principles of preference described above are closely related to
some of the basic principles of perception and judgment. First, our perceptual
apparatus is attuned to the evaluation of changes or differences rather than to the
evaluation of absolute magnitudes. People are much better in detecting changes
in attributes such as illumination or noise level than in evaluating the absolute level
of these attributes. Second, for most sensory and perceptual continua, the sensitivity
to changes decreases as one moves away from the adaptation level. Thus, the slope
of the subjective scale decreases with the distance from the reference point. A given
cost that appears exorbitant by itself often becomes insignificant when placed in
the context of a much larger expense. Note that this phenomenon implies that
people's utility function for losses is risk seeking and not risk averse. Third, a
greater sensitivity to negative than to positive changes is perhaps one of the basic
properties of the human organism; a high sensitivity to loss, pain, and noxious
stimuli has a defmite adaptive value.
9.3 SUMMARY AND COMMENT
The preceding sections described two phenomena, the certainty effect and the
reference effect, that reflect people's attitudes toward risks and toward changes.
These effects are common, stable, and persistent. They apply to many attributes,
and they can be found in the choices of both naive and sophisticated individuals.
Nevertheless, they are incompatible with the standard interpretation of expected
utility theory. These violations of utility theory cannot be attributed to careless-
ness or momentary changes of heart. Rather, they reflect systematic tendencies
shared by careful and intelligent people. The normative implications of these effects
for the study of decision making in general and the conduct of decision analysis in
particular are worthy of discussion.
First, both the certainty effect and the reference effect may be regarded as
errors of preference. Although both effects are to be expected in certain situations,
they are unacceptable from a normative standpoint. Nevertheless, they raise several
theoretical and practical issues concerning the intricate interplay between descriptive
and prescriptive theories of choice (Kahneman and Tversky, 1976).
The rationale for decision analysis rests on the fallibility of intuitive judgment.
The concept of error in preference, however, is not treated explicitly in applied
decision theory. Nevertheless, in order to justify the cornmor, procedures for
measuring utility and subjective probability, one must assume that the observed
violations of expected utility theory can be treated as random error. If the violations
218
are large and systematic rather than small and random, it is no longer possible to
infer proper utilities and probabilities from choices between hypothetical options.
No consistent utility function for wealth, for example, can be inferred from the
choices of an individual who evaluates monetary outcomes as gains or losses relative
to some reference point. Similarly, one cannot recover a proper subjective prob-
ability measure from the preferences of an individual who exhibits the certainty
effect. The application of decision analysis, therefore, presupposes the descriptive
validity of utility theory, at least as a first approximation. The existence of biases
such as the certainty effect and the reference effect underscores the need for
decision aids to help people make more consistent and rational choices. At the same
time, these biases call into question the validity of the common procedures used in
decision analysis to derive utilities and probabilities.
Much of the discussion of rationality in the context of utility theory focuses on
the prescriptive validity of certain axioms, such as the substitution condition of
von Neumann and Morgenstern or Savage's sure-thing principle. In these discussions,
people usually agree on the definition of the consequences and disagree on the
adequacy of various axioms. The classic argument between Allais (1953) and
Savage (1954) is a case in point. Both Allais and Savage are willing to defme the
consequences in monetary terms; they differ in their opinion of the nonnative
appeal of the sure-thing principle. It is my belief that the major nonnative issue
is the legitimacy of the consequences, or the proper interpretation of the outcomes.
Consider the certainty effect (Allais's example) as a case in point. If one views
the outcomes in terms of monetary gains, or number of lives lost, then the
certainty effect is clearly untenable. If, on the other hand, one includes the regret
associated with the failure to win the gamble (after giving up a sure gain) as part of
the consequences, then the certainty effect becomes compatible with utility theory.
Whether the certainty effect is rational, therefore, depends on the legitimacy of
introducing consideration of regret. This problem, however, lies outside the scope
of utility theory.
Consider next the reference effect. Economists and decision analysts tell us that
utility for money should be defined over final asset positions and not over gains and
losses. This proposition, however, does not follow from utility theory. If people
actually experience the consequences as gains and losses relative to some reference
point, should they not incorporate these experiences into their definition of con-
sequences? If man is constructed in such a way that he is highly sensitive to gains
and losses, then any attempt to maximize human welfare must recognize this fact.
One could argue, in return, that people are too sensitive to small changes around
a reference point and that the formulation of decision problems in terms of terminal
outcomes rather than gains and losses would improve the rationality of decisions.
This argument is appealing, but it is important to recognize that it does not follow
from utility theory. It tells people how they should feel, not what they should do.
Normative decision theory is fonnulated in tenns of an abstract set of con-
sequences that are the carriers of utilities. The axiomatic theory, by its very nature,
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leaves the consequences uninterpreted. Thus, such a theory can instruct people how
to maximize their utility functions; it cannot assist in the interpretation and the
evaluation of the consequences. Unfortunately, there is probably as much irration-
ality in the interpretation and the evaluation of consequences as there is in the
intuitive computation of expected utilities. In this respect, axiomatic utility theory
provides only a partial analysis of the problem of rational choice. A comprehensive
analysis of decision making should deal explicitly with the interpretation of out-
comes, the justification of preferences, and the legitimacy of values. Such an
analysis is likely to be explicative, or even therapeutic, rather than normative. To
the best of my knowledge, no systematic analysis of this type is available.
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DISCUSSION
MacCRIMMON: 1 would like to ask Dr. Tversky whether a certainty effect
perhaps oversimplifies what is really going on. We have done some recent work that
indicates that at least two parameters are related to this certainty effect - the
magnitudes of the probabilities and the magnitudes of the consequences. Suppose
you have two alternatives A and B. Alternative A yields $1,000 with probability
p and $0 otherwise. Alternative B yields with probability p a gamble of a 0.8
chance at $5,000 and a 0.2 chance at $0 or a 1 - P chance at $0. Let us start with
p = 1: A yields a sure $1,000 and B is a gamble. This is the kind of problem t!lat
Dr. Tversky is talking about, and we did indeed get results that are not consistent
with utility axioms.
On the other hand, when p is equal to 0.05, alternative A results in $1,000 with
probability 0.05 and alternative B yields $5,000 with probability 0.04. People
perceive no significant difference between these probabilities. So rather than say
certainty effect, I prefer to think of it as a kind of probability ratio. Our results
show that the proportion of people choosing B depends on p.
If we increase the $5,000 and $1,000 up to millions, the proportion of people
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choosing B still depends on p. However, the results indicate the proportion depends
not only on p but also on the magnitude of the consequences. What I am interested
in is the whole domain of magnitudes and probabilities. There seems to be a
certainty effect, but there also seems to be some type of magnitude effect that is
just as strong. We have obtained the same results for undesirable consequences.
Is it really appropriate to call what is happening a certainty effect if you look just
at one little piece of the domain? If you looked at the whole domain, maybe you
would find more complicated effects operating that require explanation. For
example, it might be that if you have gambles in only one part of the domain, then
you are safe in applying utility theory. However, when you must evaluate lotteries
with large differences in magnitude and probability, expected utility should be used
with care.
TVERSKY: I agree with Dr. MacCrimmon that the certainty effect does not
incorporate all violations of the substitution axiom. Nevertheless, it is probably
one of the most common and significant departures from utility theory. I suspect
that in the problems you studied, you get a sharp drop in the effect when you limit
yourself to risky combinations. There, the substitution principle will hold, at least
to a first approximation. The question raised by Dr. MacCrimmon is whether the
certainty effect is large enough to justify treating it as a separate effect or whether
it is a special case of something else. I think our data are not complete enough to
decide.
TODA: There is another effect that is also very interesting. People are sometimes
very serious about getting a $1 discount when they are buying $10 items, but they
usually do not ask for a $1 discount when they buy a car or a house. This is usually
explained by the flat utility over that area, but I just don't believe it. As Dr.
Tversky said, man is very sensitive to differences. I think that not only is the zero
point calibrated against the status quo, but also the full range of an attribute is
calibrated against the possible alternatives.
TVERSKY: I think that the effect described by Dr. Toda is a special case of
the reference effect. It follows from the fact that the marginal utility decreases with
the difference from the reference point.
TODA: I understood that by the reference effect you meant only the origin. I
am suggesting that the reference point for the unity is also important.
KULIKOWSKI: My argument is much the same as Dr. Toda's. I think there is
a danger that we are trying to generalize too much from some experimental facts.
You found that some people were more sensitive to losses than to gains. It is not a
general situation; it is possible to give examples where the opposite happens. I
think this is a very interesting approach to finding out what the real structure of
one's utility is. My feeling is that this is something very individual. Maybe we
should think about the mechanisms that motivate different attitudes.
FISHBURN: I have become aware recently of a number of S-shaped utility
curves that have been published in the literature. One of the things we find in many
of these situations is that the individual involved is satisfied by some kind of an
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expectation, a target level that he would like to meet. This might be something
that is set by his firm, like a 20 percent return, and in almost all cases the utility
functions show a sharp break in form at a point that the financial economists have
labeled the target point. Sometimes below the target you observe that this
phenomenon swamps things so that risk-seeking might be inferred. I think there
is a reasonable and very rational explanation for some of these breaks in the curves
with regard to this target or reference point.
In some situations I think there is the additional variable of individual prefer-
ences. This might be labeled embarrassment about falling below the target level. If
the decision maker has a chance of falling below the target level, he will take un-
favorable gambles in order to avoid looking as bad as he might otherwise. Above
the target he may be risk averse.
KEENEY: Let me expand on Dr. Fishburn's point that there may be an addi-
tional attribute in the problem. Let us define attribute X as income and attribute
Yas degree of embarrassment. The consequences (x,y) here are described by two
levels, the amount of money x and degree of embarrassment y. I might find that
any conditional utility function u(x, y') over the income levels, holding the degree
of embarrassment fixed at y', would have a nice risk-averse fonn. The fact is that
when my x level changes in a consequence (x ,y), then my y automatically changes.
There is a strong correlation of x and y levels in the consequences. Perhaps the
correlation is even one·to-one, meaning y is a function of x, call if [(x). If I
originally structure the problem in one variable, namely income, the utility func-
tion over X is really the utility function u[x,[(x)] over the consequences (x,y)
= [x, [(x)] . I think that this can sometimes be an explanation of the certainty effect.
MEYER: In many cases, I accept the explanation that Dr. Fishburn suggested,
which is that the real consequence is not the one that you are talking about. The
decision maker is looking at the discomfort of not meeting a target. Perhaps the
best example is a businessman's utility function for assets or earnings. When you
cover a range that includes bankruptcy, you can show that a businessman who is,
however you ask the questions, risk averse when business is as nonnal, becomes
terribly risk-seeking when he is near the danger of bankruptcy. Now that makes
good sense, since he has no more than everything to lose. The real consequences
are that his business goes bankrupt, and it doesn't matter whether it goes bankrupt
with a loss of $100 ,000 or $100 ,000,000. There is an artificial scale for large
negative losses. The same is true for the public servant who is concerned with traffic
accidents. It doesn't probably matter very much to him in terms of his public
position whether the consequences that he is engaged in are 100 more traffic deaths
a year or 300 more traffic deaths a year. He fails in either case and loses his job.
The scale with which failure should be measured is not the scale with which you
are asking the questions. Why do we have to try to explain those phenomena that
you have discussed in terms of reference effects or certainty effects that are
measured on just one scale, a single attribute? Shouldn't we be willing to investigate
them with more than one attribute?
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TVERSKY: There are many instances in which an S-shaped utility function
doesn't make sense, as in the case of the expert who assessed the utility function
for society. It is dangerous to defend such utility functions simply because in
another context a similar function could be defended.
There are two main possibilities for accounting for the certainty effect. One,
followed by Kahneman and myself, is to introduce uncertainty weights instead
of subjective probabilities and thereby abandon the expectation principle. The
second possibility, suggested by Dr. Keeney and Dr. Meyer, is to introduce an
additional attribute. This is, in part, a strategic problem: which approach is likely
to produce better results? It is my belief that one could develop an adequate
descriptive theory of choice by generalizing the expectation property, without
introducing additional attributes in an ad hoc fashion.
10 A Dynamic Consumption Modeland Optimization of
Utility Functionals
R. Kulikowski
10.1 INTRODUCTION
There is a vast amount of literature that approaches consumer behavior in terms of
multiple objectives or utility functions. Most of the work done in the field concen-
trates on the static situation that exists when the utility of a given commodity is
an instantaneous function of expenditures or, in other words, when commodities
purchased in the past have no influence on the present utility. This, however, is
not the case when one considers consumer expenditures for durable goods or
government expenditures in the fields of education, health, welfare, environmental
protection, and so on. In these cases, it is possible to introduce a dynamic con-
sumption model using a dynamic utility functional.
This paper has been motivated by the research concerned with the construction
of a complex, long-range, national development model. The model - MRI 1 - is
being constructed at the Institute of Organization and Management of the Polish
Academy of Sciences. It consists of three main submodels: production, consump-
tion, and environment. The consumption submodel is characterized by the utility
function with parameters that are estimated on the basis of past statistical data. It
takes into account the utility structure changes caused by GNP per capita and the
change in price indices. The model is normative, in the sense that one can investigate
the national growth path that would result from alternative development strategies
in terms of productive investment and government expenditures in such fields
as education, R&D, health service, and pollution control. [For more details con-
cerning the MRI methodology, see Kulikowski (1973, 1975a, b).]
The optimal investment strategies for MRI have already been derived (Kulikowski,
1975a,b). In the present paper, an effort is made to derive the optimal consumer
and government expenditure strategies - those that maximize the utility functional.
1 Model Rozwoju numer I (Development model no. I).
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10.2 DYNAMIC CONSUMPTION MODELS
Consider a single (or aggregated) consumer having at his disposal in the time interval
[0, TJ the given amount of financial resources Z. The fmancial resources, generally
speaking, consist of salaries, savings, and the like. It is assumed also that the con-
sumer can obtain a loan in order to realize the dynamic consumption strategy in
[0, TJ should the demands of that strategy exceed his salary in certain subsets of
[0,1']. He is supposed, however, to pay back the loan (together with interest)
before the end of T interval.
Assume also that the consumer's overall utility function U(x), xeSl, where n
is a given subset of N-dimensional space En, is given. It is well known (see Chipman,
1960; Fishburn, 1970) that U(x) is a real-valued, order-preserving vector function.
However, to be more specific, we shall deal with the widely used function 1
N
U(x) = Uon xfj, (10.l)
j= 1
where Uo, ~j, i = 1,2, ... ,N are given positive constants, and
N
L ~j <. 1.
j=1
(10.2)
(10.3)
Assume that Xj, i = 1, ... ,N represents the consumer's component utility
levels, which are related to the expenditure intensity Yi(t), t €lO, T] ,i = 1, ... , N
in an inertial and nonlinear fashion (for convenience, rather than general method·
ology, we shall deal with continuous instead of discrete time variables):
Xj(t) = ( kj(t, r) [yj(r)] aidr,
where kj(t, r) = given nonnegative function, kj(t, r) = 0 for t < r; and (Xj = given
positive number less unity. A typical example of kj(t, r) is the stationary [i.e.,
kj(t, r) = kj(t - r)] delayed exponential function, Le.,
= 0,
t> 1;,
t< 1;.
In the last case, the consumer expenditures create no utility before t = 1;. Such
a situation happens, for example, in education and health expenditures. For instance,
in order to command a better salary, the consumer must finish school, which will
cost him Yj(t) in money and 1; in years of study.
It should be observed that, because of the exponent -Ojt, the utility level (i.e.,
the health or training level) decreases with time if no additional expenditures are
incurred.
1 That function has also been adopted in the first version MRI models. An extension of Equation
(l0.1) to the CES (constant elasticity of substitution) function is also possible.
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(10.5)
where
If no dynamic effects are present, (i.e., when the change in expenditure results
in an immediate change of utility), one can write formally ki(t) = Aio(t) [where
o(t) is the Dirac's unitary pulse] and get
Xi(t) = Ai [Yi(t)] Cl'i.
(A more elegant notation based on distribution theory can also be used here. In
that case o(t) can be regarded as a linear functional.)
It should also be observed that, because 0 < Qi < I, there is a "decreasing return
to scale" effect in (10.3) that corresponds to saturation of utility level (e.g., the
training or health level) with respect to increase of expenditures.
Since Xi, i = 1, ... , N are generally functions of time, it is necessary to deal
with the time-averaged utility,
D(y) = fT wet) U(x)dt, (lOA)
o
where w(t) = given discount function, such as wet) = (I + rft (r = discount rate);
and D(y) is a nonlinear function with respect to the vector functiony(t) = {Y1(t),
Y2(t), ... ,YN(t)}, tdO, T].
In the model being discussed, we do not take into account the effects caused by
past expenditures, i.e., the expenditures for t < O. One possible way of taking these
expenditures into account is to replace (10.3) by
Xi(t) = xlt) +rki(t, T) [Yi(T)] Cl'idT,
o
Xi(t) = r~ ki(t, T) [Yi(T)] Cl'idT
represents the utility of commodities purchased in the past.
In order to derive the optimal consumption strategy,
(l0.4), subject to the monetary constraints:
N JTL Wi(t)Yi(t)dt ";;Z,
i =1 0
Yi(t);;;'O,tdO,T],i= 1, ... ,N,
one should maximize
(10.6)
(10.7)
where Wi(t) = weights or interest functions [when loans are used, one can assume
Wi(t) = (I + Ei)T-t (Ei = interest rate)] ;and Z = total consumer financial resources.
The present model can be used mainly for investigation of the behavior of the
single (or aggregated) consumer only. In the case of macromodeling of centrally
planned economies, one can use the following extension of the present model.
Let there be n different consumer classes, each described by the utility
Ui(Yi) = UOi faT l11 {f kvi(t - T) [Yvi(T)] Cl'vdT }iJ V W(t)dt, (10.8)
where UOj > 0, Qv€(O, 1), ~:;r=1 ~v = 1; and kvi(t) = nonnegative functions.
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The expenditure intensities Ylli(t) should satisfy the following
n iT
.I Zlli <ZIl'Zlli = wit)Ylli(t)dt, 11= 1, ... ,N
and /=1 0
Ylli(t);;;' 0, tdO, T] , i = 1, ... ,n, II = 1, ... ,n,
constraints:
(10.9)
(10.1 0)
where Zlli = the expenditure of ith consumer class for 11th commodity.
In the present model ZI may represent aggregated consumer private expendi-
tures (out of his salary) while Z2,'" ,ZN represents government expenditures in
such fields as education, health, social care, and environment. The expenditures
Z2, ... , ZN can be regarded as the government contribution to the social welfare.
The government recognizes here that the utility functionals are different for dif·
ferent classes of consumers, and it tries to allocate the fmancial resources (by means
of differentiating salaries, medical and social care, and the like) so as to maximize
utility. For example, the government may compensate miners for their hard work
by improving their medical and social care.
The problem of optimization of consumption strategy consists of findingYlli(t)
=Ylli(t), i = 1, ... , n, II = 1, ... ,N, such that the functional
n
U(y) = I Ui(Yi)
i=1
(10.11)
attains a maximum subject to constraints (10.9) and (10.10).
It should be observed that in the consumption model under discussion a de-
centralized system of consumption strategies has been adopted. According to this
system, the government is concerned with the best allocation of Z among N dif-
ferent spheres of activity, while each individual consumer is concerned with the
best allocation of his salary (represented by Zli, for instance).
10.3 SOLUTION OF THE OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM
In order to solve the problem, the following notation is introduced:
Zlli(t) = [Ylli(t)] QIl, II = 1, ... ,N, i = 1, ... , n.
It is convenient to consider first the single-consumer model [(10.1) to (10.6)] .
In the present case, we can drop the i index in (10.8) through (I 0.1 1), and our
problem becomes that of finding the nonnegative strategies ZIl(t) = ZIl(t), 11= 1,
... ,N, which maximize the functional
(10.12)
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where
subject to
SoT Wier) [Zi(r)] IIcxidr";; Zi, i = 1, ... , N. (10.13)
In order to solve the present problem, one can apply the generalized Holder
inequality il
rT N N (IT }vY =J
o
JJ
1
fvCr)dr";; []1 0 ft/ilv(r)dr ,
which becomes an equality if and only if (as is true almost always)
cdl/ill (r) = cJflili(r), re[O, T] , i = 1, ... , N,
where Ci = constant and i = 1, ... ,N. In that case, one obtains
N [ T t ]Y.,;;.TI (cl/cailir dt( k 1(t-r)ZI(r)dr
1=1 Jo Jo
N T IT
=.TI(CdCi)ilir zl(r)dr k 1(t-r)dt.
1=1 Jo T
where the equality appears if and only if (as is true almost always)
[
T ]~t 1(t) = CZl(t), ZI(t) = wiler) { k,(t - r)dt '-cx,.
The value of c can be derived by using (10.13), yielding
c = ( Z, }0<1f: w,(r)[z,(r)] 1I00'dr
(10.14)
(10.15)
(10.16)
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Then
Y(z) = fl (cdc;i'jZ Ia, { rT wI(r)
1= I Jo
[
T ]2a, }l-a,
. wll(r)t kl(t-r)dt dr
.n (c ~)(3j rT wI(r)[zl(r)] lIa, dr. (10.17)
,-I Cj Jo
The optimal strategies Zj(t), i = 2, ... , N, can be derived by using (10.14)1,
which can be transformed to an equivalent form, assuming the Laplace trans-
formations
exist.
Then
and
or
where
Kj(p) = L{kj(t)},Zj(p) = L{zj(t)},ZI(p) = cKr(p),
---l.......
Kr(p)= L{W1I(r)tT kl(t-r)dtr-a,
cIKI(p)ZI(p) = clcKI(p)Kr(p) = cjKj(p)Z;(p),
, ccIKI(P)Kr(p) .
Zj(p) = ()' I = 2, ... ,N,
cjKi p
A ( CI _ ( )
Zj t) = c - Zj t ,
Cj
Using the conditions (10.13), we get
Zj(t) = {g Wj(t) [~:(t)] lIajdtrZj(t), i = 1, ... , N,
and - instead of (1 0.17) - we obtain
(10.18)
where
N
Y(z) = Cq TI Z~II{3I1, q
11=1
(10.19)
I It can be shown that, in order to solve (10.14), the index i = 1 should be assigned to the
most inertial production factor specified by the set of {Kj(p)}.
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The solution obtained can also be used for the utility functions with noninertial
factors. In the simplest case, N = 2, when
y = LT {f k 1(t-r)ZI(r)drY [Z2(t)] 1-{3dt,
one can use (10.18), setting k 2(t) = 8(t) [K2(p) = 1] . The form of the solution in
the present case coincides with the result obtained by Kulikowski (1975a).
The results obtained so far can easily be extended to the general model described
in (10.8) through (10.11). We shall assume that all the expenditures in the vth sphere
of activity (Zv) are given and that they should be allocated among consumers (so
that ZVj represents the amount of vth expenditure for the ith consumer) in such a
way that the following relation holds:
nI Zv· ';;;;Zv, v = 1, ... ,N.
j =1 I
(10.20)
(10.21)
Taking into account (10.19), the consumer utility functions can be written as
N
y. = G'J n ZOi. v{3v
I 'V=l Vi '
where
N
q 1-Icxv{3v,i=1, ... ,n,
v =1
{rT }l/qJo wl(r)[Zli(r)] 1I0i. ' dr
N {IT }-Oi. v{3v IQ
. n wv(r)[zv.(r)] 1I0i. vdr .
v=1 0 I
Then the problem of optimum allocation of Zv, v = 1, ... ,N, among the n
consumers can be formulated as follows: Find the nonnegative ZVj =ZVi, v= 1,
... ,N, i = 1, ... , n, such that
n N
Y = I G~ n zep{3v
j=1 v=1 I
attains maximal value, subject to (10.20).
The solution to this problem (see Kulikowski, 1975b) is unique and assumes
the following form:
where
and
(Gi/G)Zv, v=l, ... ,N,i=I, ... ,n,
n
G I Gj
j=1
N
G? I zev{3v.
v=1
(10.22)
(10.23)
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The consumer's dynamic strategies ivi(f), II = I, ... , N, i = I, ... ,n, can be
derived by use of(10.18):
iv/f) = [ f~ wi(f) [:::(f)] IIC> idfrzv,(f),
where
II = I, ... ,N, i = I, ... ,n, (10.24)
(10.25)
- '(f) = L -1 [KUP)K li(p)}
ZVI Kvi(p) '
Kvi(p) = L{kvi(f)}, K li(p) = L{kli(f)},
K!i(P) = L [Wi"I(T)IT kli(t-T)dft,Il-C>I.
Now it is also possible to solve explicitly the problem of optimal allocation of
total consumption Z generated by the economy among the different spheres of
activity represented by the expenditures Zv, II = I, ... , N. In other words, one
would like to find the nonnegative values Zv = tv, II = I, ... , N, such that the
aggregated utility described by (10.23) attains a maximum subject to the constraint
~;y= 1 Zv ,,;;; Y *.
The unique solution of that problem becomes
Qvl3v
N Y*, II = I, ... ,N.
~ Qvl3v
v=1
It can be shown that the strategy outlined in (10.25) also maximizes the result-
ing utility function:
N
U = [j f1 ZYv [j = constant
V= 1 v'
10.4 CONCLUSIONS
In the dynamic consumption model described by (10.1) through (10.11), there
is an optimal strategy of allocation of expenditures. This unique strategy can be
derived explicitly by use of (10.22), (10.24), and (10.25).
As already mentioned, the model discussed can be used for long-term modeling
of the consumption sector of the normative model of national development MRI.
In particular, it can be used for planning of the allocation of resources in the sphere
of aggregate consumption (i.e., the government expenditures in health, education,
and the like) of a planned economy.
The model can also be used to explain the individual consumer's expenditure
strategy, during the life-span. For example, it can be shown (Kulikowski, 1975)
that the optimum expenditures for durable goods (such as housing and education)
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decrease with time, while expenditures for immediate consumption goods increase.
This behavior cannot be explained by a static consumption model. In the dynamic
model the "investments" at the end of the optimization interval do not pay, and
the consumer's strategy is understandable.
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DISCUSSION
MEYER: In your objective function you integrate over time for a given com-
modity and then multiply over all commodities. If you were to exchange the time
and commodity subscripts, you would be multiplying single period functions over
all commodities. I think perhaps your analysis would be unaltered. That seems to
be worth investigating.
KULIKOWSKI: Yes, I believe that's correct.
RAIFFA: Leaving aside the mathematics of how to do it, the model very much
looks like the capitalist models, where you have to consider benefits and costs
in several time periods.
KULIKOWSKI: The overall goal is to allocate resources in the most efficient
way - to maintain an efficient economy. From this point of view, we take a
normative approach. It starts with the utility functional.
11 State-Dependent Time Preference
Richard F. Meyer
11.1 STATE-DEPENDENT UTILITIES
The consequences of a decision are often spread out over time, sometimes over
very long periods of time: for example, the stream of income and cash flow due
to a long-term investment; the stream of personal consumption due to a career
decision; and the stream of environmental quality measures due to a plant-siting
decision. In all these cases it is natural to divide time into discrete periods (e.g.,
months or years). Let us denote by x = (XJ,X2, ... ,xn ) a time-stream of con-
sequences, where Xi refers to the consequences in period i.
Since most problems in which temporal considerations are important involve
long periods of time, they also involve considerable uncertainty. Hence we would
like to obtain a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function u(x) for the stream
x. The expectation of u can then be used when making decisions under uncertainty.
A number of results have been derived (see Meyer, 1970; Richard, 1972; and
Oksman, 1974) which allow us to structure the multiperiod utility function u in
terms of single-period functions, using a variety of utility-independence assump-
tions. These utility-independence assumptions require that no preference-learning
take place - e.g., that the consumption levels we are to enjoy in the near future
will in no way affect our preferences for consumption in the distant future. Since
this is in many cases too gross an assumption, this paper explores the implications
of allowing state-dependent preferential learning.
For the sake ofconcreteness, let us confine ourselves to the example of a person's
preference for his consumption stream C = (Cl, C2, ... ,cn ). We shall sometimes
wish to think of Cn as the legacy, and we may wish to partition the entire stream
into a "past" and a "future" relative to time m according to cm = (cJ, C2, ... ,cm )
and cm = (cm , cm +1> •.• , cn), where m = 1,2, ... ,n. Alternatively, we may
think of cm as the "near" future (if "now" is just before period 1) and of cm as
the "distant" future. Lowercase letters will denote actual consumption levels, and
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uppercase letters the corresponding attribute "consumption." For example, Cj is
the level in period i of the attribute Cj , which we think of as "period-i consump-
tion."
Our aim is to structure a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility u(c) that allows
experiential adaptation of preferences. Most multivariate structures derived for
u(c) have assumed that decisions about the "distant" future Ct+ 1 are utility-indepen-
dent from those about the "immediate" future Ct for all 1 ,;;;;; t <n. Yet in many
cases we would not expect people to act in so super-rational a manner. For example,
we may become accustomed to the standard of living recently experienced and
adjust our aspiration levels and the scale of our risk aversion so as to conform to
this recent experience. Or we may feel that we appreciate a high standard of living
more after a period of relative deprivation and that we mind a (temporary) low
standard of living less when we know that it will be followed by a period of
affluence. These are all examples of utility dependence: our preferences for the
future are affected by our past experience, or our preferences for the immediate
future depend on what the distant future holds in store. This paper focuses on the
special utility structures appropriate in such cases.
11.2 EFFICIENT BACKWARD AND FORWARD STATE DESCRIPTORS
Consider u(ct , Ct+l) as a utility function for Ct+1 ("the future") when Ct ("the
past") is given. Since Ct +1 is utility-dependent on Ct (i.e., the past does matter),
u(Cf, Ct+l) when viewed as a function of ct+1 is not strategically equivalent to
u(c~,ct+1) for all c~. Another way of saying this is to observe that our utility for
Ct+l may be affected by certain features of the past, although not necessarily by
all the detail contained in the full description of the past, Ct. It is therefore natural
to introduce a state descriptor of the past, sict), where St(·) may itself be vector-
valued (although presumably of lower dimension than ct ) and where it has the
property that two different pasts, ct and c~, which have the same St [i.e., St(Ct)
= St(c~)l , will lead to strategically equivalent utilities for the future. We may then
regard the conditional utility of Ct +1 given Ct as a function of St instead of ct ,
and we shall denote it as u t+1(Ct+ll stCct » - that is, the "forward" utility for
streams starting in period t + 1.
Thus far we have required only that St(·) be a more economical description of
the past than ct> but that it still be adequate for decisions regarding Ct+l' Now we
want to ask that St(·) be in some sense as economical a descriptor as possible for
this purpose. We therefore define St(") to be an efficient backward state descriptor
if and only if for any past state St the strategic equivalence of ut+1(·1 St) and
ut+l("1 s~) implies that St = s~. Another way of stating this is to require that all
Ct that lead to strategically equivalent (with respect to Ct+1) u(ct> .) be assigned
the same St.
Suppose we have introduced efficient backward state descriptors at times
(ll.2a)
(l1.2b)
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t - 1 and t. We may then prove the following important theorem, which asserts
the updatability of efficient state descriptors.
THEOREM 1 If St-l (.) and St(·) are both efficient backward state descriptors,
then St(·) is a function of st-! and Ct only.
Observe that Ut+1 and u t must for a given stream Ct be strategically equivalent
for decisions regarding Ct+l' Symbolically, this implies that
ut(c t , Ct+11 St-I) = a(ct , St-I> St) + b(ct, St-I> St)Ut+l(Ct+ll St), (11.1)
where a(') and b(·) may depend on anything other than Ct+I' Now suppose St
were not a function of St-I and Ct only - in other words, suppose that we can
change ct-! in such a way that St-I is kept constant but St changes (without chang-
ing c t ) to s~. In that case (11.1) implies that
Ut(Ct+l) = a(sd + b(sdut+1 (Ct+11 sd
= a(s;) + b(S;)Ut+l(Ct+11 s;),
where we have suppressed the dependence on ct and st-! since they are kept con-
stant in (11.2). Equating (I 1.2a) and (l1.2b) shows that u t+1(ct+ll St) and
Ut+1 (Ct+ll s;) are strategically equivalent. But if St(·) is efficient, this implies that
St = s;, which is contrary to our initial assumption that C~-1 could be changed
(while holding ct constant) so as to hold St-l constant but to change St. Hence
St = ft(Ct, St-l)'
The above argument was presented for backward state descriptors, but a com-
pletely analogous line of reasoning applies to forward state descriptors, 1t+1(Ct+l)'
which permit a less detailed, more economical description of the distant future
to serve as a conditioning variable for decisions affecting only the near future Ct.
Again, we may introduce the notion of an efficient descriptor: i.e., St+l(') is
efficient if, when uict 1St+l) and Ut(Ct I S~+I) are strategically equivalent, then
St+l = S;+I' Again an updatability theorem follows: St is a function of ct and
st+lonly.
11.3 UTILITY STRUCTURES RESULTING FROM EFFICIENT
STATE DESCRIPTORS
Let t < t' be two instants of time that divide all of time into three parts: a "past"
Ct prior to t; a "present" from t to t' that we shall denote by Ct,t' = (Ct+b ... ,
ct'); and a "future" Ct'+1 from t' on. Clearly, it would be desirable if decisions
regarding Ct,t' could be based on efficient state descriptors for ct and Ct'+1 when
such state descriptors exist. The following theorem shows that this is indeed the
case.
(l1.3a)
(1 1.3b)
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THEOREM 2 Let S; and St'+1 be backward and forward state descriptors
for decisions regarding Ct +1 and ct ' respectively. There will then exist a utility
function ut,dct,t' 1st , 5t'+I) that is strategically equivalent to u(c) for decisions
regarding Ct, t' only.
Proof To prove this theorem, we first observe that both Ut +1 and ut may be used
to make decisions regarding Ct,t', and hence they must be strategically equivalent
for such decisions. Let C~,t' and C;,t' denote, respectively, any least and most
desirable "presents," for a given past c t and future Ct'+I' Note that c~,t' and C;'t'
can depend 1 on c t and Ct' +1 only through St and St' +1'
Hence we may normalize Ut+1 and u t ' for decisions regarding c t ,t' between
C~,t' and C;,t' and equate both to Ut,t':
~ ( ~ I~) ~ (0 ~ I~)
u t +1 Ct,t', Ct'+1 St - Ut +l Ct,t', Ct'+1 St
Ut,t' = ~ (* ~ ~) +- (0 ~ I~ )
Ut+1 Ct,t',ct '+11 St - Ut+1 Ct,t', Ct'+1 St
udct, Ct,t' I5 t '+I) - udct> C~,t' I 5 t '+I)
udct, C;,t' I5t'+I) - udct> c~,t'l St'+I)'
Since (11.3b) depends on Cf, but (11.3a) depends on the past only through St,
it follows that changes in Ct that leave S; unchanged cannot affect Ut,t', so that
Ut,t' depends on the past only through St. Similarly, since (l1.3b) depends on the
future only through St' +1> it follows that u t , t' can depend only on the forward
state variable, which completes the proof of Theorem 2.
When the state descriptors are efficient, they impose a great deal of additional
structure on the utility for a stream. Suppose that for some value of t we knew
efficient backward and forward state descriptors St and St+1> respectively. What
can we then say about u(ct , ct +1)? We may drop the subscripts t and t + I, since
we are dealing with a given time t throughout. We observe that u(c, C) must be
strategically equivalent to u(cl S) for decisions affecting C only and that u(c, C)
must be strategically equivalent to u(ci S) for decisions affecting conly. It follows
that
U(C, C) = a(e) + b(e)u(c! s) = a(C) + b(C)u(cl S), (11.4)
where the a(') and b(') functions are scalars. Now, we deduce from the right-hand
side of (11.4) that Ucan depend on the future only through a, b, and S, so that U
depends at most on a, b, S, a, b, and S. We can think of these as the six "features"
of C that matter: three features of the past and three features of the future. Careful
analysis, however, will reveal that at most four of these features can vary indepen-
dently: sand 5 always affect our preferences, and any two of the other four may
1 --4> ~ - +-TOJ'rove this for C~,t', observe that Ut+, depends on Ct onl? throug!1 St and that ut' depends
on Ct'+1 only through st'+', so that, if ctt' mini~izes~(ct,Ct.t',Ct'+,) over all Ct,t', then
C~,t' will minimize Ut+1 for all pasts with the same St as Ct, and C~,t' will minimize ut for all
futures with the same st' +1 as ct' +1' A similar argument holds for ci,t'·
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enter as independently varying functions into the utility structure. This analysis
is carried out in the Appendix to this paper and is based on the following lemma.
LEMMA Let aCe) vary independently of b(e) and s(e), in the sense that for
some ethere exists a e' for which a(C') *- aCe) but 1) and sare unchanged. Then
b depends only on cthrough s.
Proof The proof follows from (11.4). Evaluate (11.4) at eand e' and subtract
the two to obtain
a(e) - aCe') == beC) [u(e IS) - u(C' Is)1for all c. (11.5)
Since the left-hand side of (11.5) does not depend on C, and since the factor on
the right in brackets depends on conly through S, it follows that b can depend on
conly through s.
From this lemma we conclude that the following three cases cover all possible
consistent "structures" for aand b:
I. ais independent of 1) and S, and b == b(S).
2. ais a function of 1) and sonly, and b can vary independently of s.
3. ais a function of 1) and sonly, and b == b(S).
Clearly, a similar lemma and trichotomy will hold when aand b are replaced by
aand 1), so that we have to examine a total of 3 x 3 == 9 subcases. These nine cases
are examined in the Appendix, and it is shown there that only the four subcases
deriving from cases I and 2 above matter - case 3 does not contribute a new and
different structure. The resulting four structures are
u == a+ a+ f(S, S)
u 1) b f(s, S) + constant
u == a + 1) f(s, S)
u == a+ b f(s, S)
(11.6)
(11.7)
(11.8)
(11.9)
where a and 1) (a and b) denote functions of e(c) that may be independent, in
the sense of the lemma, of each other and of s (S). Note that each of the four
forms contains two "features" of the stream c in addition to sand s. In (11.6)
and (11.7) past and future are treated symmetrically, with one feature devoted
to each. Clearly, (11.6) is a generalization of the additive form, and (11.7) is a
generalization of the multiplicative form. It is interesting to observe that the only
utility dependence of past and future enters through sand s. By contrast, past
and future are treated asymmetrically in (11.8) and (11.9), both features being
assigned to one or the other. Thus (11.8) implies that an efficient forward de-
scriptor s that tells all one needs to know about the distant future to make decisions
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about the near future is all one cares about when making decisions about the dis-
tant future.
The next question to explore is: What happens when one of the four forms
(11.6)-(11.9) applies at every time t? The general answer to this question is un-
known, but there are a number of interesting structures that result from the sym-
metric cases (I 1.6) and (I 1.7). We begin by observing that if u satisfies (Il.6),
then eOlU + i3 satisfies (I 1.7), so we need consider solutions to (I 1.6) only. One such
solution is of the form
u(c) = tl at(ct) + f (tl Zt(ct) + So + Sn+l) . (I 1.10)
This satisfies (I 1.6) for 1 <, t <, n, as we may see by identifying a, a, s, and S
according to
t n
at = I af'{ct'); at+1 = I a«ct')
t' =1 t'= t+1
t n
St = So + I Z«Ct'); St+1 = L Zt'(Ct') + Sn+I'
t'=1 t'=t+1
An especially simple form of u results if we choose f(·) in (I 1.10) to be an
exponential function. In that case the single-period utility for period t will be a
linear combination of at(·) and Zt(·), with weights that depend on the pattern of
C in all other periods. Thus we could, for example, choose at(·) and zk) to be two
exponential utility functions with different risk aversion, e.g., - e-OlCt and - e-rct ,
so that the utility for period t is the sum of two exponentials (Meyer and Pratt,
1968; Schlaifer, 1971), but with a risk-aversion function that changes from O! to ~
over a range of c t determined by all other components of c. Alternatively, we could
choose at(·) = Zt(·), in which case (11.10) becomes the special case of the multi-
linear form when only the pure sum and pure product term are present.
Equation (11.1 0) is not the only form of solution that satisfies (11.6) for every
t. Another useful structure is given by
n n+1
u(c) = I L Yt(Ct)z«Ct'),
t=o t'=t+1
where for notational convenience we have introduced
(l1.11a)
Yo(·) = So,Zn+I(·) = Sn+I' (I1.11b)
The proper identification of a, a, s, and S can be made by rewriting (11.11a) as
follows (arguments are dropped throughout):
u(c) = (yo +YI + ... +Yt-I) (Zt + ... + Zn + zn+d
+ (Yo +YI + ... +Yt-2)zt-1 + ... + (Yo +YI)Z2 + YOZI (I 1.12)
!
II
~
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Let us introduce the state descriptors St-l and St according to
St-l = Yo +Yl + ... +Yt-l; St = Zt + ... + Zn + zn+1> (11.13)
so that the first line in (I 1.12) is the product St-l St. The second line of (I 1.12)
depends only on the past, so we identify it as at-I> and the third line is clearly at
since it depends only on the future.
A particularly interesting form of (I 1.Ila) occurs when we choose
(I 1.14)
(11.15)
In this case St-l and St are obtained by discounting, with heavier weights given to
time periods closer to t. In other words, the discounting is backward for St and
forward for St-I> just as we would want. Also, the single-period utility for period
t is of the form
Ut(Ct Ict) = (yo + ... +Yt-l)Zt +Yt(Zt+l + ... + zn+l)
[
t ] [n+l-t 1
= tt (3iY(Ct_D z(ct) + ~1 ~z(Ct+D Y(Ct),
so that single-period utilities are a sum of z(·) and y(. ) with weights depending on
the past and the future, respectively. Thus we have found a way to reintroduce
discounting, but for the state descriptors rather than to combine single-period
utilities.
There is yet another special form to be derived from (I 1.11 a). Earlier it was
stated that if the U given by (I 1.11 a) satisfies (I 1.6), - e-au will satisfy (I 1.7).
Let us choose Yk) = (3-t w( 0) and Zt = (3tw(o), so that
[
n-l n J
u(c) = - exp - a L ,L (3t'-tw(Ct)w(cf') .
t=l t =t+l
The single-period utilities become
[
n t-l ]
ut(Ct Ict) = - exp - a ,L (3t'-tw(cf') + ~ (3t-t'w(ct') w(ct),(11.16)
t=t+1 t =1
so that single-period utilities are of the form ut = - exp [- 'Ytw(Ct)] where 'Yt
depends on the past and the future. Now we recognize that if Ut is of this form,
then the single-period risk-aversion function (see Pratt, 1964) is
and this shows how the past and the future influence, through 'Yt, our risk aversion
for the current period.
Equation (I 1.15) is a very useful form for further analytical work, especially if
w( 0) is chosen to be linear. It exhibits all the discounting, risk-aversion, and
temporal-interdependence properties we may feel necessary and thus shows the
richness of temporal preference modeling available to us through the use of efficient
state descriptors.
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II.A APPENDIX
In this appendix the implications of (11.4), reproduced here for convenience,
are explored:
u(e, c) aCe) + D(eYu(c Is)
aCe) + D(c)u(els)
(11.AI)
(1I.A2)
Following the reasoning outlined in section 11.3, we trichotomize the properties
of forward and backward descriptors, depending on whether a (a) may vary
independently of Dand s (D and S). The resulting nine cases, which are mutually
exclusive and jointly exhaustive, are shown in Table II.AI. For each case, the way
in which (II.AI) and (1I.A2) specialize under the particular assumptions regarding
a, a, D, and b is reported, and the resulting equations are marked (1) and (2),
respectively. Each case implies a certain structure for u(e, c), which is also shown
in the table. The arguments necessary to derive this structure from equations (1)
and (2) are given below for six of the nine cases. The other three cases follow from
symmetry arguments. It is also shown below that the resulting utility structure in
each case satisfies the corresponding equations (1) and (2) - i.e., it is both necessary
and sufficient.
The arguments are presented in detail for the first case, so as to explain the
notation and general method. The other cases are dealt with more concisely, and
reference to Table II.AI is necessary.
CASE I
We see from Table II.AI that (II.AI) and (Il.A2) specialize to
u - a + D(s)u(e!s)
a + D(S)u(el s).
(1)
(2)
Here the notation a (a) without argument is meant to convey that a (a) can,
through appropriate changes in e (c), be made to vary without varying D (D) or
s (S). Similarly, the notation D(S) [D(S)] conveys the fact that variations in e
(c) influence ]j (D) only through their impact on s(S).
It follows from (1) that u can depend on eonly through aand S, and it follows
similarly from (2) that u can depend on eonly through aand S, so we may, without
loss of generality, write u as
u = a+ a+ f(s, s, a, a) (11.A3)
where fis an arbitrary function.
Substitute (1I.A3) in (1) and (2) to obtain
D(s)u(els) = a + f(s, S, ii, a)
D(S)u(elS) = a + f(s, S, a, a).
(I1.A4)
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Since the left-hand side of (Il.A4) depends on conly through S, it follows that
the righ t·hand side cannot depend on aand S, so [does not depend on a. Similarly,
it is argued from (II.AS) that [cannot depend on Ii either, so [must be a function
of sand salone, hence the result
u = a + Ii + [(s, s). (ll.A6)
Finally, we must show that (II.A6) actually satisfies (I) and (2) - i.e., that (I)
and (2) impose no further conditions on u beyond those already accounted for in
deriving (II.A6). From (I), (2) and (11.46), we conclude that
l1(e Is) = Ii +~g' s) (ll.A7)
and
<-(<- ---> _ a+[es, s)
u cis) - b(S) . (lI.A8)
Equation (lI.A7) is indeed dependent on conly through S, and (lI.A8) depends
on eonly through S, so consistency is established.
CASE II
Equation (2) implies that u depends on eonly through S. Hence we see from (I)
that u(e Is) can depend only on sand s. Call this function [(s, s), and the result
follows. Equation (I) is automatically satisfied. Equation (2) implies that
<-(<-1---> - a + b [(s, s) - 1i(S)
u c s) - b(s) ,
which indeed depends on eonly through S.
CASE III
Equation (2) implies that u depends on eonly through S, so from (I) we reason
that u depends on eonly through s; hence we may set b u= [(s, s), which yields
the indicated result. By analogy to case II, it then follows from (2) that
u(cls)
so we again have consistency.
a + [(s, s) - 1i(S)
b(s)
CASE V
It follows from (I) and (2) that u depends only on b, D, s, and S, and that
-li(b,s)+bu(els) = -a(b,s)+bu(cls). (ll.A9)
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The left-hand side of (l1.A9) is a linear function of D, and the right-hand side is
a linear function of 15, so that both sides must be multilinear in Dand 15; that is,
they must be equal to
0:0 + 0: 1D+ 0:215 + 0:31:i 15, (ll.AlO)
where the o:'s may depend on s and s but not on Dand 15. Comparison of like
terms of (Il.AlO) and (Il.A9) yields
- a(15, s) == 0:0 + 0:215 (Il.All)
u(cls) == 0:1+0:35 (Il.AI2)
- ti(D, s) == 0:0 + O:ID (Il.A13)
u(cls) == 0:2 + 0:3D (Il.AI4)
Equation (Il.All) implies that 0:0 cannot depend on S, and (Il.A13) implies that
0:0 cannot depend on S, so 0:0 must be a constant. Similar further analysis of the
four equations above reveals that 0: 1 is a function of s but not of s, that 0:2 is a
function of sbut not of S, and that 0:3 may be a function of sand s. Substitution
of (Il.A12) and (Il.AI3) in (I) therefore yields
u == - 0:0 + Db 0:3(S, s),
which is the desired result if 0:3 is renamed f. Sufficiency may be proven by sub-
stituting (I l.AI 1) and (ll.AI2) in (2) and deriving the same expression for u.
CASE VI
From (1) we conclude that u depends on conly through s; hence from (2) it follows
that u== f(s,s), whence the result. That this result also satisfies (I) is seen by
solving (I) for u:
-->(--> ~) _ arb, s) + 15 f(s, s) - a{n
u cis - D(S) ,
which indeed depends on conly through S.
CASE IX
Equation (I) implies that u depends on conly through s; equation (2) implies
that u depends on conly through S, hence the result, which is automatically con-
sistent with (I) and (2).
CONCLUSION
A review of the results in Table II.Al allows identification of the truly different
structures that have been uncovered. It is clear that the four cases I, II, IV, and V
are fundamentally distinct, whereas all others are special cases of these four: III
is a subcase of II; VI a subcase of IV; IX a subcase of all four, and so on.
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DISCUSSION
PESCHEL: In some cases it might be natural to demand the utility independence
condition between the variables in a certain interval from all the variables of inter-
vals that are some specified distance out from this interval. This seems to correspond
to a special case of your results.
MEYER: Yes, because in that case you want the state descriptor St to depend on,
say, consumption in the three preceding periods, but not on consumption four or
more periods ago. We want to use as a state descriptor St = (Cl> ct - b Ct-2), which
can be updated by just shifting components and moving the next one in. An example
of a real problem where such assumptions seemed appropriate was worked out by
David Bell (see Chapter 18). His results fit neatly into this theory.
KULIKOWSKY: Is there any assumption about forgoing some present consump-
tion to obtain greater future consumption? In other words, you invest now and you
get the benefit in the future. Do you have something like that here?
MEYER: No, because we are talking about the preferences. First you must assess
the utility for the consumption streams. You must also consider the economic
environment, which includes the production function and anything that determines
the constraints the real world imposes. Then you ask an optimization question,
which is how to act in that constrained environment. What choices should you make
in order to maximize expected utility? There is nothing in this model about environ-
mental constraints of any sort.
LARICHEV: How can you verify conditions such as those described in your
paper?
MEYER: That's not easy. David Bell describes (Chapter 18) how he derived
one such utility function in the case of the budworm situation. It required pains-
taking, careful questioning about what you would do in the way of decisions if
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you had one past, what you would do if you had another past, if you had a third
one, and so on . You try to infer from the responses such things as whether there are
independence conditions, or whether there are state variables that you seem to be
dependent on. In other words, you attempt to map out the preferences as people
reveal them through answers to hypothetical questions.
You can do it only through hypothetical questions. But it is to be hoped that
these hypothetical questions relate very strictly to problems of extreme urgency
to the person you are talking to. It's quite different to ask a random individual
rather than a statesman about inflation versus unemployment trade-offs, especially
when that individual feels he has no impact on the trade-offs between inflation
and unemployment. But when you are trying to get a decision maker to assess
things that are very urgent to him, then I think these hypothetical questions are a
lot more meaningful and the answers are a lot more trustworthy.
Part Two
Applications

12 Use of Multiattribute Utility Measurementfor Social Decision Making 1
Ward Edwards
Decisions do, and should, depend on values and probabilities - both subjective
quantities. Public decisions, even more than other kinds, also should depend on
values and probabilities. These quantities should be public, not only in the sense of
being publishable, but also in the sense that the values, and perhaps the probabilities,
that lie behind the decision should depend on some kind of social consensus, or at
least on some kind of aggregation of individual views, rather than on any single
individual's views.
The problem of obtaining such aggregate numbers differs for values and prob-
abilities. A strong case can be made that probabilities should be generated out of
data and expertise whenever both are available. Unless you happen to have a pocket
calculator handy, your opinion about whether the natural logarithm of 222 is
5.40258 is not nearly so good as mine; I just calculated it. Considerations of social
justice, every man's right to his own opinions, and the like, while never utterly
irrelevant even to probabilities, become less important as differences in expertise
become more important. Therefore, this paper will ignore the many fascinating
problems of combining or reconciling conflicting views about probabilities and will
deal only with the problem of public values.
As is discussed in detail below, the point just made about probabilities applies to
values as well. Some aspects of value, specifically the location of the objects to be
evaluated on the relevant dimensions of value, are also often matters of objective
information, expertise, or some mixture of both. Yet most of us would agree that
1 Preparation of this paper was supported by the Advanced Research Projects Agency, Depart-
ment of Defense, under Department of the Navy, ONR, Prime Contract with Decisions and
Designs, Inc., Subcontract #P.O.75-D30-D7Il between Decisions and Designs, Inc., and the
University of Southern California. Reproduction for any U.S. Government use is permitted.
I am grateful to Drs. Peter C. Gardiner, Marcia Guttentag, Michael F. O'Connor, and Kurt
Snapper for their permission to review at length work for which they were wholly or partly
responsible and to Drs. Edith H. Grotberg and Ralph Keeney for their helpful comments.
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individuals are entitled to disagree about values and to have those disagreements
respected and taken into account in public decision making. How can this be done?
Arrow's (1951) famous impossibility theorem has been interpreted by some as
offering an answer: it doesn't. I cannot bring myself to take that answer very
seriously, though I believe the theorem. Public decisions are made every day, and
they do respond to individual differences in values in a crudely aggregative fashion.
In my view, Arrow's assumptions are not strong enough. For one thing, he worked
with ordinal rather than cardinal utility; this paper takes cardinal utilities for
granted. For another, he was unwilling to assume the interpersonal comparability
of utilities. Yet, with or without axiomatic justification, we do in fact compare
strengths of preference every day. That argument, carried to its extreme, would
lead to the rather uninteresting idea of making social choices on the basis of the
averaged utilities of the people affected. Although social choices are often made
by mechanisms of this nature (e.g., by voting), they are not the subject of this
paper.
The thrust of this paper is that a public value is a value assigned to an outcome
by a public, usually by means of some public institution that does the evaluating.
This amounts to treating "a public" as a sort of organism whose values can be
elicited by some appropriate adaptation of the methods already in use to elicit
individual values. From this point of view, the problem's interest lies in finding the
appropriate adaptation ofthose methods - an adaptation that will take into account
individual disagreements about values, individual differences in relevant expertise,
existing social structures for making public decisions, and problems of feasibility.
The paper is structured around three examples. One is land use management,
specifically, a study aimed at the decision problems of the California Coastal Com-
mission. The decision·making body in this case is a regulatory agency exposed to a
wide variety of social pressures. While the public exposure to organized pressures is
explicit in this example, most of the issues that arise in this form of social decision
making also arise, often in subtler and more muted forms, in other social decision
contexts.
The second example is administrative decision making - specifically, the process
that the Office of Child Development of the U.S. Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare used in developing its research program for the 1974 fiscal year. It is
the only one of the three examples in which the tools were used to make real
decisions. In away, administrative decisions are misleading. The presence of a
senior administrator with official power to make the decisions suggests, incorrectly,
that this administrator's values are being maximized by the decisions made. Seldom
is the case so simple. For one thing, every boss has a boss, and everyone attempts
to take the values of his superiors into account in his own decisions. Moreover, every
competent boss has a staff whose views he respects and whose values he regards as
relevant, often more relevant than his own. Finally, administrative agencies often
serve specific public constituencies, in addition to serving some abstract and
impersonal ideal of the public good. The fact that values differ from one staff
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member to another and from one constituency to another makes the case of
the administrative decision maker not greatly different from the case of the
regulatory commission. By the time pressures from above and from below are
taken into account, little room may be left for the administrator's own personal
values.
The third example is more abstract; it concerns an attempt to develop a con-
sensus among disagreeing water quality experts about a measure of the merits of
various water sources for two purposes: the input, before treatment, to a public
water supply, and an environment for fish and wildlife. The experts were all in-
volved in public decisions about water, but each worked in a different jurisdiction,
so there was no need for consensus as a basis for decision. Still, agreed-upon measures
of water quality for these purposes would be very useful.
The ideas presented in this paper are closely related to, and grow out of, those
contained in Edwards (1971), Edwards and Guttentag (1975), and Edwards et aZ.
(1975). Conceptually, these discussions overlap. They are closely related to those
presented by Bauer and Wegener (1975); we, too, are engaged in exploring the
fusion of multiattribute utility measurement with differential equation modeling
as a tool for social planning. While this paper, being primarily concerned with exist·
ing applications, does not discuss that fusion, it may be helpful to keep its possi·
bility in mind as a reason for this discussion of approaches to conflicting social
values.
The focus of this paper is on planning. 1 do not understand the differences
among evaluations of plans, evaluations of ongoing projects, and evaluations of
completed projects; all seem to me to be instances of the same kind of intellectual
activity. Multiattribute utility measurement can and, 1 believe, should be applied
to all three; the only difference is that in ongoing or completed projects there are
more opportunities to replace judgmental estimates of locations on value dimen-
sions with utility transforms on actual measurements - still subjective, but with
firmer ground in evidence.
The fundamental idea is this. Arguments over public policy typically turn out to
hinge on disagreements about values. Such disagreements are often about degree,
not kind; developed and developing nations may agree on the virtues of both
increased industrialization and decreased degradation of the environment, but they
may differ about the relative importance of these goals. Normally, such disagree-
ments are fought out in the context of specific decisions, over and over again, at
enormous social cost each time another decision must be made. Multiattribute
utility measurement can spell out explicitly what the values of each participant
(decision maker, expert, pressure group, government, and so on) are and show how
and how much they differ - and, in the process, it can frequently reduce the extent
of such differences. The exploitation of this technology permits regulatory or
administrative agencies and other public decision·making organizations to shift their
attention from specific actions to the values these actions serve and to the decision-
making mechanisms that implement these values. By explicitly negotiating about,
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agreeing on, and (if appropriate) publicizing a set of values, a decision-making
organization can, in effect, inform those affected by its decisions about its ground
rules. This can often remove the uncertainty inherent in planning and can often
eliminate the need for costly, time-consuming, case-by-case adversary or negotiating
proceedings. Thus, explicit social policies can be defmed and implemented with
more efficiency and less ambiguity. Moreover, such policies can easily be changed
in response to new circumstances of changing value systems, and information about
such changes can be easily, efficiently, and explicitly disseminated, greatly easing
the task of implementing policy change.
12.1 A TECHNIQUE FOR MULTIATTRIBUTE UTILITY MEASUREMENT
Edwards (1971) has proposed the following technique for multiattribute utility
measurement based on extensive use of simple rating procedures. While it lacks
the theoretical elegance of techniques proposed by, for example, Raiffa (1968,
1969) or Keeney (1972), it has the great advantage of being easily taught to and
used by a busy decision maker or member of a decision-making staff or organiza-
tion. Moreover, it requires no judgments of preference or indifference among
hypothetical entities. My experience with elicitation procedures suggests that such
hypothetical judgments are unreliable and unrepresentative of real preferences;
worse, they bore untutored decision makers either into rejection of the whole
process or into acceptance of answers suggested by the sequence of questions
rather than answers that reflect their real values - or both.
The basic idea of multiattribute utility measurement is very familiar (see, for
example, Raiffa, 1968). Every outcome of an action may have value on a number
of different dimensions. The technique, in any of its numerous versions, is to dis-
cover those values, one dimension at a time, and then to aggregate them across
dimensions using a suitable aggregation rule and weighting procedure. Probably
the most widely used, and certainly the simplest, aggregation rule and weighting
procedure consists of simply taking a weighted linear average; only that procedure
will be discussed here. Theory, simulation computations, and experience all suggest
that weighted linear averages yield extremely close approximations to very much
more complicated nonlinear and interactive "true" utility functions, while remain-
ing far easier to elicit and understand. (See, for example, Wilks, 1938; Dawes and
Corrigan, 1974; and Einhorn and Hogarth, 1975.)
The technique consists of ten steps.
Step 1. Identify the person or organization whose utilities are to be maximized.
If, as is often the case, several organizations have stakes and voices in the decision,
they must all be identified. People who can speak for them must be identified and
induced to cooperate.
Step 2. Identify the issue or issues (Le., decisions) to which the utilities needed
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are relevant. Depending on context and purpose, the same objects or acts may
have many different values. In general, utility is a function of the evaluator, the
entity being evaluated, and the purpose for which the evaluation is being made. The
third element of that function is sometimes neglected.
Step 3. Identify the entities to be evaluated. Formally, they are outcomes of
possible actions. In a sense, however, the distinction between an outcome and the
opportunity for further action is usually fictitious. The value of a dollar is the value
of whatever you choose to buy with it; the value of an education is the value of the
things the educated person can do that he could not have done otherwise. Since it is
always necessary to cut the decision tree somewhere - to stop considering outcomes
as opportunities for further decisions and instead simply to treat them as outcomes
with intrinsic values - the choice of what to call an outcome becomes largely one
of convenience. In practice, it is often sufficient to treat an action itself as an out-
come. This amounts to treating the action as having an inevitable outcome - that
is, one assumes that uncertainty about outcomes is not involved in the evaluation
of that action. Paradoxically, this is often a good technique when the outcome is
utterly uncertain, so uncertain that it is impractical or not worthwhile to explore all
its possible consequences in detail and assign probabilities to each.
When uncertainty is explicitly taken into account in social decision making, the
tool of choice for doing so is often a set of scenarios, each with a probability. A
scenario is simply a hypothetical future, organized around the stakes in the decision
at hand and taking into account the effect of various exogenous factors on the
value of these stakes. While there has been considerable sophisticated experience in
the combined use of scenarios and multiattribute utilities, no reports on this
experience have yet been published.
Step 4. Identify the relevant dimensions of value for evaluation of the entities.
As Raiffa (l969) has noted, goals are ordinarily hierarchical. It is often practical
and useful to ignore their hierarchical structures, however, and instead to specify
a simple list of goals that seem important for the purpose at hand.
It is important not to be too expansive at this stage. The number of relevant
dimensions of value should be modest, for reasons that will become apparent
shortly. The number of dimensions can be limited by restating and combining goals,
or by moving upward in a goal hierarchy. Even more important, it can be limited by
simply omitting the less important ones. There is no requirement that the list
evolved in this step be complete, and there is much reason to hope that it will not
be.
Step 5. Rank the dimensions in order of importance. This ranking, like Step 4,
can be performed either by an individual or by representatives of conflicting values
acting separately or by those representatives acting as a group. I prefer to try group
processes first, so that the various arguments can be expressed openly, thus giving
the participants a common information base, and then to get separate judgments
from each individual. The separate judgments will differ, of course, both here and
in the following step.
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Step 6. Rate dimensions in importance-preserving ratios. To do this, start by
assigning the least important dimension an importance of 10. (We use 10 rather
than 1 to permit subsequent judgments to be fiI\ely graded and nevertheless ex-
pressed in integers.) Now consider the next-least-important dimension. How much
more important (if at all) is it than the least important? Assign it a number that
reflects that ratio. Continue on up the list, checking each set of implied ratios as
each new judgment is made. Thus, if a dimension is assigned a weight of 20, while
another is assigned a weight of 80, it means that the 20 dimension is one-fourth
as important as the 80 dimension. By the time you reach the most important
dimensions, there will be many checks to perform; typically, respondents will want
to revise previous judgments to make them consistent with later ones; this is
acceptable. Once again, individual differences are likely to arise.
Step 7. Sum the importance weights, divide each by the sum, and multiply by
100. This is a purely computational step that converts importance weights into
numbers that, mathematically, are rather like probabilities. The choice of a 0-to-100
scale is, of course, completely arbitrary.
At this step, the folly of including too many dimensions at Step 4 becomes
glaringly apparent. If 100 points are to be distributed over a set of dimensions and
some dimensions are very much more important than others, then the less im-
portant dimensions will have nontrivial weights only if there are not too many of
them. As a rule of thumb, eight dimensions is enough, and fifteen is too many. At
Step 4 respondents should be discouraged from being too fmely analytical; rather
gross dimensions will be appropriate. Moreover, the list of dimensions may be
revised later, and that revision, if it occurs, will typically consist of increasing rather
than decreasing the number of dimensions.
Step 8. Measure the location of each entity being evaluated on each dimension.
The word "measure" is used rather loosely here. There are three classes of dimen-
sions: purely subjective, partly subjective, and purely objective. The purely sub-
jective dimensions are perhaps the easiest; an appropriate expert is simply asked
to estimate the position of that entity on that dimension on a 0-to-100 scale,
where 0 is defined as the minimum plausible value and 100 is defmed as the maxi-
mum plausible value. Note "minimum and maximum plausible" rather than "mini-
mum and maximum possible." The minimum plausible value often is not total
absence of the dimension.
A partly subjective dimension is one in which the units of measurement are
objective but the locations of the entities must be subjectively estimated.
A purely objective dimension is one that can be measured nonjudgmentally, in
objective units, before the decision. For partly or purely objective dimensions, it
is necessary that the estimators provide not only values for each entity to be
evaluated but also minimum and maximum plausible values, in the natural units of
each dimension.
At this point we can identify a difference of opinion among users of multi-
attribute utility measurement. Some (for example, Edwards, 1971) are content to
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draw a straight line connecting maximum plausible with minimum plausible values
and then to use this line as the source of transformed location measures. Others,
such as Raiffa (1968), advocate the development of dimension-by-dimension
utility curves. Of the various ways of obtaining such curves, the easiest is simply to
ask the respondent to draw graphs. The X axis of each such graph represents the
plausible range of performance values for the attribute under consideration. The
Y axis represents the ranges of values or desirabilities or utilities associated with
the corresponding X values.
Strong reasons argue for the straight-line procedure whenever the underlying
dimension is conditionally monotonic (that is, either more is better than less or else
less is better than more throughout the plausible range of the dimension, regardless
of locations on the other dimensions). Essentially, these reasons are that such
straight lines will produce close approximations to the true value functions after
aggregation over dimensions (correlations in excess of .99 are typical), and, of course,
elicitation effort is much reduced. Still, respondents are sometimes concerned
about the nonlinearity of their preferences and may prefer to use the more compli-
cated procedure. Additionally, preferences may not be monotone. Partly for these
reasons, two of the three studies reported in this paper used nonlinear value curves,
though they avoided the elaborate techniques dependent on hypothetical indiffer-
ence judgments that have often been proposed in order to obtain such curves.
A common objection to linear single-dimension value curves is that they ignore
the economic law of diminishing returns. If you prefer meat to drink and regard
meat as more important than drink and your utility function is linear with quantity
of meat, you will keep on buying and perhaps consuming meat until you die of
thirst. The objection is valid in some contexts, especially those in which the dimen-
sions of value are separable, as they are in a commodity bundle, or those in which
the set of available options is so rich that the dimensions might as well be separable.
For contexts like those used as examples in this paper, the objection is irrelevant;
linear single-dimension value curves could have been used whenever conditional
monotonicity applies in all three examples. The option of reducing less important
dimensions to near-zero values did not exist.
In what sense, if any, are rescaled location measures comparable from one scale
to another? The question cannot be considered separately from the question of
what "importance," as it was judged at Step 6, means. Formally, judgments at Step
6 should be designed so that when the output of Step 7 is multiplied by the output
of Step 8, equal numerical distances between these products correspond to equal
changes in desirability. Careful instruction is usually needed to communicate this
concept to respondents.
Step 9. Calculate utilities for entities. The equation is
Ui = L WjUij>
j
where ~jWj = 100, Ui is the aggregate utility for the ith entity, Wj is the normalized
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importance weight of the jth dimension of value, and uij is the rescaled position
of the ith entity on the jth dimension. Thus, Wj is the output of Step 7 and Ujj is
the output of Step 8. The equation, of course, is nothing more than the formula
for a weighted average.
Step 10. Decide. If a single act is to be chosen, the rule is simple: maximize Vi'
If a subset of i is to be chosen, then the subset for which ~j Vi is maximal is best.
A special case arises when one of the dimensions, such as cost, is subject to an
upper bound - that is, when there is a budget constraint. In that case, the con-
strained dimension should be ignored in Steps 4 through 10. The ratios Vi/Cj ,
where Cj is the cost of the ith entity, should be chosen in decreasing order of that
ratio until the budget constraint is used up. (More complicated arithmetic is needed
if programs are interdependent or if this rule does not come very close to com-
pletely exhausting the budget constraint.) This is the only case in which the benefit-
to-cost ratio is the appropriate figure on which to base a decision. In the absence of
budget constraints, cost is just another dimension of value, entering into V j with a
minus sign, like other unattractive dimensions. In the general case, it is the benefit-
minus-cost difference, not the benefit-over-cost ratio, that should usually control
action.
An important caveat needs to be added concerning benefit-to-cost ratios. Such
ratios assume that both benefits and costs are measured on a ratio scale - that is, a
scale with a true zero point and ratio properties; however, the concepts of both
zero benefit and zero cost are somewhat imprecise on close analysis. A not-too-bad
solution to the problem is to assume that you know what zero cost means, and then
attempt to find the zero point on the aggregate benefit scale. If that scale is
reasonably densely populated with candidate programs, an approach to locating
that zero point is to ask the decision maker, "Would you undertake this program if
it had the same benefits it has now, but had zero cost?" If the answer is yes, the
program is above the zero point on the benefit scale; if the answer is no, it is below
the zero point.
The multiattribute utility approach can easily be adapted to cases in which there
are minimum or maximum acceptable values on a given dimension of value by
simply excluding alternatives that lead to outcomes that transgress these limits.
Because its emphasis is on simplicity and on rating rather than on more com-
plicated elicitation methods, I call the above technique a Simple Multiattribute
Rating Technique (SMART). I leave the critics the task of extending the acronym
to show that its users are SMART-alecs.1
FLEXIBILITIES OF THE METHOD
Practically every technical step in the preceding list has alternatives. For example,
Keeney (1974) has proposed use of a multiplicative rather than an additive aggrega-
tion rule. Certain applications have combined multiplication and addition. The
methods suggested above for obtaining location measures and importance weights
1 A reviewer suggests "Always Linearizing Every Conceivable Scale."
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have alternatives; the most common is the direct assignment of importance weights
on a 0-to-100 scale. (I consider this procedure inferior to the one described above,
but I doubt that it makes much practical difference in most cases.)
INDEPENDENT PROPERTIES
Either the additive or the multiplicative version of the aggregation rule assumes
value independence. Roughly, value independence means that the extent of your
preference for location a2 over location aj of dimension A is unaffected by the
position of the entity being evaluated on dimensions B, C, D, and so on. Value
independence is a strong assumption, not easily satisfied. Fortunately, in the
presence of even modest amounts of measurement error, quite substantial deviations
from value independence will make little difference to the ultimate number Uj , and
even less to the rank ordering of the Uj values. [For discussions of the robustness of
linear models, on which this assertion depends, see Dawes and Corrigan (1974) and
Einhorn and Hogarth (1975).] A frequently satisfied condition that makes the
assumption of value independence very unlikely to cause trouble is conditional
monotonicity; that is, the additive approximation will almost always work well if,
for each dimension, either more is preferable to less or less is preferable to more
throughout the range of the dimension that is involved in the evaluation for all
available values of the other dimensions. When the assumption of value indepen-
dence is unacceptable even as an approximation, much more complicated models
and elicitation procedures that take value dependence into account are available
(Keeney and Raiffa, 1976).
A trickier issue than value independence is what might be called environmental
independence. The traffic congestion caused by a coastal development is extremely
likely to be positively correlated with the number of people served by the develop-
ment. Yet these two dimensions may be value-independent; the correlation simply
means that programs that cause little traffic congestion and serve many people
are unlikely to present themselves for evaluation.
Violations of environmental independence can lead to double counting. If two
value dimensions are perfectly environmentally correlated, only one need be
included in the evaluation process. If both are included, care must be taken to
make sure that the aggregate importance weight given to both together properly
captures their joint importance. For example, if number of people served and
traffic congestion were perfectly environmentally correlated and measured on the
same scale after rescaling, ifthey had equal weights, and if one entered with positive
and the other with negative sign into the aggregation, the implication would be that
they exactly neutralized each other, so that any feasible combination of these two
variables would be equivalent in value to any other feasible combination. The
decision maker is unlikely to feel that way, but he may have trouble adjusting his
importance weights to reflect his true feelings. His life could be simplified if he
redefined the two dimensions into one - e.g., number of people served, taking into
consideration all that implies with respect to traffic.
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The problem is complicated if the environmental correlation is high but not
perfect, but the solution remains the same: try, whenever possible, to define or
redefine value dimensions in order to keep environmental correlations among them
low. When this cannot be done, check on the implications of importance weights
and location measures assigned to environmentally correlated dimensions to make
sure that their aggregate weight properly reflects their aggregate importance. The
situation is similar, though transparent examples are harder to construct, when the
sign of the environmental correlation and the signs with which the dimensions enter
into the aggregate utility function are such that double counting would over-
emphasize rather than underemphasize the importance of the aggregate of the two
dimensions.
A final technical point should be made about environmental correlations.! In
general, if you must choose one entity from all the possibilities, the correlation
between the dimensions will be large and negative. In the technical language of
decision theory, the point is simply that the undominated set of acts (Le., the
contending entities) must lie on the convex boundary and so are necessarily
negatively correlated with one another. This point becomes much less significant
when one is selecting a number of entities rather than just one, since the selection
of each entity removes it from the choice set, redraws the convex boundary of
remaining entities, and probably thus reduces the negative correlation.
Unfortunately, the higher the negative environmental correlation among value
dimensions, the less satisfactory the use of the value independence assumption
becomes as an approximation when value correlations are actually present. At
present, I know of no detailed mathematical or simulation study of the effect of
size of the environmental correlation on acceptability of the value-independence
approximation. This question is likely to receive detailed examination in the
next few years.
12.2 EXAMPLE 1: LAND USE REGULATION2
12.2.1 THE CALIFORNIA COASTAL COMMISSION
Before 1972, two hundred separate bodies - city, county, state, and federal govern-
ments, agencies, and commissions - regulated the California coast. The citizens of
California, in reviewing the performances of these two hundred bodies, were
apparently dissatisfied, and, in a voter-sponsored initiative placed on the ballot
during the general election of 1972 they approved legislation placing coastal zone
planning and management under one state commission and six regional com-
missions. In passing the Coastal Zone Conservation Act with 55 per cent of the vote,
the voters invested decision makers with ultimate authority (to be overruled only
! I am grateful to David Seaver, who first called the issue discussed in the following paragraphs
to my attention.
2 This example, based on Dr. Peter Gardiner's Ph.D. thesis (1974), has also been discussed at
length in Gardiner and Edwards (1975).
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through appeal to the courts) to preserve, protect, restore, and enhance the environ-
ment and ecology of the state's coastal zone.
The coastal zone is defined in the Act as the area between the seaward limits of
state jurisdiction and 1,000 yards (~ 910 m) landward from the mean high tide line.
Any plan for development within the coastal zone must be approved by the appro-
priate regional commission before it can be implemented. Disapprovals can be
appealed to the state commission and then to the courts if necessary. (Development
permits are similar to other types of building permits and authorize only the specific
activities named.)
The South Coast Regional Commission (Region V), comprising Los Angeles and
Orange counties, is one of the six regional commissions. Los Angeles County is
heavily urbanized and in 1970 contained 35 per cent of the state's population and
41 per cent of the state's coastal county population. Los Angeles County includes
the coastal cities of Long Beach, Redondo Beach, Hermosa Beach, Manhattan
Beach, Los Angeles (Venice and the harbor area), and Santa Monica and unincor-
porated county areas such as Marina del Rey. These cities and areas all contain
portions of the coastal zone that are under the control of the Region V Com-
mission. Approximately $1 billion worth of development was authorized in the first
year of the commission's activities, and over 1,800 permits were acted upon. At
times there has been a backlog of as many as 600 permit requests awaiting action.
The evaluation and decision-making tasks that confront the Region V Commission
members are important, far-reaching, difficult, and controversial.
Although the Act specifies that certain attributes should be considered in
making evaluations, it fails to specify just how they are to enter into the evaluation
process. Nor does the Act specify how the commissioners are to balance the con-
flicting interests affected by their decisions. In effect, the Act implies that individual
commissioners assigned to the commission will represent the interests of all affected
parties with respect to the coastal zone in Region V. How this is to be accomplished
is left unspecified. In practice, attempts to include the preferences and value judg-
ments of interested groups and individuals occur when the commission holds public
advocacy hearings on permit requests. Under these procedures, opposing interest
groups express their values and viewpoints as conclusions - often based on incon-
sistent sets of asserted facts or on no facts at all - in the form of verbal and written
presentations at the open hearings.
Fourteen individuals involved in coastal zone planning and decision making
agreed to participate in the study reported here. They included two of the current
coastal commissioners for Region V, a number of active conservationists, and one
major coastal zone developer. The purpose of this study was to test the con-
sequences of using multiattribute utility measurement processes by having people
with differing views who participate in or are close to the regulatory process make
both individual and group evaluations of various proposals for development in a
section of the California coastal zone. Evaluations were made both intuitively and
by constructing multiattribute utility measurement models.
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To provide a common basis for making evaluations, a sample of 15 hypothetical
but realistic permit requests for development was invented. The types of permits
were limited to those for development of single-family, duplex, triplex, or multi-
family dwellings (owner-occupied or for renting). Dwelling unit development (lead-
ing to increased population density) is a major area of debate in current coastal
zone decision making. Most permit applications submitted to the Region V Com-
mission so far fall into this class. Moreover, permits granted in this class will prob-
ably generate further permit requests. Housing development tends to bring about
the need for other development in the coastal zone - public works, recreation,
transportation, and so on. The permit applications provided eight items of infor-
mation about the proposed development that formed the information base on
which subjects were asked to make their evaluations. These eight items were
abstracted from staff reports submitted to the Region V coastal commissioners as
a basis for their evaluations and decisions on current permit applications. The
commissioners' staff reports do include some additional information (the name of
the applicant, for example), but the following items are crucial to an evaluation:
1. Size of development. The number of square feet of the coastal zone taken up
by the development.
2. Distance from the mean high tide line. The distance between the nearest edge
of the development and the mean high tide line, measured in feet.
3. Density of the proposed development. The number of dwelling units per acre
for the development.
4. On-site parking facilities. The percentage of cars brought in by the develop-
ment for which parking space is provided as part of the development on-site.
5. Building height. The height of the development in feet (17.5 feet per story).
6. Unit rental. The dollar rental per month (on the average) for the development.
If the development is owner-occupied and no rent is paid, an equivalent to rent is
computed by taking the normal monthly mortgage payment.
7. Conformity with land use in the vicinity. The density, measured on a five-
point scale from "much less dense" to "much more dense," of the development
relative to the average density of adjacent residential lots.
8. Esthetics of the development. A rating on a scale from "poor" to "excellent."
Each of the invented permit applications was constructed to report a level of per-
formance for each item. They were as realistic as possible and represented a wide
variety of likely permits.
Each subject answered seven questionnaires; in general,S days was allowed for
each questionnaire. In responding to the questionnaires, each subject (a) categorized
him/herself on an II-point continuum that ranged from very conservationist-
oriented to very development-oriented, (b) evaluated intuitively (holistically) 15
sample development permit requests by rating their overall merit on a 0-to-100-
point scale, (c) followed the steps of multiattribute utility measurement outlined
previously and in so doing constructed individual and group value models, and
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TABLE 12.1 Group Product Moment Correlations
Group
1
2
Test-Retest
Holistic
Evaluations
(Reliability)
0.949
0.867
Test
Holistic-SMART
Evaluations
0.944
0.665
Retest
Holistic-SMART
Evaluations
0.917
0.873
(d) reevaluated the same 15 sample permit requests intuitively a second time.1
Subjects were not told that the second batch of permits was a repetition of the
first.
The location of the proposed developments was Venice, which is part of the city
of Los Angeles between Santa Monica and Marina del Rey. Venice has a diverse
population and has been called a microcosm (Torgerson, 1973); in many ways, it
presents in one small area instances of all the most controversial issues associated
with coastal zone decision making.
Mter completing the initial questionnaire, in which they categorized themselves
according to their views about coastal zone development, the 14 individuals were
divided into two groups. Group 1 comprised the eight more conservation-minded
subjects, and Group 2 was composed of the other six subjects, whose views, by
self-report, range from moderately to strongly prodevelopment.
In both the intuitive evaluation and multiattribute utility measurement tasks the
subjects reported no major difficulty in completing the questionnaires. An example
of one participant's value curves and importance weights is shown in Figure 12.1.
The abscissae represent the natural dimension ranges and the ordinates represent
value ranging from 0 to 100 points. Although the value curves shown are all mono-
tone and could therefore be linearly approximated, as indicated earlier, 11 of the
14 subjects produced at least one nonmonotone value curve. Accordingly, this
study used the actual value curves for each subject rather than the linear approxi-
mation.
To develop group intuitive ratings and group value models, each individual in a
group was given, through feedback, the opportunity of seeing his group's initial
responses on a given task (intuitive ratings, importance weights, and the like) and of
revising his own judgments. These data were fed back in the form of group means.
Averaging individual responses to form group responses produced the results
reported in Table 12.1, which shows in the second column test -retest holistic
1 The evaluation and decision making in this study are assumed to be riskless. Decisions in-
volving permit requests, by the nature of the permits themselves, suggest that the consequences
of approval or disapproval are known with certainty. The developer states on his permit what
he intends to do if the permit is approved and is thereby constrained if approval is granted. If
the request is disapproved, there will be no development - unless the present or subsequent
owner of the land presents a new or revised request. Revision of permit requests to meet
commission objectives often occurs, both before and after the original hearing. In that sense,
the commission's decisions are risky - but this possibility was omitted from the present study.
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FIGURE 12.1 Value curves and importance weights for permit request dimen-
sions. Importance weights are in parentheses.
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evaluations of the 15 sample permits. These correlations are computed by taking
the mean group ratings for each permit on the initial (test) intuitive evaluation and
the second (retest) intuitive evaluation. The test holistic-SMART evaluation
correlations are computed by comparing a group value model's ratings of the 15
sample permits with the group's initial intuitive evaluations. The group value
model is found by computing the mean importance weights and mean value curves
for the group and then evaluating each permit using the group's value model. The
retest holistic-SMART evaluation correlations are similar except that the second
intuitive evaluation is used.
As can be seen from Table 12.1, each group's value model, constructed accord·
ing to the procedures of multiattribute utility measurement, has apparently
"captured" the holistic evaluations of the group reasonably well. The interesting
question is then "What is the effect of using a group's value models versus that
of using a group's intuitive evaluation?"
To answer this question, a two-way analysis of variance of permit values was
conducted. The independent variables were groups and permit requests. These
results indicate that the two groups initially (i.e., by holistic intuitive evaluations)
held differing viewpoints (i.e., were drawn from differing populations) although
the differences were not dramatic. Substantial percentages of variance were
accounted for both by group main effects and by permit-group interactions for
the first·test holistic evaluations. Results for the retest were similar. Both findings
indicate differing viewpoints between the two groups. The main effect could be
caused, however, by a constant evaluation bias alone. The key indication of differ·
ing viewpoints is the interaction term. The use of each group's value model
evaluations instead of their intuitive evaluations causes the percentage of variance
accounted for by the interaction to drop from 12 percent to 2 percent. Figure 12.2
shows this difference dramatically. The multiattribute utility technique has turned
modest disagreement into substantial agreement.
Why? Here is a plausible answer. When making holistic evaluations, people with
strongly held points of view tend to concentrate on those aspects of the entities
being evaluated that most strongly engage their biases. The multiattribute pro·
cedure does not permit this; it separates judgment of the importance of a dimension
from judgment of where a particular entity falls on that dimension. These applica·
tions varied on eight dimensions relevant to the environmentalists·versus-builders
arguments. While these two views may be reflected in different opinions about how
good a particular level of performance on some dimensions may be, evaluation on
other dimensions will be more or less independent of viewpoint. Agreement about
those other dimensions tends to reduce the impact of disagreement on controversial
dimensions. That is, multiattribute utility measurement procedures do not allow
anyone or two dimensions to become so salient that they emphasize existing
sources of conflict and disagreement. Multiattribute utility measurement cannot
and should not eliminate all disagreement, however; such conflicts are genuine, and
any value measurement procedure should respect and so reflect them. Still, in spite
of disagreement, social decisions must be made. How?
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I distinguish between two kinds of disagreements. Disagreements at Step 8 seem
to me to be essentially like disagreements among different thermometers measuring
the same temperature. If they are not too large, one has little compunction about
taking an average. If they are large, then one is likely to suspect that some of the
thermometers are not working properly and to discard their readings. In general,
I think that judgmentally determined location measures should reflect expertise,
and I would expect different value dimensions typically to require different kinds
of expertise and therefore different experts. In some practical contexts, one can
avoid the problem of disagreement at Step 8 entirely by the simple expedient of
asking only the best available expert for each dimension to make judgments about
that dimension.
Disagreements at Steps 5 and 6 are another matter. These seem to me to be the
essence of conflicting values, and they should be given as much respect as possible.
For that reason, the judges who perform Steps 5 and 6 should be either the decision
maker(s) or carefully chosen representatives of the decision maker. Considerable
discussion, persuasion, and information exchange should be used in an attempt to
reduce the disagreements as much as possible. At the least, this process offers a
clear definition of the rules of debate and an orderly way to proceed from informa-
tion and data to values and, finally, decisions.
Even this process will seldom dispel disagreements entirely, however. The next
two examples will suggest ways to proceed further.
12.2.2 A PUBLIC TECHNOLOGY FOR LAND USE MANAGEMENT
I conclude this example with a rather visionary discussion of how agencies respon-
sible for land use management could carry out their responsibilities by fully exploit-
ing SMART or some similar value measurement technique.
The statutes would define, at least to some degree, the appropriate dimensions
of value, as they do now. They might, but probably should not, specify limits on
the importance weights attached to these dimensions. They might, and perhaps
should, specify boundaries beyond which no value could go in the undesirable
dimension.
The main functions of the regulatory agency would be four: to specify measure-
ment methods for each value dimension (with utility functions or other methods
for making the necessary transformations at Step 8); to specify importance weights;
to define one or more bounds on acceptable levels of aggregated utility, and perhaps
also to define lower bounds not specified by statute on particular dimensions; and
to hear appeals.
The regulatory agency could afford to spend enormous amounts of time and
effort on its first two functions, specification of measurement methods and of
importance weights. Value considerations, political considerations, views of com-
peting constituencies and advocates, the arts of political maneuvering and com-
promise - all would come into play. Public hearings would be held, with elaborate
and extensive debate and full airing of all relevant issues and points of view.
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The regulatory agency would have further responsibilities for dealing with
measurement methods for wholly or partly subjective value dimensions. Since such
measurements must be judgments, the regulatory agency must make sure that the
judgments are impartial and fair. This could be done by having staff members make
them, or by offering the planner a list of agency-approved impartial experts, or by
mediating among or selecting from the conflicting views of experts chosen by those
with stakes in the decision, or by some combination of these methods. I consider
the first two of these approaches to be most desirable, but recognize that the third
or fourth may be inevitable.
The reason the costs of prolonged and intensive study of measurement methods
and of importance weights could be borne is that they would recur infrequently.
Once measurement methods and importance weights had been agreed on, most
case-by-case decisions would be automatically made by means of them. Only if
political and social circumstances or technology changed would reconsideration
of the agreed-on measurement methods and importance weights be necessary,
and even such reconsiderations would be likely to be partial rather than com-
plete. They would, of course, occur; times do change, public tastes and values
change, and technologies change. Those seeking appropriate elective offices could
campaign for such changes - an election platform consisting in part of a list of
numerical importance weights would be a refreshing novelty!
The decision rules would, of course, be public knowledge. That fact probably
would be the most cost-saving aspect of this whole approach. Would-be developers
and builders would not waste their time and money preparing plans that they
could easily calculate to be unacceptable. Instead, they would prepare acceptable
plans from the outset. Once a plan had been prepared and submitted to the regu-
latory agency, evaluation would consist of little more than a check that the
planner's measurements and arithmetic had been done correctly. Delay from sub-
mission to approval need be no more than a few days.
Changes in the decision rules can be and should be as explicit as the rules them-
selves. Such explicitness would permit both regulators and those regulated to know
exactly what current regulatory policies are and, if they have changed, how and
how much. Such knowledge would greatly facilitate both enlightened citizen partic-
ipation in deciding on policy changes and swift, precise adaptation of those regulated
to such changes once they have taken effect.
In short, multiattribute utility measurement allows value conflicts bearing on
social decisions to be fought out and resolved at the level of decision rules, rather
than at the level of individual decisions. Such decision rules, once specified, define
regulatory policy, removing nearly all ambiguity, without impairing society's free-
dom to modify policies in response to changing conditions. Possible savings in
financial and social costs, delay, frustration, and so on are incalculable, but cost
reduction in dollars alone could be 90 percent or more.
Resolution of value conflicts at the level of decision rules rather than at the level
of individual decisions may have the potential of revolutionary impact in land use
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management and in many other public decision contexts as well. Any new idea is
bound to be full of unexpected consequences, booby traps, and surprises. For a
while, therefore, the wise innovator would want to run old and new systems in
parallel, compare performance of the two, and build up experience with the new
system. A good mechanism might be to define an upper and a lower bound, with
automatic acceptance above the upper bound, automatic rejection below the lower
one, and hearings in between. This would provide a convenient administrative
device for operation of such parallel procedures. Initially, the upper bound could
be very high and the lower bound very low so that most cases would fall between
and be handled by the traditional hearing mechanism. A candidate number for the
lower bound, at least initially, is the utility of the do-nothing (i.e., status quo)
alternative, for obvious reasons. If what the applicant wants is not clearly better
than the status quo, why does he deserve a hearing? As experience and confidence
in the multiattribute utility measurement system develop, the two bounds can be
moved toward each other, so that more and more cases are handled automatically
rather than by means of hearings. This process need work no hardship on any
rejected applicant; he can always appeal, accepting the delays, costs, and risk of
losing implicit in the hearing process rather than investing in upgrading his plan.
And the regulatory agency, by moving the boundaries, can, in effect, control its
case load and thus gradually shorten the frequently inordinate delays of current
procedures.
Although I know of no public context in which even limited experimentation
with the methods advocated here is occurring, I have hopes.
12.3 EXAMPLE 2: PLANNING A GOVERNMENT RESEARCH PROGRAM
The Office of Child Development (OCD) of the U.S. Department of Health, Educa-
tion, and Welfare (HEW) has a variety of responsibilities. Perhaps the largest is the
operation of Project Head Start, a very large program for encouraging the develop-
ment of preschool children that is not included in this example. It also sponsors a
research program concerned with methods for promoting child welfare, for dealing
with specific problems of children, and the like.
In the fall of 1972, OCD was faced with the task of planning its research pro-
gram for fiscal 1974, which began on July 1, 1973. Guidance from the Department
of Health, Education, and Welfare indicated that this research program, unlike its
predecessors, would have to be justified by means of some assessment of its costs
and benefits. While OCD staff members knew how to assess the cost of a research
program, they had considerable difficulty in thinking about how to assess its bene-
fits in quantitative form. To perform the assessment, Marcia Guttentag, Kurt
Snapper, and I were brought in as consultants, to work, primarily with John Busa
of OCD, on the analysis. A fuller report of this project has been published by
Guttentag and Snapper (1974).
266
The ten-step process specified earlier in this paper was used. Initially, we assumed
that the organization whose utilities were to be maximized was OCD; we later
learned that this was a considerable oversimplification. We also assumed that the
entities to be evaluated were proposed research programs; this initial assumption,
too, turned out to be excessively simplistic.
12.3.1 ELICITATION
Step 4. To carry out Step 4, OCD brought together for 2 days a group of 13
people - OCD administrators and staff, both from Washington and from OCD
field offices allover the country, plus several academic experts on child develop-
ment. At my insistence, the value dimensions were segregated into two lists, one
concerned with benefits to children and families and the other concerned with
benefits to OCD as an organization. The reason for the distinction is that in previous
applications of the method, I had found that dimensions that were in fact con-
cerned with organizational survival and growth were frequently couched in language
that suggested that they referred to fulfillment of the organizational mission;
organizations are often unwilling to admit the importance of survival and growth
in their decisions. Thus, for example, a dimension that in fact was "Enhance the
impact of OCD on federal programs related to child health" might appear as
"Promote child health." It seemed to me that a clearer picture of OCD's actual
values could be obtained if the values associated with organizational survival and
growth were segregated from those concerned with fulfillment of its mission, so
that each class of values could be dealt with separately.
Initial lists of value dimensions (called goals or criteria, in order to facilitate
communication with the respondents) in each of the two groups were elicited by
inviting the participants to state those goals; each list ended up with 35 to 40 goals
on it. A major task was then to pare the lists down. Early eliminations were easy
because some of the goals were simply restatements of others in slightly different
language or because everyone agreed that a particular goal was not important
enough to be worth considering or that it was not relevant to designing a research
program. Later, further paring of the lists was accomplished by having each partici-
pant rank-order the importance of the goals in each list separately and then pro-
posing that goals that were low on most rank orders be deleted. This process pro-
duced many deletions; more important, it produced extremely searching and
sophisticated discussions of just what each goal meant, how it related to other
goals, and what sort of research or other action might achieve it. These discussions
combined with the social effects of face-to-face interaction to produce considerably
more agreement about the meanings of the various goals and their relative im-
portance than would have occurred otherwise, though, of course, the agreement
was very far from complete.
Steps 5 and 6. Each participant in the process was then asked individually to
perform Steps 5 and 6. All 13 forms were returned with usable ratings. A few more
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goals were eliminated on the basis of these ratings, essentially on the argument that
they contributed 5 percent or less to total importance and respondents seemed
rather well-agreed on their low level of importance. Of course, with all the low-
rating dimensions eliminated at various stages along the way, the remaining high-
importance dimensions showed considerable interpersonal disagreement. Careful
analysis showed that disagreement was not systematically related to the race, sex,
or organizational locus of the respondent.
The Acting Director of OCD assigned final importance weights, mostly in good
agreement with the means of the 13 respondents. He also made judgments relating
importance weights across the two lists - values to children and families and values
to OCD. These judgments permitted the consolidation of the two lists, with their
separate importance weights, into one list:
Criterion A (Importance weight = .007) The extent to which a recommended
activity is likely to foster service continuity/coordination and elimination of frag-
mentation, or is likely to contribute to this goal.
Criterion B (Importance weight = .145) The extent to which a recommended
activity represents an investment in a prototypical and/or high-leverage activity or
is likely to contribute to the development of prototypical/high-leverage programs.
Criterion C (Importance weight = .061) The extent to which a recommended
activity increases or is likely to contribute to an increase in families' sense of efficacy
and their ability to obtain and use resources necessary for the healthy development
of children.
Criterion D (Importance weight = .052) The extent to which a recommended
activity is likely to increase the probability that children will acquire the skills
necessary for successful performance of adult roles, or is likely to contribute to that
goal.
Criterion E (Importance weight = .036) The extent to which a recommended
activity is likely to contribute to making the public and institutions more sensitive
to the developmental needs of children.
Criterion F (Importance weight = .048) The extent to which a recommended
activity is likely to promote the individualization of services or programs, or is likely
to contribute to this goal.
Criterion G (Importance weight = .043) The extent to which a recommended
activity is likely to stimulate the development of pluralistic child care delivery
systems that provide for parental choice, or is likely to contribute to the expansion
of such systems.
Criterion H (Importance weight = .014) The extent to which a recommended
activity is likely to promote self-respect and mutual regard among children from
diverse racial, cultural, class, and ethnic backgrounds, or is likely to contribute to
this goal.
Criterion I (Importance weight = .009) The extent to which a recommended
activity is likely to result in effective interagency coordination at federal, state, and
local levels, or is likely to contribute to this goal.
Criterion J (Importance weight = .160) The extent to which a recommended
activity is consonant with administration and departmental policies and philosophy
or reflects prevailing public and social thinking.
Criterion K (Importance weight = .120) The extent to which a recommended
activity is likely to make public leadership more sensitive to the needs of children.
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Criterion L (Importance weight = .145) The extent to which a recommended
activity is likely to influence national child care policy in a positive way.
Criterion M (Importance weight = .032) The extent to which a recommended
activity is capable of rational explication, that is, the extent to which it represents a
logical extension of past results and conclusions, is indicated on theoretical grounds,
or fulfills prior commitments.
Criterion N (Importance weight = .129) The extent to which a recommended
activity is likely to produce tangible, short-term results, that is, the extent to which
it is likely to produce or contribute to the production of solid conclusions, benefits,
or results within a relatively short period of time.
The dimensions had acquired considerably more careful definitions along the way.
Of the five criteria receiving importance weights of .10 or more, four came from
the list of values to OCD rather than from the list of values to children and families.
Even Criterion B, which was on the list of values to children and families, might
have been on the other list as well. These findings should be no surprise to students
of administrative and bureaucratic decision making. They should, however, give
researchers reason to pause for thought. Especially interesting was the fate of one
goal that had appeared on the first list of values to children and families: 'Contrib-
ute to knowledge expansion and/or use of knowledge for program planning."
This was easily eliminated as relatively unimportant. At the time, I found its
elimination baffling, since I had been told that the goal of the exercise was to
evaluate research proposals. As it turned out, this was not the goal of the exercise;
I had failed to perform Step 3 properly. Moreoever, OCD is an organization
interested in applying knowledge to problems. Its programs are mostly action-
oriented. New knowledge is important only if it can lead to more effective action.
Consequently, the value of new knowledge should derive from its contribution to
action goals. Thus, the elimination of a goal that in effect valued knowledge for its
own sake was consistent with the basic mission and value structure of OCD.
Step 3. When this subject started, I had naively supposed that OCD received a
flow of research proposals and that we were to develop a method of deciding
which ones to implement or fund. Actually, OCD projects start as statements of
research priorities or as Requests for Proposals. The question of what we were
trying to evaluate might have been handled much better if I had understood more
clearly at the outset how the process by which OCD generates its research program
differs from the process by which some other HEW agencies, such as the National
Institutes of Health, generate theirs.
Still, we supposed that we were trying to evaluate specific research activities.
These activities came from many sources. Major reports to OCD and HEW were
summarized, and their recommendations were, where appropriate, restated as
research projects. Recommendations of possible research projects were obtained
from many members of the OCD staff, from the Office of the Assistant Secretary
for Planning and Evaluation in HEW, and from many other interested government
and private groups. Several hundred recommendations were assembled, combined,
and refined as a result of this process. For specificity, a proposed duration and cost
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was attached to each. Most of these were in the range of I to 3 years and $50,000 to
$1,500,000.
Step 8. Informal screening was used to reduce the output of Step 3 to a smaller
and more manageable set; ultimately, 56 research recommendations were carried
through the entire analysis. Of these, six were obviously unattractive and were
included in order to facilitate location of a true zero point on the aggregate utility
scale. Each of these 56 recommendations was scaled on each of the 13 dimensions
of value by three members of the OCD staff independently - 56 x 13 x 3 = 2,184
judgments in all. Interjudge reliability was generally quite good, considerably higher
than it had been for the importance weights and quite high enough that we had no
compunctions about taking the average over the three judges as the scale value for
each research project on each dimension. The projects scattered out well over each
dimension. For example, for dimension H the range was from 880 to 260; for
dimension G the range was from 470 to 25.
Step 9. Now, calculation of utilities for each recommendation required no more
than multiplication and addition. The range of aggregate utilities for the 56 research
recommendations was about 550 to about 200, and the distribution was well spread
out over that range; the mean was 369 and the standard deviation of the 56 utility
values (on that scale) was about 71.5. For convenience, the scale was stretched out
by a linear transformation so that the lowest aggregate utility was 0 and the highest
was 1,000. On this new scale, the mean was 483 and the standard deviation was 204.
The next step, since we wanted to look at benefit-to-cost ratios, was to see if
the utility scale had a locatable true zero point. The Acting Director of OCD was
asked whether there were any projects on the list that he would not wish to have
OCD sponsor even if they cost nothing. There were ten such projects, including all
six of the ones that had been left in for this purpose. A cutting score of 29 5 (on the
O-to-I,OOO rescale utility function) identified them with only one inversion, so 295
was adopted as the zero point of the O-to-I,OOO utility scale (which thus became a
0-to-705 scale); projects falling below that score were dropped from consideration,
and benefit-to-cost ratios were calculated for the rest. Ordering in cost-benefit
ratios, of course, differed from ordering in benefits alone.
Step 10. Our failure to perform Step 3 properly now caught up with us. The
process by which we had produced proposed research topics was casual and ad hoc,
and the results showed it. The proposed topics did not cover all important sub-
stantive areas of research on child development and were not well formulated with
respect to the topics they did cover. Moreover, by this time we had a somewhat
better understanding of the role the evaluative machinery we had developed could
play. It was not well designed to evaluate specific research projects, but it could
evaluate higher-order questions having to do with directions in which programs of
research might go.
Step 3 again. Working with OCD scientists, we developed a comprehensive tax-
onomy of research areas, taking into account those that had been omitted as well
as those that had been included in the previous list of research projects. This pro-
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duced a short list of general research foci under which most of the previously
generated specific projects could be subsumed.
Step 10 again. Using only the five value dimensions with highest weights, each
general research focus was evaluated. A rough rule-of-thumb was proposed: each
research focus should receive a proportion of the available funds proportional to
its utility. The Acting Director of OCD, with value dimensions in hand but without
knowing the utilities of the research areas, made a tentative allocation of funds.
This allocation was compared with the result of the rule-of-thumb. The relationship
was close, though not perfect. The Acting Director reduced the funding of areas
that received too much by that rule-of-thumb and increased the funding of areas
that received too little. A comparison of the 1973 and 1974 research budget alloca-
tions clearly showed that changes did occur in these directions and in amounts close
to those suggested by the rule-of-thumb.
12.3.2 CONCLUSION
In retrospect, the most serious deficiency of the procedure was our failure to
perform Steps I, 2, and 3 in time. Step 1 caused difficulties; not only the values of
OCD but also those of reviewing organizations within HEW were relevant and
should have been ascertained. The most important failure, however, was that the
procedures for performing Step 3 were hasty and ad hoc and resulted in unsatis-
factory lists of research recommendations. This failure ultimately forced the
decision process to a much higher level of abstraction, at which broad research
areas rather than specific projects were evaluated.
While this was not what we had originally had in mind, it may have served OCD
well. The value dimensions originally elicited from OCD staff members and others
were not particularly appropriate to evaluating specific research projects. They did
not address such questions as the feasibility of the project, how it related to what
had already been done, the extent to which it advanced knowledge in some signifi-
cant area, and so on. On the other hand, those dimensions did address the question
"What do OCD staff members value?" They are more appropriate for broad pro-
grammatic guidance than for evaluating specific projects. Developing a second
mechanism suitable for evaluating specific responses to statements of OCD research
priorities or Requests for Proposals would have been an interesting and valuable
exercise in using hierarchical value structures. Such an evaluative mechanism would
measure congruence of the responses with OCD's broad values as reflected in the
requests that stimulated them, while at the same time measuring the congruence
of those responses with the general criteria one uses to evaluate social science
research projects. But we were not asked to do that.
The methods used to obtain value dimensions and importance weights seemed
to work well in a technical sense. The extensive use of group discussion, inter-
spersed with ratings and reratings, considerably enhanced OCD's awareness both of
its own values and of value conflicts within its staff and, in the process, did much to
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reduce those conflicts. In retrospect, this was by far the most important and useful
outcome of the project.
The finding of relatively high reliability of location measures, even on these very
abstractly defined dimensions and with rather poorly defined research projects,
was expected but gratifying. Location measurement is a matter for expertise, and
these judges were experts in the field. The ease with which a true zero point for
utility was defined, and its precision, was surprising. One interesting reason for
the precision of the zero point may well have been that only one respondent was
asked to make that particular set of judgments.
The difficulties at the decision stage resulted, of course, directly from the
failure to define the decision options clearly enough early enough. That is one
mistake I believe I have learned not to make again.
12.4 EXAMPLE 3: INDICES OF WATER QUALITY!
In 1968, the U.S. National Sanitation Foundation (known as NSF, but not to be
confused with the National Science Foundation) published an index of water
quality based on an additive combination of measures of nine parameters of water.
The judgments were collected from more than 70 water quality experts. However,
the index did not distinguish among possible uses of water and so left unanswered
the question of whether different indices might be appropriate for different pur·
poses. O'Connor (1972, 1973) set out to answer that question by developing two
different indices. One described the quality of a surface body of water that is to
be treated if necessary and used as a public water supply (PWS). The other de·
scribed the quality of a surface body of untreated water from the point of view of
its ability to sustain fish and wildlife (FAWL). O'Connor's approach was to develop
multiattribute utility models for each use and then to examine the relationship
between these models. At least moderate correlations were inevitable, but absence
of very high correlations would indicate that at least two indices of water quality
were needed.
12.4.1 PROCEDURES
Eight experts on water quality located allover the country were the subjects. Four
were university professors; the others were officials of organizations responsible for
water supplies. In a mailed questionnaire, the experts were asked to rate the im·
portance of each of 36 parameters for water for each of the two uses on a O·to·IOO
scale by assigning 100 to the most important parameter and rating others relative
to that parameter. (A variant of my proposed procedure, this one has the advantage
that experts usually agree better on what is most important than on what is least
! The work summarized in this example was performed by Dr. Michael F. O'Connor (1972) as
his Ph.D. thesis.
272
important, but it also has the disadvantage of making it more difficult to preserve
the ratio properties of the weight estimates.)
In a follow-up visit by O'Connor, each expert selected a subset of about 12 of
the original 36 parameters and rerated the importances of those he had selected.
He also drew a function relating the relevant physical parameter continuum (e.g.,
pH) to quality; the function was required to have its maximum at 100 and its
minimum at O.
On the basis of the results of this visit, a second questionnaire, feeding back
to each expert the results from all respondents and asking for a rerating of im-
portances, was sent out. A second visit followed. For the second visit, the list of
parameters was reduced to 17 for PWS and 11 for F AWL, in part by deletion of
parameters considered by other experts not otherwise participating in the study to
be redundant. The goal of the second visit was to achieve consensus on both im-
portances and functions relating parameters to quality. The main tool used for this
purpose was displays of all judgments obtained from the second questionnaire and
of average weights and functions. No expert objected to the parameter deletions;
indeed, as a result of the second visit four more parameters were deleted from the
PWS list and two from the FAWL list. Table 12.2 shows the final parameters and
normalized average importance weights. Most of the judges were willing to accept
the average functions relating each physical parameter to quality as adequately
representative of their own opinions, but they were much less willing to accept
the average weights. The final functions, averaged over experts, relating water
quality to physical parameters were also accepted by most of the experts.
Finally, anumber of imaginary water sampIes were prepared, described by a param-
eter values on the relevant dimensions. Each expert was told the parameters of
TABLE 12.2 Final Parameters Chosen for Inclusion in the PWS and FAWL
Indices, with Corresponding Normalized Average Importance Weights
PWS FAWL
Normalized Normalized
Parameter Weights Parameter Weights
Fecal coliforms .171 Dissolved oxygen .206
Phenols .104 Temperature .169
Dissolved solids .084 pH .142
pH .079 Phenols .099
Fluorides .079 Turbidity .088
Hardness .077 Ammonia .084
Nitrates .070 Dissolved solids .074
Chlorides .060 Nitrates .074
Alkalinity .058 Phosphates .064
Turbidity .058
Dissolved oxygen .056
Color .054
Sulfates .050
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the sample, the scaled values for PWS and FAWL developed from the averaged data,
those obtained from the expert's own weights combined with the average curves,
and how the sample would score on the previously developed NSF index of water
quality. The experts were invited to inspect these indices and change any they felt
to be incorrect. All correlations among indices for the same use were very high;
the lowest correlation between an average index and one prepared from an indi-
vidual expert's judgments was .922, and when he changed some judgments the
correlation rose to .956. Intercorrelations among PWS, FAWL, and the earlier
NSF index were moderate, generally in the range from .6 to .8. Oearly, use does
make a difference; a single water quality index is not good enough.
linear approximations to the average curves were tried and generally produced
very high correlations (e.g., .968) with the indices based on the average curves. An
exception arose for certain water samples (chosen for realism) and the FAWL index,
where the linear approximation produced correlations with the nonlinear index of
about .70. This exception resulted from bad fits between the nonlinear function
and its linear approximation for phosphates, turbidity, and dissolved solids, all of
which were highly variable in the realistic water samples.
12.4.2 COMMENTS
Most of the rather forceful methods used to obtain agreement in this study were
made necessary by shortage of time with each expert and lack of opportunity for
face-to-face discussion among the experts. While this procedure is not well designed
to make experts feel happy with the final outcome, it did produce PWS and FAWL
indices that seem serviceable for most purposes and that are clearly different. Face-
to-face procedures would probably have produced very similar results but would
have left the experts feeling happier about the indices finally developed.
O'Connor had considerable difficulty in getting his experts to understand the
importance weighting method he used. It is unclear whether the difficulties were
caused by shortage of time to explain and practice, or by the method itself; I
suspect both contributed.
Both the experts and O'Connor had difficulties with the additive model. One
difficulty had to do with toxic substances, such as pesticides. Both indices were
made conditional on absence of these substances; their inclusion in even small con-
centrations would have made the quality of the water unacceptably low, in the
opinion of these respondents.
The other difficulty is more instructive. Both pH and fecal coliforms were
important for PWS, but fecal coliforms were more than twice as important as pH.
Low pH values (Le., acid water) will kill the fecal coliforms and so may actually
increase water quality. This relationship, so far, is clearly an instance of environ-
mental correlation, not of violation of the underlying additive value model. How-
ever, a pH as low as 3.0 produces water so unsatisfactory as an input to PWS that
its quality is zero regardless of its merits on the other dimensions. Consequently,
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at this low pH level, the additive value model is violated. O'Connor handled this
problem by using the additive model above 3.0 pH, and defining any water with
pH of 3.0 or lower to have quality 0 for PWS. This definition produces an ugly dis·
continuity in the model but is otherwise unimportant, since a pH of 3.0 or any·
where near it is rare indeed in water being considered as input to PWS.
12.5 CONCLUSION
This paper has reviewed three attempts to use multiattribute utility measurement
with a number of expert respondents in more·or·less applied settings. Three very
different approaches to the problem of interpersonal disagreement are illustrated
by the three examples. All seem to work. Comparing them, I feel that the pro-
cedure that used face-to-face discussion most (the oeD example) was most success-
ful in producing agreement; procedures depending on indirect feedback of other
experts' judgments were clearly less successful.
All three examples underline, in my view, the importance of simplicity in
elicitation procedures. Amounts of respondent time ranged from a minimum of 6
hours to a maximum of 2 days per respondent in these examples; that is simply
too short a time to teach any expert how to make sophisticated judgments about
preferences among imaginary bets and then collect a useful set of judgments from
him, especially if a great deal of that time is taken up, as it should be, with dis-
cussion between him and other experts about the substantive issues lying behind
the judgments.
So important does this issue of simplicity seem to me that our next major study
will examine the following question: How well can a multiattribute utility measure-
ment procedure do by using an additive model, linear single-dimension utility func-
tions for monotonic dimensions, and importance weights of 1,0, and -1 only? The
literature on unit weighting in multiple regression (e.g., Dawes and Corrigan, 1974;
Einhorn and Hogarth, 1975) suggests that unit weighting may work surprisingly
well, as does the literature on combining subtests (e.g., Wilks, 1938). I expect that
high negative environmental correlations among dimensions of value can make such
an approximation too simple. Still, if such an approximation isn't too bad, what an
enormous simplification of elicitation methods it offers us!
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DISCUSSION
JACQUET-LAGREZE: You spoke of taking uncertainty into account by assign-
ing probabilities to a set of scenarios. How do you proceed?
EDWARDS: In none of the cases in this paper was uncertainty considered.
However, there are other instances in which I have been involved that do consider
very elaborately conceived uncertainties. We assign probabilities to a variety of
scenarios and work with expected utility on the basis of those probabilities and
utility models. In those situations the utility functions are much more complicated.
You almost invariably find that the preferred model forms for the respondent
involve both additive and multiplicative components. The reason is very simple:
Some dimensions are just so overwhelmingly important that if a particular entity
being evaluated scores zero on that dimension, you want it to have a zero score
overall. A simple additive model would not do this.
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There is no fundamental difference between working with the mixed models and
working with the simple additive model that I discussed in my paper. The technique
for assigning scenario probabilities is judgmental, as you would expect. Compared
to probabilities, odds have the enormous advantage of not getting you involved in
normalization difficulties; people can do very well at making odds judgments. While
there are a variety of technical problems inherent in using mixed models, a dis-
cussion of them here is inappropriate. The most important of them is that "scenario
footprints" should be of nearly constant size - that is, you don't have one great
big global scenario and one little tiny scenario.
MacCRIMMON: I am a bit confused about what you meant at the outset by
rejecting hypothetical questions. What I thought you were going to do was take real
choices made by real decision makers and infer something about their values. This
is called the revealed preference approach in economics. What I thought you
objected to at that point was somebody sitting at a computer console being fed
hypothetical choices. However, as you went on, you required people to give judg-
ments about importance numbers - whatever that means - and value numbers -
whatever that means. To me, these numbers seem about as hypothetical as you can
get.
EDWARDS: I have to agree that these are indeed hypothetical. However, they
are not completely hypothetical because the respondents are well aware of how
they will be used. One of the ingredients in this whole process is to take individuals
through this assessment procedure at the level of examples, so that when they make
such judgments they know what is going to be done with them. The intuition that
they develop seems to be useful.
One of the reasons I advocate such assessment procedures is that I have tried
choices using imaginary betting techniques and have gotten the most overwhelming
rejection that you could ever wish to see. I was startled at the unanimity with
which untrained respondents reject such elicitation procedures, although they are
not at all unwilling to rank dimensions in order of importance. They do not seem to
have much difficulty with the task once they know how the numbers they produce
are going to be used. It is also not necessary to offer a very sophisticated or com-
plicated explanation of the use of the numbers.
13 The Use of Decision Analysis inCapital Investment Problems
Arnalda C. Hax and Karl M. Wiig
13.1 INTRODUCTION
A capital investment usually consists of the allocation of large amounts of money
with plans for recouping the initial investment plus adequate profits (or other
returns) from cash flow (or other benefits) generated during the economic life of
the investment. The decisions associated with these allocations of funds ordinarily
are the responsibility of a firm's top executives, and these decisions constitute the
major tools used to implement the strategic actions of an enterprise. Capital invest-
ments are required to strengthen and renew the resources of a firm.
Once investments are made, the decisions are very hard to reverse without
severely disturbing an organization economically and compromising its ability to
achieve its goals. Thus, capital investment decisions require careful analysis and are
among the most difficult and important decisions managers have to make.
There are certain constant characteristics of capital investment decisions that
must be emphasized at this point because they are important to the methods used
to analyze the consequences of these decisions:
Time When large amounts of money are committed, the impact of this action
is felt for many years in the organization. The long-lasting effects of capital invest·
men t decisions imply that long planning horizons - 10 to 20 years or more - should
be adopted in analyzing them. This forces recognition of the time value of money
(that is, a dollar spent or earned today is worth more than a dollar spent or earned
in the future). Normally, the difference in value of money through time is taken
into consideration by discounting the cash flows generated by the investment
during the planning horizon. The discount rate used for this purpose should reflect
the opportunity cost that is incurred when available funds are devoted to a given
investment. When ample funds are available to an organization, the discount rate
should be at least equal to the interest paid in borrowing money or to the return on
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investment from other ventures or programs. Time values can also be attached to
flows of benefits other than money (such as commodities) through the planning
horizon of the investment problem.
Uncertainties The long-lasting consequences of the investment decision create
uncertainties. Indeed, the cash flows that are expected through the life of the
investment are not known with certainty, nor are critical factors such as market
shares and raw material supplies. Ignoring these uncertainties results in a severe
oversimplification that may lead to the selection of a poor investment alternative.
Risk Uncertainties create an environment in which risk attitudes play an
important role. It has long been recognized that investors are ordinarily risk averse,
their degree of risk aversion depending on their personal preferences, their present
assets, and the nature of the uncertainties they have to face. A complete analysis
of an investment decision has to provide the decision maker with the means to
evaluate properly the implications of his risk attitudes in each strategy option that
is being considered.
Trade-oIls between multiple objectives The selection among competing alter-
natives cannot be resolved, in many practical applications, by means of a single
objective or attribute. In these cases it is necessary to proVide a mechanism that
allows evaluation of the trade-offs existing between multiple objectives.
We describe in this paper an analysis that was conducted to deal with a capital
investment decision facing a major U.S. mining company. The approach followed
in this analysis includes a systematic treatment of time, uncertainties, risks, and
multiple-objective trade-offs. We believe this approach can serve as a general frame·
work for other investment problems of the same type.
The conceptual basis for our approach may be found largely in the field of
decision analysis (see, for example, Raiffa, 1968; Schlaifer, 1969; and Keeney and
Raiffa, 1976). Similar applications of decision analysis to capital investment prob-
lems have been reported by Howard (1968a) and by Spetzler and Zamora (1971).
13.2 CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CAPITAL INVESTMENT DECISION
Two things should be clearly understood before an investment decision analysis
is undertaken: what decision is about to be made and who the decision makers are.
A decision (as defined by Howard, 1968b) is an irrevocable allocation of resources
- irrevocable because it would be impossible or too costly to reverse the decision
after it has been made. This implies an actual commitment of funds by manage·
ment. The definition of the investment decision requires a great deal of creativity,
not only to identify the most attractive opportunities for capital investment, which
determines the environment in which the decision has to take place, but also to
construct all the relevant alternative ways of approaching that decision that are
open to the decision maker. These efforts, which Simon (1960) refers to as the
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intelligence and design phases, respectively, are perhaps the hardest parts of decision
making, and the ones that have received least attention from both traditional and
scientific management schools. It is here that the natural talents of individual
managers are tested the most. Our approach provides a systematic way to structure
the elements of a given decision so as to facilitate the selection of the most prom-
ising alternative. This is what Simon calls the choice phase. The approach takes as
input the definition of the investment problem; therefore, it does not contribute to
the process of identifying investment opportunities (the intelligence phase). By pro-
viding easy ways of testing and evaluating new alternatives, it might contribute only
indirectly to the design phase.
The second basic element of the capital investment problem is the identification
of the decision maker (or decision makers). As we will see, this is an essential ele-
ment since we need to know (a) the scope of the analysis, (b) the decision options
that the decision maker(s) wants to consider, (c) his attitude toward risks, and (d)
the trade-offs he is willing to make at various levels of outcomes. This approach
calls for personal interaction with the decision maker: dealing with an individual
is significantly different from dealing with a group of individuals making a collective
decision.
13.3 GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE INVESTMENT PROJECT
A major mining company found its supply of ore running short and hence enter-
tained projects to increase its supply. An opportunity for decision making presented
itself at the beginning of 1973, when the U.S. Government offered for bids two
parcels of land with extensive ore deposits. There were two major decisions to be
made in this situation:
1. The bidding decision, which consisted primarily of:
The amount to bid for each parcel
Whether to bid alone or with a partner
The bids were to be submitted 2 weeks apart, with the second bid submission after
the results of the first were known. Only one government parcel was sought. Bidding
with a partner had the advantages of obtaining a greater level of expertise and of
sharing the risk associated with the venture but had the disadvantage of providing a
smaller share of the benefits (production and value) to be derived from the venture.
2. The production decision, which consisted of the way in which existing com-
pany ore deposits or those added by the bidding were to be developed and operated.
There were two options:
Develop and operate plant alone (available only if government parcel A or B
were won)
Develop and operate plant with a partner
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If bidding were successful, the government property would be developed. If the bid
were to be won with a partner, the partnership would be extended to the exploi-
tation phase. If the bidding were unsuccessful, a partnership with an owner of ad-
joining land would be required, since the deposits currently owned by the firm were
not enough to allow a large-scale exploitation. Moreover, the company was consider-
ing heavy investment in another venture; a final decision on this venture was
expected in the fall of 1973. If funds were committed to this venture, the
company would be forced to develop the project analyzed herein with a partner.
In the following analysis we will refer to this project as the "competing venture."
In most investment projects the total plant capacity is a decision variable.
Because of the technology involved in the mining operation, the total annual
capacity of the plant was given directly as a function of the size of the available
ore deposits, which were already well known from previous assessments in each
case.
The major alternatives in our investment decision have been described. The
following are significant factors in the analysis of these alternatives:
The project had a planning horizon of 28 years: 3 years of engineering studies
and plant design; 5 years of construction; 20 years of plant operation (economic
life of investment).
Great uncertainties were associated with the required mining technology and the
future product prices.
The total capital commitments were of the order of $500 million.
The president was the single decision maker because of his authority and per-
sonal interest in the problem.
13.4 MODELING AND DATA COLLECTION PHASE
Having defined the decisions and selected the major alternatives, we proceed to a
brief description of our model of the investment problem. More details of the
model, as well as discussion of alternatives to our assumptions, are found in Hax
and Wiig (1975).
13.4.1 SELECTION OF A PLANNING HORIZON AND NUMBER OF TIME PERIODS
The planning horizon indicates how far into the future we have to look to take into
account all the significant outcomes of the investment decision. The planning
horizon extends from the present until the end of the economic life of the invest-
ment project. Ordinarily, it includes feasibility studies and construction periods
preceding the operating phase of the investment. As mentioned above, a planning
horizon of 28 years was selected for our project. This planning horizon was divided
into periods of 1 year.
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13.4.2 SELECTION OF THE DECISION VARIABLES
Decision variables are those factors that are under the control of the decision
maker. The ultimate purpose of this analysis is to provide guidance to the decision
maker with regard to the optimal values for the decision variables. As we have
explained in the general description of the investment project, the decision variables
in this case are:
1. Bidding alone or with partner first for property A, and then, if unsuccessful,
for B
2. Deciding how much to bid for properties A and/or B
3. Developing and operating deposits alone or with partner
Recall that neither plant capacities nor alternative mining processes were decision
variables in this case. Variables I and 3 are bivalued. Variable 2 is a continuous
variable that can assume an infinite number of values. However, it is common
practice in decision analysis to discretize such variables to a limited number of
options to reduce the computational burden. For these reasons, we confined our
analysis to three bidding values - high, medium, and low - for each property.
13.4.3 SELECTION OF PARAMETERS
Parameters (exogenous variables) are those elements of the problem (such as prices,
costs, and demand) that, imposed by the external environment, are beyond the con-
trol of the decision maker. In our project the most important parameters associated
with the investment decision were
Schedule and magnitude of capital investment (by year and by category):
Land and preparation
Mining plant
Ore upgrading plant
Product market prices
Plant capacity
Operating costs
Tax rates (corporate income tax rate; investment tax credit rate; and depletion
allowance rate)
Depreciation (periods and methods for book and tax depreciation for each cash
flow category)
Inflation rates over planning horizon
Fraction of capital investment subject to investment tax credit
In addition, there are parameters associated with the probabilities of winning bids
and success of the competing venture. Since our project was to be financed entirely
by internally generated funds, interest rates were not considered.
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There is some arbitrariness in the distinction made between parameters and
decision variables, and one could argue that, for a certain price, most parameters
can be subject to some degree of control by the decision maker. For instance, the
demand for products can be altered by advertising and promotions, and costs and
prices can be changed. We can always start, however, from a reference point that
defmes the appropriate values for the parameters and insert as decision variables
those actions the decision maker can take (like promotions or advertising expendi·
tures) to change the initial values of the parameters.
13.4.4 CASH FLOW PROJECTION MODEL
The basic objective of the cash flow projection model is to determine the stream
net annual cash flows after taxes over the planning horizon. The relation that
defines the net annual cash flow is
(
Net Cash FlOW) _ (R ) (caPita! Investment) (0 . C ) (T )
f - evenue - C· a! Ch - peratmg ost - axa ter tax or aplt arges
The model used to calculate each component in this equation for each time period
is found in Hax and Wiig (1975).
13.4.5 TRANSFORMATION OF CASH FLOWS INTO A SINGLE PROFITABILITY
MEASURE
In order to compare the cash flows generated by the decision alternatives, it is con-
venient to reduce them to a single measure of profitability. This measure of profit-
ability should provide a consistent indicator of the preferences of the decision maker
toward alternative cash flows, so that if the decision maker prefers the cash flow
associated with alternative A to the one associated with alternative D, then the
profitability measure of A should be greater than that ofD.
Although several measures of profitability have been proposed (see, for example,
Bierman and Smidt, 1966), we strongly recommend that net present value (NPV)
be adopted for this purpose in capital investment decisions. In order to obtain the
NPV of a stream of cash flows, it is necessary to defme a discount rate. The classical
approach to this issue is to select as the discount rate either the cost of capital
(Modigliani and Miller, 1958; Solomon, 1963) or the decision-maker marginal
opportunity rate. Another approach, which is more consistent with the decision
analysis way of thinking (Howard, 1968a; Spetzler and Zamora, 1971), is to con·
sider the discount rate as a statement of time preference on the part of the decision
maker.
It is important to emphasize that this discount rate should not be inflated to
incorporate margins for uncertainties or risks. Doing this will only confuse the
treatment of the time preferences in the reception of the cash flows with the
uncertainties inherent in the magnitude of these cash flows and the risk attitudes
of the decision maker toward these uncertainties. So far, we have purposely
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excluded from our analysis uncertainties and risk considerations. These issues are
treated below.
13.4.6 SELECTION OF OBJECTIVES AND MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS
So far, we have limited ourselves to analyzing the investment decision in tenns of
its cash flow implications. The transfonnation of the cash flow stream into a
single measure of profitability, discussed in the previous section, provides the speci-
fication of a criterion and a measure of perfonnance that could be of great assistance
in distinguishing the relative merits of the various alternatives the decision maker
faces. In fact, many investment opportunities in the private sector can be properly
decided upon if profit maximization (or cost minimization) is treated as the single
objective. However, in some applications it is extremely difficult to identify a
unique objective that represents adequately the preferences of the decision maker
with respect to the outcomes of his decisions. It could be that there are several
attributes that he considers important (profit, share of market, employment
stability, customer satisfaction, and so' on). For our project the decision maker felt
it was essential to incorporate two objectives into the analysis: maximization of
profit, as measured by the NPV of the projected cash flows, and maximization of
product output available to the company from the venture after the partner's share
has been subtracted.
13.4.7 IDENTIFYING PARAMETERS WHOSE UNCERTAINTIES MUST BE TREATED
EXPLICITLY
Although, in rigorous terms, the potential values of every parameter of the problem
over the duration of the planning horizon are subject to some degree of uncertainty,
the impact that those uncertainties have on the selected objective(s) (say, the
NPV of the investment) can be quite different. In many cases, therefore, it is
possible to classify the parameters into two groups: the detenninistic parameters
and the uncertain parameters.
Deterministic parameters are those whose uncertainties can be ignored without
causing undue oversimplifications in the analysis because the expected range of
variability of the parameters is small or the change of the objective's value within
the range is negligible. Their values will be assigned constant numbers, usually the
most likely values or "best single estimates" available, in each period of the planning
horizon.
Uncertain parameters, also called critical parameters, are those whose uncertain-
ties must be properly recognized and dealt with; otherwise, a critical element of the
problem will be overlooked, and the wrong alternative might be chosen.
Significant uncertainties were associated with the bidding process since it was
not possible to describe in a deterministic way the outcome of the bidding decision.
In addition, there were uncertainties involved with the success or failure of the
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competing venture that had implications for the developing of the mining activity,
with or without a partner. From the outset, therefore, we were confronted with the
following uncertain parameters:
Probability of winning the bids for land parcels, given specific bid values
Probability of success of competing venture
The remaining uncertain parameters for our project were selected subjectively.
The decision maker had no hesitation about pointing out those parameters whose
uncertainties made it necessary that they be included in the analysis. The additional
uncertain parameters were
Magnitude of capital investments
Product market price
Operating costs
Notice that, of the parameters of our project listed in section 13.4.3, the follow-
ing were considered to be deterministic:
Plant capacity
Tax rates
Depreciation rates
Fraction of capital investment subject to investment tax credit
Inflation rates
Inflation was taken into consideration by expressing all costs and prices in terms
of 1973 dollars.
13.4.8 CONSTRUCTION OF A DECISION TREE
After the uncertain parameters have been specified, it is useful to structure the
investment problem by using a decision diagram or decision tree. The decision tree
is a graphic representation of the interaction of decision variables with the uncertain
parameters (or events). These interactions are presented sequentially through the
time spanned by the planning horizon in the order in which decision variables are
chosen by the decision maker and in which uncertain parameters become known to
him. Simple introductions to formulating and solving decision trees are given by
Hammond (1967) and Magee (1964a, b); comprehensive discussion of the subject
is provided by Raiffa (1968) and Schlaifer (1969).
The decision tree of the investment problem is constructed in order to organize
the elements of the problem clearly, to recognize and communicate the alternatives
that are meaningful to the decision maker, and to program the remaining computa·
tions necessary to the analysis.
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The decision tree for our project is shown in Figure 13.1. The initial decision
node has four alternatives: bid for government property alone; bid with partner;
stay with own property; and do not pursue or develop project. The bidding process
is represented by nodes 2 through 5 (with a like set of nodes for bidding with
partner). The bidding decision is represented by bid levels (high, medium, low) for
parcel A (node 2) with a resolution of uncertainty associated with each (node 3).
All bids are opened for public inspection, and, after this, new bids may be sub-
mitted for parcel B in a similar manner (nodes 4 and 5). Node 6 represents the out-
come of the competing venture. If that venture is undertaken, the company only
has sufficient resources to develop the mining project with a partner. If the com-
peting venture is rejected, whatever partnership arrangement had been decided on
would continue.
13.4.9 ASSESSMENT OF PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTIONS OF UNCERTAIN
PARAMETERS
Once the parameters whose uncertainties are to be treated explicitly are determined,
the next stage of our analysis consists of measuring the likelihood of occurrence of
the possible outcomes of the uncertain parameters. This is accomplished by specify-
ing the probability distributions of those parameters. If the parameters are indepen-
dent of each other, each probability distribution can be determined separately.
However, if the outcome of one parameter depends on the level of achievement of
another parameter, we might have to assess conditional and marginal probability
distributions. In these cases, characterizing the probability distribution of the un-
certain parameters could be complex. For discussions of this subject see Schlaifer
(1969, Chapters 8 and 9) and Winkler (1968).
In our project, because of the unique nature of the mining venture and the lack
of previous experience with the parameters' behavior, we relied completely on sub-
jective assessment to characterize the nature of the probability distributions of the
uncertain parameters:
Probability Distribution of Winning Bids This distribution is given in Figure
13.2. It was assessed by determining the 1 percent, 25 percent, 50 percent, 75 per-
cent, and 99 percent fractiles of the highest bid. The 1 percent fractile is $5.5
million, indicating that the assessor believes that there is only one chance in a
hundred that the highest bid for this particular parcel will be below $5.5 million.
All the uncertain parameters were assessed by means of this fractile technique.
Probability of Success of Competing Venture The probability of success was
assessed at 0.1.
Magnitude of Capital Investment In order to incorporate uncertainties in the
capital investment stream, we used a capital investment multiplying factor. This
factor, whose distribution ranged from 0.6 to 2.0, was multiplied by the engineering
estimates (base case) of the capital investments to yield the possible capital invest-
ment stream.
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FIGURE 13.2 Probability of winning bids, encoded by decision maker at 1 per-
cent, 25 percent, 50 percent, 75 percent, and 99 percent.
Product Market Prices Five market price distributions were assessed - for
1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, and 2000. Whenever we sample from these distributions,
we draw a single random number (from 0 to 1.0) and obtain the corresponding prices
for the 5 years indicated. Prices for intermediate years are interpolated. This
approach was adopted in order to take into consideration the strong correlation
between market prices for the various years. A more formal approach would have
required assessing conditional probabilities of market prices in year n given a
specific price in year n - 1. The computational effort required for such an assess-
ment would have been prohibitively expensive.
Operating Costs The operating costs were represented by two distributions.
First, an initial operating cost was assessed. Operating costs for the subsequent
years were obtained by applying a growth factor, whose distribution ranged from
0.75 to 1.5, to this initial value.
13.4.10 DEFINITION OF RELEVANT STRATEGIES AND COMPUTATION OF
RISK PROFILES
In our project, 26 strategies were defined. These strategies refer to the partnership
conditions (bidding either alone or with a partner); the bidding level for each
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FIGURE 13.3 Risk profiles (in NPV) for four selected strategies. Mean NPV for
strategy 1 was $71 million; for strategy 2, $81 million; for strategy 17, $87 million;
and for strategy 25, $101 million.
parcel - high, medium, and low - if a bid is to be placed; or not bidding at all and
developing already owned property.
It is not enough to measure the profitability of each strategy by the expected
net present value since the uncertainty in the project makes it impossible to
guarantee the achievement of a specified NPV. We need to include some measures
of the variability of the NPV. It has become common practice to represent the per·
formance of a project by providing the complete probability distribution of the
selected measure of profitability. This distribution is known as the risk profile of
the investment. Figure 13.3 provides the NPV risk profiles for four of the 26
strategies (strategies 1, 2, 17, and 25). These strategies stochastically dominated all
other strategies. The NPVs were calculated for a discount rate of 10 percent. It can
be seen from Figure 13.3 that strategy 25 dominated all other strategies except for
a minor end·effect where strategy 1 becomes preferable.
13.4.11 TREATMENT OF RISK ATTITUDES FOR SINGLE-oBJECTIVE PROJECTS
Sometimes for projects with single objectives, the risk implications of each strategy
can be resolved by carefully analyzing each strategy's risk profile. If a clear
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dominance exists, as seems to be the case with strategy 25, the decision maker
can feel confident enough to reach a decision at this stage of the investment
analysis. In any event, the risk profiles could eliminate from further consideration
a number of the strategies selected initially that are shown to be clearly dominated
by a subset of superior strategies. If a clearly dominant strategy cannot be identi-
fied at this stage, it might be necessary to assess the attitude of the decision maker
toward risks by eliciting his utility function (or preference function). A utility
function provides a complete description of the decision maker's attitude toward
risk over the range of all the possible consequences of the project under analysis.
Using the lottery technique discussed in ScWaifer (1969), the exponential
utility function
U(NPV) = 1.3 (1_e-·OO5(NPV+l00)
was assessed for NPV scaled from 0 for - $100 million to 1 for $200 million. This
utility function allows characterization of each strategy by a single number, its
expected utility. The optimal strategy is then selected simply by choosing the
strategy with the highest expected utility.
For our project, the four leading strategies and the do-nothing option had the
following expected utilities and certainty equivalents:
2 17 25 26
Bid High Bid Low Develop Own
Bid High with with Property with Do
Alone Partner Partner Partner Nothing
Expected risk
utility .704 .747 .750 .797 .512
Certainty equivalent
($million NPV) 56 71 72 90 0
As was the case with the NPV risk profIles, strategy 25 is dominant. It is now also
clear that strategies 2 and 17 are almost indistinguishable and strategy 1 is much
worse than the other strategies.
13.4.12 OPTIMAL STRATEGIES WITH TWO OBJECTIVES
The steps described so far provide a complete and comprehensive analysis of capital
investment decisions with a single objective. As indicated in section 13.4.6, the con-
sequences of our project could not be properly evaluated by considering profitability
measures alone. A second objective of great significance was the maximization of
product output.
A higWy simplified treatment of multiple-objective decisions can be performed
by assigning a weight to each objective that reflects its importance to the decision
maker. This approach will transform the multiple-objective analysis into a
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single-objective problem. This procedure neither recognizes the nonlinear trade-offs
that frequently exist among competing objectives nor considers interdependence
among these objectives.
We will now proceed to apply to our problem a more formal treatment based on
decision analysis and utility theory concepts. This stage of our project closely
follows the approach of Keeney (I972) and Keeney and Raiffa (I976).
The two competing objectives, and their associated attributes (NPV and per-
centage of possible government parcel production rate), that the decision maker
considered of importance in our decision situation were
Maximization of profit
Maximization of output
The ranges of the attributes were - 100 to + 200 for NPV and 0 to 100 for possible
percentage of production (P). The single-objective utility function for NPV was
established above in section 13.4.11 (for P= 100).
The next step was to establish the proper form of the two-objective utility
function. By reassessment of the certainty equivalents of NPV at several values of
P, and then by repeating the procedure for P at several values of NPV, it was con-
cluded that the two objectives were utility-independent. A utility function of the
following form was adopted:
U(NPV,P) = U(NPV,Po) + U(NPVo,P) + kU(NPV,Po) U(NPVo,P)
= alUl(NPV,Po) + a2U2(NPVo,P)
1 -al -a2
+ al UI (NPV, PO)a2 U2 (NPV 0, P),
ala2
where NPVo and Po are reference values ofNPV andP; Ul(NPV, Po) and U2(NPVo, P)
are the single-objective utility functions for NPV and P, respectively, and they are
assessed at the reference value Po and NPVo; and al and a2 are scaling constants.
The single-objective utility functions Ul(NPV) and U2(P) were fitted to first-
order exponential functions. The assessment of the constants a land a2 was per-
formed along the same lines as those described by Keeney (I972) and resulted in
the function
U(NPV,P) = 0.988 (I _e-·OOS(NPV+lOO» + 0.197 (I _e-·03P )
+ 0.067 (I - e-·OOS(NPV+lOO»(I - e-·03P ).
The corresponding utility surface is given in Figure 13.4, which also includes the
basic gamble and the point of indifference used to determine the constants a l and
a2 in the utility functions. This utility surface reflects the willingness of the decision
maker to trade off a reduction in NPV of about $11 million in order to increase
available production from 35 percent to 50 percent; this unwillingness was later
corroborated by consistency checks.
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The expected utility for each strategy was calculated using Monte Carlo simula-
tion by computing the utility for each trial from the NPV and available production
and then converting these projections into expected utility values. To compute an
illustrative certainty equivalent for each strategy that corresponds to the expected
utility value obtained from the simulation, it is common practice to freeze one of
the attributes at a specified reference point. By assessing the certainty equivalent
at this arbitrarily specified value for one attribute (in our example, 50 percent of
available production), the value of the other attribute that corresponds to the
certainty equivalent can be determined. For our project, the four leading strategies
and the do-nothing option had the following expected utilities and corresponding
certainty equivalents:
Bid High
Alone
Expected two-
objective utility .719
Certainty equivalent
($ million NPV)
(assessed at P = 50) 51
2 17 25 26
Bid High Bid Low Develop Own
with with Property with Do
Partner Partner Partner Nothing
.722 .706 .710 .386
52 45 47
Strategies 2 and 1 have the highest utilities and have now become the most
desirable. According to the decision maker's preferences with regard to the two
objectives, he should bid high on the government parcels with a partner. Almost
the same utility is found for bidding high without a partner. These results contrast
with the analysis of NPV or single-objective risk attitudes, where strategy 25 was
found to be best (develop own parcel with partner and do not bid on government
land). The utilities of all these strategies are about twice that of doing nothing.
13.5 CONCLUSIONS
In many capital investment projects there are several competing objectives to be
considered if the optimal strategy is to be determined. For the project analyzed in
this paper, the two-objective optimal strategy (strategy 2) was not found to be
optimal when only the monetary objective was considered. The ranking of
strategies by the three methods of analysis were (by direct ranking of strategies
from Figure 13.3 and from the earlier tables of risk utility and two-objective utility
scores):
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2 17 25 26
Bid High Bid Low Develop Own
Bid High with with Property with Do
Alone Partner Partner Partner Nothing
NPV analysis rank 4 3 2 5
NPV risk utility
rank 4 3 2 5
Two-objective
utility rank 2 4 3 5
It can be seen that the rankings change significantly when the second objective
is brought in. The differences in terms of NPV between strategies 25 and 2 is $20
million (25 is better), while the difference between the two strategies' certainty
equivalents (in NPV) with two objectives is $5 million (2 is better). If the certainty
equivalents from the NPV analysis had been the basis for the decision, the wrong
strategy would have been chosen. In addition, the value of the chosen strategy (25)
would have been overestimated by $25 million compared with the multiattribute
optimal strategy (2). The changes in the certainty equivalents for the four strategies
under the three analysis methods are shown in Figure 13.5.
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The decision maker chose to pursue strategy 2 as a result of the analysis out-
lined in this paper. He had been frustrated by his inability to handle the two
objectives and resolve the trade-offs (or conflicts, as he expressed it). With the
multiattribute utility analysis he was satisfied that his views and values were prop-
erly represented and, hence, he had no hesitation in accepting the optimal strategy.
Minimization of scarcity of capital emerged as a third objective when the final
results were presented to the decision maker, and if strategy 1 (bid alone) had been
found to be best, it would have been necessary to include this objective in the
analysis, since the decision maker would have placed a value on reducing capital
outlays for the first 3 years through partnership until the firm had become strongly
committed to the project.
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DISCUSSION
ZIONTS: Did you calculate the highest bid price that you could consider that
still gave you a positive net present value? If so, was it significantly greater than the
bid price calculated?
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wnG: It was not. We did not do the analysisperse, but we did some sensitivity
analyses that indicated this.
MacCRIMMON: Did you do any sensitivity analyses using the two-objective
utility function? Given your results, it might be that small changes in the param-
eters might lead to quite different rankings of the alternatives.
WnG: We did a very small amount. Unfortunately, we were pressed for time
on this project. This is one of the things that often happens with real decisions.
KULIKOWSKI: I have two questions. You have a strategy that you call "do
nothing." Did you take into account the so-called forgone opportunities? As you
mentioned, if the company didn't engage in the project, they could spend their
money somewhere else. The next question is about the return on capital. Is this
taken from the point of view of the company, or, in a broader sense, does it also
include social considerations?
wnG: First, I would say we did not adequately portray the "do nothing"
strategy in tenus of opportunity cost. We defined it essentially as just a zero net
present value instead of looking at the expected return on investment for other
opportunities. Secondly, we looked at the economics exclusively from the com-
pany's viewpoint.
MEYER: I do not understand the first part of your answer; presumably, the
discount rate you used was precisely what you assessed the opportunity cost of
invested funds to be. Philosophically, what meaning does that discount rate that
you use have other than the return you could have made from that capital if used
otherwise? If that is the meaning it had, then isn't the answer to the previous
question, "Yes, we did take into account the return from other opportunities,
and that is what our 'do nothing' is."
wnG: If you have a large portfolio of opportunities to choose from, yes. I
think if you were to do this analysis properly, you would have to look explicitly
at the projects that you displace by committing funds, and this we did not look at
at all. So in that sense we did not look properly at the forgone opportunities.
KEENEY: Were the utility assessments conducted with the president of the
company? Also, what difficulties did you have in obtaining those, and what recep-
tiveness or lack of it does he have toward using such procedures again?
WnG: The utility assessments were the president's. I think he would be quite
willing to do such assessments again if he were faced with a situation that required
this kind of attention. He was very interested in participating in this "game," as
he saw it. In other words, he thought very highly of the novelty of doing this aspect
of the analysis in this particular way. We don't find this attitude in all situations
that we encounter.
EDWARDS: What kind of feedback did you get from the discrepancy between
predicted bid and actual bid?
WnG: We did not provide the distribution of expected bids. Our client's staff
provided that. The expected bid was approximately an order of magnitude less than
the actual top bid. Our client's bid was also an order of magnitude under the top bid.
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RAIFFA: As is often the case, probability distributions are assessed too tight.
This has been demonstrated in practice as well as in the laboratory.
PESCHEL: How sure can you be that the last rank order that you got is a
reliable one, since the differences between them are small?
WIIG: They are small. In this particular case, we did keep track of the dominance
relationships among strategies for many possible scenarios. We found that our best
strategy was very robust. I think this is something that we tend to avoid considering
on specific occasions.
ROY: It is possible to split your strategies into two parts, the second following
in I or 2 years?
WIIG: In this case we have perhaps four initial strategies, and after a couple
of months you have to branch some of these four into several other strategies.
ROY: How do you take into account the fact that after 6 months you will
perhaps get some new information concerning the uncertainties that you have
initially? Do you adapt the first decision to account for this information?
RAIFFA: This question could arise in general. Certainly, decision analysis
incorporates any consideration of the way uncertainties unfold in time, as well
as reactions later on. Thus, if the tree were an accurate representation of what
could happen, then the analysis adequately considers these factors. If the purpose
of your question goes deeper, implying that the decision tree is never really com-
plete, then there would be uncertainties that would unfold in the future that are
not even contemplated on the tree. In this case, the analysis is incomplete, and
one would have to make adjustments for that lack of completeness. All these con-
siderations are closely tied to the difficulties of problem definition.
MEYER: My point relates directly to that question. Just to play devil's advocate,
I am going to suggest that this decision analysis did the opposite of what you want
a decision analysis to do - namely, it prevented discussion about the real strategic
issues in the problem. Now I need a lot of suppositions in this case in order to
achieve my point. You got a very narrow distribution of future crude prices, of
bids by others, and so on. That's not unusual. You had excluded from consider-
ation a scenario that was an improbable one, namely the Middle East war. Every-
thing was done to give you assessments that are too narrow. Then, for no reason
that I can see other than to make the calculation come out with the desired answer,
you brought in another variable for which we have utility, apart from the monetary
factor. This was the notion of how much additional crude supply we can acquire.
Now I suggest that the strategic questions for an oil company are indeed whether
they want to be crude rich, in what part of the world they wanted their crude
resources to be; whether they want their primary contribution to be refining and
distribution activity, or whether they want to be the owner of crude reserves,
charging high economic rents for mineral sources. The question for analysis is how
the strategic questions facing this oil company should be included in the problem.
You included them by putting in the amount of crude supply obtained as an
additional variable. What I am suggesting is that because you wanted to keep the
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calculations rather simple and limited, the real strategic issues that decision analysis
is supposed to address here were not addressed. Now, I have obviously made an
extreme case, and I make it only so that, if there is going to be debate on this sort
of question, you have something to punch against.
wnG: I think you have raised a very relevant question, and I think it's one that
might be quite typical for applications of decision analysis by people like me and
by companies like ours. Indeed, it is very, very difficult for us to change the scope
of the analysis. We are faced with situations that have a predetermined scope, and
we are not allowed to go outside that scope. This particular analysis, although it
was done for an oil company, was done at a time when all companies considered
that the world would go on in the future as it had in the past. They did not worry
about drastic changes in supply. I think that the decision maker in this case was
concerned about it, but the company itself (Le., the board of directors) was not
concerned about it and did not want to discuss it.
MEYER: I have some knowledge of the activities of another oil company during
the period your decision was considered. This company had a group of people
developing scenarios and had already forecast enormous uncertainties in oil prices.
They had a scenario for the kind of thing that happened. It is a fascinating question
to decide how much impact you have by structuring the problem and by fitting
objective functions and by doing all those things. In fact, you might have much
more impact by just stimulating somewhat broader thought that might result in
much broader distributions.
RAIFF A: This is a question that comes out in all kinds of quantitative analysis.
Very often, hard analysis drives out the softer strategic planning aspects. In my
experience, I can give examples where the analysis was so constrained that it left
out the strategic considerations. In other examples, the analysis forced the articu·
lation of strategic issues that were lying linked but unrecognized in the decision
maker's mind.
14 Selecting Nuclear Power Plant Sitesin the Pacific Northwest
Using Decision Analysis
Ralph L. Keeney and Keshavan Nair
The Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS) is a joint operating agency
consisting of 21 publicly owned utilities in the State of Washington. In 1974,
WPPSS authorized a study by Woodward-Oyde Consultants to identify and
recommend potential new sites in the Pacific Northwest suitable for thermal
electric power generating stations with a nominal capacity of 3000 MWe that
might be required after 1984. The study was to be conducted on the basis of
existing information and field reconnaissance; no detailed site-specific studies were
to be made. The objective of the study was to recommend sites that would have a
high likelihood for successful licensing and that therefore would be most suitable
for the detailed site-specific studies necessary for fmal selection of a single nuclear
power plant site. The approach (Nair et al., 1975) used to conduct this study con-
sisted of two major steps:
A screening process to identify the candidate sites
A decision analysis to evaluate and rank the candidate sites
Details of the overall study process are described in Woodward-Clyde Consultants
(I975).
This paper focuses on evaluation of the candidate sites. To indicate how those
sites were identified, the screening process is summarized in section 14.1. Section
14.2 describes the objectives and the attributes used to evaluate the candidate sites.
The assessment of the utility function is presented in section 14.3, and probability
assessments describing the possible impacts associated with each site are given in
section 14.4. Section 14.5 presents the evaluation of sites using the information
developed and the sensitivity analysis. The final section contains our conclusions
and recommendations.
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14.1 THE SCREENING PROCESS: IDENTIFYING THE ALTERNATIVES
The study area consisted of approximately 170,000 square miles, including the
entire State of Washington, the major river basins in Oregon and Idaho that are
tributary to rivers in Washington, and the major river basins of the Oregon coast.
The study was directed toward finding new sites, and therefore all areas within
a 10-mile radius of the U.S. Energy Research and Development Agency's Hanford
reservation and other site areas for which electric generating facilities have been
formally proposed or are under development were excluded. It is clearly impractical
to evaluate every possible site in such a large area. Financial and time constraints
require that one concentrate on areas where the likelihood of finding candidate
sites is high.
The first step in the screening process involved establishing the basis for selecting
sites. An extensive hierarchy of issues and considerations pertaining to thermal
power plant siting was developed. The issues concerned safety, environmental,
social, and economic considerations. Criteria defining a reqUired level of achieve-
ment on each consideration were established to identify areas for further evalu-
ation. Examples of these specific criteria are given in Table 14.1.
Some of the criteria for inclusion result from the rules of regulatory agencies
- e.g., distance from a capable fault or proximity to a protected ecological reserve.
Other considerations are functional - e.g., the accessibility of an adequate supply
of cooling water. There are also considerations related to cost, for which the project
team, in consultation with representatives of WPPSS, established minimum levels
of achievement - e.g., the ruggedness of the terrain and distance from railroads and
waterways. In addition, considerations relating to public opinion and priorities were
included. Examples of such considerations are exclusions of areas of scenic beauty
or unusual ecological character that have not been designated as legally protected
areas.
Once screening criteria were specified, those parts of the study area where a
criterion was satisfied were identified and plotted on an appropriate map. Overlay
techniques were used to produce composite maps that specified areas meeting all
the criteria. A field reconnaissance team of experienced engineers, geologists, and
environmental scientists visited these areas. Using their observations as well as pub-
lished information, these experts identified nine candidate sites for further con-
sideration. The subsequent evaluation of these sites using decision analysis is the
main topic of this paper.
Before we proceed, an important remark concerning the screening process is in
order. A big assumption is made implicitly when we include or exclude areas merely
because they fall just under or over a cutoff level on one criterion. In reality, there
is no sharp distinction, and utilizing this approach may eliminate potential areas
that are fine on several criteria but just barely fail on one or two. However, such
an approach provides a mechanism of rapidly focusing attention on candidate areas
that have higher probabilities of containing acceptable potential sites. We consider
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TABLEl4.l Examples of Criteria Used in Screening Process
Issue Consideration Measure Criteria for Inclusion
Health and Radiation Distance from Areas > 3 mi from
safety exposure populated populated places
areas > 2,500
Areas > I mi from
populated places
< 2,500
Flooding Height above Area must be above
nearest water primary floodplain
source
Surface Distance from Areas> 5 mi from capable
faulting fault or unclassified faults
> 12 mi long
Environmental Thermal Average low Rivers or reservoirs
effects pollution flood yielding 7-day-average,
10-year-frequency low
flow> 50ft'/sec
Sensitive or Location with Areas outside designated
protected respect to protected ecological
environments ecological areas
areas
Socioeconomic Tourism and Location with Areas outside of designated
effects recreation respect to scenic and recreational
designated areas
scenic and
recreational
areas
System cost Routine and Cost of cooling Rivers or
and emergency water water reservoirs yielding
reliability supply and acquisition 7-day-average, 10-year-
source frequency low flow
characteristics > 50 ft3/sec
Cost of pumping Areas < 10 mi from water
water supply
Areas < 800 ft above water
supply
Delivery of major Cost of Areas within 25 mi of
plant providing navigable waterways
components access for
major plant
components
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that the advantages (particularly in terms of time) of applying screening criteria
override the disadvantage of possibly disregarding some candidate areas.
Another point to keep in mind is that screening criteria may change with time;
they depend on social, political, technological, and financial conditions. Future
siting efforts may need to use different or additional criteria as conditions change.
14.2 ESTABLISHING THE OBJECTIVES AND MEASURES OF
EFFECTIVENESS
To help in identifying those characteristics that would differentiate the appropriate-
ness of locating a nuclear power facilit~l at one site instead of another, detailed
descriptions of the sites were developed. The information gathered included the
area, location, present use, and ownership of the site; the quality and quantity and
location of the water supply; details of the natural factors, including geology,
topography, flooding potential, and volcanic considerations; population in the
vicinity; vegetation and wildlife, including fish, in the area; access to various trans-
portation modes for construction and operation of the facility; existence of a local
work force and catalog of potential socioeconomic effects of the construction
phase; and so on. By means of this information, plus data gathered during the
screening process, approximately 30 potential objectives with associated attributes
for evaluating these particular sites were identified.
It was unlikely that each of these would be significant in the evaluation process.
Hence, each one was qualitatively examined (and in some cases, quantitatively
examined in a preliminary manner) to determine the reasonableness of keeping it
in the evaluation process. Three general concepts were used for this examination:
• The significance of the impact in terms of an attribute in relation to impacts
as measured by other attributes. For example, the annualized capital cost of a
nuclear power plant is in the range of $200-300 million for the candidate sites,
and the annual revenue loss from adverse effects of plant operation on fish is in the
range of $0-500,000. Under these conditions, the contribution of the latter to
the relative preferences of the sites could be neglected.
• The site-dependent variation of the impact in terms of an attribute. For
instance, even though yearly manpower costs for plant operation may be signifi-
cant, they might be omitted from consideration if these costs are nearly identical
for all sites.
• The likelihood of occurrence of significant impacts as measured by an attri-
bute. If one combines the magnitude of impact with the likelihood of its occur-
rence, the resulting "weighted" impact can be relatively insignificant. Consider,
for example, adverse effects on crops that could amount to as much as $9 million
per year. However, considering the near-zero probabilities of such extreme losses,
the "weighted" impact is in thousands of dollars rather than in millions of dollars.
Such an impact is considered insignificant.
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TABLE 14.2 Attributes and Ranges Used in Evaluating the Candidate Sites
Range
Issue
Health and
safety
Environmental
effects
Socioeconomic
effects
System cost
Attribute
X I == site population factor
X, == loss of salmonids
X, == biological impacts
at site
X 5 == length of intertie
to 500-kV system
through environmentally
sensitive areas
X. == socioeconomic impact
X. == annual differential
cost between sites -
1985 dollars, 30-yr
plant life
Worst
0.20
100% of
100,000 fish
(Subjective scale
described in Table 14.3)
50 mi
(Subjective scale
described in Table 14.4)
$40,000,000
Best
o
o
o
o
The examination of possible objectives was evolutionary in nature. Preliminary
estimates were made of possible impacts and their probabilities. Using these, some
objectives were disregarded. Estimates of the remaining impacts were updated on
the basis of field visits, and a few more objectives were discarded. As a result of
this process, the list of attributes in Table 14.2 was generated for evaluating candi-
date sites. For each of the attributes, a measurement index was established and
ranges of possible impact determined.
14.2.1 CLARIFYING THE ATTRIBUTES
Attribute Xi> the site population factor, is an index developed by the U.s. Atomic
Energy Commission to indicate the relative human radiational hazard associated
with a nuclear facility. The site population factor at a location L, denoted SPF(L),
is defined by
SPF(L)
50~ p(ry2
r=l
50 '~ Q(rr2
r=l
(14.1)
where r is miles from site L, Per) is the population living between r- 1 and r miles
of L, and Q(r) is the population that would live between r - 1 and r miles of L
if there were a uniform density of 1,000 people per square mile. The r- 2 is meant to
account for the decrease in radiation exposure hazard with distance. The purpose
of the denominator in (14.1) is to allow one to intercept an SPF == 0.1, for example,
as equivalent to a uniform distribution of lOO (Le., 0.1 times 1,000) people per
square mile within 50 miles of the site.
TABLE 14.3
Scale
Value
o
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
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Subjective Scale for Biological Impacts {Attribute X3)a
Level of Impact
Complete loss of 1.0 mi' ofland that is entirely in agricultural use or is entirely
urbanized; no loss of any "native" biological communities.
Complete loss of 1.0 mi' of primarily (75%) agricultural habitat with loss of
25% of second growth; no measurable loss of wetlands or endangered-species
habitat.
Complete loss of 1.0 mi' of land that is 50% farmed and 50% disturbed in some
other way (e.g., logged or new second growth); no measurable loss of wet-
lands or endangered-species habitat.
Complete loss of 1.0 mi' of recently disturbed (e.g., logged, plowed) habitat,
plus disturbance to surrounding previously disturbed habitat within 1.0 mi
of site border; or 15% loss of wetlands or endangered-species habitat.
Complete loss of 1.0 mi 2 of land that is 50% farmed (or otherwise disturbed)
and 50% mature second growth or other community; 15% loss of wetlands
or endangered-species habitat.
Complete loss of 1.0 mi' of land that is primarily (75%) undistrubed mature
"desert" community; or 15% loss of wetlands or endangered-species habitat.
Complete loss of 1.0 mi' of mature, second-growth (but not virgin) forest
community; or 50% loss of big game and upland game birds; or 50% loss of
local wetlandS and local endangered-species habitat.
Complete loss of 1.0 mi' of mature community or 90% loss of local productive
wetlandS and local endangered-species habitat.
Complete loss of 1.0 mi' of mature, virgin forest or local wetlandS or local
endangered-species habitat.
a This is a qualitative scale of potential short- and long-term impacts (excluding the impact on
salmonids) that could result from the construction and operation of a power plant on a site.
The impacts range from "0" for no impact to "8" for maximum impact. Site visits and general
reconnaissance showed that the biologically important characteristics (aside from aquatic
resources) of the regions are:
• Virgin or large, mature, second-growth stands of timber or "undisturbed" sagebrush
communities
• Known or potential habitat of endangered species
• Wetland areas (though most are small and are comprised of small swamps)
Two separate indices were required to measure the salmonid impact adequately
- the percent of fish lost in a stream and the number of fish in the stream. The
reason for using these two measures, rather than simply using the number of fish
lost, is that the salmonid population in each stream is distinct. Therefore, the loss
of 2,000 fish in a stream of 2,000 is a greater loss than 2,000 fish in a stream of
50,000. For the Columbia River (over 350,000 salmonid), only the number lost
is important because it is virtually impossible that a large percentage of these fish
will be affected by a specific nuclear power plant and also because most of the fish
in the Columbia are native to its tributaries.
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Because attributes X3 and X4 were meant to capture many detailed possible
impacts, it was necessary to develop subjective indices for each of them. The sub-
jective index for biological impacts shown in Table 14.3 was developed by two
experienced ecologists. Three main features captured by this scale are native
timber or sagebrush communities, habitats of rare or endangered species, and pro-
ductive wetlands.
The subjective index for socioeconomic impact, attribute X4, was constructed
by a sociologist/planner (Table 14.4). The scale includes the implications for the
public debt, social and cultural institutions, municipal services, and local authority
due to the construction and operation of the nuclear facility. The purpose of such
a scale is to identify a number of impact levels that are clearly articulated. In
evaluating any specific site, one states the likelihood that the true impact will
be between any particular adjacent pair of impact levels defined in Table 14.4.
The length of the transmission intertie line running through environmentally
sensitive areas is measured in miles by attribute Xs. Attribute X6 is the annual
differential cost between sites in terms of 1985 dollars, assuming a 3D-year plant
life. The discount rate used was 8.4 percent. Costs such as the major plant com-
ponents are not included in attribute X6, since these would be the same for all
sites. The differential is calculated relative to the lowest-cost site, for which the
"differential cost" is set at zero.
14.3 DETERMINING THE PREFERENCE STRUCTURE
The position taken in determining the preference structure was that Woodward-
Clyde Consultants would act as the decision maker for WPPSS. Other points of
view were considered by conducting sensitivity analyses. It was decided that the
utility function for each attribute would be assessed for the most knowledgeable
members of the team (the "experts"). The trade-off constants would be jointly
assessed by key members of the project team on the basis of their perception of
the WPPSS point of view.
The process of determining the utility function can be broken down into four
steps:
Determining the general preference structure
Assessing the single-attribute utility functions
Evaluating the scaling constants
Specifying the utility function
Before illustrating our procedure, let us define XI to be a specific amount of attri-
bute XI, i = 1,2, ... ,6, so, for instance, X6 may be $8 million, a specific amount
of the differential cost attribute X6' We want to determine the utility function
u(x h X 2, ••• ,X6) over the six attributes of Table 14.2.
TABLE 14.4
Scale
Value
o
I
2
3
4
5
6
7
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Subjective Scale for Socioeconomic Impact (Attribute X4)
Level of Impact
Metropolitan region, population 100,000. No significant impact.
Semiremote town, population 250. Self-contained company town is built at the
site. As many as half of the plant construction force continue to commute
from other areas. Some permanent operating personnel continue to
commute. Cultural institutions are overloaded, very little change in the social
order. Public debt outstrips revenues by less than 6 months over previous
levels.
Remote town, population 250. Self-contained company town is built at the site.
Most of the work force moves into company town. Most permanent operating
personnel begin to assimilate into the community. Cultural institutions are
impacted, significant changes take place in the social order. Growth of the
tax base due to permanent operating personnel is orderly, but public debt
outstrips revenues by more than 6 months, less than 1 year, over previous
levels.
Semiremote city, population 25,000. About half of the plant construction force
immigrates and seeks housing in the city. Most of new growth is in mobile
homes. All city systems (law enforcement, sewer, water, schools, code
enforcement) are taxed to the limit. Outside financial assistance is required.
Cultural institutions are impacted, social order is slightly altered. Permanent
operating personnel easily assimila te into community, tax base grows signifi-
cantly, but lags in assessment, planning, and capital improvements construc-
tion produce a boom-town atmosphere. Public debt outstrips revenue growth
by 1-2 years.
Remote city, population 25,000. Most workers locate in the city. All city
systems are impacted. Land-use patterns are permanently disrupted. Growth
outstrips planning activities and regulatory systems. Assessment falls behind.
Revenue-debt lag is greater than 2 years.
Semiremote town, population 1,500. Many workers commute from outside
areas. Permanent operating personnel and some workers seek housing in the
city. New growth is predominantly mobile homes, with much permanent
construction as well. New construction in service establishments and expan-
sion of commercial facilities. Town has basic planning and land-use regulatory
functions established, but these are overwhelmed by magnitude of growth.
Assessment and enforcement lag 2 years or more; community facilities are
impacted. Land-use patterns are permanently disrupted. Cultural institutions
are severely impacted; social order is permanently altered. Much growth
occurs in unincorporated areas, untaxable by town.
Remote town, population 1,500. Most workers try to locate in or near the town.
Most growth is in unincorporated areas. City systems are impacted; lack of
regulation in unincorporated areas impacts rural development patterns,
which in turn severely impacts the cultural institutions and social order. Tax
base cannot expand to meet demand for capital improvements.
Remote city, population 10,000. Severe impact due to attractiveness to large
numbers of plant workers. Basic services and established planning, assessment,
and enforcement procedures are sufficient to provide the framework for
rapid growth but insufficient to handle the magnitude of such growth.
Massive imbalances in long-term city finances occur,leading to revenue-
debt lags of several years. City size and bonding experience probably do not
permit revenue financing, so the "bust" portion of the cycle is virtually
inescapable.
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14.3.1 DETERMINING THE GENERAL PREFERENCE STRUCTURE
The first important step in selecting the fonn of the utility function involves
investigating the reasonableness of preferential independence and utility indepen-
dence conditions (Keeney and Raiffa, 1976). Provided certain of these conditions
are appropriate, the six-attribute utility function is expressible in a simple func-
tional form of the six one-attribute utility functions. Let us illustrate the way one
checks for such conditions.
Two attributes {Xi, Xj } are preferentially independent of the other attributes
if the preference order for (Xi, Xj) combinations does not depend on fixed levels
of the other attributes. Consider differential cost X 6 and impact on salmonids
X 2. We first asked ourselves what level of X 6 would make (X6, 100 percent of
100,000 salmon lost) indifferent to (40 million, 0 percent), given that the other
four attributes were at their best levels. The answer obtained was 20 million. We
then examined the same question with the other attributes at their worst levels.
We still felt an appropriate response for X6 was 20 million. By considering other
pairs of indifferent points, we established that the trade-offs between {X6 , X 2}
would be independent of the level of the other attributes. Since the project team
had been exposed to concepts of preferential and utility independence, they were
in a position to state, after an initial series of questions of the above type over the
attributes, that in general the trade-offs between any two attributes did not depend
on the levels of the other attributes. Thus, each pair of attributes was considered
preferentially independent of the others.
Attribute X j is defined to be utility independent of the other attributes if the
preference order for lotteries on Xi does not depend on fixed levels of the other
attributes. This implies that the conditional utility functions over Xi are the same
regardless of the levels of the other attributes.
To establish whether X3 (biological impact) was utility independent of the other
attributes, we assessed the conditional utility function for X3, assuming the other
attributes are at fixed levels. We then reassessed the conditional utility function
with the other attributes fixed at different levels. The assessment was conducted
using the techniques described in the subsequent section. It was decided that the
relative preference for lotteries involving uncertainty only in the consequences for
X 3 did not depend on the other attributes. Thus, attribute X3 was utility indepen-
dent of the other attributes.
The above independence conditions implied that the multiattribute utility
function u is either of the additive form
6
u(x) = I kiUi(Xi),
i=1
or of the multiplicative form
6
1 + ku(x) = n [1 + kkiUi(Xi)],
i=1
(14.2)
(14.3)
307
where U is scaled 0 to I and the Uj are single-attribute utility functions scaled from
o to I, the kj's are scaling constants with 0 < k j < I, and k >- I is a scaling
constant determined from the kj's.
A proof of this and suggestions for assessment are found in Keeney (I 974).
For reference, the multiplicative utility function turned out to be the appropriate
one for this study, as we will later show. Although only one utility independence
assumption is necessary to invoke either (14.2) or (14.3), this condition was veri-
fied for all the other attributes as a consistency check.
14.3.2 ASSESSING THE SINGLE-ATTRIBUTE UTILITY FUNCTIONS
The assessment of the utility functions with objective indices - that is u b U2, Us,
and U6 - was done using the standard 50-50 lottery technique discussed in Keeney
and Raiffa (1976). For instance, by considering preferences between a series of
specified levels of X6 and a 50-50 lottery yielding either a $0 or $40 million differ-
ential cost, each with probability 0.5, it was decided that WPPSS would be indiffer-
ent for a specified level of $22 million. Thus, since utility is a measure of preference,
the lottery and $22 million must have equal expected utilities. Consistent with
(14.3), we set the origin and scale of U6 by letting the utility of the worst point 40
(see Table 14.2) equal zero and the utility of the best point 0 equal I. Equating
expected utilities leads us to u6(22) = 0.5, which gives us another point on the
utility curve. From this, the exponential utility function shown in Figure 14.1 H
was evaluated. By examining the implications of this utility function for additional
choice situations, it was decided that it was appropriate for evaluating the various
sites.
For the subjective scales, a modified assessment technique was required. In order
to achieve meaningful utility assessments for these attributes, only the defined
points on the scales were used. For instance, with biological impact, the biologist
member of the team was asked, "For what probability p is a biological impact of
magnitude 4 (see Table 14.3) equivalent to a lottery yielding a p chance at level 0
and a (1 - p) chance at level 8?" By trying several values of p, we found p = 0.6
to be the indifference value. Consistent with (14.3), we set U3 (0) = I and u3(8) = 0,
from which it followed that u3(4) = 0.6. Questioning continued in this manner
until the utility of each of the defined points on the subjective scale was fixed. A
number of consistency checks were used, which resulted in some changes in the
original assessmen ts.
The adjusted utility functions assessed for each attribute are shown in Figure
14.1. Details of the assessment of the utility functions U2 and U3 are given in
Keeney and RobilHard (1976). The assessment of U2 was particularly interesting
because of the two separate measures - the numbers and the percentage lost -
required to describe adequately the possible impact on salmonids. Let us define
Y as the number of salmonids in a stream in thousands and Z as the percent lost.
Attribute X 2 is then a composite of Y and Z, so we will define X2 == (y, z). If a
0.20.2
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FIGURE 14.1 The single-attribute utility functions.
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stream has less than 100,000 salmonids, a utility function U2 was found to be
U2(X 2) == U2(Y, z) = uz(z) + Uy(y) - uz(z)Uy(y), 0 ~Y ~ 100,
where Uy and Uz are as illustrated in Figure 14.IB and C. For streams with greater
than 300,000 salmonids, an appropriate utility function was
U2(X2) == U2(Y, z) = 0.568 + 0.432 uQ(q),y ~ 300,
where Q, defined as the number of salmonids lost, is Y times Z, and uQ is as shown
in Figure 14.1 D. There are no streams with between 100,000 and 300,000 salmonids
in the areas involved in our study, so the discontinuity in U2 betweeny = 100 and
y = 300 is not a difficulty.
14.3.3 EVALUATING THE SCALING CONSTANTS
The scaling constants were assessed by five members of the project team in two
steps. The first consists of ranking the ranges of attributes in order of importance,
and the second involves quantifying the magnitude of each k i .
To establish the ranking of the k/s, the first question asked was: "Given that
all six attributes are at their worst level as defined in Table 14.2, which attribute
would you most like to have at its best level, assuming that the other five attri-
butes remain at their worst levels?" The answer was X6 , annual differential site
cost, which implies that k 6 should be the largest scaling constant. (It should be
noted that if the worst value of the differential site cost had been less than $40
million, some other attribute might have been first.)
The order in which the remaining attributes were moved from their worst to
their best levels was Xl, X 2, X 4 , X s, and X 3• This ordering implies
(14.4)
The next step was to establish the actual values of scaling constants. This was
accomplished by assessing specific trade-offs between attributes. For example, the
trade-off between attributes X 6 and Xl was established by answering the following
question: "Consider a site B with a SPF = 0.2 and unspecified annual differential
site cost. At what value of annual differential site cost would you be indifferent
in choosing between site B and site A, which has an annual differential site cost
of $40 miilion and a SPF = 0, given that all other attributes are fixed at identical
levels for both sites?"
The project team's response was that if site B had an annual differential site cost
of $5 million, it would be indifferent to site A. This implies that the project team
was willing to incur an increase in annual differential site cost from $5 to $40
million in order to move a site from a sparsely populated area (SPF = 0.20) to an
uninhabited area (SPF = 0). This assessed trade-off is represented graphically in
Figure 14.2A. The trade-offs assessed for the other pairs of attributes are also
shown in Figure 14.2.
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In order to check the consistency of the trade-offs, several other trade-offs not
involving cost were established empirically. These are shown in the insets in Figure
14.2. They proved to be very consistent with the original assessments.
The next step in the assessment of scaling constants involved determining a
probability p such that option C (a consequence with zero differential cost and all
other attributes at the worst levels of Table 14.2) and option D (a lottery yielding
either all attributes at their best levels, with probability p, or all at their worst
levels, with probability I - p) are indifferent. After consideration of several levels
of p, the group's response was p = 0.4.
14.3.4 SPECIFYING THE UTILITY FUNCTION
Since options C and D are indifferent when p = 0.40, their expected utilities must
be equal. By our choice of scale, when all attributes are at their best levels, U = 1.0;
and when all attributes are at their worst levels, U = 0.0. Therefore, the expected
utility of option D is p(1.0) + (1 - P)(0.0) = p. From (14.3), the utility of option
Cis k 6 , so
k6 = P = 0.40. (14.5)
The assessed trade-offs between cost and each of the other attributes are used to
express all other scaling constants in terms of k 6• Since k 6 is known, the other k i
values can be determined.
Consider the calculation of scaling constant kl> associated with attribute Xl> the
site population factor. By definition, the indifference points of the trade-off assess-
ments must have equal expected utilities. Thus, from the indifference point of the
assessed trade-off in Figure 14.2A, we know that
U(X6 = $40,Xl = 0) = U(X6 = $5,Xl = 0.2), (14.6)
where we have not bothered to specify levels of the other attributes. However,
because of the preferential independence conditions previously verified, we know
that (14.6) is valid for all levels of the attributes X 2, X 3 , X 4 , and X s. In particular,
let us assume that the other attributes are at their worst levels such that U2(X2)
= U3(X3) = U4(X4) = us(xs) = O. Then, using (14.3), the utilities in (14.6) are
equated by
1 + kk1 = 1 + kk6(0.895),
which simplifies to
k1 = 0.895 k 6 •
From (14.5) we know that k 6 = 0.40, so (14.7) becomes
k1 = 0.895(0.40) = 0.358.
(14.7)
The remaining trade-off constants can be calculated in an analogous manner, yield-
ing the set
k 6 = 0.400, k 1 = 0.358, k 2 = 0.218, k4 = 0.104, k s = 0.059, k 3 = 0.013. (14.8)
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The constant k is calculated from (14.3), given the k i values. If (14.3) is
evaluated with all attributes at their best levels (i.e., all utilities are 1.0), then k is
the solution to
I+k
6
n (1 +kka,
i=l
-1 < k =1= O.
Using (14.8), the unknown k is calculated to be
k = -0.325. (14.9)
The multiattribute utility function (14.3) is completely specified by the k/s in
(14.8), the k in (14.9), and the single-attribute utility functions in Figure 14.1.
14.4 THE PROBABILITY ASSESSMENTS
The consequences associated with development at each site can be characterized
by the levels the six attributes of Table 14.2 would assume should a power plant
be constructed on that site. To account for the uncertainty associated with esti-
mating the levels of the attributes, probabilistic estimates were made.
The estimation of the possible impacts at each site was accomplished in three
forms. Attribute Xl (site population factor) and attribute X s (length of power
transmission intertie passing through environmentally sensitive areas) were assumed
to be deterministic, as each was known with a high degree of certainty. For attri-
butes X 3 and X4 , measured by subjective indices, the probabilities that the impact
would fall within ranges specified by two adjacent impact levels were assessed.
The probabilistic estimates for attributes X 2 and X 6 were quantified by assessing
the parameters - the mean and variance - for a normal probability distribution.
Assessing the probabilities over each attribute individually assumes implicitly
that probabilistic independence exists among the attributes. After our initial
assessments, the project team discussed this assumption in detail. We concluded
that it was reasonable to assume that conditional on any al ternative, the probabili-
ties associated with the level of any attribute were independent of the level of any
other attribute. Thus, for example, the probability of various levels of biological
impact was independent of the level of impact on salmonids given a particular site.
14.4.1 THE ASSESSMENTS FOR EACH ATTRIBUTE
The probabilistic assessments for each site were based on existing information, site
visits, and data developed dUring the study. Each attribute for each site was assessed
by specialists in the relevant disciplines. Thus, the assessments represent the pro-
fessional judgment of individuals based on their expertise and on all information
currently available concerning the candidate sites. The resulting data are illustrated
in Table 14.5, where we have labeled sites Sl through S9. We will describe briefly
how each attribute was assessed.
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The Site Population Factor
To calculate the SPF using (14.1), it was necessary to know the number of people
residing in concentric rings with centers at the candidate sites. This information was
obtained from maps and census data.
Impact on Salmonids
The assessment of the reduction in the annual spawning escapement of salmonids
was based on losses associated with construction of the cooling-water intake struc-
ture, with intake and discharge of cooling water, and with storage impoundments
for cooling water. The impact on salmonids is dependent on the proportion of the
river flow used for cooling water. Since the cooling-water requirements remain
approximately constant for all candidate sites, the impact is determined by the
size and characteristics of the river supplying cooling water. The salmonids that
could be entrained are those passing the intake along the edge of the river. To be
conservative, it was assumed that the concentration of salmonids was higher along
the shore than in the middle. In the estimates of losses due to entrainment in
Table 14.5 it was assumed that newly developed intake structures designed to
minimize or virtually eliminate entrainment (i.e., Raney Well) would be used. The
construction of the intake structure and storage impoundments would result
primarily in loss of spawning and juvenile rearing areas.
Biological Impact at Site
The ecologists on the team were asked to assess the probabilities that the impact
would fall between adjacent intervals on the scale for assessing the biological impact
at each candidate site (Table 14.3). To help in thinking about this question, de-
scriptions were developed for each site; two examples of summary descriptions of
the existing biological characteristics are given below:
S6 The site region consists of varying proportions of mature second-growth
forest, logged areas, and some small agricultural areas. There are a few small swampy
areas and nearby wetlands. There is a high likelihood that Columbia white-tailed
deer, an endangered species, may occupy the site or live nearby.
S9 This area is primarily agricultural, mostly wheat and potatoes, with small
pockets of sagebrush habitat. There are no wetlands, and no endangered species
are known to inhabit the area.
Socioeconomic Impact
A subjective evaluation was made of the likely socioeconomic effects of a nuclear
plant on communities near each site. For each site, this required information
concerning the percentage of the plant construction labor force likely to immigrate
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and the existing characteristics of nearby communities, including population size,
travel time from site to labor supply, age of community, type of public financing
for which the community is likely to be eligible, size of the corporate area, role of
the community in the region, and generalized land use patterns (used also to
subjectively evaluate the tax base.)
Environmental Impact of Transmission Intertie
The length of the power transmission intertie passing through environmentally
sensitive areas (i.e., land that was not clear-cut, cultivated, or urbanized) was
assessed from field visits to each of the sites.
Annual Differential Site Costs
The economic comparison does not include a detailed estimate of the total cost of
a plant at each of the candidate sites but is an evaluation of the differential costs
of construction and plant operation associated with each site. Differential costs
are measured relative to the least expensive site (S2). The comparison was based
on current (1975) bid prices which were escalated to a proposed bid date of 1980
(on-line date 1985) using an 8.4 percent average annual rate of escalation. Allow-
ances for contingencies, interest during construction, and bonding cost were included
in the differential costs. The differential capital costs were converted to an annual
cost expressed in 1985 dollars using an appropriate factor for cost of bonds and an
estimated plant life. This nonescalatable annual cost, plus the annual differential
costs of operation, formed the basis for the economic comparison of the sites. The
cost estimates were developed using "standard power plant arrangements" at each
of the candidate sites.
Site visits indicated that a potential for liquefaction of existing foundation
materials under earthquake loading existed at sites S2, S3, and S4. Because the
likelihood of liquefaction at these sites cannot be ascertained without site-specific
studies, two cost estimates were made for the sites: one if the elimination oflique-
faction potential is not necessary, and one if it is found to be necessary. The
method of eliminating the potential for liquefaction that was used in making cost
estimates was removal of the liquefiable foundation materials and replacement
with suitable compacted flll. These additional costs were incorporated in the capital
costs associated with site grading and are reflected in the annual differential site
costs.
The primary cost estimates were average values. The uncertainty in these esti-
mates was represented by a normal probability distribution, and it was assumed
that the standard deviation was equal to one-fourth the mean values. Few data were
available to justify this assumption, so we were particularly careful to check the
cost estimates in the sensitivity analysis described in the next section.
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14.5 EVALUATING SITES AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
Since the cost of eliminating liquefaction potential is significant and since site-
specific information could eliminate the uncertainty, it was considered appropriate
to analyze the problem twice, first including potential liquefaction costs and then
excluding them. The results would provide guidance on whether it would be worth-
while to obtain definitive information on liquefaction potential.
A small computer program was developed for evaluating the sites and conducting
sensitivity analyses. Because of the utility-independence assumptions that were
verified before selection of the utility function (14.3) and because of the assump-
tion of probabilistic independence conditional on each alternative, it was appro-
priate to calculate certainty equivalents, attribute by attribute, for each of the
alternatives. This gave us a six-attribute vector representing the "equivalent certainty
impact" of each site. These were examined for dominance. No strict dominance
existed, but there were several cases of "almost" dominance (one alternative pre-
ferred to another on all but one attribute). Thus, without introducing the full
power of multiattribute utility, we could specify a reasonable ranking of the sites.
In particular, the least preferred sites were easily identifiable. We proceeded to the
utility analysis.
14.5.1 RANKING RESULTS BASED ON BEST ESTIMATES
The expected utility of each site was first calculated using the best estimates of all
inputs for both the liquefaction and no-liquefaction cases. This resulted in two
preferential rankings of alternatives, depending on whether liquefaction potential
exists. Both the rankings and expected utilities indicate how much better one site
is than another when all six attributes are considered. The differences in expected
utilities for each site result from changes in all six attributes for the sites. However,
it is easier to consider the significance of the difference in expected utility in terms
of only one attribute. For ease in interpreting this significance, the differential cost
of an "eqUivalent" site with attributes Xl through X s at their best levels is shown
in Table 14.6 for each site. This equivalent site is one with the same expected
utility as the real site to which it is associated. Note, for instance, that the differ-
ence between the sites ranked first and fifth for both the liquefaction and the no-
liquefaction cases is approximately 9 million 1985 dollars per year - a rather
substantial amount.
14.5.2 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
The purpose of the sensitivity analysis is to investigate how the ranking of the
alternatives changes if the inputs to the decision analysis differ from the best-
estimate values. Sensitivity analyses were conducted both with and without costs
associated with liquefaction potential. For each of these conditions, the sensitivity
of the ranking to the scaling constants in the multiattribute utility function and to
certain changes in the possible consequences was examined.
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TABLE 14.6 Best-Estimate Ranking of Nine Candidate Power Plant Sites
Without Liquefaction Potential With Liquefaction Potential
Annual Annual
Differential Differential
Cost of Cost of
Equivalent Equivalent
Expected Sitea Expected Sitea
Order Site Utility (10· 1985 dollars) Order Site Utility (10· 1985 dollars)
1 S3 0.921 10.85 1 Sl 0.894 14.60
2 S2 0.920 10.98 2 S2 b 0.887 15.53
3 Sl 0.894 14.60 3 S7 0.854 19.89
4 S4 0.868 18.06 4 S5 0.843 21.30
5 S7 0.854 19.89 5 S4 b 0.827 23.35
6 S5 0.843 21.30 6 S3 b 0.822 23.98
7 S9 0.812 25.22 7 S9 0.812 25.22
8 S8 0.811 25.34 8 S8 0.811 25.34
9 S6 0.808 25.71 9 S6 0.808 25.71
~ An equivalent site is one of equal utility with all attributes at their best levels except for costs.
Additional site grading costs associated with correction of possible liquefaction potential
included in analysis.
Changes in the Scaling Constants
The best-estimate values of the scaling constants kj, i = 1,2, ... ,6, are given by
(14.8). In the sensitivity analysis, the value of each k j was increased and then
decreased as much as possible without changing the order of these kj's. For example,
k 1 was the second-largest k j value, based on the best-estimate values. The adjacent
values were k6 = 0.400 and k 3 = 0.218. Therefore, two sensitivity runs were per-
formed to investigate the influence of k 1 values of 0.399 and 0.219, which rep-
resents the range that maintains the same order of the kj's. The range for k 6 was
varied from 0.358 (the value of k 1) to 0.500.
The analysis indicated the rankings of the sites remained essentially unchanged
for all the changes in the k j factors. Specifically, in the case where no liquefaction
potential was assumed, there were no changes in the ordering of the best six sites.
When liquefaction was assumed, there were a few changes between the sites ranked
fifth and sixth, depending on the specific changes in the k/s. However, the sites
ranked first through fourth maintained their positions.
Changes ofSelected Consequences
The sensitivity of the rankings in Table 14.6 to the estimates of the differential
costs and salmonid impacts was investigated. Specifically, we investigated separately
the implications of each of the following four changes in possible impacts: increases
in differential site costs of 20 percent and 50 percent, a change in the coefficient of
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variation of the nonna1ly distributed site costs from 25 percent to 50 percent,!
and the unavailability of a scheme to prevent entrainment of salmonids at the
cooling-water inlets.
When liquefaction potential was assumed, there were no changes in the ranking
of the six best sites for any of the variations mentioned. Assuming no liquefaction
potential, S2 replaced S3 as the best site for 20 percent and 50 percent increases in
the costs. This was the only change in the ranking of the best six sites of Table 14.6.
In both cases, there were some changes in the rankings of the worst three sites.
14.6 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The results of the ranking process indicate that six of the nine candidate sites are
superior to the other three under all reasonable variations of the preference struc-
ture and assessed consequences. The six sites are Sl, S2, S3, S4, S5, and S7. Con-
sidering both the rankings (i.e., with and without liquefaction), the three sites recom-
mended for detailed site-specific evaluation are S2, Sl, and S7. If liquefaction
potential is studied first and found not to exist at S3 and S4, then the three sites
recommended for site-specific studies are S2, S3, and S4. In interpreting these
recommendations, it should be noted that sites Sl, S2, and S3 are close to each
other.
Site-specific studies should concentrate on obtaining infonnation to satisfy
regulatory agency requirements. The most important of these are the geological,
seismological, and geotechnical studies necessary to identify and classify lineaments
and landslide potential. Additional studies to identify potential major environ-
mental, socioeconomic, or cost impacts and to refine some of the cost data utilized
in the ranking process should be conducted. Because of the site visits that have
already been made, a lower order of effort is required for these studies.
The sites were identifIed and ranked on the basis of criteria described in this
paper. There are several factors that were not considered in this study but that
could have a significant bearing on the selection of a specific site. These include
political and legal considerations, the distribution of plants, the future requirements
of multiple plants at a site, and the reliability of the transmission grid.
The ranking process was based on the judgments and preferences of the project
team. It is recommended that further studies be conducted to include the prefer-
ences and judgments of members of WPPSS. It may also be desirable to include,
either explicitly or indirectly, the preferences and judgments of the general public.
The preferential ranking of the nine candidate sites is presented in Table 14.6.
However, if the highest-ranking site is selected for construction, it does not follow
that the second-best site in the original ranking should be chosen for the con-
struction of the next plant. Because of the influence of the selected site on the
1 An alternative way to state this assumption is that the standard deviation of site costs in-
creases from 25 percent to 50 percent to 50 percent of the mean estimated costs.
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desirability of the remaining sites, procedures should be developed to re-rank the
sites after one site has been selected.
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DISCUSSION
RIVETT: I am a little disturbed by your use of experts to judge utility func-
tions that will be used to evaluate a decision that is in the public domain. If I were
one of these experts, I would hate to assume that my utility function would be a
good surrogate for that of the general public. We have had some major decisions in
the United Kingdom, for example, on the location of factories in areas of great
natural beauty where there was a tremendous outcry from the articulate middle
class, but no outcry at all from the lesser paid workers who would ultimately get
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the jobs in the factory. Those who know the system can make their voices heard, but
a large proportion of the public does not. I have a suspicion that a politician who
depends on the votes of the region might have been a more appropriate person to
use in assessing the utility function.
TVERSKY: I see nothing wrong with using the expert to assess utility functions
in the area of his expertise. The question is whether we let some people act outside
their areas ofexpertise. The basic problem is in defining the boundaries of expertise.
In the medical field, for example, physicians are certainly the experts in assessing
the relationships between certain symptoms and diagnosis. They are certainly not
experts in combining probabilities, and yet they are giving us those numbers. We
should try to decompose the problem into areas where they are real experts, let
these experts work on their part, and let somebody else do the rest.
EDWARDS: I have faced exactly the same question in my own work. Concerning
preferences, there are two different classes of questions: questions about the
characteristics of single-dimension utility functions and questions that have to do
with trade-offs on different objectives. I feel that experts are appropriate to answer
questions of the fIrSt class, such as preferences for the number of salmon in a river.
But questions of the second class, concerning, for example, how important it is to
worry about salmon as against worrying about the destruction of virgin wilderness,
are public questions. Yet in your problem, you had the same team of experts gen-
erating the trade-offs and the individual utility functions. Would you agree that
perhaps there is a public interest inherent in the trade-offs that is not the same as
the public interest inherent in the individual utility function?
KEENEY: In theory, I agree with the point you are making. In practice, whether
it is appropriate to have the same people make the trade-offs for the public depends
on what the alternatives are. I think that in almost all important decisions, such as
power plant siting, the decisions are made by some small group of selected people.
This is the case whether we do anything like decision analysis or not.
In this discussion we are explicitly focusing on the trade-offs. I think it would be
interesting to try to find out what the public opinion is on such a set of trade-offs.
This might have been a reasonable way to use the overall analysis. In defense of the
type of thing that we did, I'd say that because the trade-offs are a little more
explicit than is often the case, the public and concerned citizens who were not
formally involved in the analysis can clearly see our assumptions. Hopefully, this
raises the level of debate and consciousness about what was done, and maybe this
will lead to some modification and improvement in the decision when it is taken.
MEYER: There is another aspect of this whole mode of analysis that seems to
make it inappropriate for this task. This study was focused solely on making trade-
offs for siting a single power plant. By assessing a utility function for a single site,
you are forcing a compromise of feelings into the utility function. Yet, in practice,
a sequence of plants will be sited. Considering the sequence of plants offers a
marvellous opportunity for giving one group what they want in some cases and
another group what they want in others. With the present study, if you site two
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plants, you may get two that no one is especially happy with. Explicitly recognizing
the multiple siting situation may give a whole new scope for making trade-offs.
I think this approach would also be much more in line with what the politician
would do.
NAIR: The task we were given by our client was to select one site. In doing this,
we found that there were three sites whose suitability was approximately equal,
and we recommended site-specific studies for these. The selection of the best site
will depend on the information from these studies.
KEENEY: Although we explicitly ignored sequencing aspects in the study, we
did make it clear that when the next study is done after this first plant is built,
the utility functions could change completely in light of the presence of the first.
MEYER: That was not exactly what I had in mind. It may be that in selecting
the first site, the biologist really got his way. That makes a good case in the political
process for the next study to allow the worker who is concerned with the direct
economic consequences to get his way. Then you even tually get a portfolio of
sites, each one of which gives someone something. As I understand this amalgama-
tion process of utility function, it avoids doing that. It avoids sharp differentiation
between who gets what in which decision.
KEENEY: The analysis we did does not explicitly indicate which group of
people get what. The ecologist observes the impacts on the ecological attributes,
and the economist the impact on the economic attributes, :md so on. There is a
little of this, but generally a clear indication of the information you are referring to
is not available from our analysis. Had the problem been defined as the sequencing
one, I would think it would have been very important to get this information.
15 A Community Information FeedbackSystem with Multiattribute Utilities I
Volker Bauer and Michael Wegener
Allover the world, the task of planning and controlling the development of large
conurbations seems beyond the problem-solving capacity of even higWy developed
social systems. In spite of immense capital investment and use of sophisticated
technology, industrialized countries have failed to improve or even maintain living
conditions in large cities. Urban sprawl, traffic chaos, collapsing public services,
noise, and air and water pollution are indicators of the decline of the quality of
urban life and have become the focus of growing citizen dissatisfaction with the
urban environment and of conflicts between various interests.
The causes of the inability of large cities to cope with their most vital problems
are various. They include the concentration of economic and political power in
the hands of few relatively small segments of urban society, as well as the de jure
and de facto limitations on the planning authority of communities and the in-
adequacy of municipal budgets in relation to the growing responsibilities of munic-
ipal administrations. They also include outdated land use legislation that makes
rational allocation ofland uses nearly impossible. They include, as well, the growing
size, complexity, and vulnerability of the technical infrastructure; the growing inter-
dependency and compleXity of the economic and social environment; and the fore-
seeable depletion of natural resources like land, water, air, and energy. However,
they also include the ever-growing expectations with which the population perceives
and measures the results of urban planning.
The growing sensitivity of the population to local planning issues is expressed
by increased demand for public services, by more frequent and more articulate
statements of group interests, and by stronger claims for citizen participation in
the local decision-making process. This tendency seems to be irreversible. With
t The research reported in this paper was conducted at Ballelle-Institut e.V., Frankfurt am
Main, and supported by the Bundesministerium fUr Raumordnung, Bauwesen und Stadtebau;
the City of Vienna; and the Science and Human Affairs Program of Ballelle Memorial Institute.
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growing complexity the sociotechnoeconomic system becomes increasingly vul-
nerable to disturbances like sabotage, terrorism, or strike originating from small
groups of outsiders or key insiders. It is this vulnerability, more than anything
else, that forces government at all levels to base its authority on broad consent and
cooperation rather than on coercion and technocratic control.
This perspective focuses attention on the participation of "plain" people, i.e.,
of nonexperts, in the local decision process. The difficulty lies in the fact that
the management of a city is a highly specialized activity and is normally per-
formed by experts - planners, economists, and administrators. How can these
experts communicate with people not trained in matters like planning, economy,
or administration, whose assent and cooperation, however, they have to win? The
same system complexity that makes nonexpert participation necessary makes it
nearly impossible for nonexperts to understand the decision alternatives or to
introduce their preferences into the decision process.
One of the core problems of urban decision making, therefore, is the establish-
ment of effective information feedback between experts and nonexperts about
planning alternatives, consequences, and preferences. In this paper, an approach
is presented that attacks this problem in two ways:
• By using dynamic systems simulation techniques to provide and process
structured information on planning alternatives and their outcomes
• By using decision analysis techniques to provide and process structured
information on the perception of the outcomes by experts and nonexperts
While both parts of the approach are of equal importance, the emphasis of the
paper is on decision analysis. From a decision-analytic point of view, the urban
decision situation is extremely complex:
Multiple objectives. Urban decision making deals with a large sector of societal
life encompassing many closely interrelated subsectors. Each of these sectors
contributes in some way to the overall success of planning.
Long time frame. Although urban change seems to proceed incrementally,
many decisions in urban planning are indivisible, are irreversible, and have long-
lasting effects.
Multiple interest groups. In no other field of decision making is the distinction
between decision subjects and decision objects so elusive. The decision makers
usually are part of the groups affected by the decisions.
Uncertainty. Only a part of the urban system can be influenced directly by
public planning decisions. Decision outcomes depend to a large degree on the
behavior of private actors.
Section 15.1 is an attempt t<J explicate more fully the urban decision situation
and its problems. In section 15.2 the methodology designed to address some of
these problems is introduced. Section 15.3 is a detailed account of the evaluation
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component of the proposed methodology. In section 15.4 the first experimental
applications of the methodology are reported. Section 15.5 is a critical appraisal
of the methodology and a report on the outlook for further development.
15.1 THE URBAN DECISION PROBLEM
The ultimate goal of urban planning is to maintain and improve the conditions of
life of the urban population at large. The failure of most large cities to achieve
that goal suggests that a close look at the urban decision-making process is in
order.
The urban decision-making process differs in many respects from decision-
making processes in other fields, such as industrial or military planning. The first
basic difference lies in the size and complexity of the decision object, the urban
system. Urban planning deals with a complex sector of societal life that comprises
nearly all aspects of human activity, such as living, working, travel, education, and
leisure. For planning purposes, the system must be considered as a whole, as
changes in one part of it affect elements in all other parts. Accordingly, the goal
system that is to guide urban planning decisions must be comprehensive indeed if
it is to cover all relevant aspects of urban life. This comprehensiveness is indis-
pensable, as trade-offs are made between objectives from different aspects of urban
life.
The second characteristic of urban planning is its relation to time. On the one
hand, the physical plant, the social and economic structure of a city, changes only
in small, marginal increments. This requires that the action set, as well as the goal
system, be very specific and detailed. On the other hand, there are many decisions
in urban planning that are basic, indivisible, and irreversible and that have long-last-
ing effects.
The third essential characteristic of the urban decision-making process lies in
the relation between decision subjects and decision objects. Inasmuch as the objects
of decisions are people who themselves might participate in the decision making, the
distinction between decision subjects and decision objects tends to become irrele-
vant. The implications for the decision process are fundamental: even if the decision
makers try to anticipate the assumed preferences of their clients, the single goal
structure guiding the decision analysis has to be replaced by a multitude of goal
structures representing the different perceptions of the "conditions of life" by
various groups.
The fourth important difference in the urban decision-making process is that
only a relatively small part of the urban system is in fact controlled by the plan-
ning authority. A far larger part is subject to individual decisions made by a large
number of private individuals, groups, or organizations. The instruments that the
public authority can use to influence the development of that larger "market"
part are limited, even though the "conditions of life" depend greatly on the
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functioning of the market sector. Therefore, the eventual consequences of decision
alternatives are not easy to predict; as their prediction implies the consideration of
the behavioral response of a large number of other actors, it is bound to contain a
measure of uncertainty and error.
In summary, the urban decision-making process can be characterized by the
following properties. It deals with a large sector of society that is at once decision
subject and decision object. Because the object system is large and indivisible, the
goal system has to be comprehensive and contain a large number of objectives.
Because changes in the system occur on a micro scale, the alternatives and objec-
tives have to be specified in great detail, yet there are some decisions that are long-
term and irreversible. Because various groups of the city are affected by planning
decisions, not one but many preference or goal systems have to be considered in
the analysis. Because control of the urban system by the planning authority is only
partial, prediction of decision consequences is particularly difficult.
If this is a valid description of the urban decision-making process, the next
question is: How well does it work? The unsatisfactory state of large cities suggests
that it does not work wen. Of course, there is the convincing argument that even if
it did work well, the troubles of cities would not be relieved, as their causes lie out-
side the jurisdiction of city governments. But it still seems likely that improvements
in the urban decision-making process might at least help to improve the situation.
Therefore, a step-by-step inspection of the traditional practice in urban decision-
making seems necessary if we are to find out why it does not work well. It soon
becomes apparent why the traditional practice is in no way prepared to tackle the
difficulties characteristic of urban planning. In the first place, the planner has only
the vaguest idea of the goals and objectives that the plans, programs, or actions he
designs are supposed to serve. Moreover, he has no analytic tools to predict any but
the most trivial first-order effects of his action alternatives; he cannot forecast
with any degree of reliability what the second-order and third-order effects of his
plans might be throughout the urban system: how private actors - e.g., developers,
homeowners, commuters - might respond. But even if he could, he would not be
able to communicate these consequences in a comprehensible way to the decision
makers and the people affected by his plans, because there are no tools to convey
such complex technical material to people not trained in planning. By the same
token, because the people affected by planning decisions do not comprehend what
the consequences will be, they have no way of developing an informed opinion
about the issues and of expressing their attitudes and interests in the matter, which,
again, leaves the planner without badly needed information about the public
acceptance of his projects and about the needs and aspirations of his clients.
Hence, insufficient information feedback may be identified as one of the major
causes of malfunction of urban planning practice. Underlying this difficulty is the
fact that the information-processing capacity of planners, decision makers, and the
individuals or groups affected by planning is unequal to the complexity of the
problems. This complexity cannot be reduced without losing sight of the substance
of the problems themselves, nor can the necessity of feedback between experts
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and nonexperts be dismissed without losing sight of the overall purpose of planning
- improving the condition of people.
From this it follows that new tools are needed to support the dialogue between
planning experts and nonexpert citizens:
By providing relevant and detailed information about direct and indirect con·
sequences of planning decisions
By providing relevant and detailed information about the preferences of dif-
ferent groups in the population affected by planning
By relating the above two kinds of information and displaying them in a trans-
parent format comprehensible to both planning experts and nonexpert citizens
In the following section a methodology designed to meet these requirements will
be presented.
15.2 SIMULATION AND EVALUATION
The methodology presented in this paper consists of a combination of systems
simulation and decision analysis techniques. In this section, the components of the
proposed process - a multiperiod, multiregion, dynamic, digital simulation model
of urban development and an evaluation procedure based on the multiattribute
utility theory - will be described separately. Then it will be shown how these
components are combined into an integrated process in which, by iteratively
applying simulation and evaluation to planning alternatives, one or more planners,
decision makers, or citizen groups may learn about the impacts of plans and the
potential conflicts arising from them.
15.2.1 THE SIMULATION MODEL
Simulation is a scientific experiment on a model of the object of investigation,
rather than on the object itself. If a mathematical model of the relevant character-
istics of the investigated system is available, action alternatives to influence the
development of the system may be tested with little risk and effort.
Mathematical simulation models for urban planning were first developed in the
United States in the 1950s. In Western Europe, urban simulation models have
been developed, mainly in Great Britain and Switzerland. In the Federal Republic
of Germany, two major research projects on urban simulation have been conducted
under research contracts with the federal government (Battelle-Institute, 1973;
Popp et aI., 1974). The product of one of these projects is the urban simulation
model POLIS, developed by Battelle-Frankfurt. The POLIS model simulates the
development of the spatial distribution of population, employment, buildings, and
land use, as well as of transportation, in response to planning interventions by the
city or other public agencies over a number of time intervals (periods) until a plan-
ning horizon is reached. The urban area is divided into subunits (zones) whose
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structure is represented by state variables. The zones are connected to each other
and to the surrounding region by public transit and highway networks.
The simulation of a period begins with the analysis, description, and documen-
tation of the state of the urban system. The analysis starts with the simulation of
traffic flows of the base year. Travel times computed in the traffic model are used
to calculate accessibility indices of all zones; these indices are a measure of loca-
tional advantage, afforded by the available transportation system, with respect to
various activities and infrastructure facilities of the urban area. From accessibilities
and other zonal attributes for each zone, attractivity indices are computed that
express the market demand for land by various urban activities.
Next, the allocation part of the model begins. First, public action programs are
executed. The model allows the introduction of time-sequenced and localized pro-
grams in housing construction; industrial development; and educational, social,
recreational, and transport infrastructure. All construction programs are accom-
panied by necessary local roads and parking facilities, and all housing programs
provide for service facilities like schools and neighborhood shopping and recreation
areas. The remaining (private) construction activity is distributed over the urban
area according to the market pattern of supply and demand within the restrictions
of a zoning plan. The likely distribution of private construction for each type of
building use is estimated as a function of the attractivity and capacity of each zone
for that particular use. Displacement of one type of building use by more profitable
types is considered in the model by demolition or explicit change in building-use
type. After the simulation of private construction, projected population and
employment are distributed over the available housing and commercial and indus-
trial buildings, and demographic, social, and employment distributions are updated.
Finally, the availability of local service facilities is checked against relevant
standards. Where service is severely substandard, the city administration is assumed
to intervene with an appropriate program.
This closes the simulation of the first period. The state variables of the model
have received new values. The model starts, with changed parameters and new
assumptions, the simulation of the next period. This cycle is reiterated until the
last period has been simulated. For each simulated planning alternative, the model
gives detailed information about the development of population, employment,
physical structure, transportation, and environmental quality of each zone. In
addition, the costs of each alternative are accumulated and exhibited as cash flows
between various groups in the city.
The results of the simulation are documented in various forms of printed output
- tables, diagrams, and maps. In addition, the levels of some 240 state variables for
each zone, representing the demographic, employment, and building and land use
structure of the zone and its service, transportation, and environmental character-
istics, are stored for each time step of the simulation in a "historical" file. The
historical me thus contains a point-to-point account of the likely consequences of
all simulated alternatives in great spatial and temporal detail. After the simulation,
the historical file is kept available for further analysis.
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15.2.2 THE EVALUATION MODEL
Simulation models do not generate "optimal" solutions; they only describe the
consequences of given solution alternatives. This "deficiency" turns out to be one
of the essential advantages of simulation techniques. The experimental character
of the simulation corresponds specifically with the iterative decision process of
socioeconomic planning. Experiments with simulation models may be started with-
out much prior knowledge about the planning problem itself, the constellation of
goals, or their potential conflicts. The work with the model initiates a learning
process about the interdependencies of the modeled system and about the con-
sequences and interactions of planning interventions that allows an iterative
approach to successively "better" solutions.
Simulation models thus, in a formal sense, are value-free. Judgments about the
desirability of the outcomes have to be made outside the simulation model; without
such judgments the outcomes would be meaningless. Hence, evaluation is an indis-
pensable part of the simulation approach. It is only by evaluation that the simula-
tion results that really matter are extracted from the large volume of information
produced. Processing the results of a complex simulation model can be accom-
plished only by an efficient operationalized procedure.
For processing the results of the POLIS simulation model a formalized evaluation
procedure for assessing the relative merit of plans for one or more goal structures
was developed and operationalized in the form of a computer program. It is based
on multidimensional scaling of utility as implied in the multiattribute utility theory
(MAUT) (Raiffa, 1969; Bauer et 01., 1972; Humphreys, in press). MAUT proceeds
by decomposing a complex object of evaluation (a plan) into its independent
dimensions (attributes) through the use of a goal hierarchy. The attributes are
individually evaluated by means of utility functions, weighted, and aggregated by
a formal additive composition model. At each level of the hierarchy, the utility
of the plan with respect to specific aspects is found, and at the top level the total
utility becomes apparent.
Differences in the value structures of different groups involved in the planning
process are expressed in the model by the same hierarchy but with different weights
and utility functions. The program thus simultaneously evaluates the results of the
simulation for goal structures representing the interests of different individuals or
groups in the city. For use with the POLIS simulation model a goal hierarchy has
been adopted whose elements are implied by the aspects of urban development
contained in the model. The interface between the simulation and evaluation
models is the historical file mentioned above. Following the instructions of the user,
the evaluation program reads from this file for each zone the data required for the
evaluation, translates them into utility-relevant attributes, and maps these attributes
by means of utility functions on a standardized utility scale. After these two kinds
of transformations, the simulation results enter the lowest level of the goal
hierarchy, whence, subject to the underlying weighting scheme, they are successively
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aggregated to higher-level, more general utility measures. Thus it is possible not
only to evaluate straightforward indicators of system performance like housing
quality, availability of services, and accessibility, but also to relate them to attri-
butes of other problem areas as well as to more general utility aggregates, such as
quality of life. The program calculates for all goal structures utility values for all
levels of the hierarchy and for all zones or for any aggregates of zones. In addition,
differences between the evaluations by different evaluators - i.e., potential con-
flicts - are shown.
15.2.3 THE LEARNING PROCESS
The combination of simulation and evaluation can be applied to the solution of
planning problems in three ways:
• In its simplest form the combined process is a spatially disaggregated evalua-
tion procedure. Only one goal system is used - e.g., urban development goals as
formulated by the municipal legislature. In principle, any past, present, or future
state of the city may be checked against that goal system. If only one such state is
evaluated, the model shows spatial disparities in the distribution of public services
and other indicators of quality of life. If more than one plan is evaluated, com·
parisons between plans on each desired level of spatial, temporal, or sectoral dis-
aggregation may be made.
• If different goal systems of various groups are assumed, the augmented pro-
cedure allows not only a comparison between plans but also a comparison between
attitudes of different groups toward a single plan in any desired spatial, temporal,
or sectoral detail. In addition, it is possible to analyze the differences between
group attitudes and thus identify potential conflict zones or problem areas.
• In its most complex application the combination of simulation and evaluation
is integrated as a part of the iterative solution-finding process of urban development
planning. The following five steps may be identified:
1. Participants of the planning process define goals to be achieved by planning.
2. The planner is guided by these goals in formulating one or more plans in the
process of design.
3. The consequences of the plans are predicted by the simulation model.
4. The consequences of the plans are measured against the predetermined goals
in the evaluation model.
5. A plan that satisfies the goals of all groups is adopted; if no such plan is
found, the process is continued in one of three ways:
a. The planner proposes a new plan that either contains new elements or modi-
fies existing elements so that a compromise can be reached.
b. The participants agree to change their assumptions about future develop-
ments: i.e., they modify the simulation model.
c. At least one of the participating groups agrees to change the weights of its
goals or its satisfaction standards: Le., it modifies the evaluation model.
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The motivation for these modifications comes from the growing information about
the planning problem, the solution alternatives and their consequences, and the
potential conflicts arising from them. This makes the solution-finding process an
individual or collective learning process, in which, by iterative application of simu-
lation and evaluation, a plan that is acceptable to all participants is achieved.
15.3 THE EVALUATiON TECHNIQUE
Evaluation is the measurement, as objectively as possible, of the contribution of
certain actions or programs to the achievement of individual or public objectives
or goals. The dimension that is measured is utility, a function of three basic
elements: the evaluator, the entity being evaluated, and the purpose for which the
evaluation is being made (Edwards, 1971).
In the urban planning context the object of evaluation seems to follow from the
obvious purpose of evaluation - to make choices among possible programs. It
seems, at first, obvious that the competing programs should be evaluated, but
because of their instrumental character, it is not the programs but their con-
sequences for the urban system that have to be evaluated. More precisely, it is the
different states of the urban system resulting from the programs that constitute the
object of evaluation.
The question of who does the evaluation will make things even more problem-
atic. It has been argued earlier that urban planning represents one of the most diffi-
cult decision situations, one in which a large, complex sector of society is, at the
same time, the subject and the object of decisions. Since urban society is not mono-
lithic but consists of groups with usually divergent interests, all groups likely to be
affected by the programs under debate should, ideally, participate in the evaluation.
The methodology reported in this paper is typically applied, therefore, in the
situation where the evaluation subjects are groups that represent different sections
of the urban population whose interests in the problem at issue conflict. It may be
noted that, with Arrow's theorem in mind (Arrow, 1963), no formal technique is
provided either to aggregate evaluation judgments over groups or to aggregate group
evaluations from individual judgments. Both aggregation steps are deliberately left
to the informal process of group discussion and consensus finding. In fact, the
group dynamics involved in the process of establishing consensus within and among
the participating groups are considered to be an essential component of the learning
process.1
1 That is, groups are, irrespective of their size, expected to end up with one single evaluation
result, which formally looks exactly like an evaluation prepared by a single evaluator. Hence,
the single evaluator can be considered a special case of the group evaluator. This makes the
methodology also applicable to situations in which not groups, but one or more individuals, are
to be the evaluators.
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With the above definition of the evaluation object and subject, the definition of
the purpose of the evaluation can be reformulated. While the effectuation of deci-
sions remains the ultimate rationale of the evaluation, the informal intermediate
steps of the process become more and more important, the steps of incrementally
approaching consensus within and between the evaluating groups. Only if evaluation
techniques can be successfully integrated into the process of socialleaming are they
likely to play any part in urban decision making.
15.3.1 THE MAUT PROCEDURE
The principal concept of multiattribute utility theory is simple: The evaluation
object, here the "city," is decomposed by means of a hierarchical, descriptive
model into its relevant dimensions. The dimensions at the lowest hierarchical level
are operational: Le., they are measurable attributes or indicators for intangible attri-
butes of the evaluation object. The individuals or groups participating in the evalua-
tion assign relative importance weights to each element of the hierarchy. In
addition, the evaluators attach to each of the attributes of the lowest level of the
hierarchy a transformation or utility function that determines a utility value for
each plausible value of the attribute. In a final step, for each element of the
hierarchy, a utility value can be calculated as a weighted average of all lower-level
elements that are associated with that element by using the additive model of
MAUT1:
~W'U'j J J
~w, 'j J
where Uj = utility of element i; Uj = utility of lower-level elements j associated with
i; and Wj = importance weights of lower-level elements j.
In this particular application the values of the lowest-level attributes of the
hierarchy are provided by the urban simulation model. Utility functions are
weighted and designed by each participating individual or group separately. For
each of them and for each plan one utility value is generated for each element of
the hierarchy, including a total utility value for the top-level element.
15.3.2 GOAL HIERARCHIES
The term "goal hierarchy," used traditionally in multiattribute studies, is mis-
leading. The hierarchy does not involve any normative aspects; it is simply under-
stood as a set of rules to represent a complex object: a descriptive model. The
descriptive model is value-free insofar as it is complete.
1 The conditions for the validity of the additive model are discussed in Bauer et al. (1972,
pp. 36 -39). It may be noted that this formulation of the model is wholly deterministic,
leaving the problem of uncertainty to a later discussion.
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The generative rules of the hierarchical model originated in the tradition of
medieval logic :
1. A hierarchy is a configuration of interrelated elements arranged in levels.
2. Each element of the hierarchy is completely represented by the associated
elements on the next lower level.
3. The elements of the hierarchy are independent dimensions of the associated
element on the next higher level.
Various techniques for the construction of hierarchies have been reported (Bauer
et al., 1973, pp. 17--40). If the conditions of the hierarchy are strictly observed,
the result will be a complete description of the evaluation object in the form of a
tree. Each level is in itself a complete description of the evaluation object, with
generality or abstraction decreasing from the top to the bottom. The lowest-level
attributes must be directly measurable if the hierarchy is to be operational. This
requirement determines the number of levels and elements of the hierarchy.
The hierarchical model of utility is favored because the acceptance of its restric-
tive conditions allows the application of the simplest conceivable mathematical
model of utility aggregation: addition. Besides this, there is one more reason for
the retention of the hierarchy: as indicated above, there is usually more than one
plan evaluated and more than one individual or group participating in the evalu-
ation. This means that the numbers that matter are not so much the calculated
utilities in absolute terms - which may be impaired by interdependencies between
the elements - but differences between utilities, which may be considerably less
affected by those interdependencies.
Given the above considerations, it seems advisable to use the hierarchical model,
the additive form of MAUT. Furthermore, it seems permissible, for pragmatic
reasons, to relax its exhaustiveness and independence assumptions:
1. The hierarchy need contain only those attributes that the simulation model
is able to generate, provided the areas not covered by the model are carefully
pointed out to the evaluators.
2. The attributes of the hierarchy need not be completely independent of
each other, as long as care is taken to work with relative rather than absolute
utilities.
These two assumptions, dictated by pragmatic considerations, will seem debatable
to many.l But one can hardly see any alternative way to decompose an object of
1 In a 1974 meeting at Battelle (Frankfurt), H. Raiffa linked the concept of independence to
the question of trade-offs between attributes: two attributes are independent of a third attri-
bute if trade-offs between them do not depend upon the level of the third attribute. But this
is "preferential" or "utility" independence, as opposed to probabilistic -technical or "environ-
mental" independence, e.g., correlation of real-world phenomena. Raiffa argued that environ-
mental interdependence is irrelevant as long as preferential independence is preserved to justify
the additive model. At the same meeting, W. Edwards pointed to the robustness of additive
models in the presence of input error, but he was concerned about the danger of double-
counting associated with environmental correlation.
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evaluation of such immense complexity as a city, if simplistic and intuitive judg-
ments are to be avoided. Perhaps the hierarchy should be considered no more
nor less than a syntactical skeleton displaying certain semantic conventions. The
user of the hierarchy, different from its designer, does not really care whether this
semantic relation holds in the real world or whether the elements are independent.
From this perspective, the hierarchy functions in the communication process: it
guarantees that evaluating groups with different educational backgrounds under-
stand each other. If they talk about, say, public transit, then at least the semantic
components of the term are unambiguously determined by its context in the
hierarchy. Only by using this common linguistic base can differences between
groups be recognized.
15.3.3 WEIGHTS
The descriptive hierarchy obtains normative character, i.e., it becomes a goal
hierarchy, by weights and utility functions. This statement is based on the assump-
tion that human judgment may be modeled (a) by determining for each element
of reality a number that represents its importance relative to other elements and
(b) by determining for each such element a function that represents the relation
between the actual value of the element and the satisfaction of the evaluator.
In earlier tests the weighting technique of paired comparison was selected and
demonstrated with a small attribute set (Bauer et al., 1973, pp. 44-48). It soon
became obvious that this technique becomes impractical if it is transferred to a
goal hierarchy with a large number of attributes. Therefore, the weighting tech-
nique was modifed in the following manner:
• The weighting is done separately for each cluster of the hierarchy. "Ouster"
is used to denote any hierarchy element plus its subordinate element set on the
next lower level of the hierarchy. In each cluster the sum of weights is defined to
be one hundred. In addition, care is taken that no cluster contains more than eight
or nine subordinate elements, in order to reduce the number of concepts to be
handled simultaneously by the evaluators.
• Instead of paired comparison, a method of direct scaling was adopted for
weighting the cluster elements. The evaluators are asked to decide upon the relative
weight of each of the subordinate elements of each cluster - Le., its relative
importance for the utility of the associated element on the next higher level of the
hierarchy.
• To further facilitate the weighting process, alternative sample weightings are
provided by the project team, so that the evaluators may simply select one of the
suggested alternatives. Figure 15.1 (right) contains examples of such weighting
suggestions for a series of clusters on successively lower hierarchical levels.
• If the evaluators are groups, each one is requested to agree upon a single
weighting scheme. They are encouraged to settle intragroup disagreement or
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conflict by discussion rather than by formal rules like majority vote or averaging
of individual weights.
• If an evaluator or a group of evaluators does not explicitly specify weights for
anyone cluster, a "default" weighting scheme taken from the sample weightings is
automatically assigned. The project team specifies which of the sample weightings
should serve as default for each group.
It may be argued that by handing out suggested weighting alternatives the pro-
ject team is likely to influence the results. This clearly did not happen in the experi-
ments, since in all cases the evaluators soon started to override the suggested weights
by their own ratings. Rather, they used the suggestions as a kind of orientation to
structure their discussion about the issues. The provision of "default" weights
relieves the evaluators from the burden of working through every detail and,
instead, frees them to concentrate on the issues that they feel to be most central.
The direct scaling technique itself may also be questioned. And, indeed, it may
be a questionable practice to ask whether "housing" is more important than
"education" without knowing the range or domain in which these aspects of urban
life may vary. I However, this argument must be viewed in conjunction with the
technique of cluster weighting and with the conventions used for the design of the
utility functions, which will be discussed below. The cluster-weighting technique
guarantees that the elements whose importance is to be compared are at least
roughly comparable, since, by definition, they belong to the same aspect of the
evaluation object and since they are likely to include no totally irrelevant items.
The convention of designing utility functions, on the other hand, provides a
semantic norming of the domains of the attributes, regardless of the actual
numerical levels they may acquire later. These two circumstances help to convey to
the participants a fairly clear understanding of what the weights really mean.
15.3.4 UTILITY FUNCTIONS
While the hierarchy and the weights establish the relation between a goal and all
other goals of the goal system, the goal itself - its meaning, direction, and domain
- is established by a utility function. The utility function represents the aspirations
of the evaluator with respect to a certain goal, or, in other words, his ideas about
the level of achievement that is desirable with respect to that goal. The utility func-
tion specifies for each goal whether it has been served badly or satisfactorily or
well.
This leads to a distinction between two types of goals that have different types
of utility functions. For the goals on all but the lowest level of the hierarchy the
lIn Raiffa's argumentation (expressed at the 1974 Battelle meeting), importance weights have
meaning only relative to the scaling of the attributes: if the domain of an attribute changes, its
weight should change, too. In Edwards' more pragmatic view, the implicit specification of the
domains of the attributes given by the context often must suffice, since frequently the actual
range of the action alternatives is not known at the time the weighting has to be done.
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type of function is already known: these goals are well served if their subordinate
goals on the next lower level are served well. More precisely, the degree of achieve-
ment of such goals, or their utility value, is simply the weighted average of the
utility values of the subordinate goals, with the weights provided by the weighting
procedure. This is the weighting function underlying the additive model of MAUT.
The goals on the lowest level of the hierarchy are not amenable to such treat-
ment because they do not have subordinate goals. Instead, they are defined to be
independent dimensions or attributes of the evaluation object. While the goal
hierarchy and the weighting scheme are concerned with general properties of all
possible evaluation objects, it is at this point that the actual levels of the properties
of a particular evaluation object enter the evaluation procedure. The second type
of utility function serves to make that entrance possible. As the first type of
utility function coincides with the additive weighting function of MAUT, the term
"utility function" will be used exclusively for the second type.
The goals or attributes on the lowest level of the hierarchy may be any relevant
aspect of the evaluation object, provided that they are operational or measurable
on some nonarbitrary scale. Of course, one must expect that they come in many
different dimensions - technical, physical, monetary, and so on. The utility func-
tion translates these differently scaled dimensions into the dimension that the
evaluation model is intended to measure: utility. That means that one utility value
has to be assigned to each plausible value of the attribute, no matter what scale it
is measured on. It thus becomes apparent in which direction and by how much the
attribute has to be changed to increase its utility by a certain margin.
If the attributes are not operational and measurable, evaluation still would be
possible, but only on an ad hoc basis, by subjectively assessing the utility of a
specific attribute level in a specific option environment. Hence, each option alter-
native would have to be evaluated directly by human evaluators. In most cases,
however, this is neither desirable nor possible. Instead, the utility function pro-
vides a general transition rule by which even alternatives unknown to the evaluators
may be evaluated. Thus, the operationality of the attributes is indispensable; it
allows a priori evaluations that can be applied to a whole category of action alter-
natives. On the other hand, the postulate of operationality certainly does restrict
the selection of more qualitative attributes of the evaluation object for which
appropriate indicators cannot be found.
Another problem of utility functions has to do with the independence assump-
tion underlying the additive model of MAUT. Especially in the case of complex
evaluation objects containing a large number of attributes, the independence
assumption, whether it is "environmental" or "preferential" independence, is
almost certain to be violated. At best, the attributes can be expected to be fairly
independent of each other if they are allowed to vary only within a very narrow
margin - that is, if the domains of the utility functions are very small. One way
of securing additivity, therefore, would be to reduce the domains of the attribu tes
as much as possible. However, this would prevent the evaluation of innovative
338
action alternatives with still unknown levels of attributes that may fall outside the
restrictive domains, and assessing innovative designs is one of the very purposes of
evaluation in planning.
The technique selected for designing utility functions reflects the above con-
siderations. The most straightforward of all techniques, "curve drawing," was
used and modified by analogy to the weighting technique applied:
1. The utility function of an attribute is defined to be a real-numbered function
of t~e attribute value (AV), or level, or outcome, of that attribute. The value of
the utility function, or the utility value (UV), of the attribute, is defmed to be
bounded between zero and one hundred, with the following semantic implications:
Utility Value
(UV)
a
100
Attribute Value
(AV)
A totally unacceptable outcome
The outcome that can be
achieved by reasonable, good
practice of planning
There are no restrictions on the character of the utility function within the above
domain; in other words, it need not be monotonic, continuous, or convex, nor need
it have a unique minimum or maximum.
2. For each lowest-level attribute one utility function has to be designed by
each evaluator or group of evaluators. First, the utility function is discussed with
the help of graphic representation. Then, the resulting curve is entered into the
computation as a set of up to ten pairs (AV, UV). Thus, there is no need to define
the function in terms of a mathematical expression. The sections of the curve
between the points entered are approximated linearly by the procedure.
3. To further facilitate the process of designing utility functions, alternative
sample utility functions are provided by the project team, so that evaluators may
simply select one of the suggested alternatives, or define new ones. Figure 15.1
contains some examples of suggested utility functions.
4. If the evaluators are groups, each group is requested to agree on the selec-
tion of utility functions. As with the weighting, the groups are encouraged to
settle intragroup disagreement by discussion instead of through a formal voting
procedure.
5. If an evaluator or a group of evaluators does not explicitly specify a utility
function for anyone attribute, a "default" utility function taken from the sample
utility functions is automatically assigned. The project team specifies which of the
sample utility functions should serve as default for each group.
This technique has proven to have many advantages. In the experiments, the
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evaluators qUickly grasped how to read and interpret utility functions with the
help of the sample utility functions handed out to them. They used the sample
utility functions to focus their own discussion and usually settled on one of them
without difficulty. As with the weights, the provision of "default" utility functions
was extremely valuable in reducing the amount of evaluation work to be per-
formed by the evaluators. In fact, only in this way is it possible to make such a
large number of individual judgments within a reasonable length of time without
losing sight of the important issues and of the larger context in which they must
be seen.
15.3.5 CONFLICT MEASUREMENT
Two kinds of conflict may occur in the context of multiattribute evaluation:
• Conflict between goals (intrapersonal conflict): Two goals are said to be in
conflict if the achievement of one of them reduces the probability of achieving
the other. Almost everyone's goal system contains many such conflicts.
• Conflict between people (interpersonal conflict): Two evaluators or groups
of evaluators may have different opinions on the importance of goals and on
goal achievement - Le., they have different interests or preferences. Consequently,
their evaluations may result in the selection of different alternatives.
While the weighting technique of MAUT takes into account the first kind of con-
flict, no formal procedure is provided for the second kind. Disagreement between
or within groups is to be settled by informal discussion. However, this discussion
may be supported by supplying information about the degree and constitution of
the disagreement. Therefore, an attempt has been made to measure interpersonal
conflict, or differences between evaluation judgments.
Mack and Snyder (l957) postulate three conditions for the existence of conflict
between two groups:
Satisfaction of interests of both groups is impossible. Winning by one group
implies loss for the other.
One group is more powerful than the other and is interested in keeping its
power.
Both groups are aware of the difference between their interests and of the
inequality in their power.
Obviously, only the first condition of conflict is addressed here, as no information
about the distribution of power between the groups or their perception of it is
available. Hence, the concept of conflict measured here is a rather narrow one:
it is merely the divergence of preferences, expressed by different weights and
utility functions; it may be termed latent conflict. However, detailed and concrete
information is available about this kind of conflict.
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There may be various ways of measuring differences between weights and
utility functions of two evaluators or groups of evaluators. In this case, linear
correlation was used. The Bravais-Pearson product-moment correlation coef-
ficient was considered to be a good measure of similarity of judgment , a coefficient
of + 1 indicating complete agreement and a coefficient of -1 indicating complete
antagonism between the groups. Three types of conflict measures were computed:
Correlation between the weights assigned to the goals by each group: a measure
of agreement on priorities
Correlation between the utility values calculated for each plan using the utility
functions of each group: a measure of agreement on satisfaction levels
Correlation between the weighted utilities of each plan for each group: a measure
of agreement on achieved satisf'llction
The latter two types of conflict measures can be calculated for each zone of the
city, using zonal utility values. Thus, conflicts may be localized and traced back to
their origins -lack of public services, unsatisfactory housing, or insufficient trans-
portation, for example. Such localized conflict measures, however, are meaningful
only when both groups live or work in that zone.
Since not only existing but also projected states of the city may be the object
of evaluation, it is, in principle, possible to predict the occurrence oflocal conflicts.
However, this facility must be used with caution. First, one must consider that
the future states are evaluated on the basis of present knowledge and goal systems;
potential changes of values and attitudes are, at least in the present form of the
analysis, not taken into account. Second, the limited concept oflatent conflict dis-
regards the dynamics of genuine, or open, conflicts, which usually originate from
causes that are beyond the scope of local planning. Nevertheless, it can be assumed
that planning alternatives that reduce the amount of latent conflict may at least
help to reduce the overall conflict potential in urban society.
i5.3.6 COMMUNiCATiON OF RESULTS
It is essential to the success of a dialogue that the participants understand each
other. Therefore, the communication of the results of simulation and evaluation
to the evaluators is a critical step in the procedure and a prerequisite to the intend-
ed learning process.
At present, the standard printed output of the simulation and the evaluation
model each consists of some 100 pages of tables, diagrams, and maps. In spite of
careful design, much of it usually turns out to be irrelevant, while other informa-
tion is required by the participants in the experiments that might have easily been
provided from the computations performed. This indicates that the problem of
communication of results is still largely unsolved. Much of the difficulty encountered
may be attributed to the fact that interactive computer access was not available
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at the time of the experiments, but even with interactive computing, the output
options have to be carefully tailored to the information needs of the users. This
is even more important when the users are not trained in the processing of large
amounts of numerical information. In such cases, appropriate nonnumerical (Le.,
graphic or textual) transformations of numerical information become important
elements of the procedure.
A few guidelines for effective communication of the evaluation results to the
evaluators can be derived from the experiments that have been conducted. Much
depends on the ability of the person explaining the results to divide the informa-
tion into digestible portions in order to avoid information overload. It is equally
important always to relate the results to the interests and problems of the partic-
ular group addressed.
The communication of results usually starts with the most general information
and moves from there to the concrete and specific. First, for each plan the total
utility as seen by different groups is discussed. Next, this total utility is disaggregated
into its components. They reveal in which sector of the goal hierarchy the different
groups are well or badly served by each plan. The same type of analysis can be
repeated for each goal cluster on each level of the hierarchy as desired.
In the next step, the analysis is augmented by the local dimension. On the most
general level, the utility values of the zones as seen by any two groups may be
plotted against each other. Zonal utility values of any goal for any group may be
displayed in a map showing local disparities in the satisfaction of that goal.
From there, one or more zones may be selected for further analysis, zones in
which the participating groups have a specific interest because they live or work
there. For the selected zones, all previous steps of the analysis may be repeated.
In addition, on the zonal level, utilities may be traced down to the attributes that
caused them. By a listing of attributes with "critical values" it is possible to identify
attributes whose improvement appears to be most urgent.
With all this information, the participants are prepared to understand the con-
flict measures. The most general measures of conflict apply to the whole city.
Zonal conflicts may be displayed in conflict maps that show where there is a dis-
crepancy between the satisfaction levels or the achieved satisfaction as perceived
by any two groups. The information contained in the conflict measures has a two-
fold function in the process: it helps the participants to find out where and how
other groups are better or worse served by a plan, and it makes them realize where
the achievement of their own satisfaction interferes with that of others. In addition,
changes in the conflict measures over repeated applications provide a measure of
successful adaptation of interests during the learning process.
Sample evaluation results are presented in section 15.4.
15.3.7 ITERATiON
After a first cycle of simulation and evaluation, all input is reviewed, and the whole
process is repeated. The iteration constitutes a learning process as the participants
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act with improved insight into the behavior of the system that is to be planned.
From the first simulation and evaluation results each evaluator or group of
evaluators has a fairly good perception of where the present plans are satisfactory
and where or how they should be changed. The ideas of different groups on these
changes will differ. As, obviously, only one plan can be executed, the divergent
ideas must be consolidated.
The appropriate format of such consolidation is public bargaining. In the
hypothetical environment of experimentation, this means some sort of organized
gaming. It should be noted that even in reality such bargaining will remain in a
sense fictitious, since in most countries there is no room for actual local planning
decision outside the institutional bodies of the local legislature. The gaming session
will result in guidelines for plan revision. In the experiments, a "planning com-
mission" composed of members of all participating groups was constituted to
design a compromise plan from these guidelines.
In addition, the evaluators are free to revise their goal systems. In most cases,
they will start with changing the importance weights. From the preceding evaluation
the evaluators know which attributes or sectors of the hierarchy are served less
well than others. It may be assumed that most evaluators will shift additional
weight to those attributes that seem to deserve more attention because of failure
to achieve them. If this happens at the same time that the plan is revised, the
overall rating of the plan may become worse, even though the plan has, in fact,
improved.
Only after they have altered their importance weights are the evaluators
likely to change their utility functions. People will decrease their aspirations
or standards with respect to a goal only if they understand that these standards
are completely unrealistic. On the other hand, an increase in aspiration levels
seems plausible only if no other attributes have grave deficits, something that
is hardly ever achieved.
15.3.8 ON UNCERTAINTY
A brief final comment should be made on the treatment of uncertainty in the pro-
posed procedure. There can be no doubt that the outcomes of planning measures
in urban planning over a long time frame are far from certain, as has been
emphasized earlier. Nevertheless, as will have been noticed, the mathematical
model of utility used in the procedure described here contains no term for the
consideration of uncertainty. The rationale for this lies in the fact that a highly
sophisticated prediction instrument, the simulation model, is used to predict the
outcomes to be evaluated. If the consequences of the planning actions were pre-
dicted intuitively (which hardly seems possible), a subjectively estimated probability
could, and should, have been assigned to each of them. This is not possible with
the simulation results, as there has been no attempt so far to trace probabilities
from model input to model output, and it seems very unlikely that such an attempt
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should ever be successful. Hence, from the point of view of the evaluators, all model
output has equal certainty, or equal uncertainty, which relieves the decision model
of the necessity of distinguishing between different levels of probability.
Of course, this means that the reliability of the evaluation results can be no
better than that of the simulation output. Still, it is assumed that this reliability
is higher than that of a decision analysis based on intuitive prediction of outcomes.
15.4 WORKSHOP EXPERIMENTS
Although the simulation model alone has been applied to land use and transpor-
tation planning problems in Cologne and Vienna, the combination of simulation
and evaluation has been tested in a series of experimental applications. For these
tests, Darmstadt was selected as an "experimental city" because of its manageable
size and the availability of data. The Darmstadt data, having been assembled and
coded as required by the simulation model, served as the input for three experi-
mental workshops with groups of different size and professional background. l
Selected results of these workshops are presented below.
15.4.1 WORKSHOP ORGANIZATION
As a common basis for all three workshops three basically different alternatives
for land use and transportation planning in Darmstadt were formulated with the
help of staff members of the Darmstadt city planning department (Figure 15.2):
IO/A New concentration of population and employment in the northern
part of the urban area, combined with maximum investment for highway con-
struction; no improvement of public transportation
20/B Incremental housing development added to old village cores; balanced
transportation concept with moderate improvement of highway system and transit
service
30/C "Antisprawl" concept with high-density corridor across the central city
district; environment-conscious transport scheme with cutbacks on highway con-
struction; new linear (individual-cabin-type) transportation system along inner
city corridor
A fourth alternative is the hypothetical "zero" or do-nothing alternative (NY,
for the German Nullvariante), which assumes no public planning actions whatsoever
1 These workshops were held in 1973 and 1974. Participating in the first workshop were 26
researchers from various Battelle laboratories; the second workshop was held with 25 junior
planning officials of the State of Hessen; the third workshop was conducted at the University
of Karlsruhe with 22 postgraduate students of regional sciences.
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and represents pure market behavior. These four planning alternatives were pre-
pared for input into the simulation model and simulated in advance for workshop
use.
Because of lack of space it is not possible to illustrate the results of the simula-
tions in this paper. It must suffice to say that the four alternatives differed widely
with respect to land requirements, depletion of natural resources, traffic conditions,
environmental quality, and costs for the public budget and for the society at large.
The workshops lasted from 3 to 5 days. At the beginning of each workshop the
participants were divided into three groups representing socioeconomic groups
(high, medium, and low income). To facilitate group identification, typical rep-
resentatives of each socioeconomic group were described in written self-portraits
included in the workshop material. The groups were asked to anticipate as well as
they could the needs and interests of the socioeconomic group they were to rep-
resent and to make evaluations from that perspective. In workshops 2 and 3 the
results of the preceding workshops were explained to the participants in an attempt
to build upon the earlier experiences and thus make all three workshops a con-
tinuous learning process.
After the participants were briefed on the procedure and on general planning
problems of Darmstadt, the workshops followed the sequence of steps shown
below:
1. The results of the advance simulation of the four initial plans were presented
to the participants. In workshops 2 and 3 the results of the preceding workshops
were communicated as well.
2. The groups made their first evaluations.
3. The initial plans were evaluated with these initial goal systems. In workshops
2 and 3 plans generated during the preceding workshops were also evaluated.
4. In a gaming session the new results were discussed by the groups.
5. A "planning commission" consisting of two delegates from each group
designed a "compromise" plan.
6. The groups revised their goal systems.
7. The compromise plan was simulated and evaluated with the initial and the
new goal systems.
Because of lack of time only in workshop 3 was it possible to reiterate and re-
enter the procedure with step 4, a new gaming session.
15.4.2 INITIAL RESULTS
In all workshops the first evaluation showed considerable differences in the atti-
tudes of the groups toward the different plans and in the groups' satisfaction levels.
The most interesting result was that, at the higher aggregation levels of utility, the
group representing the medium-income sector of the population arrived at the
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highest utility values for all planning alternatives. All plans seemed to meet the
needs of the middle class, which may partly be explained by the fact that most
planners are middle-class people. The lowest utility values were computed for the
group representing low-income people, which may be considered self-evident.
Of the plans, least favored was the "do-nothing" alternative (NV), which seems
plausible, as by definition this alternative does not attempt to solve any problem
at all. However, the groups did not agree on the rank order of the remaining alter-
natives. The low-income and medium-income groups expressed a clear preference
for the antisprawl concept 30/C, the plan that implies the most radical change of
urban structure. These two groups might have agreed on this alternative, even
though the middle class would derive more benefits from it. The high-income group,
however, preferred the incremental-growth alternative (20/B), an alternative that
implies only minor changes compared with the "do-nothing" alternative. Table
15.1 shows the total utility of the four initial plans as seen by each group after
the initial evaluation of the first workshop. All utilities shown are computed for
the simulated system state 25 years after the base year, i.e., for the year 1995.
The numerical differences between the utilities of the plans may seem to be
relatively small. This raises the question of the sensitivity of the evaluation pro-
cedure to input changes. Formally, utilities may vary, by definition, between a
and 100. For utilities aggregated from a number of attributes, however, both ex-
tremes are equally unlikely as they imply that all subordinate attributes with non-
zero weights have utility a or 100. For a given set of subordinate attributes the
aggregate utility may vary only between the lowest and the highest utility value
occuring in the attribute set. These extremes are still very unlikely as they imply
that all less extreme attributes have zero weights. In summary, the "averaging of
averages" implied in the additive model of MAUT causes, on the higher levels of
a goal hierarchy, a strong tendency toward utilities in the medium range of the
utility scale.
The conclusion from this is that the interpretation of aggregate utilities must
consider relatively small differences. In addition, it suggests that the analysis should
proceed from aggregate utilities to partial or disaggregate utilities whose domains
tend to increase with disaggregation. An example of such disaggregated analysis is
shown in Figure 15.3. The global utility values of alternatives NV and 30/C from
the second workshop are disaggregated into their five components on the second
TABLE 15.1 Total Utility of Four Initial Plans, by Group (Workshop 1)
Income
Group
High (1)
Medium (2)
Low (3)
Plan
NV
47.2
54.8
39.8
lOlA
49.3
58.6
43.8
20/B
50.7
52.4
41.2
30lC
49.4
59.2
44.2
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hierarchical level. Each of these components is depicted as a rectangle whose width
represents its relative weight and whose height represents its utility value. It is
readily seen that the improvement of plan 30/C over the do-nothing alternative is
effected mainly by the improvement of transport services. One general observa-
tion can be made: the proflle of the weighted utility values is largely determined
by the weights. This can be explained by the fact that the standard deviation
relative to the mean is much higher for the weights than for the utilities, and this
di fference tends to increase on the higher levels 0 f the hierarchy.
Figure 15.4 shows results that are disaggregated locally as well as hierarchically.
A zone was selected for each of the three groups; each zone is populated pre-
dominantly by members of the socioeconomic segment represented by the group.
In this case the selected utility aggregates are not taken from the same hierarchical
level, so their weights do not add up to 100. The most interesting result of this
kind of analysis is that at the level of zonal utilities the differences between the
groups are much more distinct than if they are aggregated for the whole city. For
instance, the zonal utilities of group 3 are, with one exception, much lower than
the global utilities averaged over all zones for the same group. For comparison,
the respective global utilities are shown by broken lines. The conclusion from this
is that, obviously, low-income people live in those areas of the city that they
themselves consider to be less desirable. The reader may note that a similar analysis
for the two other groups leads to quite different conclusions. (These findings
suggest a modification in aggregating utilities over zones. Instead of averaging
utilities weighted by total zonal population, only the population of the socio-
economic group for which the evaluation is made might be used as weights. It is
likely that this would increase the differences of utility between groups.)
The above results help in the interpretation of intergroup conflicts as they are
revealed by the evaluation technique. Conflicts between the high-income and
low-income groups tended to be most severe, the major areas of conflict being the
most favored, attractive, and expensive housing areas in the southeast part of the
city, and the northern part of the city, where a new satellite is currently being con-
structed. The conflict intensity between the high-income and the medium-income
groups and between the medium-income and the low-income groups, appeared
to be generally lower, which again seems plausible.
15.4.3 ITERATION RESULTS
If it is supposed that repeated application of simulation and evaluation initiates
a learning process for the participants, the changes of results after iteration are of
specific interest. Two questions may be asked: (a) How do the utilities of plans
change? and (b) Can the conflicts between groups be reduced? It will be shown that
these questions are closely related.
To answer the first question, the total utilities of the compromise plans as
designed by the "planning commissions" of the second and third workshops are
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TABLE 15.2 Total Utility of Compromise Plans, Compared with Utility of
Best Plans of Preceding Workshop, by Group
Workshop 2 Workshop 3
Income Group 30/C 31/E 31/E 32/F
High (1) 52.2 50.5 49.9 49.9
Medium (2) 53.4 51.8 48.0 48.4
Low (3) 42.7 41.6 41.6 42.5
TABLE 15.3 Total Utility of Plan 30/C in All Three Workshops, by Group
Workshop
Income Group 1 2 3
High (1) 49.4 52.2 49.2
Medium (2) 59.2 53.4 46.6
Low (3) 44.2 42.7 41.8
compared in Table 15.2 with those of the best plans of the preceding workshops,
evaluated with the same goal systems. It can be seen that in the second workshop
the compromise plan means a reduction of utility for all groups. Only the planning
commission of the third workshop succeeded in improving the utility of the city.
Even there, the gains in utility seem small compared to the amount of effort that
went into the design of the plan.
There may be several reasons for this. First, the planning commissions worked
under limitations of time and resources; only one iteration was perfonned. Second,
the small degree of improvement may be an indication of the difficul ty of influenc-
ing the conditions of life with the limited instruments of urban planning. The third
reason may be the most important: "improving" the existing plans was not the only
purpose of the planning commission; it also had the task of consolidating diverging
opinions into a plan that was acceptable to all groups. One of the characteristics
of compromise is that a gain in consensus may have to be paid for with a loss of
satisfaction for all.
This leads to the second question, which concerns the reduction of nonnative
differences between the groups. This process can be analyzed by looking at how the
same plan was evaluated by groups with changing goal systems over time. Table
15.3 shows how planning alternative 30/C was evaluated in all three workshops.
Obviously, the perceived utility of plan 30/C decreased from workshop to work-
shop. As the plan was always the same, this decrease must be attributed to changes
in the value systems applied in the evaluation. In fact, a look at the distribution of
weights on the second level of the hierarchy reveals significant shifts in emphasis
(Table 15.4). The general tendency of these shifts was away from the technical
aspects of urban life, such as transportation and energy, and toward more socially
oriented aspects, such as housing and public services. But, as pointed out earlier,
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TABLE 15.4 Perceived Utility of Plan 30/C, at Second Level of Hierarchy,
by Group and Workshop
Income Public
Group Transport Energy Residential Economic Services Total
High (1)
Workshop 1 30 20 10 30 10 100
Workshop 2 36 24 8 24 8 100
Workshop 3 28 28 9 27 9 100
Medium (2)
Workshop 1 49 21 9 12 9 100
Workshop 2 35 15 20 10 20 100
Workshop 3 12 18 28 21 21 100
Low (3)
Workshop 1 27 3 35 7 28 100
Workshop 2 27 3 35 18 18 100
Workshop 3 20 0 48 8 24 100
good transportation was the greatest asset of plan 30/C. Therefore, a shift of
emphasis to less-well-served areas of the hierarchy must necessarily lead to a decrease
in the plan's overall utility. These findings seem to underline the assumption that
evaluators are likely to shift weight to attributes that rated low in previous
evaluations.
It remains to be seen if these losses in perceived utility were compensated for
by a gain in achieved consensus. Table 15.5 shows the development of the three
kinds of correlation coefficients computed as conflict measures of plan 30/C. The
numbers clearly convey the degree of similarity in the goal systems of the three
groups. With respect to the weights (i.e., the relative importance of goals), there is
TABLE 15.5 Correlation Coefficients of Weights, Utilities, and Weighted Utilities
as Conflict Measures
Correlation Coefficient
Group 1-2 Group 1-3 Group 2-3
Weights
Workshop 1 0.83 0.00 0.31
Workshop 2 0.87 0.07 0.20
Workshop 3 0.74 -0.22 0.13
Utilities
Workshop 1 0.77 0.43 0.71
Workshop 2 0.63 0.71 0.72
Workshop 3 0.80 0.78 0.92
Weighted utilities
Workshop 1 0.90 0.34 0.61
Workshop 2 0.91 0.20 0.38
Workshop 3 0.55 -0.21 0.27
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TABLE 15.6 Correlation Coefficients of Weighted Utilities, Workshops 2 and 3
Income Groups
Correlated
1-2
1-3
2-3
Workshop 2 Workshop 3
30/C 31/E 31/E 32/F
0.90 0.91 0.84 0.71
0.20 0.19 0.09 -0.16
0.38 0.38 0.29 0.27
fairly high consensus (correlation) between groups 1 and 2, less consensus between
groups 2 and 3, and practically no consensus between groups 1 and 3. Clearly, the
consensus decreased from workshop to workshop; this must be attributed to the
shifts in weights discussed above. If one correlates unweighted utilities, the corre-
lations are, in general, much higher. Here, the tendency is reversed. With each
workshop, the agreement between the groups about the perceived state of the
urban system increased. The conflict measures using weighted utilities show the
combined effects of those two tendencies: consensus between the groups on their
achieved satisfaction decreased from one workshop to the next.
A final inspection may show whether this tendency can also be observed in the
development of consensus between the groups during the workshops. Table 15.6
shows conflict measures based on weighted utilities of the compromise plans
designed in workshops 2 and 3 and of the respective previous plans. Clearly, dis-
agreement between the groups on the satisfaction achieved by the plans again
remained constant or increased.
These results are far from satisfying. They imply that in no case did the groups
succeed in finding a substantially better plan or in reaching consensus on a com-
promise. For a decision aid designed to improve urban decision making, this looks
like a poor performance. Could it be that increased dissatisfaction and disagreement
are necessary first steps in the learning process, before real progress can be made?
The experiments conducted so far have been too limited, both in number and in
duration, to answer that question.
15.5 APPRAISAL AND OUTLOOK
In spite of the limited number of experiments conducted, a preliminary assessment
of the applicability of the proposed procedure seems to be possible.
On the procedural-technical level, the following observations can be made:
• The procedure is accepted by the participants as a meaningful decision aid
that supplies relevant information.
• The procedure is transparent and straightforward enough to be understood
and operated by the participants.
• The procedure is flexible enough to respond to spontaneous input by the
participants.
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• The procedure provides the participants with insights into interdependencies
of the urban system that they might otherwise have been unable to recognize.
• The procedure makes the participants realize that satisfaction of their own
interests may interfere with that of others'.
• The procedure motivates the participants to cooperate in resolving conflict
by compromise.
On the other hand, two problems still need to be solved if the procedure is to be
successful:
• The output of the simulation and evaluation programs should respond more
flexibly to the information needs of the participants.
• Feedback between the computer models and the participants should be made
quicker, easier, and more economical in order to allow more iterations in less time.
Interactive computing and more sophisticated output media - multiscreen graphic
displays, for example - seem to offer reasonable solutions to these two problems.
It is expected that the application of such technology, in conjunction with more
refined group-dynamic techniques, would help to make the group discussions more
realistic and effective, so that, eventually, the distant goal of inviting "real" people
to the sessions could be approached.
On the theoretical level, an unanswered question is how appropriate the assump-
tions underlying the evaluation procedure are with respect to the decision situation
of urban planning. A preliminary answer will be given in two parts.
First, the restrictions under which the multiattribute model is considered valid
are inspected for their applicability to the urban decision situation. It has been
demonstrated in this paper that they are applicable only in a very crude, approxi-
mate manner. In particular, it has been shown that because of the immense com-
plexity of the evaluation object, the conditions of data exhaustiveness, precision,
and independence can hardly be satisfied: as the decision outcomes cannot be pre-
dicted intuitively, only attributes implied in the simulation model (which is far
from complete) can be processed. But, as the number of attributes is still very large,
only the crudest techniques for determining weights and utility functions (e.g.,
direct scaling and "curve drawing") can be applied. And again, because of the
large number of attributes, the time required to test the independence of each one
would be prohibitive. Moreover, it cannot even be expected that the attributes will
be independent, either preferentially or environmentally. In summary, it must be
concluded that, with respect to very large goal systems, the restrictions of the
multiattribute model are far too great; they must be relaxed drastically if the
model is to become practical.
Second, the multiattribute model itself - that is, its ability to portray human
judgment in the context of urban decision making - is examined. The discussion
will touch only briefly upon three important problems. The first of these is the addi-
tive model itself. The theory does not explain which part of human judgment is rep-
354
resented by utility or satisfaction as expressed by weights and utility functions.
What does it really mean to multiply weights and utilities? In this paper, the assump-
tion has been made that evaluators tend to shift weight to badly served attributes.
If this is true, weights would, in a sense, be measures of dissatisfaction. Utility, in
the additive model, would then be the sum of the products of dissatisfaction and
satisfaction. Does this make sense? At least it makes the interpretation of weighted
utility values extremely difficult. They can no longer be seen as an expression of
pure utility; they might instead express the interest of the evaluator in changing
the appropriate domain of reality. To put it simply, the "utility" of an important
attribute with a low satisfaction level is not the same as that of an unimportant
attribute with a high satisfaction level, although MAUT would suggest that it is.
The second problem is the static nature of the multiattribute model as it is
presently applied. This problem becomes critical when the simulation and evalu-
ation models are combined: the evaluators are to evaluate future states of the city
with current values. Obviously, goal systems change with time, either in response
to changes in technology and life-style or in adapting to changes in the goal systems
of others, or because the limited perceptional capacity of man prevents the evalu-
ators from perceiving more than a small portion of their total goal system at any
one point, which forces them to periodically update their awareness of their own
preferences. Only this last type of short-term adjustments of goal systems is dealt
with adequately by the intended learning process. The treatment of long-term
changes of goal systems would require the design of a dynamic simulation model
of urban value structures that would be no less complex than the simulation model
of the real city. As such a model would have to contain feedback cycles, it is very
unlikely that the model structure of a dynamic MAUT would still be the additive,
hierarchical model. [Some thoughts on dynamic simulation of goal systems are con-
tained in Bauer and Wegener (1975, pp. 412-413).]
The third problem is the limited concept of rationality implicit in the multi-
attribute model, as it is in most decision analytic approaches. Following this concept
of rationality, a rational decision consists of the selection of the action alternative
with the highest utility with respect to a given set of goals. The goal system is taken
as fixed, its validity depending only on its being as errorless as possible - that is,
on its representing the goal system of the decision maker as truly as possible. With
multiple-group decision making, conflict analysis, and the possibility of feedback,
this concept of rationality becomes obsolete. Now the goals, too, become depen-
dent variables and are subject to change. The situation of the decision makers has
changed: they have to decide which interests their decisions are going to serve; they
are becoming aware of their partisanships. Rational decision making now implies
the awareness of partisanship, and the validity of a decision analysis depends on
the extent to which it reveals this partisanship. Decisions must finally be made.
This means that at some point the learning process has to be stopped, but when?
When all participants are satisfied, or when no more improvement of plans is
possible?
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It has been the purpose of the last three paragraphs to show that the multi-
attribute model of MAUT, in its present form, is by far too restrictive in scope, too
insensitive to change, and too limited in its concept of reality to encompass human
conflict resolution behavior in complex decision-making environments like urban
planning.
There are no easy solutions to these problems. A few pragmatic attempts to deal
with some of them have been discussed in this paper. While all of the problems will
offer opportunity for research for some time to come, further work in two direc-
tions seems particularly important. One line of development would try to improve
the feedback mechanism by integrating simulation and evaluation models in one
interactive model. With this tool, more realistic gaming techniques and guidelines
for conflict resolution could be devised. The other line of development would
attempt to simulate urban preference structures in a dynamic MAUT model.
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DISCUSSION
EDWARDS: My results are almost diametrically opposite to yours with respect
to the question of whether such analyses lead to less conflict among the partici-
pants. One possibility that occurs to me for explaining the difference between
what you found and what I found is that you were not working with actual mem-
bers of these disagreeing communities; rather, you were working with people who
are instructed to think of themselves as surrogates for these members.
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WEGENER: We have a theory about why the procedure was not successful, in
the way we had wished it to be, in reducing conflicts among groups. In modifying
their goal structures, the groups were motivated by the desire to shift attention
to those areas of the goal structure that in the first run were badly served for that
group. This, of course, would result in a decrease of satisfaction for the group even
if the compromise plan "objectively" increased in quality. Maybe we should
design an experiment in which we change only one thing at a time, either the plan
or the goal system. Our results might then be different.
EDWARDS: You posed a question at the beginning of your talk - who can tell
you how to limit the number of dimensions? It seems to me you answered your
own question: you did it yourself.
WEGENER: But when should it be done? Should it be done before we enter the
decision analysis or during the decision analysis? One could ask: Why do you start
with so many attributes? We had no way of eliminating any of them before we
entered the decision analysis.
KEENEY: Then how did you eliminate all those attributes that were never
included in the problem?
WEGENER: To be sure that you have not forgotten any attribute would mean
increasing the number of attributes in the beginning, but, of course, you will never
be able to include everything. The simulation model is the limit. The whole pro-
cedure can be only as complete as the simulation.
KEENEY: Although I have had no experience with a problem involving as many
attributes as yours, I do have an idea that may be useful in eliminating some of the
attributes before going through an analysis. At the beginning of our problem, let
us say we have developed 12 attributes. Rather than build a simulation model or
work on the probabilistic aspects first, suppose we try to get the preference func-
tion or utility function. Suppose that it happened to be additive and we scaled it
so that the sum of the weights was 1. It might be the case that 0.9 of that went
with six of the attributes and the other 0.1 went with the six others. Then you
might for a first cut eliminate those last six and evaluate alternatives on the scale
from 0 to 0.9. If you were just looking for a best alternative, and if one is at least
0.1 better than any other alternative, then it would be the best even if the addi-
tional six attributes were included. More generally, if no single alternative has a
utility 0.1 greater than all the others, each alternative that is at least 0.1 less than
the utility of the best alternative - as indicated on just the six attributes - can be
eliminated from further consideration. This can be used iteratively, starting with
the heaviest weighted attributes and sequentially adding the next heaviest.
BELL: Did you make any attempt to examine the qualitative preference struc-
ture by examining trade-off considerations, for example, before assigning your
weights?
WEGENER: I have only one answer for that. Can you imagine performing
exotic things like marginality checks or independence checks with such a large
number of attributes? I cannot and I am not sure if the average decision maker
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is able to reasonably answer questions on marginality or on trade-offs even with
a very small number of attributes.
RAIFFA: I think it is possible to check qualitatively whether preferences in
one cluster are independent of those in another cluster. The fuzzier people are,
the easier it is to construct a model that will reasonably represent their prefer-
ences. The aim in your work, as I understand it, is to concentrate on the trade-
offs between groups. The only way that you can come to grips with the trade-offs
between groups is to construct some reasonable preference model for each group.
16 Multiobjective Decision Making withApplications to
Environmental and Urban Design
Y. Sawaragi, K. Inoue, and H. Nakayama
16.1 INTRODUCTION
The rapid advance of material civilization over the past two decades has produced
many harmful effects on both human beings and their physical environment.
Environmental degradation and destruction is widely recognized as a serious social
problem. Because their causes and effects are complex and wide-ranging, the
best approach to environmental problems may be an interdisciplinary one that
includes politics, economics, sociology, medical science, and engineering.
Beginning in 1972, the Education Ministry in Japan conducted a 3-year research
project on environmental pollution control; the project's emphasis was on an
engineering approach. Some 200 researchers from Japanese universities were
organized into several research groups. The first study discussed in this paper was
performed as part of this project and deals with trade-off analysis of the problem
of thermal discharge in stearn power plants by using a new constrained optimization
technique, the "multiplier method."
Also briefly described below is a project of the Systems Development Labora-
tory of Hitachi, Ltd., whose aim is the construction of a decision-making model
to aid in analysis and prediction for carrying out urban administration policies and
planning; the quantified consciousness of the public is introduced as a unified
standard for decision making. The basis of the model is Hiroshima City, and the
study was carried out in 1971-1973 by some 20 experts in such fields as engi-
neering, economics, management, and psychology.
16.2 CONSTRAINED OPTIMIZATION TECHNIQUES AND TRADE-OFF
ANALYSIS
Consider a system in which two or three criteria are to be minimized while other
criteria are maintained within satisfactory ranges so that the decision maker can
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make his decision with the help of the illustration of the trade-off relation between
the criteria to be minimized. For example, consider the following problem:
Minimize
subject to
3,4, ... ,m
and
xE S1.
The trade-off relation between criteria fl and f2 is easily illustrated by solving the
auxiliary problem:
Minimize
subject to
and
xES,
where S= {xlfj(x) <b j , 3 <i<m,xES1}, and b2 is perturbed over the domain
F = {b I there exists xES such that f2(X) <b}. Since the auxiliary problem for
fixed b 2 is a traditional optimization problem, existing optimization techniques
may be applicable. Among them, the multiplier method (Sayama et al., 1974;
Nakayama et al., 1975a, b) seems to be the most promising for several reasons:
It can be applied to general nonconvex programmings as well as to convex ones.
The optimal solution and the values of the Lagrange multipliers are obtained
simultaneously.
It does not include any parameter increasing to infinity, and thus the process
of convergence is stable.
The second feature is particularly pertinent to application of the method to the
stated problem, since the Lagrange multiplier is the trade-off ratio between fl and
f2'
The multiplier method is based on a generalized Lagrangian:
{
rgf(X),
m m
L(x, a;r) = fl(x) - ~2 agj(x) -j~ ragl(x)
aj + rgj(x) , gj(X) >0
(16.1)
where gj(x) = bi - fi(X), Here, any of the constraints except for i = 2 may be
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excluded from L(x, a; r), and the region prescribed by them could be joined to n,
if necessary.
The computing procedure is summarized as follows:
1. Set k = O.
2. Choose a penalty parameter r > 0 and initial values of multipliers cJ< > O.
3. Find x k that minimizes L(x, cJ<; r) over n.
4. Stop the iteration if one of the following criteria is satisfied:
Ia{'gj(xk) I<E j = 2, ... ,m
Ifl(Xk ) - L(xk , cJ<; r) 1< E,
where E is a sufficiently small positive number. Otherwise, go to (5).
5. Adjust cJ< in the following way:
{
a{' - 2rgiCxk),
a~+l = (a{')3
[a~ + rgj(xk)F'
and return to (3), setting k = k + 1.
As a simple example of the application of these techniques, we discuss the
investigation of thermal discharge in a steam power plant (Inoue et al., 1974).
The power plant has an output of 300-500 MW and has a once-through cooling
system. High-temperature, high.pressure steam is generated in a boiler. This steam
is sent to the turbine, and the turbine drives the generator to produce electric
power. The steam that comes out of the turbine is cooled in the condenser and
resupplied as water to the boiler. The latent heat generated by the cooling and
condensation of steam is transferred to the cooling water. The temperature of
the cooling water is elevated, and the heat is transferred to the water source.
The efficiency of the electricity generation depends on the temperature of con-
densed water from steam, and this temperature in turn is governed by the tem-
perature of the cooling water.
In the steam power plant model, alternatives to once-through cooling, namely,
recirculation path and dilution path, are considered. The model specified the
relationships among costs of fuels, cost and availability of water, temperature and
pressure at various points in the power plant, and so on.
One of the criteria to be minimized is the cost of generating electricity given by
C = P,·F+Pw • W+Ph ·H, (16.2)
where P, is the price of fuel, including resource use tax ($/Btu); Pw is the price
of water, including resource use tax ($/gal); Ph is the heat discharge tax ($/Btu);
F is the heat supplied to the boiler (Btu/kWh); W is the quantity of intake water
(gal/kWh); and H is the waste heat removed from the condenser (Btu/kWh).
Another criterion to be minimized is
DT = Tout - Tiro
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(16.3)
where Tin and Tout are the temperature of the intake and discharged water.
A part of the result of calculation using the multiplier method described in
this section is displayed in Figure 16.1 for a plant with Tin = 70°F. Regulation of
the temperature rise in cooling water DT is taken as abscissa and the minimum cost
C; is taken as ordinate. The effect of regulation of the temperature differential of
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FIGURE 16.1 Trade-off relation between minimum generating cost C; and
cooling-water temperature differential DT.
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cooling water on the economic status of a steam power plant with once-through
cooling system is clearly shown.
16.3 A PROCEDURE IN GROUP DECISION
The aim of traditional optimization is to find a solution x* that affords a minimum
to a single objective function f(x). This is equivalent to finding a state "nearest" to
the ideal point i = inf f(x). Similarly, the aim of some multicriteria optimization is
considered to be the identification of a state "nearest" to the ideal point F=
infF(x) = (inffl(x), inf f2 (x) , ... , inffr(x))T, where F= ([1,[2,'" ,[rl. What,
then, does "nearest" mean?
The concept of "near" is akin to that of distance. In mathematics, there are
many kinds of distance. Most multicriterion problems define distance by using the
vector Po, where
(16.4)
and F(x) is a state and P is the ideal point. However, by using the vector Po, we can-
not usually specify a unique solution, but a minimal solution set (Pareto optimal
solutions) can be generated. Distance may be introduced by using the decision
makers' value judgements so that a unique solution may be chosen. It is Minkowski's
p-metric
(16.5)
that is most often used in a wide class of practical problems. Here, wi (i = I, ... ,r)
are weighting coefficients and the parameter p balances between the criteria.
Decision makers may define parameters wi and p by their own preferences and
reconciliation between these preferences (Nakayama and Sawaragi, 1975).
Based on (16.5), a kind of social welfare function can be determined. Decision
makers must fully comprehend the special feature of each social welfare function
and use it suitably according to the situation. For example, using p = I in the
p-metric, the trade-off ratio at the solution x* , which minimizes Pi> is given by
(16.6)
On the other hand, for p = 00, the ratio of values betweenfi(x*) andjj(x*) is given
by
(16.7)
In other words, the social welfare function for p = I regards the trade-off ratio
between each criterion as important, and, as p increases, the corresponding social
welfare function emphasizes the ratio of values between criteria rather than the
trade-off ratio. If decision makers want both the trade-off ratio and the ratio of
values at the desired levels, the following form is appropriate:
SW = ff' •.f!f2 ..... ffr.
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(16.8)
In this type of social welfare function, the relation between the trade-off ratio and
the ratio of values is given by
(16.9)
Nash's method for dealing with bargaining problems is based on a special form of
(16.8).
16.4 URBAN PLANNING
The Systems Development Laboratory of Hitachi, Ltd. (Kozawa, 1974; Hitachi,
1972, 1973), has considered policymaking in urban planning from the point of view
of a decision-making problem in the urban administration system. The study,
which lasted from 1971 to 1973, was designed to allow the inclusion in decision
making of evaluations of the public's feelings about the quality of urban life.
They began the development of a model that quantitatively evaluates the quality
of urban life based on the citizen's perception by using the hierarchical worth
program structure and worth function. The hierarchy of worth structure for urban
systems is constructed as in Figure 16.2; the worth imputed for the lowest item is
then defined as the worth function of the selected urban attribute. To do this,
citizen satisfaction is classified into the following three patterns:
S = k(P-Po)
S = klogP/Po
S = So EXP [k(P - Po)]
where Sand P denote the degree of satisfaction and the level of the performance,
respectively. Some 33 functions S = f(P) are established on the basis of the above
three patterns, and a best fit function among them is selected by the least-square
method applied to data on citizen information derived through use of a question-
naire. The worth function W = W(P), whose range is from 0.0 (at the lowest level of
admissible perfonnance) to 1.0 (at the satisfactory level), is then obtained using one
of several methods, such as (a) a scale transformation for the obtained satisfaction
function (e.g., the time it takes children to go from the house to the playground);
(b) econometric methods (e.g., worth function of income); and (c) a method using
a proxy index for worth (e.g., response times for emergency medical services).
Next, each worth function is weighted so that a social welfare function may be
determined. The weights for items at the lowest level are established by normalizing
the factor loading, which is obtained by the principal component analysis applied
to the questionnaire data on citizen information. In this example, the weights at
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higher levels of the hierarchical worth structure are based on the judgment of
decision makers or administrators.
Finally, the social welfare function is amalgamated as a linear combination of
all worth functions with the weights obtained above. The decision makers deter-
mine their policy adaptively by observing the outputs from the social welfare
function. Several experiments were made for seven plans; among them were plans
for installation of sewerage and for siting of roads and parks.
16.5 CONCLUSION
Assessment of the environment has become a most important theme. In light of
this, Hitachi's project suggests ways of controlling environmental pollution. Since
the environmental system inevitably has multiple objectives, or multiple attributes,
we believe that decision making with multiple objectives offers the most promising
tool for solution of environmental problems. Especially since decision making in
environmental or urban design requires citizen consensus, there is a need for ef-
fective methodologies for public decision.
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DISCUSSION
KULIKOWSKI: How did you determine the weights for each worth function
in the social welfare function?
NAKAYAMA: The weights were based on the data gathered from citizens
through questionnaires.
RAIFFA: That's in the second example. In the first one concerning thermal
pollution, was it also done that way?
NAKAYAMA: With the thermal pollution, we haven't decided the weights.
We were just concerned with describing the feasibility trade-offs.
RAIFFA: I'd like to make a brief remark concerning your ideal point introduced
.in section 16.3. It seems that you specify some distance measure and try to find the
point in the efficient set that is closest to the ideal using this measure. With such a
procedure, you have to be very careful about units of measurement, because
distance is not invariant to changes in these units of measurement.
17 Alternative Formulations for a TrajectorySelection Problem: The Mariner
Jupiter I Saturn 1977 Project
James S. Dyer and Ralph F. Miles, Jr.
17.1 INTRODUCTION
This paper presents several formulations of a planetary trajectory selection problem,
a problem that may be viewed alternatively as a bargaining problem, as a social
welfare maximization problem, or as a single-decision-maker problem with multiple
attributes. Both the theoretical and practical implications of these formulations are
discussed. These formulations are then applied to a trajectory selection problem for
the Mariner Jupiter/Saturn 1977 (MJS77) Project (Schurmeier, 1974). This appli-
cation is summarized here, and additional details may be found in Dyer and Miles
(1976, 1977).
Two MJS77 spacecraft will be launched by the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) in August and September 1977 on trajectories that will
swing by Jupiter in 1979, encounter Saturn in late 1980 or 1981, and then escape
the solar system. Funding for the MJS77 Project is in excess of $300 million, and
the Project is managed for NASA by the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) of the
California Institute of Technology. NASA has selected some 80 scientists, divided
by specialization into 11 science teams, to participate on the MJS77 mission. The
scientists interface with the Project through a Science Steering Group (SSG) com-
posed of the team leaders of the science teams. At the time these trajectories were
selected, 10 of the 11 science teams had been chosen.
The selection of the trajectories for the mission is a major Project decision,
since the trajectory characteristics wil\ significantly affect the scientific investiga-
tions. At a meeting on October 22 and 23, 1973, a pair of trajectories was
We acknowledge the efforts of the many people who have contributed to the MJS77 trajectory
pair selection process: the scientists participating on the MJs77 science teams, the JPL science
team representatives, the trajectory analysts and computer programmers of the Mission Analysis
Division of JPL, and the members of the MJS77 Project Office. This work represents one phase
of research conducted at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory for the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration under Contract NAS 7-100.
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selected and recommended by the SSG for incorporation as the Project standard
trajectory pair. While this trajectory pair may not actually be flown, it nevertheless
represents a commitment by the scientists, because the Project systems will be
designed to this standard trajectory pair. Thus the selection of the standard
trajectory pair was viewed as an important milestone, both by the Project and by
the scientists.
17.2 ALTERNATIVE FORMULATIONS
An analysis was performed before the October meeting of the SSG to facilitate
selection of the trajectory pair. The trajectory selection problem can be viewed as
a bargaining problem, as a social welfare maximization problem, or as a single-
decision-maker problem with multiple attributes. Each of these alternative view-
points was employed in the analysis. For each viewpoint we shall present and
criticize one or more alternative problem formulations. While we do not discuss all
the viewpoints and alternative formulations corresponding to each viewpoint, those
that we have chosen are representative of the available solution concepts.
17.2.1 A BARGAINING PROBLEM
Formally, the Project Manager has the final responsibility for the selection of the
trajectory pair for the two MJSn spacecraft. Nevertheless, subject to the tech-
nological and astrodynamic limitations on the spacecraft, this trajectory should be
selected so that it satisfies the science requirements of each of the science teams.
Therefore, the evaluation process for the trajectory pairs should consider the needs
of the scientists rather than of the Project Manager.
The relationship between the scientists and the Project provides additional justi-
fication for this point of view. The scientists who participate in these planetary
missions are the same people who testify in congressional budget hearings in support
of the missions; since scientific support is required to obtain funding for these
missions, the Project management has a stake in maintaining the goodwill of the
scientists.
According to this viewpoint, it is inappropriate to conclude that the scientists
are subordinate to the Project Manager. At times, it is more appropriate to view the
Project Manager as assisting the scientists in the role of an arbitrator whose task is
to reconcile conflicts among the teams over scientific objectives. Therefore the Pro-
ject Manager should seek some arbitration scheme to aid in selecting the final
trajectory pair. Among the problem formulations that provide such arbitration
schemes are bargaining models from cooperative game theory.
A Bargaining Model Formulation
The trajectory selection problem may be viewed as a finite, n-person game, in this
case with the teams corresponding to players so that n = 10. This definition assumes
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that any internal organizational problems within a team have been accounted for,
so that the team "speaks with one voice" (see Shapley and Shubik, 1974). This
latter assumption is appropriate, since from the perspective of the Project, the
science teams are viewed as individual entities. Subject to certain policies and
constraints defined by the Project, the science teams are relatively autonomous.
Conflicts and disputes that might arise within teams are to be settled by the team
members without Project intervention.
A pure strategy t~ for player (team) i is selected from the set T i of technologi·
cally and astrodynamically feasible trajectory pairs. Although there are in fact an
infinite number of feasible trajectory pairs, in practice only a finite number of
trajectories will be considered, and there is no significant theoretical loss in restrict·
ing T i to be a finite set of m trajectory pairs representative of the infinite set and
requiring t~ = t{. for all i,je{l, ... , 10} and k = 1, ... , m. Thus, the set of pure
strategies will be identical for each team, and the player superscript i can therefore
be omitted for the strategy t k and the set T.
We scale the utility function of each team so that ui = 0.0, i = 1, ... , 10, when
we obtain no useful information for team i. Such a situation could arise, for
example, if the trajectory pair were chosen so that the instruments associated with
an experiment could not function, or if the mission were canceled. We also define
ui = 0.0, i = 1, ... , 10, if the teams do not agree on a trajectory pair, since they
must eventually agree on (or accept) the same solution. Failure to reach agreement
would be tantamount to canceling the mission as it is now defined; as a result, no
useful information would be obtained by any team.
One solution for this n-person game is provided by the Nash bargaining model
(1950) as generalized to the n-person case by Harsanyi (1959). In this model, the
convex, compact bargaining set Us;. Rn represents the set of all payoff vectors
u = (u l , ... , un), which can be obtained by the joint action of the players. That
is, U includes both the payoff vectors resulting from actual bargains and those
resul ting from randomizations among bargains. The payoff vectors are expressed in
terms of the utility functions of the n players. Any bargaining situation is character-
ized by both the bargaining set and the status quo point u", = (u~, ... ,u~),which
represents the situation where no bargain takes place. Therefore, a bargaining
situation is denoted by [U, u",] .
The arbitration scheme proposed by Nash requires the determination of the
point uthat maximizes
n
n (u i -u~),
i=1
subject to ueU and u;> u"'. This solution u is unique, and it is the only solution
that satisfies Nash's four axioms of "fairness."
The n-person game formulation of the trajectory selection problem is appropriate
for use with the Nash bargaining model. The payoff vector of zeros associated with
failure to reach an agreement becomes the status quo point in the Nash model.
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Since the status quo point represents the situation where no bargain takes place,
we can set u* = (0, ... ,0) without requiring knowledge of the trajectory initially
desired by each team.
A Critique
A critique of the use of the Nash bargaining model for the trajectory selection
problem is provided by Bonnardeaux et al. (1976). They conclude that the four
Nash axioms that characterize a solution are acceptable rules of arbitration for this
problem. However, they question the practical usefulness of a randomized solution
that could result from the application of the Nash model.
As an alternative, they recommend the use of the restricted bargaining set V'
consisting only of the payoff vectors u = (u 1, ••• , un) that result from actual
bargains. The multiplicative collective choice rule they propose is the determination
of the trajectory pair thE T that maximizes
10
n Ui(th)'
i=1
(17.1)
This latter formulation does provide a solution that may violate one of the four
Nash axioms (symmetry), but this can be justified via the argument of Zeuthen
(see Harsanyi, 1956). For further details, see Bonnardeaux et al. (1976).
Another issue of concern is the simplistic view of the payoff vector associated
with failure to reach agreement, which becomes the important status quo point in
the Nash model. In reality, if no agreement were reached, the Project Manager
would resolve the problem. He might impose a solution hitherto unknown to the
science teams, or he might require a fundamental redesign of the mission. The latter
could actually result in the removal of some science teams from the mission in
order to achieve a more compatible set of experiments. This situation complicates
any attempt to model the bargaining problem because the failure to reach agree-
ment actually corresponds to a different probability distribution over all feasible
trajectory pairs for each team. It is difficult to assess how seriously the simplifying
assumptions regarding the status quo distort the solution to the Nash model.
17.2.2 A SOCIAL WELFARE MAXIMIZATION PROBLEM
The argument that the evaluation process for the trajectory pairs should be directed
toward the scientists is a persuasive one. At issue is the appropriate role of the
Project Manager. According to the viewpoint that justified a bargaining model, the
Project Manager assumed the role of an arbitrator. Certainly, other possibilities
exist.
For example, the Project Manager may define the technological and astro-
dynamic constraints on the trajectories and work with the scientists to develop
feasible candidate trajectory pairs. Having done this, he may play no other role in
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the selection of the final trajectory. Keeney (1976) calls this the participatory
group problem, wherein the scientists themselves must actually generate the rule
for aggregating the preferences of the science teams in order to select an alternative.
In another approach, the Project Manager may take a more active role and serve as
a "benevolent dictator" who imposes the rule for aggregating team preferences.
In either case, the trajectory selection problem is viewed as an n-person social
welfare maximization problem, with the teams corresponding to individuals so that
n = 10. This formulation also assumes that each team speaks with one voice. Alter-
native formulations of this problem allow the use of both ordinal and cardinal ex-
pressions of preference by the individuals (teams) within the group.
Formulation with Ordinal Data
The science teams must rank, in order of decreasing preference, the set T of m
technologically and astrodynamically feasible trajectory pairs. There are two
preference aggregation rules commonly used with ordinal rankings such as these.
The rank sum rule is one of the oldest and most widely used preference aggrega-
tion rules. It requires the calculation of the mean ordinal rank for each trajectory
pair, with the trajectory pair achieving the lowest mean rank being preferred. It is
a slight variation of the Borda method, in which each individual assigns a "mark"
to the n alternatives (ranked from worst to best) of 0, 1, ... , n - 1, and the
winner is the alternative receiving the largest total number of marks (Fishburn,
1971 ).
Also often used is the majority decision rule, or the Condorcet rule (Fishburn,
1971, 1973). According to this rule, an alternative with a strict simple majority
over each of the other alternatives should be the social choice. This rule requires
that the alternatives be compared pairwise in order to determine the majority
winner in each case.
Formulations with Cardinal Data
The additive social welfare function defined on cardinal utility function values can
be written in the general form
10
C(tk ) = L Aiui(tk)'
i=l
(17.2)
where tkeT denotes a particular trajectory pair, and Ai is a weighting factor for the
ith science team. Alternate sets of sufficient conditions for an additive social
welfare function have been given by Harsanyi (1955) and Keeney and Kirkwood
(1976). We found these conditions to be pursuasive in our case, so the additive
form (17.2) was used in the analysis.
There still remains the difficult problem of making interteam utility compari-
sons. To do this requires consideration of the related issues of interteam normaliza-
tion through the scaling of each science team's utility function and the choice of
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the Ai's, the weighting factors. Discussions of the practical importance of making
interpersonal (interteam) utility judgments are provided by Rapoport (1975) and
Shapley and Shubik (1974).
First let us consider the problem of interteam normalization. Suppose we
arbitrarily scale each ui so that
and
maximum Ui(th) = 1.0
thET
minimum Ui(th) = 0.0
thET
(17.3)
(17.4)
where f* and t~ solve (17.3) and (17.4), respectively. Ideally, we would like the
"utility differences" between ui == 1.0 and ui == 0.0 to be the same for each team
(see Suppes and Winet, 1955). This means that we must explicitly recognize the
magnitudes or intensities of the anticipated gains or losses in preference. This
might be partially accomplished by ensuring that the trajectory pairs f* and
t~, respectively, determine similar consequences for each team.
A similar consequence for ui(f*) could be created by using the same strategy
employed in the definition of the status quo point for the Nash bargaining model.
That is, a "no-data" trajectory pair could be included in T. This no-data pair would
obviously be considered the worst alternative (t~) by each team.
It is more difficult to ensure that the consequence associated with t i* is the
same for each team, since the feasible trajectory pairs are constrained by tech-
nological and astrodynamic considerations. However, by allowing each team to
suggest trajectory pairs for inclusion in T, we can guarantee that there is at least one
pair th € T that is "very good" for team i, since experiments that would be incom-
patible with the mission constraints were eliminated from consideration in the
early phases of the mission design. To this extent, an attempt can be made to equate
the magnitude of the preference difference between f* and t~ for each team.
The Ai,S can be chosen to compensate for imbalances in the perceived magnitudes
of the preference differences in similarly scaled u i functions. However, we have
chosen a scaling procedure for the ui,s that should eliminate any such imbalances.
The Ai,S can also be used to ensure that the preferences of some teams are favored
over those of others because their associated experiments are "more important."
Neither NASA nor the scientists would claim that the different science investi-
gations are "equally valuable." Great differences actually exist among the resources
(dollars, weight, and power) allocated to the various science investigations, which
implies differences in value. However, the task of specifying differential weighting
factors, Ai,s, would be an extremely divisive one for the group (the SSG). One of
the guidelines for the trajectory selection process explicitly stated by the Project
Manager was that it should not create dissension among the members of the SSG.
The SSG preferred to assume that all of the experiments were equal, implying that
Ai ==">J for all teams i and j. Clearly, any differential weights would have to be
assigned by the Project Manager in his role as a benevolent dictator.
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A Critique
The difficulties with the rank sum and majority decision rules based on ordinal
data are well known. To summarize briefly, the results of using the rank sum rule
can be modified by irrelevant alternatives. The application of the majority decision
rule does not always provide a weak ordering due to cyclic results. Neither of
these rules considers the strength of preference of individuals. For further dis-
cussion, see Sen (1970) or Fishburn (1971).
The advantages of these two rules are that they are easy to understand and
easy to operationalize. Ranking of alternatives is relatively easy and noncontro-
versial task, even for science teams considering such complex alternatives as
trajectory pairs.
The conditions justifying the additive social welfare function based on cardinal
data are theoretically appealing. The difficulty lies in operationalizing the collective
choice rule. The first concern is the appropriate choice of the scaling procedure for
the individual utility functions (the ui,s) and the related issue of selecting the
weights (the Xi,S).
In the trajectory selection problem, the choice of ti* and t~ attempts to provide
a scaling of the ui,s with approximately equal magnitudes of preference difference
for each team. However, the SSG prefers to assume that all of the Xi,S are equal to
avoid the difficult problem of specifying unequal weights, even though the scientists
would not actually claim that the experiments are "equally valuable." The Project
Manager would be reluctant to assign unequal Xi weights because of the supporting
relationship between the scientists and the Project.
Another concern is the possibility that the individual team utility functions are
erroneous. This could result from errors caused by a difficulty in understanding the
cardinal utility function assessment procedure, by a lack of effort in accurately
evaluating the candidate trajectory pairs, or by deliberate misrepresentation of
preferences in an attempt to influence the results.
17.2.3 A SINGLE·DECISION-MAKER PROBLEM WITH MULTIPLE ATTRIBUTES
When does a "benevolent dictator" become a single decision-maker treating the
utility functions of individuals as attributes? The difference between these two
cases is not substantial.
In the trajectory selection problem, the Project Manager may agree that the
evaluation process should be based on the preferences of the scientists. However,
this need only imply that these preferences are the appropriate criteria on which
he should base his decision, not that the scientists should actually make the
decision. After all, the final responsibility for the selection of the trajectory pair
is his, so it also seems appropriate to expect him to make the decision.
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Formulation
Since the Project Manager views the preferences of the science teams as the appro-
priate criteria for his decision, the set of relevant consequences is not the set of
feasible trajectory pairs T. Rather, it is identical to the restricted bargaining set of
the "payoff vectors" u = (u 1, •• • , u1<>:J associated with the trajectory pairs in T.
Various forms of multiattributed utility functions have been proposed (e.g.,
see Fishburn, 1974; Keeney, 1974; and Farquhar, 1975), but the simplest form
to operationalize is additively separable in the criteria. For the trajectory selection
problem, such a utility function may be written as
(17.5)
where Vi(u i ) is a utility function of the Project Manager defined on the utility
function of science team i.
Debreu (1960) presents conditions that permit the use of the additively sep-
arable utility model under certainty. However, the associated assessment procedures
are cumbersome. We prefer to justify (17.5) on the basis of Fishburn's "marginality
conditions" (Fishburn, 1970), which allow the additive utility function to be
written in the convenient form
(17.6)
where fi(Ui) is a utility function scaled from 0 to 1 and Ai is a scaling factor or
"weight" for the ith criterion.
Note that if Vi in (17.5) or l in (17.6) is a positive linear transformation of
ui , then (17.5) or (17.6) is equivalent to the additive social welfare function (17.2).
Therefore, we would expect the conditions justifying (17.5) and (17.6) to be very
similar to those which justify (17.2), and that is indeed the case.
Fishburn (1970) has shown that v(ul, . .. , u1<>:J may be evaluated by an additive
utility function if the desirability of any lottery from the viewpoint of the Project
Manager depends only on the marginal probability distributions of the ui,s and not
on their joint probability distributions. That is, if the marginal probability distri-
butions for each ui are identical in two different lotteries, then the decision maker
must be indifferent between the two lotteries.
If the marginal probability distributions for ui are the same in two lotteries, then
the expected value of ui is the same for the two lotteries. Since ui is the utility
function of the ith science team, that science team would also be indifferent
between the two lotteries. This marginality requirement is satisfied if the decision
maker subscribes to the following condition: if two alternatives are indifferent from
the standpoint ofeach individual, then they are indifferent for the group as a whole.
Harsanyi (1955) uses this condition, plus the assumptions that the social welfare
function and the utility function of the science teams obey the von Newmann-
Morgenstern axioms of utility theory, to obtain a linear social welfare function
(17.2).
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Using the convenient additive form (17.6), if fi is not a positive linear trans-
formation of ui , then the Project Manager may take decisions that are not con-
sistent with the preferences of the science teams. On the basis of our previous
arguments, this may seem undesirable. However, there may be instances in which
the Project Manager might wish to impose such transformations.
The ui function reported by the ith science team may not accurately reflect
its preferences because of deliberate or unrecognized errors. The Project Manager
may choose to adjust the reported values [imposing some function fi(U i )] so that
the results are more consistent with his own expectations and beliefs. In such a
case, fi(u i) will be a surrogate for the "theoretical ui ." Alternatively, the Project
Manager may choose to modify the ui reported by a team because he considers
their implied level of risk aversion to be unacceptable, even though he believes it
faithfully represents the actual preferences of science team i.
The problem of specifying the values of the Xi,S is the same as if (17 .6) were the
additive social welfare function.
A Critique
The major concern with this viewpoint of the trajectory selection problem as a
multiattribute problem is the Project Manager's reluctance to take an active role
in the decision process. He would prefer to have the recommendation of the
trajectory pair made by the scientists. However, he may wish to maintain the
option of modifying the utility functions reported by the teams [define fi(u i)]
or of assigning the weights (the Xi,s) in some instances.
To see some implications of the additive formulation, suppose that there are
only two science teams on the Project. The additive formulation (17.5) implies
that the Project Manager would be indifferent between a 50-50 chance of either
u 1 = 1 and u2 = a or u1 = a and u2 = 1, and a 50-50 chance of either u1 = 1 and
u2 = 1 or u 1 = a and u2 = O. That is, he would be indifferent between launching
the mission knowing that one of his experiments would fail and the other would
work perfectly and launching the mission with a 50-50 chance that both experi-
ments would work perfectly.
In discussions of social choice, it is often suggested that the latter alternative
"should" be preferred since it is more equitable: both science teams receive the
same result. In the case of the trajectory selection problem, it seems more likely
that the Project Manager would prefer the former alternative, which at least
guarantees some success on the mission. Thus, in certain situations, the additive
model may not be appropriate, and one would need to revert to an alternative
model, perhaps of the form of Keeney's multiplicative utility formulation (1974).
17.2.4 THE CHOICE OF THE ALTERNAnVE FORMULAnONS
The purpose of an analysis is seldom to determine a solution. Rather, the purpose
is to provide information to the decision maker. Thus, there may be no compelling
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reason to select one of these alternative formulations as the appropriate one for
the trajectory selection problem, or to be concerned if several formulations pro-
duce different rankings of the alternatives. As we have seen, each of these fonnu-
lations is based on a set of assumptions that supports one viewpoint of this complex
problem, but no single formulation is compatible simultaneously with the richness
of viewpoints associated with a complex, real-world problem involving many
individuals.
Shapley and Shubik (i 971) note that numerous solution concepts have been
proposed for n-person games by many different authors.
Each solution, in its own fashion, seeks to probe into some aspect of societal
rationality - Le., the possible, proposed, or predicted behavior of rational indi-
viduals in mutual interaction. But all of them have to make serious compromises.
Inevitably, it seems, sharp predictions or prescriptions can be had only at the
expense of severely specialized assumptions about the customs or institutions of
the "society" being molded. The many intuitively desirable properties that a
solution ought to have, taken together, prove to be logically incompatible. A com-
pletely satisfying solution is rarely obtained by any single method of attack on a
multiperson competitive situation....
In this spirit, we selected nine different collective choice rules for use in the analysis
of the trajectory selection problem for the MJSn Project. Each of these collective
choice rules is compatible with one or more of the alternative viewpoints of this
problem, and each alternative viewpoint is represented by at least one rule.
17.3 THE MJSn TRAJECTORY SELECTION PROCESS
The trajectory selection process required the JPL engineers to develop, in collabor-
ation with the science teams, a large set of trajectories that spanned the range of
scientifically attractive alternatives. Through negotiations within the SSG, 32
candidate trajectory pairs were selected and presented to the science teams for
evaluation. The evaluations by the science teams were then analyzed by JPL within
the context of the alternative theoretical formulations presented in the preceding
section. The science team evaluations and the results of the analysis were then
presented to the SSG at a meeting on October 22 and 23,1973. The final trajectory
recommendation was made by the SSG and approved by the Project Manager.
17.3.1 THE SCIENCE TEAM EVALUATIONS
As the first step in the trajectory pair evaluation, the science teams were requested
to rank, in order of decreasing preference, the set T of 32 candidate trajectory pairs.
The next part of the instructions presented the procedure for determining the
preferences of the science teams on a cardinal scale of measurement. This cardinal-
ization was attained through the use of von Neumann-Morgenstern lotteries (von
Neumann and Morgenstern, 1947).
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The utility function values were generated in a two-step process. For the cardinal-
ization of preferences between trajectory pairs, each trajectory pair tk was com-
pared to a lottery between the most preferred and least preferred trajectory pairs.
The ith science team was requested to assign a probability number p~ such that it
was indifferent between the certain receipt of the trajectory pair tk and the lottery
that yielded its most preferred trajectory pair t h with probability p~ or its least
preferred trajectory pair dwith probability I - p~. In this manner, each of the 10
science teams generated 32 probability numbers p~, one for each of the 32 trajec-
tory pairs.
As we have noted. the additive collective choice rule requires that interteam
utility comparisons be made. To accomplish this, the utility scales need to be
adjusted to compensate for differences in the relative strength of preference between
the least preferred trajectory pair and the most preferred trajectory pair for each
team.
For this normalization, each of the science teams was requested to state a
probability number pi such that it was indifferent between the certain receipt of
its least preferred trajectory pair d and the lottery that yielded its most preferred
trajectory pair ti* with probability pi or a no-data trajectory pair t* with probability
I - pi. In the instructions, the no-data trajectory pair t* was called the "Atlantic
Ocean Special," in remembrance of the flight of Mariner 8, which terminated
abruptly in the Atlantic Ocean.
By setting Ui(ti*) = 1.0 and ui(t*) = 0.0, the teams obtain ui(d) = pi. The
formula for calculating the utility function values for the trajectory pairs thus
becomes
Ui(t~) = p~ + (1 - p~) pi.
This two-step process was used to generate the utility function values because
of a concern that some science teams would be so risk-averse to a lottery with the
no-data trajectory pair that either these science teams would be unable to dis-
criminate among the trajectory pairs intermediate in preference, or they would
refuse to participate in the lottery process. This concern was well founded, as the
subsequent analysis will show.
The no-data trajectory pair was also identit1ed as the status quo point in the
Nash bargaining model formulation of the trajectory selection problem. Therefore,
this normalization also provides utility function values that can be used in the
multiplicative collective choice model.
The science teams were given approximately 1 month to carry out this pro-
cedure. The ordinal rankings and the cardinal utility function values that resulted
are shown in Table 17.1. The acronyms at the tops of the columns identify the
ten science teams, which are described in Dyer and Miles (1976,1977).
Several science teams were extremely risk-averse. The MJS77 Project will last
about 10 years and may be the only foreseeable opportunity for some of these
scientists to be involved in a planetary mission. Given this situation, it was very
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difficult for them to consider the no-data trajectory pair with a significant, nonzero
probability.
The very low utility function values assigned to the least preferred trajectory
pairs could be explained as a conscious attempt to bias the results of the analysis.
The science teams recognized that the maximum effect on the collective choice
rules could be obtained by biasing these utility assignments downward. By spread-
ing the utility function values for the candidate trajectory pairs over the entire
range of [0.0, 1.0] rather than, say, over [0.8, 1.0] , a science team would obviously
have more influence on a multiplicative collective choice rule. In retrospect, it
probably was not appropriate to request the science teams to evaluate the normali-
zation lottery, thus in effect handicapping themselves.
17.3.2 THE COLLECTIVE CHOICE ANAL YSIS
After the trajectory pair evaluation data had been received from all ten of the
science teams, a collective choice analysis was performed at JPL. One of the
principal issues of concern was the interteam normalization procedure. Because of
this concern, two other normalization procedures were used to test the sensitivity
of the alternative formulations to the utility function values assigned to the least
preferred trajectory pairs. The second normalization procedure linearly transformed
the utility function values of each science team as shown in Table 17.1 into the
range [0.0, 1.0] , where the value 0.0 was assigned to the least preferred trajectory
pair. The third normalization procedure linearly transformed the utility function
values ofeach science team for the 32 candidate trajectory pairs into a range assigned
by the Project Scientist (who is responsible for coordinating the efforts of the
scientists), based on his assessment of the appropriateness of the least preferred
trajectory pair for each science investigation. The Project Scientist assigned the
range [0.6, 1.0] to the science teams whose experiments emphasize data collected
during encounters, and the range [0.8, 1.0] to the science teams with both cruise
and encounter objectives.
The first transformation eliminated the possible errors introduced by the difficult
normalization lottery but made the case for an unequal specification of the Ai
weights more compelling if the results were to be used in an additive collective
choice model. There was no longer any reason to believe that the magnitude of the
preference difference for each team was adequately reflected in the utility function
values. In the second transformation, the Project Scientist was actually imposing
a nonlinear fi transfonnation of the ui functions, since the utility function value
of the no-data trajectory was left at 0.0 for each team. This manipulation of the ui
values is justified by the formulation as a single-decision-maker problem with
multiple attributes (17.6). It should be noted that the Project Manager delegated
the task of manipulating the ui values to the Project Scientist, who was more
familiar with the technical aspects of each experiment.
Another issue was the choice of the weighting factor Ai for each science team in
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the additive collective choice rules. Two sets of weighting factors were used: equal
weights of 'Ai = 1.0 for all science teams; and 'Ai = 2.0 for the encounter-oriented
science teams and 'Ai = 1.0 for the other science teams. Both sets were readily
accepted by the SSG as representative weighting factors for a sensitivity analysis.
The results of the analysis with the various collective choice rules are presented
in Table 17.2 for the ten trajectory pairs ranked highest by the rank sum collective
choice rule. The collective choice rules were scaled to yield values in the range [0.0,
1.0] for ease of comparison. All of the collective choice rules would assign a value
of 1.0 to a trajectory pair that was evaluated as the most preferred trajectory pair
by every science team.
The trajectory pair rankings by the rank sum rule are shown in the first data
column of Table 17.2, with the values in the second column being the mean ranks
of the science teams linearly transformed into the range [1/32, 1.0] , with 1.0 most
preferred. The next six collective choice rules are based on the additive form ~
(17.2) or (17.6) - with the two weighting factor sets times the three normali-
zation procedures accounting for these six data columns. Finally, the last two
collective choice rules are based on the multiplicative rule (17.1), with the no-data
trajectory pair taken as the status quo alternative. The two multiplicative rules
differ in that the utility function values for one rule are linearly scaled upward from
ui(ti) = pi as assigned by the science teams, and for the second rule from ui(tI) = 0.6
or 0.8 as assigned by the Project Scientist.
The majority decision rule was not included in the IPL analysis because of
concern that cyclic results might be obtained. The application of the majority
decision rule to the ten trajectory pairs ranked highest by the rank sum rule pre-
served acyclicity but did result in two ties, thus fonning the following ordering:
(26)- {29, 27, 31} >- 25>- 5>- 8 >- 35 >- 17 >-10) with 29 - 27, 27 - 31, and
29 >- 31. The trajectory pairs ranked in the top four by the majority decision rule
were ranked in the top four by all the collective choice rules of Table 17.2.
The data in Table 17.2 do indicate a substantial agreement among the nine
collective choice rules presented there. This is partially fortuitous; partially a result
of the science selection process of NASA, which emphasized compatibility as a
major criterion; and also partially a result of the statistical properties of these
rules. All the collective choice rules could be expected to be highly correlated on a
statistical basis. Sums and products of random variables are highly correlated, even
if the random variables are independent and unifonnly distributed over their
domain.
The results in Table 17.2 can be used to illustrate some of the limitations of
these collective choice rules in practical applications. For example, trajectory pair
29 has a higher rank sum value than trajectory pair 26. However, if trajectory pair
10 had been omitted from the analysis, this relationship would have been reversed,
demonstrating the dependence of this rule on irrelevant alternatives. (This can be
calculated from the data in Table 17.3, in the following section.) Similarly,
trajectory pair 26 is ranked first by the additive collective choice rule when the
interteam nonnalization strategy based on the no-data trajectory pair and equal
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Ai weights are used, but it falls to second when the normalization strategy is
changed, or when the unequal (1.0 or 2.0) weighting factors are used. Finally,
rescaling the utility function values, so that ui(d) = 0.6 or 0.8, is equivalent to
changing the status quo point in the multiplicative rule. The sensitivity of the
resulting solution to this change is evidenced by trajectory pair 10, which is ranked
only fourteenth by this collective choice rule when ui(d) = PI but is ranked fifth
when ui(d) = 0.6 or 0.8.
17.3.3 THE SCIENCE STEERING GROUP MEETING
Following the science team evaluation and the IPL analysis of the candidate trajec-
tory pairs, the SSG addressed the selection of the preferred trajectory pair at the
SSG meeting of October 22-23, 1973. Initial discussions clarified the trajectory
requirements of the individual science teams. However, no rationale emerged for
trading off incompatible requirements, and no means was found for moving from
the general trajectory requirements to the selection of a specific trajectory pair.
At this point, the SSG requested that IPL present the collective choice analysis,
which is summarized in Tables 17.2 and 17.3. Table 17.3 shows the science team
ordinal rankings for the ten trajectory pairs ranked highest by the rank sum collec-
tive choice rule.
Two observations that can be made from Tables 17.2 and 17.3 are of primary
importance. First, trajectory pairs 31, 29, and 26 are ranked as the top three by
all the collective choice rules. In the ensuing discussion, the majority of the SSG
expressed a preference for one of these three trajectory pairs. Second, the Radio
Science Team (RSS) considered any trajectory pair ranked high by the collective
choice rules to be undesirable.
TABLE 17.3 Science Team Ordinal Rankings for Preferred Trajectory Pairs
Collective Choice
Ranking
Additive
Trajec- uiU[)
Science Team Ordinal Rankingstory Rank =.pl;
Pairs Sum AI = 1.0 RSS IRIS ISS PPS UVS CRS LECP MAG PLS PRA
31 1 2 20.5 3.0 5.0 8.5 6.0 8.0 4.0 3.0 4.0 5.0
29 2 3 20.5 5.0 19.0 6.5 9.0 3.0 2.0 2.0 4.0 4.0
26 3 1 20.5 2.0 10.0 11.0 7.0 17.5 3.0 1.0 1.5 2.0
27 4 4 20.5 1.0 30.0 16.0 3.0 17.5 1.0 4.0 4.0 3.0
5 5 6 20.5 9.0 28.5 17.0 4.0 13.0 6.0 6.0 1.5 6.0
25 6 5 20.5 7.0 28.5 25.0 9.0 1.0 5.0 5.0 11.0 1.0
35 7 7 20.5 21.0 2.0 2.0 13.5 13.0 12.0 9.0 17.5 10.0
17 8 10 20.5 4.0 13.5 6.5 13.5 24.5 9.0 14.0 17.5 8.0
8 9 8 20.5 20.0 10.0 5.0 13.5 21.0 11.0 7.0 17.5 9.0
10 10 12 3.0 11.0 24.0 8.5 19.5 2.0 20.0 24.0 17.5 7.0
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The team leader of the Imaging Science Investigation (ISS) expressed a dislike
for trajectory pair 29, to which the team had assigned an ordinal ranking of 19 and
a utility function value of 0.770, but he indicated that either trajectory pair 31 or
26 would be acceptable (utility function values of 0.940 and 0.900). The team
leader of the Cosmic Ray Investigation (CRS) stated that they could accept
trajectory pair 26, which, even though ordinally ranked at 17.5, was given a utility
function value of 0.870 (compared to 0.900 for trajectory pair 31). The team
leader of the Radio Science Investigation expressed a preference for trajectory
pair 26 over trajectory pair 31. (One member of the SSG immediately observed
that the Radio Science Team should have expressed this preference in their ordinal
rankings and utility function values.) The other team leaders expressed their satis-
faction with either trajectory pair 31 or 26.
On the basis of this discussion, trajectory pair 26 was tentatively selected as the
science-preferred trajectory pair. The JPL trajectory analysts worked that night to
improve the geometry of trajectory pair 26 for the Radio Science Investigation
team without degrading the features of the trajectories that appealed to the other
science teams. This analysis was presented to the SSG the following morning and
met with approval. The modified version of trajectory pair 26 was approved by
the Project Manager and was documented as the MJS77 "Standard Trajectories"
(Beerer et al., 1974). The two trajectories were labeled JSI and JSG, where JS
stands for Jupiter/Saturn, and I and G stand for Jupiter's satellites 10 and
Ganymede, which are encountered on the corresponding trajectories.
17.4 CONCLUSIONS
The trajectory selection process was successful in that it led to a decision generally
acceptable to all of the science teams. This success was due to a number of factors.
By means of the mission constraints imposed on the trajectory design, it was possible
to separate programmatic issues from the science issues. Thus the science teams
could be asked to evaluate the trajectory pairs solely on the basis of their scientific
merits. Another important factor was that compatible alternatives actually existed
- this is partially fortuitous but more strongly a result of the detailed project plan-
ning and coordinated science investigation selection process. The collective choice
rules were in general agreement, reflecting this compatibility.
The science teams willingly participated in the trajectory selection process
because they recognized that it was necessary that they understand the trajectory
alternatives and develop their science investigation requirements, and they recog-
nized that if a consensus could be reached among the science teams, the Project
Manager would accept their recommendation as the Project standard trajectory pair.
Also, the science teams had participated in the generation of the trajectory pairs,
and the set of candidate trajectory pairs contained at least one trajectory pair that
was considered very good by each science team.
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Clearly, the ordinal rankings of the trajectory pairs by the science teams were
essential to the selection process. These ordinal rankings and the rank sum col1ec-
tive choice rule probably would have been sufficient to identify either trajectory
pair 26 or 31 as the science-preferred trajectory pair. Nevertheless, we conclude
that the cardinal utility evaluation by the science teams and the use of nine collec-
tive choice rules based on three different viewpoints of the problem were an im-
portant part of the selection process. The cardinal utility evaluation aided the
selection among trajectory pairs 26, 29, and 31; it tested the analysis for sensitivity
to strength of preference not revealed by the ordinal rankings; and it pennitted
the use of a wider range of alternative assumptions in the analysis. The use of
alternative formulations from three different viewpoints ensured that the solution
was not particularly sensitive to some specialized assumption associated with any
one of them.
Could the selected trajectory pair have been identified without the formalities
of the decision analysis? The science teams generally believed that the same
trajectory pair would have been selected without the development of the ordinal
rankings and the utility function values [see Dyer and Miles (1976) for an extended
discussion]. While there is no definitive answer to this question, there are two
indications that it would not have been. First, the SSG was given several oppor-
tunities to identify a science-preferred trajectory pair, and it did not do so. Second,
the Project and the science teams earlier had been working with a trajectory pair
developed during the preceding year. It had been assumed that this earlier trajectory
pair was quite satisfactory, and it could have been expected to rank high among the
other alternatives. This earlier trajectory pair was included on the candidate list as
trajectory pair 20. It was most surprising to fmd that trajectory pair 20 was ranked
twenty-eighth by the rank sum col1ective choice rule.
In summary, the methodology presented in this paper did provide a suitable
framework for each science team to assess its preferences and a means of communi-
cating these preferences to the other science teams. The science teams were then
able to arrive at a consensus in an effective manner and to recommend to the
Project a science-preferred trajectory pair that was subsequently implemented as
the Project standard trajectory pair.
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DISCUSSION
ZIONTS: Vou started with 105 single trajectories. How did you get from this to
the 32 trajectory pairs? Are there any dominance considerations in the ratings?
DYER: Since you can't launch two spacecraft within 2 weeks from the same
launch pad, not all combinations are possible. This certainly helped the IPL rep-
resentatives, who picked 40 trajectory pairs and presented them to the scientists.
The scientists threw out something like 10 or 12 of those 40 and added 6 more.
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The process was repeated until every science team felt that several trajectory pairs
in the set were desirable.
ZIONTS: What about the 32? Were there no cases of dominance?
DYER: Ves, there were. However, we analysts did not try to go through and
say we were excluding pairs at all. We were sensitive to the notion that the scientists
should do that. Even if there was dominance in terms of the information that they
had given us, we did not want to throw anything out.
TVERSKY: It seems to me that the analysis was quite effective in helping this
community to exploit consensus or to reach a satisfactory decision. I'd say that it
may not have been maximally effective from the standpoint of changing their way
of thinking about the problem. This, I think, is probably a consequence of the fact
that you accepted the scientific teams' basic attributes rather than trying to re-
structure the problem in terms of the real attributes involved. It is very unlikely
that, if you were to analyze the dimensionality of the structure of the information
to be obtained from such a mission, it would correspond exactly with the number
of teams involved. My comment is not meant, of course, as a criticism of the
analysis. It just seems that most of the effort went into devising and ranking alter-
native schemes rather than into thinking about the value dimensions that were
involved.
DYER: Vour point is a good one. I am certainly not convinced that the selected
trajectory pair was best in the sense of science value, whatever that means. I think
some sort of a multiattribute analysis would have been more appropriate. It was
our opinion that we could not have done such an analysis. Our judgment was that
the teams did not like talking about the objectives of their experiments. When we
tried it, they would make comments like, "We have not been up there before, and
we have to get there before we know what we want to do."
TVERSKY: My second question has to do with the use oflotteries in this case.
I think that it might well be argued that you really do not want to bring in lotteries,
particularly if you do not deal with the underlying value dimension but with the
team. Perhaps some kind of trade-off technique would be more appropriate than
introducing uncertainty as was done in these assessments. It seems to me that the
key criterion is whether there is a genuine uncertainty in the environment.
DYER: In practice, teams used different procedures. Some teams assigned
numbers directly, and one team even evolved their own so-called value functions,
which they used to generate their rankings.
MEYER: First of all, I'd like to emphasize some points that Dr. Tversky has
already made. If you do want to ask lotteries over the range from the worst to the
best point, then you should reflect the uncertainty of the real problem. If there
is indeed a substantial chance of the mission somehow going astray and no informa-
tion coming to the science teams, then that is a reasonable lower position for
gambles stakes. If there is no substantial chance or if the teams are not willing to
admit psychologically that there is a substantial chance, then that is not a proper
range for gambles. The range of the gamble has to correspond with the range of
outcomes that they consider likely.
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DYER: I agree with that. The Atlantic Ocean Special is a real possibility for this
mission ;it has occurred before. My more serious concern was that what was reflected
in the responses to the gambles had very little to do with the notion of the value of
the trajectory pair. I think they were very much influenced by personal desires to
be involved in the space flight. I think this is particularly exhibited with those
extremely risk-averse responses. We were getting away from what we really wanted,
which was an evaluation of trajectory pairs based on how good it was for the
experiment.
MEYER: Your problem might have been quite different if some of the trajectory
pairs had been much more risky, in the sense of chances of successfully completing
the mission, than others. If that had been the case, then the Atlantic Ocean alterna-
tive would have been a real alternative and you would probably not have seen all
these effects.
I am also disturbed about the arbitrariness of scaling that is implied by choosing
the zero point in the way you did. Did you consider asking the different teams to
identify an equal-value alternative that might be defined as follows? You bring all
the teams together with the mission director and try to reach a consensus about one
set of outcomes in which they feel they are all being treated fairly. To do this, each
of the teams could pick one alternative that they consider to be as good for them
as another alternative for the other teams. If you could have done that - I am not
saying you could have - then you could presumably infer from that what the
scaling on the teams' utility functions should be.
DYER: I don't think that could be done. It's a nice idea, but the scientists on
each team felt that they were the only people who really understood their experi-
ment. The teams would have strongly objected to such an approach.
RAIFFA: That's a nice scheme to do, and I have done arbitration schemes like
that. But once the people know that procedure, there is a great deal of motivation
to be dishonest about their preferences. I have done experiments in the laboratory
where we go through bargaining processes. If you tell the subjects what the process
is, they will sometimes figure out the optimal way to exaggerate their beliefs, in
order to win their point of view. I don't know of any procedures in these group
problems that can prove that the optimal procedure is to tell the truth, but if you
give a very, very complicated rule and then ask people for their beliefs, they cannot
easily figure out how to subvert the analysis. In fact, most of the subjects that I have
been involved with simply decide that the easiest thing to do is to tell the truth.
DYER: I think we saw examples of both types of behavior. We did see some
gaming, whereas some assessments were done very honestly, in my opinion. In one
case, the RSS team assigned nonzero utilities to only six trajectory pairs. Since
none of those six trajectory pairs was well received by the other nine teams, these
six pairs were in effect left out of the analysis. Hence, RSS had essentially no
impact on the analysis.
EDWARDS: Since there are, in fact, two distinct portions of this mission, the
Jupiter passage and the Saturn passage, it might have been that different groups had
very different models of these two portions of the mission. Some of the scaling
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problems might have been easier if you had scaled the merits of those two portions
of the mission separately. Then by taking a simple additive rule or something of the
sort, you might have been able to avoid some of the zero-point problems.
DYER: I agree with you, and I think it would have been worthwhile to do that.
After talking to the representatives of the scientists, I was convinced that there was
probably no simple rule for combining preferences for the trajectories. Saturn and
Jupiter are both unexplored bodies and are similar in terms of physical properties,
so the data collected about one affects the feelings of the scientists about data
collected from the other. What the scientists did seem to think would be reasonable,
and perhaps we could have done it, was to consider the planets together as one unit
and their satellites together as another.
LUCE: Along the same lines, what about assigning utilities to each of the two
single trajectories and then adding?
DYER: Again, I don't think there would be any simple rule for combining the
utilities of the individual trajectories, because what one trajectory achieves very
much affects one's feelings about the other. If the first trajectory collects data A,
the scientific value of collecting those same data with the second trajectory is
greatly diminished.
EDWARDS: When I have worried about classes of problems of this general
flavor, I have always found myself starting off with the goal of picking a good
solution and ending up by picking a lot of bad ones. And I have come to wonder
whether maybe that does not represent a good technique. You certainly did, in
fact, end up by picking a lot of bad ones to eliminate by techniques of varying
degrees of formality. What might have happened and how might your respondents
have reacted if you had defined the problem along those lines from the beginning?
DYER: I don't know, but I think the scaling we used is consistent with the way
they like to think about the problem.
EDWARDS: There is another possible advantage of that approach - it would
not cause the same kind of problems that gaming the system causes here. Once you
got rid of all the poor alternatives, you could allow anyone of a wide variety of
bargaining systems to be used among the participants and still feel reasonably con-
fident that what was going to come out would be acceptable.
KEENEY: After you showed the analysis to the teams, did they have an oppor-
tunity to design a few new trajectory pairs that seemed better than any of the 32
originally generated? I think this would be quite important and interesting.
DYER: On the basis of our analysis, trajectory pair 26 was tentatively selected
by the scientists as the preferred pair. The IPL trajectory analysts worked all night
to generate 11 new trajectory pairs that were very similar to pair 26 but had better
features for the RSS team near Saturn. These were presented to the scientists the
next morning, and, after 3 hours of discussion, one of these was identified as pre-
ferred. The IPL analysts used the comments at this meeting to refine this pair even
further before it was finally adopted.
18 A Decision Analysis ofObjectives for a
Forest Pest Problem
David E. Bell
This paper describes an attempt to determine and quantify preferences for a forest
region in New Brunswick, Canada. The forest is subject to outbreaks of the spruce
budworm, a pest that does great damage to the trees and thus to the logging in-
dustry, which is a major part of the economy of the province. DDT has been
sprayed so extensively for the past 20 years that if the spraying were to stop, an
extensive outbreak would be expected. The Ecological and Environmental Systems
Project at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) was
using a detailed simulation model of the forest to examine possible strategies for
handling the pest (see Holling et al., 1974), and the IIASA methodology project
was contributing to the study by creating a dynamic programming optimization
algorithm (Winkler, 1975). The study outlined here started when I attended a joint
meeting of these two projects together with some experts from the Canadian
Forestry Commission. The purpose of the meeting was to establish an objective
function for the optimization model by fitting values of Ci to the linear formula
C\ (egg density) + c2(stress)\ + c3(proportion of old trees)
+ c4(proportion of new trees). (18.1)
I am grateful for the contributions of many of my colleagues to the work described in this
paper, in particular to Bill Clark, with whom I spent many hours, not only on matters of
specific assessment but also in discussing ways to make decision analysis more applicable to
ecological problems and in philosophizing about the "time problem," the question of how to
assess preferences over time. Professor C.S. Holling, the leader of lIASA's ecology project, spent
days clarifying questions on the model and making seemingly endless lists of possible indicators
for our, then still unnamed, decision maker to study. I am grateful to George Dantzig for his
encouragement and meticulous reading of an earlier draft of this paper and to Ralph Keeney
both for introducing me to the subject of decision analysis and for the many stimulating dis-
cussions that we have had on this project and other topics since.
\ Stress is a measure of the health of the trees judged by the amount of defoliation in current
and previous years caused by the budworm.
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This disturbed me for two reasons. First, they did not appear to have a very accu-
rate way of arriving at the parameters. Second, they seemed concerned only with
monetary gains and losses to the logging industry - I had always supposed that
IIASA's ecology project was also concerned with protection of wildlife and scenery.
I began this study with two aims:
• To derive the parameters Ci for the optimization model by different means as
a comparison
• To discover the true preferences of the members of the ecology project re-
garding trade-offs between profits, wildlife, and the environment
This paper describes my progress over the next 18 months toward achieving
these aims. In performing the analysis, inevitably many mistakes were made, and if
I were to analyze a similar study now, I would do a great many things differently.
However, I have chosen to describe here what actually happened rather than to
serve up a neat exposition of decision analysis at its best. It should be borne in
mind that this study was not planned in detail; rather, it developed on a week-by-
week basis and was subject to constant interruptions, including two 6-month
separations of analyst and decision maker.
The benefits of this sort of presentation, I hope, are that, on the one hand, a
number of theoretical issues are raised to which some attention should be paid and,
on the other, potential analysts who may feel daunted by the imposing literature on
decision analysis may be encouraged to give it a try themselves.
In order to keep the paper to a reasonable length, many of the decision analysis
concepts used - such as value function, utility function, and various independence
assumptions - are described rather cursorily, and the reader who is not well ac-
quainted with their definitions should consult Raiffa (1969) or Keeney and Raiffa
(1976).
18.1 PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS
I began by asking five of the conference participants (three from IIASA and two
from the Canadian Forestry Commission) to rank a list of states of the forest,
exhibited in Table 18.1, by preference; after they had done this, I asked them to
give a value of 0 to 100 to each state, indicating its "worth." They were to rank
the list by taking any pair of forest states (summarized by the five data points)
and decide which state they would prefer the forest to be in, assuming that from
then on man was left to manage it in any way he could. The value they gave to
each state could be derived by any reasoning they wished; the only requirement
was that the ordering of preferences and of values be the same.
I then used a statistical software package to obtain regression coefficients
391
TABLE 18.1 Forest States
Proportion of Proportion of
Forest Proportion of Medium-Age Old Egg
State Young Trees Trees Trees Stress Density
1 0.10 0.30 0.60 0 0.3
2 0.15 0.35 0.50 0 0.6
3 0.10 0.40 0.50 0 0.5
4 0.20 0.50 0.30 20 1.0
5 0.10 0.30 0.60 10 0.1
6 0.10 0.30 0.60 40 0.1
7 0.10 0.40 0.50 0 0.5
8 0.15 0.35 0.50 0 0.6
9 0.50 0.10 0.40 0 2.0
10 0.20 0.50 0.30 20 1.0
11 0.20 0.20 0.60 20 10
12 0.10 0.30 0.60 50 10
13 0.20 0.30 0.50 20 10
14 0.20 0.30 0.50 50 10
15 0.20 0.40 0.40 20 10
16 0.20 0.40 0.40 50 10
17 0.30 0.40 0.30 20 10
18 0.20 0.50 0.30 50 10
19 0.30 0.40 0.30 30 80
20 0.30 0.30 0.40 0 50
21 0.20 0.20 0.60 0 150
22 0.10 0.60 0.30 10 200
23 0.20 0.20 0.60 0 500
24 0.10 0.30 0.60 40 500
25 0.30 0.30 0.40 40 500
26 0.30 0.40 0.30 0 500
27 0.30 0.40 0.30 40 500
(see, for example, Draper and Smith, 1966) for the linear formula (18.1) by using
egg density, stress, and proportion of old and young trees as independent variables
and the value as the dependent variable, deriving one formula for each of the five
participants. The formulas I derived from the rankings of the two Forestry Com-
mission members were very close to the parameters Ci actually obtained at the
meeting (despite my misgivings), but those of the three ecology project members
were quite different from the other two and from each other.
After discussion with the ecologists on the reasons for these differences, the
feeling emerged that the states in Table 18.1 were meaningless because the whole
forest could not be composed uniformly (the forest covers about 15,000 square
miles). Indeed, if it were, all 27 states would be equally terrible. I asked them
whether they could describe a new state vector that would be meaningful.
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18.1.1 DEFINING A MEANINGFUL STATE DESCRIPTION
Professor Holling then devised a list of seven typical endemic conditions of a sub-
forest together with their appropriate vector state classification. A new list was then
drawn up (Table 18.2) in which the states of the forest were described by seven
parameters (summing to 1), giving the proportion of the total forest in each con-
dition category.
All four members of the ecology group were then asked for their preference
rankings of these 20 states (the Forestry Commission experts had returned to
Canada). In addition, I calculated the ranking implied by the objective function
from the stand model used in the dynamic programming fonnulation. The correla-
tion between each pair of the five rankings was calculated. This ranged from 0.3 to
0.8 for pairs of ecologists and was negative for all ecologist/objective-function
pairs. The marked difference between the ecologists and the "forest industry"
experts partiy reflected the fact that the experts were thinking only in terms of
the immediate future, whereas the members of the ecology group were thinking
of the long·tenn implications of the various states.
However, there were still differences in preferences within the ecology group.
The preferences of Holling and Clark were essentially the same, though they arrived
at their orderings in completely different ways. Holling first created seven functions
VI(PI), Vip2), ... ,V7CP7), which gave his subjective "value" to having a pro-
portion Pi of the forest in condition i. [Note that he has thus made some assump-
tion of independence between the parameters; for a discussion of this topic see
Keeney and Raiffa (1976, section 3.5).1 Hence, he assigned a value of
vI(0.0023) + v2(0.0061) + ... + V7(0)
to forest state 2 in Table 18.2 and then used this value to obtain his ranking. Oark
fixed his sights on having about 5-10% of the forest in condition 4 (triggered
outbreak) and on keeping the predictability of the forest high (by having the
proportions in conditions 3 and 7 low). He was aiming for a manageable forest.
A general discussion of what was desirable ensued. Predictability seemed to be
one valued characteristic. (I gained a new perspective on the problem when I asked
Holling why he ranked forest mix 20 in Table 18.2 last. "Worst thing that could
possibly happen," he said.) Another such characteristic was a desire to take the
observed historical budworm outbreaks over time (a cycle of the forest moving
through conditions 1-6 sequentially) into the same pattern over space: that is, to
have the same proportion of the forest in each condition at any given time -
"controlled outbreaks."
It was decided that the seven statistics used were not sufficient to describe the
state of the forest, and Holling set to work on a more comprehensive list of in-
dicators. The aim was to devise a system with which we could enable a decision
maker ("magically") to place the forest in condition A or condition B, where A and
B are described by a set of summary statistics. Which statistics would the decision
maker like to see to enable him to make a decision? If he were a logger, he would
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want to know, among other things, the amount of wood in good condition for
logging and the forest's potential for the next few years, as indicated by the level
of budworm.
For any given decision maker we would like to build up a set of statistics (in-
dicators) that would tell him all (or virtually all) he wants to know in order to
choose between A and B.
To put this into practice, a member of the group, Bill Clark, who was well
acquainted with the problems of the area, was appointed a decision maker. After
Holling had drawn up a long list of possible indicators, we three had a meeting to
discuss this list with Clark. Which ones was he interested in?
We then ran into a problem. When a decision maker evaluates the present state
of the forest, he has to look to the future. He has to predict how the forest will
behave, keeping in mind the present number of budworms, for example. Hence,
when he evaluates the forest condition, he includes in his evaluation his judgment
of how the forest will develop in the future, and the way in which the forest de-
velops depends on the method of treatment - that is, on the policies on logging,
spraying, and the like.
Recall that we are looking for an objective function that we can optimize to
find a best policy for treating the forest. However, if the decision maker had
known of this "best policy," he might have evaluated the forests differently, which
changes the best policy. As an example, suppose that a simple device is discovered
that removes all possibility of a budworm outbreak. The forest preferences of the
decision maker will be altered. Although the result of the optimization procedure
may not be as good as this "device," it nevertheless may change his preferences.
What is needed is a set of statistics such that preferences for their values are in-
dependent of the policy being used.
This was achieved by letting the decision maker view a stream of statistics about
the conditions of the forest over a sufficiently long time horizon. Hence the de-
cision maker need not predict anything. He is to evaluate the stream of statistics as
one single finished product and need not worry about how likely they are or
wonder what policy achieved them. The internal policies of the simulator must then
be adjusted to maximize the value assigned by the decision maker.
Note that the type of statistics required has now changed. It is not necessary to
know the density of budworm at any given time; that was needed only to get an
idea about the future state of the trees. Since we can also see the quantity of
lumber obtained for the next 100 years and the amount spent on spraying, it is
irrelevant to know how much budworm is present. (Indeed, it is probably irrelevant
to know how much was spent on spraying - a simple net profit or loss may be
sufficient.)
18.1.2 FINDING THE ATTRIBUTES RELEVANT TO OUR DECISION MAKER
Clark went through Holling's list of indicators deleting, adding, and modifying.
Some were discarded for being too minor, that is, not likely to influence his
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decisions; others, because their implications were too difficult to understand (partic-
ularly standard deviations of data over space). The following list of statistics for
each year that Clark felt would affect his decisions was the result.
Financial
X I = Profit of logging industry
X2 Cost of logging
X 3 = Cost of spraying
Logging Potential ofForest
X4 Amount of harvestable wood
X s = Percent of X4 actually harvested in the given year
Forest Composition
X6 = Diversity, a measure of the mixture of differing classes, ages, types of
trees for recreational purposes (the greater the diversity the better)
X 7 = Percentage of old trees
Observable Damage
Xg = Percentage of defoliated trees
X 9 = Percentage of dead trees
X IO = Percentage of logged areas (no trees or stumps)
Social
XII Unemployment (measured by taking a certain logging level as full mill
capacity)
Insecticide
X 12 = Average dosage per sprayed plot
In addition to the list above, a variance for these statistics taken over 265 sub-
regions of New Brunswick was also included in some cases.
Ignoring the variances for a moment, this still leaves 12 x T statistics for a
history of T periods. Indeed, eight of these statistics were intended for each site,
which would have given (4 +265 x 8)T statistics.
Two SO-year histories were generated by the simulation model with an initial set
of internal policies, and these statistics calculated. Clark studied these listings and,
following his earlier procedure for ordering the listing on Table 18.2, picked a few
key statistics that he wanted to maintain at a certain level and then checked to see
that the others were not seriously out of line. The idea at this stage was to give him
a sequence of about 12 such SO-year listings of statistics and ask him to order them.
Then he would be given the complete simulation outputs and asked to rank those;
then the two lists would be compared. In this way the list of statistics would be
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modified, and he would learn better what their implications were, so that eventu-
ally he would be able to arrive at the same orderings for the complete listings and
the reduced set of statistic listings. Owing to the mechanical difficulty of keeping
IIASA's computer in operation and to lack of time, however, this was not done.
Nevertheless, for the sake of outlining the full procedure, let us assume that it was
done.
We then set about reducing the remaining list of statistics (Xl to X 12 ) to a
manageable size of at most five or six per day. I successfully argued that since the
potentially harvestable wood, potentially harvestable wood harvested, cost of
spraying, and insecticide (X4 ,XS,X3 ,X12 ) were given over all periods, if any of
these four attributes were going seriously wrong it would show up eventually some-
where else. The cost of logging could be deduced approximately from the profit
figure and the unemployment level (which is proportional to wood harvested). This
left profit, diversity, old trees, defoliation, dead trees, logging effects, and unem-
ployment. It seems clear that all but the first and last are related to recreational,
visual, and environmental considerations. If these five statistics could be combined
into a single statistic of recreation, we would have:
P = Profit
U = Unemployment
R = Recreational value of forest
as attributes for each time period.
The general plan used by Clark for producing a recreational index involved
combining the recreational potential of a region with an index of its visual quality.
The recreational potential is a value assigned by the Canadian Forestry Commission
to each region of the forest, indicating its accessibility to tourists and the quality
of its surroundings (streams, lakes, gorges, and the like). Each region has a value
of 0,30, 70, or 100. Clark felt the defoliation (Xs), logging (XIO), old trees (X7),
and diversity (X6) attributes were those that affected visual quality. He divided
the possible range of each into three classifications: for example, for defoliation a
stand with 0-15% defoliation was good, 15-45% medium, and 45-100% bad.
A region was given a visual rating equal to the worst rating of its components.
The final composition of recreational potential and visual quality was achieved by
using the chart reproduced as Figure 18.1. Because some of the regions of the
forest are not suitable for recreation under any conditions, the following are the
number of regions possible in each recreation category.
0::;; Good::;; 38
°::;; Medium::;; 262
3::;; Bad::;; 265
(18.2a)
(18.2b)
(18.2c)
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0 30 70 100
GOOD BAD MEDIUM GOOD GOOD
MEDIUM BAD MEDIUM MEDIUM MEDIUM
BAD BAD BAD BAD BAD
FIGURE 18.1 Aggregation rule for recreational potential and condition.
Since the total number of regions is fixed (265) it is necessary to specify only two
of the above classifications; hence the final list of statistics to be tabulated for each
period is
P = Profit
U = Unemployment
C = Number of good recreational regions
B = Number of bad recreational regions
18.2 THE ASSESSMENT OF VALUE FUNCTION
The aim is now to derive a formula that takes the statistics (Pt , Ut , Ct , Bt ) t = 0,
1,2... , and produces a value V such that if forest history a is preferred to forest
history [3, then
Yea) > V([3).
Over recent years a great deal of research has gone into devising good techniques
for the assessment of value functions (Keeney and Raiffa, 1976; Raiffa, 1969).
These techniques were not tried on this problem. At the time of the study the
methodology group at IIASA was experimenting with linear programming (LP)
software and was eager for examples with which to work, so I combined our two
aims and used the following linear programming approach to find value functions.
Consider a value function V having two variables x, y. Suppose the decision
maker has said that in the following pairs he prefers the first one in each to the
second: (2, 5), (3, 0); (3, -7), (1, 1); (0, 2), (-1,2). Thus
V(2, 5) - V(3, 0) > 0
V(3, -7) - V(1, 1) > 0
YeO, 2) - V(-I, 2) > O.
Suppose we approximate V with a quadratic polynomial
V(x, y) = ax + by + cxy +dx2+ ey2.
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We find that
-a + 5b + 10e - 5d + 25e > 0
2a - 8b - 22e + 8d + 48e > 0
a + 2e -d >0
(18.3a)
(18.3b)
(18.3c)
are necessary requirements for V to be a valid function. Examples of polynomial
expressions whose coefficients satisfy (18.3) are
VI(x,Y) = xy + y2
Vix, y) = x + y2
V3(x,y) = _X2+y2.
(18.4a)
(18.4b)
(18.4c)
By obtaining more pairs of preference orderings, the set of possible coefficient
values (a, b, e, d, e) may be reduced; for example, if we now find that, in addition,
(3,2) > (0,3),
then only (18.4a) is still valid.
If there are many alternative value functions for a given data set, an LP algorithm
will arbitrarily choose one of them unless it is given some selection criterion.
Supplying an objective function for the LP problem means that with the same data
set the LP will always choose the same value function; hence, as the data set alters
slightly (because of new orderings), it is easier to see its effect on the resulting
value function.
Note that if (a, b, e, d, e) is a solution of (18.3), then so is any positive multiple
of it; hence the arbitrary constraint
lal + Ibl + lei + Idl + lei = 100
was added to bound the problem (Ia I means +a if a> 0, -a if a < 0).
The objective criterion used was to maximize the minimum gap between pref-
erence rankings. In the example above, the gaps between the left-hand side of
(18.2) and the right-hand side (zero) using VI are 35,26,2; for V2 they are 24, 51,
1; and for V3 they are 30,40, 1. Hence the minimum gap in each is 2, 1,1, and so
the maximum minimum gap is 2, and VI would be the preferred polynomial from
that list.
In general, for a list of preferences
xl '7 xl, i = 1,2,3, ... ,k,
where '7 reads "is preferred to," the fu1llinear program would be
s* = Maxs
s.t. V(xf)-V(xf)~s i=l, ... ,k
la 1+ Ib I+ Ie 1+ Id 1+ ... = 100.
(18.5)
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Note that a valid function exists if and only if s* > O. If s* ~ 0, the decision maker
is questioned more closely on doubtful orderings; if he is resolute, a higher-order
approximation should be taken.
Returning to our study, with four attributes (P, U, G, B) per time period, two
qualitative assumptions were made by Clark (with my prompting) that he felt to
be reasonable (in the first case) or necessary (in the second).
1. Preferences for profit and unemployment were "independent" of those of
recreation. That is, the relative orderings of (P, U) pairs were independent of the
level of the recreation as long as it was the same in each case [for a discussion of
preferential independence, see Keeney and Raiffa (1976, Chapter 6)] . The reverse
was also felt to be true - Le., that preferences for recreational alternatives were
independent of profit/unemployment levels as long as these remained constant.
2. Clark's preferences for profit and unemployment levels in a year depended
on what those levels were the year before and what they would be the next year.
For example, a drop in profits to gain fuller employment is not too serious if
compensated for by larger profits in the surrounding years. Also, an unemployment
level of 10 percent is worse if it follows a year of full employment than if it follows
a year of 10 percent unemployment; that is, he prefers a steady level to one that
oscillates.
Clark felt that if we replaced Pt as a statistic with
Pt - 1 + Pt + Pt +1Qt = 3
we might better justify a separable value function such as
where Vt is a value function based on the figures for year t alone.
These assumptions enabled us to work with a value function
allowing us to calculate a value function for recreation independently of that for
profit and unemployment.
It was implicitly assumed here that preferences were stationary, implying Xt = X
and Yt = Y. Table 18.3 shows the rankings given by Clark for the two value func-
tions X and Y for any time period. Note that for (Q, U) it is an ordered list and
that the rankings for recreation include some equalities. The last three pairs in the
recreation list were added when I discovered that the first polynomial expression
was not suitably monotonic for extreme values. These rankings produce the fol-
lowing value functions:
X{Q. U) = 84.16Q + 2.26QU - 3.llQ2 - 10.45 U2 (18.6)
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TABLE 18.3 Rankings for Value
Functions X and Y
Ordered List
of Socio-
economic
Indicators, X
(Q, U)
(10, 0) >
( 0, 0) >
( 7, 8) >
(20, 10) >
( 0, 5) >
( 4, 8) >
( 7, 10) >
(-5, 0) >
( 30, 15) >
(-5,10) >
( 25, 25)
Rankings between
Pairs of Recreational
Alternatives, Y
(15, 50) > (14, 0)
(25, 50) > (24, 0)
(34, 0) > (35, 50)
(26, 0) > (38, 100)
(28, 100) = (22, 0)
(28, 130) = (16, 0)
(38, 227) = (22, SO)
(26, 200) = (20, ISO)
(4, 0) > ( 1, 0)
( 0, SO) > ( 0, 100)
(30,100) > (25,100)
TABLE 18.4 Five Ordered Lists of All Four Indicators
(Q, u, G, B) (Q, u, G, B)
10 0, 16, 30 10, 10, 16, 30
25, 0, 16, 100 25, 10, 16, 100
0, 0, 16,
°
0, 10, 16,
°-5, 0, 16, 50 -5, 10, 16, 50
-5, 0, 0, 50
5, 0, 1O, SO
5, 4, 16, SO 10, 0, 10, 100
5, 7, 16, 30 0, 0, 10, 30
5, 0, 16, 100 -5, 0, 10,
°5, 10, 16,
°0. 10, 16, 0
5, 0, 1O, 40
10, 0, 2, 40
0, 0, 16, 40
-5, 0, 25, 40
and
Y(G,B) (71.8 - 1.88G)G 2 - B 2(5.88 + .001 34B)
+ GB(19 .63 - 0.597G + 0.1 85B), (18.7)
using a quadratic and a cubic polynomial approximation, respectively.
Clark then ordered sets of all four attributes as shown in Table 18.4. Each
member of a group is preferred to the one below it. Using the functions (18.6) and
(18.7), these lists may be reduced to lists of two attributes; for example, the first
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list becomes
X( 10, 0), Y(16, 30)
X(25,0) , Y(16, 100)
X(-5,0), Y( 0,50).
The cubic approximation technique was used again to find a combined value
function of
VeX, Y) 15.5 y 2 +357XY +48.8X3 + 1.8ry
-9,050r- 3,039, 500X-195,197Y.
18.2.1 THE TIME PROBLEM
So far, the analysis has reduced the simulated history of the forest into a time
stream of values, one per year. For two simulated histories with output values
(VL vt vt vt ...) and (Vi, v~, vt va, . ..), it is reasonable to suppose that
the decision maker prefers the first history to the second if V: ~ Vi for all t and
if this inequality is strict for some t. (Even this dominance argument is valid only
because we are assuming that there are no interperiod dependencies of preferences.
For example, we could imagine that the 5-year stream (1,2,3,4,5) would be pre-
ferred to (10, 9, 8, 7,6) if the decision maker disliked drops from one period to
the next.)
It is not yet possible for the analyst to say whether Clark would prefer as-year
history (2, 3, -I, 999, 7) to one of (2, 3, -I, 4, 8) because we have no rules for
intertemporal trade-offs. The only manageable model for such trade-offs is a linear
assumption that
for some coefficients at> where, presumably, at ~ a t +1 ~ 0 for all t.
Had time permitted (Bill Clark returned to Canada at this point), we could have
found viable values for the coefficients at by using the same technique that led to
the coefficients in the second value function
V[X(Q, U), Y(G, B)].
However, at this stage we agreed that the simulation model should generate dif-
ferent histories using a variety of policies and should calculate the value
for a range of values of the constant a, 0 < a < I.
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18.3 THE ASSESSMENT OF A UTILITY FUNCTION
Even if we ignore the crude manner in which the time streams of the attributes
were evaluated, there remains another important element in the effective evaluation
of policies by use of an objective function. The particular history generated by the
simulator depends upon the initial condition of the forest, the many complex
equations governing the growth of budworm and of trees, and the effects of pre-
dators and other factors, but all of these are deterministic only if the weather
pattern is known. Different weather patterns will produce different histories, and
hence a policy cannot be judged purely on the results of one run; its effects must
be considered under all types of weather futures. Fortunately, this problem may
be overcome if a utility function, which is a special type of value function, is used.
Not only does a utility function have the properties of a value function, but in
situations in which outcomes are uncertain its expected value provides a valid
quantity for making rankings.
That is, if u(P, W) represents the utility (or value) of the forest history that
results from using policy P when weather history W occurs and f(W) is the prob-
ability that weather pattern W does occur, then
L u(P, W)f(W) = V(P) ,
where the sum is taken over all possible weather patterns, is a legitimate value
function over policies P.
Assessment procedures for utility functions are similar to those for value func-
tions except that the decision maker's attitude towards risk taking must be in-
corporated. As with value functions, it is useful to recognize assumptions that
will break down the assessment of one function with many attributes into one of
assessing several utility functions, each having only one or two attributes.
The assumptions that allowed the breaking down of the utility function into
utility functions of, at most, two attributes are described in the following sections.
In section 18.3.1 the general approach toward assessing the utility function is
outlined, and how it is broken down over time and across the attributes is de-
scribed. Section l8.3.2 deals with the recreation attributes and shows how this
assessment was also made easier by making certain assumptions. Section l8.3.3
then details the assessment of a utility function for the profit and unemployment
attributes. First, however, an outline of the basic independence assumption to be
used throughout the remainder of the paper is given.
This assumption is utility independence. For a utility function u(x, y), where x
and y might be vectors of attributes, if the decision maker's attitude toward risk
taking in situations where only the outcome of x is uncertain but y is fixed and
known is independent of what that fixed value of y is, then attributes X are said to
be utility independent of Y. It is important to realize that X may be utility in-
dependent of Y even if X and Y involve factors that in other respects are closely
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related. [For more information and examples see Keeney and Raiffa (1976,
Chapter 5).] The functional statement of this property is that for any two values
of Y (yl and y2, for example)
u(x, yl) = a + b u(x, y2)
for some constants a and b, where b must be positive.
In our problem, which has four attributes per year with a horizon of T periods
(T will be in the range 50-200), we require a utility function of 4T attributes;
thus, some extensive assumptions will be required. Meyer (1970), for example,
has shown that for a utility function u(x I, X2, ... ,XT) if each subset of attributes
{Xl, ... ,Xt } is considered to be utility independent of {Xt + l , ... , XT } and vice
versa, then the utility function has either an additive form
TL at Ut(Xt)
t=l
for some positive constants at or a multiplicative form
T
n [b t + Ct Ut(Xt)]
t=l
(18.8)
(18.9)
for some constants bt and ct> where in each case Ut(Xt) is a utility function over
X t alone.
These forms were inappropriate for our case principally because Clark's attitude
toward risk taking for levels of unemployment in one period depended on the
levels of unemployment in the year before and the year after, and hence Meyer's
assumptions of utility independence did not apply. Also, Clark wished to make
an assumption of stationarity (see Koopmans, 1960); that is, he wished to treat all
years equally, with regard to both value orderings and risk taking. This meant that
the coefficients at> b t> Ct and the functions Ut in (18.8) and (18.9) would have to
be independent of their suffix t, implying that all time streams that were merely
permutations of one another would be assigned equal utility, which was not the
case. For example, in dealing only with levels of employment, he preferred the
stream (100, 100,90,90, 100) to (100, 90, 100,90, 100) because of the reduced
variance between years. (So that the symbol U would not be used simultaneously
for utility and a level of unemployment, we now use "employment," rather than
"unemployment";Et = 100 - Ut is the new attribute.)
Fishburn (1965) used assumptions called Markovian dependence to produce
a form
T T-I
u(x}, ... ,XT) = L Ut(Xt, xt+d - L Ut(xt> X~+l)'
t=l t=2
(18.10)
where Ut(xt> xt+d is a utility function over the two attributes Xt, Xt+l' While this
does allow for some interdependency between attributes in neighboring periods,
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Clark was quite firm in preferring the lottery
(100,100, lOa, lOa, lOa)
(loa, 50, lOa, 50, lOa)
50, lOa, 50, lOa, 50)
50, 50, 50, 50, 50)
to the lottery
lOa, 100, 50, 50, 100)
50, 50, lOa, lOa, 50)
50, lOa, lOa, 50, 50)
100, 50, 50, lOa, 100)
where the figures are percentage of employment in 5 successive years. For (I8.1O)
to be valid for Clark's preferences, he should have been indifferent between the two
lotteries.
18.3.1 FINDING APPROPRIATE ASSUMPTIONS
To fmd a form of the utility function that would be acceptable to him, I considered
assumptions involving conditional utility independence. This condition says, in
essence, that if the set of attributes is divided into three parts X, Y, and Z, then
X is conditionally utility independent of Y if, whenever Z is fixed at some level
and we regard the problem as now having only two attributes X and Y, X is utility
independent of Y and that this is true for all fixed values of Z. [For more detailed
expositions of this concept see Keeney and Raiffa (I976, Chapter 6) or Bell (1975).]
The idea was to assume that each subset {XI,"" Xt-d was conditionally
utility independent of {Xt + l , ... , XT } and vice versa. This is quite similar to the
assumptions used by Meyer to obtain (I8.8) and (l8.9), but there is no assumption
of independence of preferences for Xt on either Xt-lor Xt+1'
These assumptions led (for T~ 4) to the conclusion that either
[A+Ut(Xt'X~+I)]r( rX [A+Ut(Xt>Xt+I)])-A
(I8.12)
or
T-I T-I
U(XI,X2,'" ,XT) = L utCxt,Xt+I)- L utCXt,X~+I)
t=1 t=2
(l8.11)
where Ais a constant and
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where x? is any fIxed value of Xi> so that, for example, Ut(x~, Xt+l) =Ut+I(Xt+l,
X~+2)' and where U was scaled so that u(x~, ... , x~) = O. For a proof of this result
see Bell (1975). Note that (18.11) is exactly (18.10) but that (18.12) not only
allows interperiod dependencies but also is able to differentiate between the lot-
teries L I and L 2 •
Bill Clark returned to I1ASA for the summer of 1975, and I quizzed him on the
appropriateness of the assumptions that led to (18.12). He agreed that they seemed
appropriate, and so we proceeded to assess his utility function over the attributes
{Pt,£t> Gt>Bd, t = 1, ... , T.
Questioning soon established that his preferences for the recreation time streams
{Gl> B I , G2 , B 2 , ••• , GT ,BT } were mutually utility independent of those for the
time streams of profIt and employment {PI, £1, P2 , £2, ... , PT , £T}, enabling us
to use the formula (see Keeney, 1972)
U(p, e,g, b) = uR(g,b)+kIUs(p,e)+k2uR(g,b)us(p, e), (18.13)
where UR is a utility function for recreation and Us a social utility function and k l
and k 2 are constants (k 2 was later identifIed as zero). I should emphasize that
Clark was not one to make assumptions merely because of expediency: whenever
he agreed that an assumption was valid, we had discussed the implications at
length and verifIed that his preferences reflected the required pattern or were
sufflciently close to allow its acceptance.
18.3.2 THE UTILITY FUNCTION FOR RECREATION
For the recreation streams, Clark felt that the assumptions of Meyer were ap-
propriate and, in addition, that in any given time period Gt and Bt were mutually
utility independent. To determine whether the additive form (18.8) or multi-
plicative form (18.9) was the appropriate one to use, I asked him if he had any
preference between the following two lotteries
where GI and G2 are the number of good recreational areas in two successive years
and Bland B 2 are in all outcomes assumed to be fIxed. (Recall that because Gt and
B t are mutually utility independent, it is not necessary to specify at what level
B I and B 2 are fIxed.) If the additive form (18.8) was appropriate, he should have
been indifferent between the two, but in fact he preferred the second lottery on
the grounds that he was very averse to having two very bad years together. This
meant that the form of the recreational utility function was
T
UR(g, b) = n (0: + (3 [k l + k2Uo(gt) + k 3uB(b t) + k4Uo(gt)UB(bt)]), (18.14)
t=1
406
1.0
0.5
40 9
FIGURE 18.2 Utility function for the number of good recreational areas.
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FIGURE 18.3 Utility function for the number of bad recreational areas.
where the various constants are independent of the time subscript because of the
assumption of stationarity.
The marginal utility functions UG and UB for the number of good and bad areas
were assessed in the usual manner (see, for example, Raiffa, 1969) by asking
questions of the form "what value G = g* for certain do you feel is equally pref-
erable to a 50-50 gamble between G = 20 and G = 5?
Thus uG(g) was assessed as in Figure 18.2 which was fitted quite closely by the
exponential curve uG(g) = 1 - exp (-0.08g). The function uB(b) was slightly more
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complicated (Figure 18.3), being fitted in two pieces by
0.7 + 0.35 [1.0176 - 0.0176 exp (0.0225b)]
-0.3 + 0.35 [+ 1.463 + 28.222 exp(-0.0164b)]
The constants k 1 , k2 , k 3 , k4 were calculated by fixing
b < 180
b;;;;' 180
and
k 1 + k 2uG(40) + k 3uB(0) + k4 uG(40)UB(0) = I
k 1 + k2uG(0) + k 3uB(265) + k4uG(0)uB(265) = 0
(l8.15a)
(l8.15b)
and then using indifferent pairs given by Clark:
(20, 150) ~ (9, 0)
(IS, 100) ~ (25, ISO)
(7, 0)~(l5,150)
(l8.16a)
(l8.16b)
(l8.16c)
to form three more equations in the k/s. Also, since Clark always prefers to in-
crease the number of good areas if possible, the constraint
(18.17)
should be true for all b, and for similar reasons
(18.18)
for all g. Examining the implications of (18.15) to (18.18), we found that the set of
coefficients
k 1 = -1.20 I k2 = -0.291 k 3 = 0.356 k4 = 0.905
were a very good fit to our information.
To finalize the recreational utility function now required only the knowledge
of O! and (3 in (18.14). For this I asked him to consider a time stream in which all
values after year 2 are assumed fixed; the number of bad areas is fixed at 100 for
years I and 2. So, considering only vectors of the type (number of good areas in
year I, number of good areas in year 2), he was to give values gJ, g2, g3, g4, gs such
that
(gJ,gt) ~ (IS, 5); (g2;g2) ~ (20, 5); (g3,g3) ~ (25, 5); (g4,g4) ~ (30, 5);
(gs,gs) ~ (35, 5) (18.19)
His answers were 9, 10,12,14, and IS, respectively. In attempting to solve (18.14)
with this information it became clear that in fact it is the additive form (18.8)
rather than the multiplicative form that fits (18.19). When I referred this apparent
inconsistency back to Clark, we established that his preference between the lot-
teries L 3 and L 4 was caused by the extreme nature of the consequence in L 3 of
two successive years with zero good recreational areas. When I replaced the zeros in
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L 3 and L 4 with something positive, he became indifferent. Perhaps this should
indicate a singularity in the function UG at G = 0, but I chose to ignore this.
Thus, the recreational utility function was established as
T
UR(g, b) = L {0.356uB(b t ) + [0.905 uB(b t ) - 0.291] uG(gd}. (18.20)
t=l
18.3.3 THE SOCIAL UTILITY FUNCTION
When Clark had accepted the conditional utility independence assumptions neces-
sary to validate the use of equation (18.12), we chose fIxed levels of P~ = 0 million
dollars per year and e~ = 100 percent employment. The main task was thus to
assess, for each t = 1, 2, ... , T - 1, the function
or, in a shorthand notation where we omit explicit reference to attributes at their
fIxed values, us(Pt> et> Pt+l, et+l)' While previous assumptions about independence
between attributes had either been elicited through questioning or had been
prompted by me, on this occasion Clark volunteered that when considering his
preferences for employment in a given year, he was concerned only with the levels
of profit in the same year and the levels of employment in the preceding and
following years, and that his preferences for profit in a given year depended only
upon the level of employment in that year. This implied that for the attributes
Pt> Et> Pt+l , E t+l we could assert that Pt was mutually conditionally utility in-
dependent (MCUI) with Pt+l and E t+l and, similarly, that Pt+l was MCUI with
Pt and E t . This set of additional assumptions proved to be most useful. Consider
the assumptions leading to (18.11) and (18.12) for T=4. In full, they are Xl
MCUI {X3 ,X4 } and {Xl ,X2 } MCUI X4 • Those that Clark had proposed were
Pt MCUI {Et+1,Pt+dand {Pt>EdMCUlPt+l,showing that (18.11) or (18.12)was
appropriate for the restricted function us(Pt> et> Pt+l' et+l)'
It is easy to show (set all attributes at their fIxed level except for P2 ) that the
assumption of stationarity forces both us(Pt> et, Pt+l, et+l) and the full function
us(p, e) either to be additive or to be multiplicative and, if multiplicative, to have
the same parameter A. The nonindifference between lotteries L l and L 2 showed the
multiplicative form to be the appropriate one. Hence, using all the declared in-
dependence assumptions, the social utility function could be expressed as
Us(p, e)
T T-l
t~l [A + UA(Pt, et)] t~l [A + uE(et> et+l)]
-A (18.21)
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for some constant A, where UA and UE are each two attribute utility functions for
which UA (p~, et) = uE(et> e~+I) = uE(e~-I' et). Thus the solution of the assessment
problem rested on finding UA, UE, and A.
The Interperiod Employment Function
We began with UE' Recall that uE(et>et+1) is, in effect, us(pO,e?, ... ,e~_I'
et> et+1, e~+2' ... , e~) so that, when questioned about his preferences, Clark was to
compare employment streams of the fonn (100, 100, ... , 100, et> et+b 100, ... ,
100). I proceeded by fixing the level of E t at some value et and then assessing the
one attribute function ul(et+11 E t = et). It appeared that for lotteries involving
levels of E t+1 that were higher than et he was risk averse but that he was risk
prone for levels of E t +1 lower than et. The reason was that the previous year's
employment level represented a goal or aspiration level for the present year, part
of his desire for stability in employment levels. The only departure from this was
that if I fixed et at anything higher than 80 percent he was never risk prone for
values of et+1 ;;. 80, because any year in which employment was at least 80 percent
was "satisfactory." Hence his "goal" was min {et> 80}. A typical graph of Ul (et+l lEt
= et) is shown in Figure 18.4.
The two-piece function was fitted again quite closely by an exponential curve
of the form
and
- exp {-0.03 et+1}
- exp {+0.03 et+d
et+1 ;;. min {80, et}
et+l :s;;; min {80, ed.
(l8.22a)
(18.22b)
0_==- ...1..- •
50 e t 100
et+l
FIGURE 18.4 Utility function for employment, conditional on the level of
employment in the previous year.
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(l8.23a)
(18.23b)
and
In a similar way U2(et IEt+1= et+l) was assessed, and it exhibited many of the same
features. Since E t - I was fixed at 100, there was a desire to achieve this goal with
et> but this was tempered by the opposite desire not to exceed et+I' The result
seemed to be that Clark preferred the pattern (100, 80, 90, 100) to (100,90,80,
100); although a drop from 100 to 80 was serious, it was better to suffer that and
follow it with 2 years of improvement than be faced with 2 years of falling em-
ployment, even though this was ultimately followed by an increase from 80 to 100.
The function u2(et IEt+1= et+l) was of the form
- exp {-0.03 et} et ~ min {80, et+1 - 5}
-exp {+0.03 etl et ~ min {80,et+1 - 5}.
The exponential coefficients in (18.22) and (18.23) are all shown equal to 0.03
because they were all fairly close and the implications seemed insensitive to this
parameter.
To obtain the combined function uE(et> et+d I used the fact that
and
UE(et> et+d = f(et+l) + g(et+l) u2(et IEt +1 = et+d
uE(et> et+l) = h(et) + k(et) uI(et+11 Et = et)
for some functionsf,g, h, k. Solving these gives
[u2(e~let+l) - u2(e; let+I)] uB(et , et+1)
(18.24)
(18.25)
= [al + a2u I(et+1!e;)] [u2(e~let+l) -u2(et let+I)]
- [a3 + a4uI(et+1Ie~] [u2(e; Iet +l ) - u2(et let+I)] , (18.26)
where ai, a2, a3, a4 were constants calculated in much the same manner as the
constants k l , k2, k3, k 4 were calculated for the recreational function, and e; i= e~
was any constant, chosen to be 50.
(18.27)
The PrOfit-Employment Trade-offs
The next step was to calculate UA (Pt> et). This could have been done in the same
way as UE was calculated, but Clark found it easier to think in terms of indifference
curves between Pt, et pairs. Hence, on graph paper with axes of et from 50 to 100
and of Pt from -10 to + 30, we located on it pairs (p:' eD, (p;, ei) between which
Clark was indifferent, again bearing in mind that all other attributes were at their
fixed levels, and then fairing in sample indifference curves. The result is exhibited
in Figure 18.5.
What was delightful to me as the analyst was that if we describe the above in-
difference curves by the functional relationship
<P(Pt> et) = constant
for varying constants, it was empirically observable that
<P(P:' e:) = <P(p;, ei) ~ <P(P:' e: + E) = <P(p;, e; + E)
-10 10 20
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FIGURE 18.5 Profit-employment indifference curves for a single year.
for all values of e. This meant that quantification of I/> was easy. I used a poly-
nomial curve-fitting program on one of the indifference curves and found that a
quadratic was sufficiently accurate; substituting in the other curves confirmed
directly the visual observation that property (18.27) held. [For an example of
this property in connection with time streams, see Bell (1974).]
The indifference curves were
I/>(Pt> et) = et + 1.9 Pt ~.04 P; = constant.
The next task was to assess a utility function over 1/>, the value function. Using the
indifference curves, any pair (Pt> et) could be replaced by an equivalent pair
(p~, 100) where I/>(p~, 100) = I/>(Pt, et) or
TJ~ = 23.75 - hh,256.3 + 100(100 - et) - 190 Pt + 4 p;.
The one-dimensional utility function UA (Pt, 100) had earlier been assessed in
the usual manner in the range -8 to +26, the result depicted in Figure 18.6.
Recall that if Clark has been consistent, we should be able to observe that
uA(O,et)=uE(et, 100). As a check I calculated the implied function UA(Pt, 100)
using uE(et, 100) and I/>(Pt, et). Actually, comparison was possible only between
-8 ""Pt ""0, but here the agreement was close. The full implied function UA(Ph
100) is shown in Figure 18.7 for Pt ""D.
Note that because 1/>(-9.15, 100) = 1/>(0, 80), the implied function UA(Pt> 100)
becomes risk prone for Pt "" -9.15. From the point of view of a consistency check,
we were perhaps fortunate that the direct assessment of UA (Ph 100) did not involve
a range that low.
For later calculations the value of UA (Pt, et) was taken to be
1 - exp [-0.055 p;] for I/>(Pt> et) ~ 100
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-8
-2
1.068( 1 - exp(- .178 Pt))
2.72(1-exp(-0.055 Pt ))
25
FIGURE 18.6 Marginal utility function for a single year's profits.
-15 -10 -5
-10
-20
FIGURE 18.7 Marginal utility function for profit implied by Figures 18.4
and 18.5.
where
and
where
The functions UA and UE were scaled so that UA (0, 100) = UE(IOO, 100) = 0 and
UA(O, 50) = uE(50, 100) = UE(IOO, 50) =-1.
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Evaluating the Constant A
To complete the assessment of us(p, e) it remained to calculate A, the constant in
equation (18.21). What this constant controls is the degree to which the decision
maker prefers a mixture of good years and bad years to appear in bunches or
interspersed. I began by asking Clark how, if he had to arrange 50 good years and
50 bad years in a sequence of 100, he would do it. Recall that if we were not using
functions with interperiod dependencies, such a question would not arise since all
permutations would be equally preferred because of Clark's "no-discounting"
policy. He certainly disliked both the options in which good and bad alternated
and in which all 50 good years came together. As l/A becomes larger, the tendency
is for the utility function to prefer smaller blocks, and as it becomes smaller (and
negative), to prefer the large bunching.
I asked Clark to consider the following four streams of 7-year employment
figures
0) 100,100,70, 70,70,100,100
Oi) 100, 70,70, 70,70,100,100
(iii) 100, 70,70, 70,70, 70,100
Ov) 100, 70,70, 100,70, 70, 100
and to tell me what statements he could make about his preferences among them.
He established that (i) was the best and Oii) the worst and felt that Ov) was pref-
erable to (ii) "if anything." Using this information I drew a graph (Figure 18.8)
that showed the utility of (i) fixed at 1, the utility of (iii) fixed at zero, and the
corresponding utilities of Oi) and Ov) as functions of l/A using (18.21). Note that
l/A =0 corresponds to the additive case (18.11).
The near indifference of Oi) and Ov) suggested that l/A should be chosen to be
about 1, but there were other considerations. In order to avoid discontinuities in
us(p, e), A+ uE(eto et+l) and A+UA(Pt, et) must always be either both negative
or both positive. If both positive, then
A;;;' max {-uE(50, 50), -uA(-20, 50)}
is a constraint, and if both negative, then
A':;;; min {-UE(100, 100), -uA(20, 100)}.
Clearly, it is the former case that is appropriate here, and so A;;;. 1.487 or l/A':;;;
0.6735. From Figure 18.8, it can be seen that ifhe is to be consistent, Clark should
prefer (ii) to Ov). He also felt that he would prefer Ov) to a 50-50 gamble between
0) and Oii), which with the existing function UE is never possible. This discrepancy
was not resolved. Clark later decided that the answer to the question of sequencing
50 good and 50 bad years was to do it in alternating 4-year blocks. This answer
contradicts his preference of Ov) over Oi). As the minicomputer I was using only
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us (100, 100,70,70,70,100,100) = 11.01-------........:.----------------
l/A
us (100, 100,70, 70,70, 70, 100)
----..........-
us (100, 70, 70,100,70,70,100)
0= us (100, 70, 70, 70,70,70,100)
-1 0
0.5
FIGURE 18.8 Relative utilities of four time streams as Avaries.
allowed time streams of up to 10 years, I could not experiment with graphs such as
Figure 18.8 for longer blocks, but this should be possible in future. A value of
A= 1.61 is currently being used.
18.3.4 THE BALANCE BETWEEN RECREATION AND SOCIAL BENEFITS
Everything was now reduced to finding the constants k 1 and k 2 of formula (18.13):
u(p, e, g, b) = UR(g, b) + k 1us(p, e) + k2uR(g, b) us(P. e). (18.28)
The constant k 2 was quickly established as zero because Clark felt that lotteries of
the following type
<
"i. UR high, Us high
L s :
2 UR low, Us low
yR high, Us low
L6:~'J
UR low, Us high
were indifferent. Actually, over the period of the analysis he alternated between
the following two arguments:
1. When unemployment is high, the people should at least be able to spend their
enforced free time enjoying the forest, and when business is booming, bad rec-
reational facilities can be overlooked. At least something should be good.
2. It is probably not the unemployed who do take advantage of weekends in
the forest, and in any case the forest as a recreational area serves a far greater
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number of people than are associated with the logging industry. Hence there is
likely to be an outcry if people notice high profits in the logging business and poor
recreation.
Argument 1 favors L 6 and argument 2 favors L s. He finally decided on indif-
ference. Thus k 2 = O.
Since, in some sense, k j now embodies the trade-off to be made between
"profits" and "environment," some care was necessary in its calculation. First I
asked for a profit level x such that for a single year
<~ (10,100,38,100)(x, 100,38, 100) ~ f (10, 100,0, 100)
where the vectors are (Pt> Et> Gt , Bt ), all other periods being assumed to be at
fixed values, and for a number of good areasy such that
«
(10,100,15,100)
(10, 100,y, 100) ~
f (-5,100,15,100)
His answers of x = - 3 and y = 6 yielded, after substitution in (18.28), the values
k j = 7.9 and k j = 5.0. To provide further evidence, I asked for a number of bad
areas z such that (0, 100, 15, z) was indifferent to (0,95, 15, 100) and a level
of employment w such that
«
0,100,30,100)
(0, w, 15, 100) ~
f 0, 100,5,200)
His answers here were z = 155 and w = 90, giving k j = 9.4 and 5.3, respectively.
I felt his answer x was the most reliable and w the least reliable (because of the
difficult trade-offs involved), and so k j = 7.5 seemed an appropriate compromise.
18.4 A SUMMARY OF THE ASSUMPTIONS
Let us review all the assumptions that were used concerning the decision maker's
preferences over the attributes {Pj,Ej,Gj,Bj, ... ,PT,ET,GT,BT }. Recall that
the mathematical result of asserting that attribute(s) X is conditionally utility in-
dependent of Y when Z is fixed is that for any values x, y, z of X, Y, Z and some
fixed value yO of Y
u(x,y,z) = !(y,z)+g(y,z)u(x,yO,z)
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for some functions f, g. Utility independence is the special case that obtains when
the set Z is empty.
The assumptions made were the following:
• The attributes {PI, E 1, P2 , E2, ... , PT , ET } are mutually utility independent,
with {G 1 ,B1 ,G2 ,B2 , ••• , GT,BT }.
• For each t= 1, ... , T-2, the set {P1 ,E1 ,P2 ,E2 , ••• ,Pt,Et} is mutually
conditionally utility independent, with {Pt +2 , Et +2 , ... , PT , ET }.
• For each t = 1, ... , T - 1, Pt is mutually conditionally utility independent,
with {Pt+1, Et+d, and Pt+1 is mutually conditionally utility independent, with
{Pt,Ed·
• For all t=I, ... ,T-l, {GJ,B 1,G2 ,B2 , ... ,Gt ,Bd is mutually con-
ditionally utility independent, with {Gt + 1 , B t +1 , ... , GT , Br}.
• For all t = I, ... , T Gt is mutually conditionally utility independent, with
B t ·
• Preferences over time are stationary; that is, ignoring end effects, if the time
index in any situation were altered by an equal constant amount for all outcomes,
relative preferences would be unaffected.
The assumptions need not be as strong as this to imply the functional form used,
but since (18.21) and (18.28) together imply all of the above, it seems worthwhile
to state them in full.
18.5 THOUGHTS ON THE WHOLE PROCEDURE
The study described here gradually shifted in emphasis from my casual curiosity
about the profit-environment trade-offs of the IIASA ecology group to an eager-
ness by that group to obtain an objective function with which to evaluate policies
and finally to a searching examination by Clark of the ability of "decision analysis"
to handle complex problems.
It could be that little more will be gained in terms of establishing better manage-
ment policies using the complex objective function assessed here than would be
the case if the original linear function were maintained. But if the policy evalu-
ations are different, then this study will have achieved a great deal. Attention can
then be focused on the reasons for the differences, and the implications resolved.
The ecology project members have benefited from this study by having to
discuss in concrete terms (seemingly for the first time) their precise objectives -
"what they want out of their forest." It is remarkable how the members of a group
who apparently agree "in principle" can differ diametrically when it comes to
quantification.
I began this study as an advocate of decision analysis as a means of raising
important issues in a decision context but as a skeptic when it came to its ability
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to deal with anything more complicated than the handling of minor monetary
decisions with uncertain payoffs; my own interest was to see what I could do with
the theory in a "real" situation. I am encouraged. With more practice, many of the
errors and much of the lack of sophistication can be eliminated in future studies.
For example, I would concentrate much more on extracting information about
which the decision maker was sure at an early stage. After a long period of ques-
tioning, decision making seems to become harder for the decision maker rather
than easier. I would be inclined to keep questions that involve uncertainty to a
minimum, as a good feel for probability is rather rare - my decision maker flatly
refused to discuss any lottery that was not a case of an equal probability for each
consequence. In theory it is possible first to evaluate a value function over all the
attributes and then to assess a single one-attribute utility over that value function;
this is a bit extreme, however, as it sacrifices much of the structure offered by the
utility independence concepts.
I was also initially skeptical about the extent to which simplifying assumptions
were "natural" as opposed to being forced on an unwilling decision maker as a
matter of expediency. It certainly appears that such assumptions are often empiri-
cally observable or are sufficiently closely approximated that little accuracy is lost.
After all, much of the weighting between different outcomes stems from the
major constants such as k 1 and k2 in (l8.28) and A in (l8.2l) rather than, say,
the particular choice of coefficient for the exponential curve fitted to uG(g).
As a practical matter, because this study was conducted in a part-time on-off
fashion over 18 months, it was inevitable that the decision maker's preferences
gradually altered over time; combined with my own frequent numerical and pro-
gramming errors, this meant that I was often forced to start from the beginning
and rework most of the calculations. It was only toward the very end of the study
that I learned to save the Fortran programs that performed many of these calcu-
lations. Because of this oversight, many of the early assessments were not reworked
or subjected to a sensitivity analysis. A golden rule for those undertaking any major
assessment that is likely to involve complex trade-offs is to program everything!
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DISCUSSION
EDWARDS: I believe you made the statement that you use the simulation
model directly to test the reasonableness of the utility function. I suppose that
means that you ask the decision maker to evaluate policies directly and then com-
pare the implications with those of the utility function. If the decision maker is
in fact capable of giving you the answers to such questions with good reliability,
why did you bother to assess the utility function in the first place?
BELL: Of course, we had to test to see if the utility function agreed with the
intuition of the ecology group on certain specific outputs. In some cases they
gave me two outputs where they were confident that one was better than the other
in order to test the function, but usually they were looking to see if the rating of
the function was sensible.
Even if they had been perfectly able to judge their preference for one time
stream over another, there is still the problem of the manpower needed to compare
the thousands of time streams generated by the simulation model and to take
into account the uncertain outcome associated with any given policy.
This coupling of a utility function with a simulation model seems to me to be
an important use of utility functions.
MEYER: There is a robustness assumption here, and that robustness assumption
is that by using a utility function that is in some sense near to the "correct" utility
function, you will be led to near optimal policies.
MacCRIMMON: Now what would happen if you presented forestry experts with
those policies evaluated as nearly optimal for the ecologist, and they said that they
all seemed terrible?
BELL: One of the reasons they would say that is that Bill Clark and ecologists
in general are operating with a much longer time horizon. In fact, the forestry
experts who came to IIASA were interested in this year, and maybe next year,
whereas the ecologists are running 200-year simulations.
MacCRIMMON: What would you have to do in that case? Presumably, the
18 months you spent with the decision maker was a learning experience. How much
time did you have to spend with the foresters to get their inputs?
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BELL: One purpose of this study was to see if the resulting policies are sensitive
to the objective function. If the answer is yes, the policy is completely different
depending on the objective, and you'd have to think hard about whether to spend
a lot of time to get a better representation of the preferences of these forestry
experts.
TVERSKY: Perhaps there is some imbalance in terms of division of effort:
construction of the utility function in the first place and the somewhat crude way
of evaluating the output of the simulation model in the second.
BELL: You have to make the decision on some basis. All I am doing is calcu-
lating the expected utility of each alternative using the outputs of the simulation
model. I am, in effect, saying that this utility function suggests this policy. And
then I have suggested scrutinizing the results. How would you suggest choosing a
policy from a simulation model?
TVERSKY: It's rather natural to go through several iterations. Do a rough
utility analysis; identify some policies that you seem to like very much. After these
results, go back and refine the simulation and the utility and iterate again.
EDWARDS: It's very disquieting to me that you have gone to so much trouble
to elicit a very sophisticated utility function, and then attempted to validate it
by plain old preference judgments. Psychologists can give you 10,000 reasons why
such judgments are lousy.
BELL: Eighteen months ago if you had asked me what I would do, I would have
said, "Do such and such regression and get the utility function." This process has
changed my answer. What I am saying now is, "Let's feed the utility function into
the computer and look at the output."
KEENEY: Suppose you evaluated policies A and B with the utility function
and found A was preferred to B. Then suppose Bill Clark observed just the simu-
lation output of both policies and preferred B to A. Finally, suppose he carefully
examined the reasons why A was preferred to B with the utility function. Which
policy do you think he would then prefer?
BELL: We haven't done that yet, so I don't know. However, after I had the
utility function for the employment stream, I printed out ten period streams with
their utilities. Then I showed Clark two time streams. His initial reaction was to
doubt the ordering. When he examined it in detail, he did agree with the ordering
implied by the utility function.
EDWARDS: I've done some experimentation of this sort. I have found that if
you work with the person long enough, then he understands what he is doing and
comes to adopt the formulation. He will take the implications of the utility func-
tion as a criterion against which to validate any preference rankings. Related to
this is something that Dr. Bell implied that is very important and worth saying
explicitly. The organism that comes out of this prolonged process, which is in part
training and in part analysis, is not the same organism that went in. An enormous
amount of learning about how to conceptualize values and about aspects of one's
own value judgments has taken place in the course of your interaction with that
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character (the decision maker). You are not going to be able to take preferences
before and after and compare them and get anything that looks worthwhile, be-
cause you are not dealing with the same organism. Moreover, you can't expect
one's preference to be unaffected by all the learning that has been going on about
preferences. Such considerations come under the general heading of validation of
the utility function, a topic that I consider to be perhaps the central topic in utility
theory and certainly the most unmanageable.
BALINSKI: It seems to me that this very elaborate analysis specifying what the
utility function was is, in fact, terribly crude. A lot of assumptions are made.
Therefore, the whole activity of coming back afterward and studying the impli-
cations seems to me in a certain sense studying the implications of the list of
preference assumptions. The purpose of this postoptimization analysis is to try to
show the decision maker what the implications of his assumptions are.
Another issue that bothered me throughout the discussion is that you seem to
have simply accepted the simulation as being the real world. Why do we accept this
at all? Has much work gone on to examine the extent to which the simulation does
represent the real world? And to what extent has this influenced the decision
makers to say, "Yes, I accept this thing because ..."?
BELL: I understand that the Canadian government has extensive data for the
last 30 years and that they can spot the outbreaks for the last 200 years, and the
simulation model validates well against that.
MEYER: I would like to comment on what Dr. Balinski said. I think there is a
complete symmetry between the simulation model, on the one hand, and the
preference function, on the other. The simulation model is not the real world.
The structure of the simulation model - specifically, the variables and equations -
is the principal decision one makes when developing the simulation model. The
parameter estimation is, to my mind, secondary. Simulation models just do not
correspond to reality at all. But as a whole, such models are reasonably robust to
small errors in parameters. I think there is complete symmetry on the utility side.
There is the general structure of the utility function, composed of additive and
multiplicative parts, involving independence and dependence, and so on: structuring
that is what Dr. Bell spent a lot of time on. Only recently have people decided to
spend a lot of time on specification of the structure of the utility function. This
corresponds completely to specification of the structure for simulation models.
There is the parameter estimation in Dr. Bell's utility function, which is subject to
all kinds of problems such as certainty effects, and so on (see Tversky, Chapter 9).
Again we hope there is a certain robustness. What I welcome in all of this is that
the same kind of attention is now being given to the utility function that is used
as a surrogate for the decision maker as is given to the simulation model that is
used as a surrogate for the real world. The surrogate should not be confused with
the real thing on either side of the picture.
BALINSKI: But how do you validate the structural aspects of the utility func-
tion? In some sense, those of you who work with axioms understand their
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implications. When you come to a decision maker who presumably does not have
the same sort of abstract sophistication, it seems to me that he accepts a certain
structural property without really knowing what the implications are. Maybe when
he sees the implications he might say, "I don't like that at all; it's not right." I am
supporting the statement that you have to go back and look at all the effects of
these assumptions. This seems to me terribly important. I am very uneasy about the
construction of these utility functions without confirmation of their implications.
MEYER: Not all these things are subject to validation, just as with the simu-
lation model. In a model of the economy, you might not believe that the level of
trade is influenced by the level of steel production even though it shows a cor-
relation if you do a regression. If your structural equations do not directly tie
these variables to each other because you don't believe there is a mechanism tying
them together, then that's just a belief that you have about the mechanisms that
work in the real world. It is not subject to validation because you can't really put
experiments on it.
The same thing is true with some of these independence and conditional in-
dependence relationships that are elicited from the decision maker. They seem
reasonable after a while, and to my mind it is important to devise a technology to
determine what seem to be reasonable simplifications. Afterwards, you should
go back and validate in two ways. You should validate that the simulation model
does more or less correspond to the real world in terms of consequences, and you
should validate that the decision maker's preference on the proposed policies seems
to correspond with what the model proposes.
RAIFFA: Perhaps I could say parenthetically that there is a history of internal
debate in IIASA between the ecologists and the economists on the role of dis-
counting; the ecologists were very uncomfortable about the required intertemporal
preference conditions. When Dr. Bell was checking these conditions, you could see
that the ecologists really would not accept the additive discounted form on some
of the ecological aspects. Because of their strong feelings, the ecologists were ready
to reject this whole kind of formal analysis. I think this is an example of how
probing indicated that some temporal aspects could be treated in a way different
from discounting. But there were still some generalized independence assumptions.
BELL: You have to remember that I did emphasize that this was almost a
private experiment between me and the ecology group. It was not proposed in the
IIASA research proposal 3 years in advance. The entire process was designed - I use
that word loosely - and carried out step by step. Its main purpose was as an experi-
ment to see if the ecologists think that this type of analysis is useful.

Part Three
General Discussion

19 General Discussion
Throughout the conference there were lengthy periods when a formal agenda
was set aside and the discussion allowed to find its own way around the possible
topics. So many thought-provoking ideas emerged that it was easy to miss a dozen
of them while developing a single one in one's mind. A complete transcript of these
discussions would occupy more space than is available, so we have chosen to
extract five topics that had some cohesion. What appears here is a heavily edited
version. It is hoped that these discussions will provide a starting point for in-
dependent discussion among readers.
CHECKING OF INDEPENDENCE ASSUMPTIONS
Much of the usefulness of the multiattribute utility approach to preference analysis
relies on assumptions of independence between the attributes. Concern was voiced
about how often these assumptions are tested for, regardless of whether they hold.
The feeling was that if the analyst is experienced in the theory of these assump-
tions, his intuition will be as good a guide as questioning the decision maker;
indeed, the analyst may influence the results of questioning by the nature of the
questions he asks.
WEGENER: I would like to make a comment on the question of whether the
independence checks have to be performed between attributes. There was a con-
ference on multiattribute utility and probability in Darmstadt recently, and there
was a review paper presented on applications of multiattribute utility. I think
there were about 90 references to recent applications. If you look through them,
you will find that almost none of these applications, which were real-world appli-
cations, really went through all the checking procedure. Now are all these people
ignorant? I don't know. The fact is that the majority are quite satisfied with what
425
426
comes out of these procedures, and they work well. What is your conjecture about
the possible convergence of the theorist's requirement and the requirements of
practical applicability?
RAIFFA: I have the feeling that if you look at most applications of probability
theory as well, you'll find that people overwhelmingly assume that random vari-
ables are independent, and sometimes they go very, very wrong because of this
assumption. It is not very difficult to have people reflect upon whether the vari-
ables should be independent, and since they are sometimes dependent, simple
transformations would make you change the nature of the variables so that they
would be independent. I think the same thing goes on here. I think that it is not
very difficult to check the quality of independence assumptions.
WEGENER: In fact, it is not done in the majority of cases.
RAIFFA: That's right, and independence of random variables is not checked
in the majority of cases either, and we all know that experience has shown that
many times you can go vastly wrong. I think I can give many examples in the
probabilistic domain where, if you ignored dependencies, you would get into
terrible, terrible trouble.
EDWARDS: I agree very strongly with what Dr. Wegener said, but I think that
what happens very often is that an informal check of some of the assumptions
takes place when the dimensions of value that you are going to consider originate.
You have informal ideas about what makes sense and what does not, with respect
to the kind of independence that may be needed for that particular aggregation
procedure. You think of this as you are generating dimensions, but you don't
usually go through the vector checks referred to here. Moreover, I am not at all
sure whether you will ever be able to do much about this under the typical time
constraints of this kind of work. Access to the decision-making body that you
are attempting to advise is limited, and it is difficult enough to show them why
they should be interested in a particular aggregation rule at all and why they
should be willing to give numerical values to things that are for them inherently
non-numerical. Trying to explain some of the further subtleties of the problem
is just about guaranteed to turn them off. I think the only solution to this problem
is the informal one, and I think the informal one is frequently used.
MEYER: There are many situations in which I am quite willing to take upon
myself the responsibility that I believe these things to be utility independent if
you asked the right questions. You just need a certain amount of experience.
And therefore I really see this line of research as leading in due time to a higher
degree of sophistication and qualification among the people working in the field,
leading to better general structuring of the utility function that is used, and not
necessarily leading to an enormous apparatus of question asking that would cause
any real city government to throw you out of the office. I think it is quite wrong
to think in those terms.
DYER: I think often a decision maker does not want to make a decision; he
would rather have some black box make the decision. Saying that the decision
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maker accepted something is not really, in my mind at least, enough to warrant
concluding that it was a good study. I think it's up to the people who do studies
of this sort to be aware of the kinds of mistakes they might make and to under-
stand the theory that has been generated in the last 10 or 15 years, and the im-
plications of it, and consequently, to do responsible analyses.
ISSUES BEHIND MAKING TRADE-OFFS OVER TIME
The problem of quantifying future preferences over future events is perhaps the
most difficult area in which to draw up a list of convincing axioms for preference
relationships. The uncertainties associated with the overall impact on one's life of
choosing a career, for example, are overwhelming. On a larger scale, technological
developments produced in the seventies could profoundly affect the lives of future
generations, but we are unable to judge which of these might be beneficial and
which harmful. We are also unable to judge how we should divide the "resources
pot" between ourselves and these future generations. The following exchange
offers but a flavor of the long discussion that took place on the subject.
MEYER: Decisions taken in the public domain are ultimately political com·
promises that are worked out between several parties - individuals who represent
interest groups or different points of view. lTItimately, the role of analyses in that
process is to help persuade, to somehow pre-empt some arguments from the de-
cision, perhaps to convince the person for whom they are commissioned of the
rightness or wrongness of what he is going after. I see them in any political system
that I know of, except for a pure dictatorship, as helping the protagonists in a bar-
gaining or a negotiation or adversary proceeding. Simple discounting has a lot
to recommend it because it is so transparent and everybody sees what you are
doing. You can debate on the discount rate to be used, you can have probing dis-
cussions about what's behind the numbers that are being discounted. You don't
get lost in the difficult structure - the typical politician has a hard enough time
understanding the simple discounting, and he is not going to understand any of
these utility functions.
RAIFFA: Since I have gone back to the United States, I have been asked to sit
on some committees dealing with trade-Qffs in environmental, ecological, and
economic problems. There is a vehement attitude among the noneconomists to-
ward the role of discounting; they feel we are selling future generations short
because of discounting. If you talk about a 10% discount, you are really ignoring
the long-run future, and I think at least the ecologically oriented community that
I am dealing with is grasping for some sort of rationale that they can use to make
intergenerational trade-offs.
MEYER: I find intergenerational trade-Qffs especially hard. They must always
be viewed in the light of population expansion. It's not merely the quality of air
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we breathe but the number of people that are there to breathe it. I find these
problems just right to be approached by this method within a research framework,
but I don't think that the methods themselves can enter the political process at this
point, and I doubt if they ever can. I think you must find other ways of popular-
izing the conclusions you draw as a sophisticated analyst.
TVERSKY: A lot of effort is put into the choice of a profession or a career, and
there are various institutions concerned primarily with giving advice and doing
research that ought to advise young people about what they should do. There is a
great deal of uncertainty, and in some respects it is probably one of the most
important conscious decisions people make in their lives. Do you think this is a
promising opportunity for application? I'd like to see somebody formulate a set of
recommended axioms that identified which independence conditions people could
live with and which not.
MEYER: I started to produce some computer programs using multiplicative
utilities to assess lifetime utility functions. For example, one MBA student who was
an officer in one of the armed forces was trying to decide whether he should just
simply leave the armed forces and take a job in private industry or government or
whether he should stay in the service for the 12 more years that he would need in
order to get his retirement pension - a career choice. He was trying to figure out
which would really be better, given his opportunities and given all the uncertainties
in the environment. Other such decisions are life insurance decisions. How much
life insurance should you carry? Everybody feels very vague about that question.
I changed my idea of how much life insurance I should carry when I put myself
through my programs, one of the early guinea pigs.
KEENEY: Did you actually change the amount you carried?
MEYER: Yes, but I really would not want to state that was a triumph for the
model since I am obviously a biased user.
AUTOMATED PUBLIC DECISION MAKING
A special topic emerged from general discussion that focused on Ward Edward's
talk. Could some automated decision process help to relieve committees of the load
of reviewing routine cases individually? This would enable petitioners not only to
have a quick decision but also to design their petitions with full knowledge of the
criteria by which they would be judged. One speaker foresaw election campaigns in
which the candidates could describe their policies in terms of parameters.
TVERSKY: The issue is the following: you basically propose to offer the public
some information regarding decisions. The question is whether, by making this
information publicly available to interested parties, you allow them to use this
information to cheat or bypass the system. Not revealing this information could be
in the public interest.
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EDWARDS: I disagree with that. I think that in almost every situation where
public decisions are being made, it is better if the basis for decision is well known.
MEYER: It seems to me that you are talking about the automation or semi-
automation of a decision-making activity according to a kind of discriminate
function, a value function that you established, that more or less simulates the way
decision makers operate. Now, getting good decision rules that will simulate what
those people do is one task, and getting them to make their decisions better is
another task. Presumably, you are attempting to improve decision making by
focusing the attention of the panel on a limited number of cases, say those that
are of a common type, rather than wasting your time on all of them, and then
deriving an evaluation for the rest. The strategic question for the particular panel or
committee to decide is whether they want to use such criteria. What should the
criteria be if they want to use them? Do they want to publicize their use or not?
What impact does this have on the nature of decision making? That's the strategic
issue: to provide a tactical instrument that they mayor may not want to use.
WEGENER: I feel that this procedure is a step in the direction of replacing
individual decisions or judgments by routine judgments simply by decomposing
them into large decisions, minor decisions, or minor judgments, and I think this can
be done in many fields. It can have one effect that might be very helpful: it could
relieve the burden of administration and make people free to concentrate on more
important decisions. For example, public discussion could concentrate on the
periodic updating of the standards that go into the procedure, which certainly will
not be the same 10 years later, and the public could participate in the kind of
thorough debate that now is held only when individual proposals are at issue.
EDWARDS: I so much agree that I would like to read a passage from my
paper: "Only if political and social circumstances or technology changed would
reconsideration of the agreed-on measurement methods and importance weights be
necessary, and even such reconsiderations would be likely to be partial rather than
complete. They would, of course, occur; times do change, public tastes and values
change, and technologies change. Those seeking appropriate elective offices could
campaign for such changes - an election platfonn consisting in part of a list of
numerical importance weights would be a refreshing novelty!"
LUCE: I should think that the university would be the first place that one
might attempt to employ these methods, partly because in the university no one
will be too shocked by professors performing the analysis, and other professors will
probably be involved in some of the decision making and presumably will under-
stand the kind of arguments that are being used. And then, of course, they are the
ones that pay the price for any failures of the system.
MEYER: Just think about this method being used for promotion of faculty!
Why do we set up committees to look very carefully at promotion to tenure? Why
do we have panels for admission of students? Why do we have this committee of
yours? It is to force a particular set of people to be confronted day after day with
individual situations so that they are somehow intimate with them, so that they
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perceive whatever changes are going on in their environment and so that discussion
of these changes takes place as soon as they are perceived. But if, by some mech-
anism like the one proposed here, the committee discusses only every tenth in-
stance that comes up because nine out of ten are more or less routine, then it can
be argued that they are really less expert and less aware of whatever is going on in
this domain. An argument can be made against the automation of anything or any
kind of decision support, and I certainly would not want to say that you must not
do this, but I think the important issue is this: When and to what extent do you, in
repetitive decision making of this sort where a group of individuals is confronted
with successive cases, do this? Do you want to do it in the justice system? After all,
it's one case after another, and they are much the same; yet we take enormous
amounts of time to create a process of examination and trial that sets the tone of a
society. Process is vitally important, and before you start playing with it by auto-
mating, I would suggest deep discussion about the true effects of changes in that
process.
TVERSKY: I'd like to attempt a partial response. To begin with, I am very
sympathetic with Dr. Luce's suggestion that we should experiment first on a small
scale, but I really think that the major determining issue - to decide whether to
automate certain decision procedures - depends on what the alternative is. I think
the drawbacks should be spelled out. People react very differently when they are
being rejected by a committee of people and when they are being rejected by some
kind of mechanized, automated decision. This cost we mayor may not be willing
to pay. But there is a cost, and I think the cost increases when you meet something
like promotion. The costs, of course, are not constant. It's part of an educational
process, and maybe if we get used to it after several years the costs will be reduced;
people will get used to it because the process is more efficient.
ZIONTS: I think there are easier problems and there are more difficult prob-
lems, and I guess I can't help but feel that coastal land use is one of the more dif-
ficult problems. A problem that strikes me as an easy one is one on which U.S.
banks, at least, have done a fair amount of work - applications for relatively small
loans. There is a form and you are asked to fill it out. If you are married, you
score two points; if you have one or two children, you score one point; if you have
more than three children, you score zero points, and so on. They then add this up,
and if your score comes to a certain number, they give you a loan. This may seem
sensible or not, I suppose, but to me at least this kind of decision is relatively
simpler than the decision on coastal land use. We must learn more about these
more routine types of decision before we automate those that are more difficult.
BELL: Any process, any decision-making body, can be replaced by a machine
if you allow an appeal. If the two of us have a problem, we go to the machine;
the machine says yes or no, and then either one of us is given the right to appeal
to the body that we would have gone to anyway. The greatest number of cases
that the decision body is going to have to consider is the number they usually
have to consider. This brings you to the point of how accurate the yes-no machine
431
is. If it is no better than the toss of a coin, we may tend to appeal anything that
would have gone before the court anyway, and, at the other extreme, if it is very
accurate and if it is known to replicate the board's decision in every instance that
goes to an appeal, the decision body will have many fewer routine matters to
consider. I am assuming the board does not back up the machine out of self-
interest.
BALINSKI: Even if we use the random number generator, I suspect the govern-
ing body or the decision board would still have less work than it has right now.
RIVETT: Maybe the boards are doing that right now.
MEYER: If we did have a random number generator to make decisions, I would
try all sorts of developments that I knew would never pass the board but might just
pass the machine.
BELL: If no one appeals, then you are justified. If you are parking on the high
street day after day after day and nobody appeals, then there is nothing wrong with
doing it.
MEYER: What do you mean, nobody appeals?
BELL: If no one appeals to the police courts about your parking on the high
street, then nobody cares.
MEYER: If we are dealing with condominiums, they are already standing there,
so it is too late to appeal.
EDWARDS: No, we are talking about proposed condominiums.
BELL: Yes, exactly. I go up and say I wish to build a condominium; the ma-
chine says yes, and then a notice is published in the gazette or something.
MEYER: And that's when the process starts.
UTILITY AS A DESCRIPTIVE VERSUS A PRESCRIPTIVE THEORY
From the discussion that took place, it is clear that decision analysis is still at the
stage of providing insight into the decision-making procedure rather than offering
hard recommendations. Some see it ultimately as an automatic means of making
decisions in the absence of the decision maker. If and when this comes about,
should the automatic procedure be descriptive or prescriptive, that is, should it
replicate the decision making of human beings, including human failings, or should
it choose that decision that is rationally and mathematically the best? Some of the
papers presented at this conference seem to give strong evidence that decision
analysis is not as ineffective as the tone of the following discussion would suggest.
ZALAI: I feel that it is urgent to have a discussion on the relevance of the
utility concept as prescriptive or normative versus descriptive. This came up partly
in connection with Tversky's paper (Chapter 9), in which he shows that, regardless
of the utility concept and its axioms, when we try to describe the behavior of the
decision maker or the people, we find it is not consistent with the theory. It is a
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benevolent description theory, which I admit is good for normative purposes to
teach people to try to make rational decisions, to explore the utilities or the good
and bad effects of different decisions.
RAIFFA: For a long time I tried to collect examples of descriptive behavior, of
behavior that would be inconsistent with the utility axioms or with rationality
axioms of the Savage kind. Some people, who did not understand my motivation,
were surprised that I, an advocate of decision analysis, would go around collecting
such examples. My reaction was simple: if descriptive behavior always mirrored
the prescriptive axiomatic structure, there would be no point in building up a pre-
scriptive theory. It is just those places where people's behavior differs markedly
from the rationality axioms that you would like to highlight. Where there is a great
deal of inconsistency, you should ask whether, on deeper reflection, the individuals
want to behave that way. If they do want to behave that way and they can give
reasonable rationalizations, then, as analysts, we should extend the theory to
accommodate this. Now I know myself that when I make decisions I am very often
inconsistent and it is not worth my while to worry about whether I am consistent;
but if it is an important problem and somebody shows me an inconsistency, then
I would want to think more about it. Sometimes I will change my mind, and
sometimes I won't. A good many people think of utility theory as a guide for
prescriptive behavior rather than as a rationalization of descriptive behavior.
RIVETT: I'd like to make a similar suggestion on this topic. I am constantly
worried about the use of utility theory since it has been going on a long time now
and nobody actually seems to take any decisions based on it. We might deduce
from this that people aren't very logical and should improve themselves. I dis-
covered some examples in the United Kingdom where the analysts say, yes, the
decision was taken using utility theory, but when you talk to the manager, he says
that he has never heard of it. I'd like to bring together the normative and the
descriptive theories.
RAIFFA: I know of several examples where people have used utility to guide
actions, but, admittedly, the number of such examples is limited. The theory has
been around for a long, long time, and it is not used very much. I think univariate
utility theory is more of a theoretical concept than an operational one. I suspect
that multivariate utility theory will become much more operational because there
is much more need for analytical help.
RIVETT: I certainly don't use utility theory in many of my own personal
decisions. I'd like to find a situation where a manager, having got his utility func-
tion, is happy to delegate his decision making to other people.
TVERSKY: The issue is whether decision analysis is a good procedure for
helping managers, and in that sense it is good only if it is compared with other
alternatives. With regard to the normative domain even in the certainty situation,
it may still perform much better than unaided intuition. The point I was trying to
make was that utility theory is inadequate because it is too weak. To form a really
powerful normative analysis, you want some more principles that would further
restrict the utility function.
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THE STRENGTH OF APPLICATIONS
A lengthy discussion took place on the last day of the workshop about decision
analysis in practice. Great emphasis was placed by all speakers on facing the realities
of the decision maker-analyst relationship. The analyst must build a bond of trust
between himself and his client and, in particular, must satisfy his client that the
analysis is helping to solve the problem.
Several speakers questioned the philosophy on which decision analysis is based,
if seen from a practical viewpoint, pointing out that a decision maker often takes
actions rather than makes decisions, that often no decision maker exists, and that
expected utility is an inappropriate context in which to make evaluations.
Those participants who had worked closely with decision makers were more
enthusiastic about the applicability of decision analysis, recognizing, however, that
at its present stage of development it is probably more useful as a means of pro-
viding insight than analytical answers.
RAIFF A: Let us now talk about the problems of implementation and the client
relationship.
WIIG: I earn my living from advising clients on one point or another. I probably
cost the client a great deal of money, so that the client has to commit considerable
resources to use my help. As a result the client is very concerned about having his
problem solved, and he is less concerned about allowing me to use my methods
to solve his problems. I find that in many instances I do not know what method I
will finally use in solving the client's problems; unfortunately, I rarely end up
doing decision analysis because the client does not understand the situation that
way, and he is unwilling to commit time to think about it in that particular way.
This means that I am very often at a disadvantage in trying to assist him in making
his decision. As practitioners of decision analysis, we need to have a very large
repertoire that we can draw on and thus instill in the client the necessary trust
in us. It is trust that is most important.
BALINSKI: I don't quite see why a decision maker, the client, should place any
trust in the decision analyst. It seems to me that in the applications I've heard
described here, the most striking thing is the crudity of the attempts to discover
some utility function. All the applications seem based on the notion that the utility
function is there, that it exists, and that it has certain properties. Some of these
properties, I thought, were called into question at the beginning of the conference,
and yet the practitioners seem not to be worried about whether this is a reasonable
model; they merely go out and apply the tools. I feel much more at ease with a
paper like that of Sam Zionts (Wallenius and Zionts, Chapter 3), in the following
specific sense. There is a model in the background that is very complex; a decision
maker cannot encompass this model in his head, so possible solutions are investi-
gated, and the decision maker is given the opportunity of seeing the consequences
of what he thinks his preferences are. This approach gives me the feeling of a very
much greater source of information. David Bell's paper, too, conveyed this notion
434
of feeding back and trying to teach the decision maker about what the preferences
are, thus providing him the basis on which he would ultimately make his decision.
RIVETT: As far as I can see, there is no one here who actually earns his money
taking decisions in anger - working in a company (not advising a company) and
rejoicing in its successes and being saddened by its failures. I look back at the
decision makers I know and ask what they would have got out of this workshop if
they had been here. Would our descriptions of the problems with which they are
faced match up with their own views? I've got the feeling they would probably
say no.
BELL: With reference to Karl Wiig's point about building up the confidence
of the man you are serving, does anyone here, when he has done a decision analysis
or an analytical study, then offer his own assessment of the value of the analysis?
Does it make any sense to say, "Well, I spent a week, but I don't really think it has
been of much value"?
WIIG: To answer briefly, I don't think I've ever delivered an answer that I
wouldn't like to own up to in terms of the analysis.
BELL: You always feel, having done the study, that the recommendation you
make is a valid one?
WIIG: I don't think I am in the business so much of providing recommendations
as of providing insight.
EDWARDS: That's been my experience, too. Moreover, the kind of insight that
I feel I have delivered virtually never takes the form of a solution. Rather, it takes
the form of a way of structuring the problem, a set of dimensions that are relevant,
a way of thinking about what the issues in the aggregation of these dimensions
are. This leads me to another point. There are two myths that seem to me to cloud
this issue. One myth is that there is such a person as the decision maker. A decision-
making organization, yes, but it is very difficult to find a man who will own up to
being the decision maker. Frequently, there will be a man who admits, as Harry
Truman did, that the buck stops here, but if you explore what he really means,
it's usually that it didn't start here. That is to say, by the time something gets to
him, it has already been very carefully studied and worked through, and his func-
tion is basically to work with what is already a higWy developed analysis generated
by a lot of other people. Now, if the decision maker is a myth in this sense, then
the notion of utility is in some similar sense a myth.
NAIR: I do make decisions using these techniques where my money is involved,
and, in addition, I do help clients make decisions. I have found these techniques
extremely useful in terms of looking at alternatives and giving "insight." On the
basis of personal experience, therefore, I'd say that such techniques are useful.
The biggest problem I have found in dealing with clients is problem definition.
They won't tell you their full problems in the beginning. The main difficulty that
we get ourselves into is trying to solve too much of the problem in a first visit.
I found that it was often beneficial to say that we had helped them structure the
problem, and that was all. By doing this we were generating the necessary trust
that would enable us to continue.
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MEYER: Ward says that the existence of decision makers is a myth. I say that
decision itself is another of the many myths. In fact, what happens is that people
take actions, that they present Truman with a number of alternatives that already
have been discussed and rediscussed in the very real political world outside
Truman's office. Truman can say that the buck stops here, but the buck doesn't
stop there at all, because he has to make a choice about whether he is going to give
a deliberate speech on this topic, or hold a press conference, or buttonhole some
congressional leaders. And these are the decisions he really has to make. They are
action decisions, affecting a process that's going on.
LARICHEV: I think it is very interesting to ask what conditions the analyst
works under. The best estimate of the value of his contribution is the practical
implementation of the work, because the motivation of the decision maker is
very different from that of the analyst. If you knew that your recommendation
would be implemented, it would be very difficult to apply mathematical models
to decision making.
FISHBURN: We are all aware that over the past two hundred years, a number
of different ideas have developed about how people actually go about their affairs
and, in addition, about how people ought to do things, and about whether the use
of the words "ought" and "should" is even meaningful. But I think that ideas and
values and beliefs have been handled in a reasonably good way through the use of
the notion of utility, or subjective expected utility.
LUCE: I'd like to make a brief comment on expected utility and the intro-
duction of probability in a highly artificial way in order to force the application
into theory. I think when probabilities are a natural part of the problem, when
there is uncertainty that is naturally there, this may be sensible. But when we
start introducing vague gambling choices between serious alternatives in order
to force this theory, many of us get nervous about it. The decision maker, if he
understands at all what you are proposing to do, is going to think this is a very,
very strange thing you are doing, and wonder why it should bear on his decision
making.
RAIFFA: Well, you have to do it with a great deal of experience and finesse.
You have to do it with the realization that some of the things that you have to
introduce will probably make decision making worse in the short run because
of abuses. I somehow have a feeling - perhaps I'm so biased because my con-
version took many, many years and involved very painful decisions, and I tried
desperately to find some substitute instead - that maximization of expected
utility is going to be around for another 50 years, because there isn't anything
that comes close.
RIVETT: I think the real test of a method is persuading someone to do some-
thing he doesn't like.
RAIFFA: Ralph Keeney and I have a very good example that we both worked
on. The client came in with his mind already made up; he wanted our analysis for
advocacy purposes. We proposed a different solution, and he changed his mind;
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it was very, very painful for him. We had really not intended this outcome when we
began.
When I was a classical statistician and probabilist and worked on classes of prob-
lems in genetics and physics, I couldn't get excited about notions of subjective
probability. However, when I moved over to another class of problems - problems
in medicine and in business where the practical issues were not repetitive and where
you could not use objective probabilities - I saw and felt the need for extending
the theory, for working with subjective probabilities and leaming how to use them.
When I became involved in situations in my work with Richard Meyer and others
where big monetary risks were involved, I struggled for a long time with ideas
other than utility, but I finally convinced myself that utility was important for that
class of problem.
In the middle sixties I started working with a public policy group at Harvard,
and I also spent some time at the Rand Corporation studying their papers and
trying to identify critical analytical issues. I was overwhelmed by the amount of
effort that was involved in structuring models, in looking at the interactions, and
in looking at the probabilistic framework, but when it came to grappling with the
real objectives, so little was done with it. In the public domain, you always face
the problem of conflicting objectives, which must be looked at very seriously.
I think that Koopmans, who spent a year at IIASA, also believes that in economics
the subject matter that is underdeveloped is the systematic analysis of objectives
that should be pursued in the public policy sphere.
I strongly believe that the multiple objectives problem will be with us for a long
time. I also believe that the problem is probably more critical in the socialist
countries than in the nonsocialist countries. Many value trade-offs are made in the
nonsocialist countries by market mechanisms, even though some of these trade-offs
are often done poorly because of imperfections in the market. So many more
decisions must be taken in socialist countries in their attempt to be rational and
systematic. But I don't see how they are going to be able to do that without bal-
ancing trade-offs between economic, mortality, morbidity, ecology, and socio-
political considerations. Somebody has to make these decisions and think hard
about them. From what I've seen in modeling from the socialist side so far I think
my observations are exactly the same as on the nonsocialist side. They do a lot
better in structuring and modeling (including probabilistic analysis) than they do
in analyzing the problem of conflicting, multiple objectives. This imbalance, of
course, exists in nonsocialist countries as well. More, much more, needs to be
done everywhere in the subject matter of this workshop.
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